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State Of Gujarat () v. Vrajlal Hansraj Sanghrajka ().
Judgment Summary — Dave, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent (plaintiff) was serving as a store-keeper at Veraval under the State of Gujarat and, in October 1957, was drawing a dearness allowance of Rs. 108-50 per month. He was suspended from duty from 15th October 1957 following allegations. A charge-sheet was submitted against him in the Court of the learned Special Judge, Junagadh, for offences punishable under secs. 467, 471, 477A of the Indian Penal Code and sec. 5(1)(c) and (d) read with sec. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He was acquitted in all three criminal cases (given the benefit of doubt). A departmental inquiry held on 19th February 1958 resulted in no punishment. He was reinstated on duty from 8th May 1959 by order of the Port Officer.
The period of suspension from 15th October 1957 to 8th May 1959 was treated as if he was on leave and was counted as on duty only for pension purposes, not for other purposes. An order dated 4th March 1960 regularised that period of suspension. The plaintiff contended that this order was arbitrary, illegal, unauthorised and was passed without giving him an opportunity to show cause; he claimed that he was entitled to full salary for the suspension period and sued the State of Gujarat for Rs. 2456.61 (salary and other emoluments for the suspension period).
The State's written statement admitted the factual matrix (suspension and reinstatement) but contended that the impugned order regularising the suspension was lawfully passed, not penal, not contrary to the Bombay Civil Services Rules, not justiciable and that the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation.
The trial Judge (Civil Judge, Senior Division, Junagadh) raised issues and held that the plaintiff failed to prove illegal suspension, was not entitled to full salary including dearness allowance for the suspension period, and that the matter was not justiciable; the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed to the District Court where the learned Assistant Judge held the impugned order to be justiciable, penal in nature, passed in breach of principles of natural justice, and held the claim not time-barred; the Assistant Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiff's suit. The State appealed to the High Court (this Court).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, it was incumbent on the State (the competent authority) to give the employee an opportunity of being heard before passing orders regularising suspension and deciding pay/leave consequences.
- Whether an order passed under rule 152 without hearing the concerned government servant violates the principles of natural justice and is therefore justiciable.
- Whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation (as argued by the State) and whether such limitation bars attack on an order said to be in contravention of natural justice.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent / Plaintiff's Arguments
- The order dated 4th March 1960 regularising the period of suspension was arbitrary, illegal and unauthorised, and was passed without giving him an opportunity to show cause.
- He asserted entitlement to full salary for the entire suspension period and sued for Rs. 2456.61 as salary and emoluments he would have received during suspension.
Appellant / State's Arguments
- The State admitted the suspension and subsequent reinstatement but contended that the impugned order regularising the suspension was lawfully passed and was not penal.
- It argued that rule 152 did not require the presence of the person concerned and that the competent authority could pass necessary orders without hearing him.
- The State submitted that such an order passed without hearing could not be said to be without jurisdiction and that if the employee had no inherent right to be heard, principles of natural justice were not violated; additionally, the claim was time-barred.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vasant Raghunath Gokhale v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 Bombay 137 | Interpreting rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules: that rule-152 proceedings are quasi‑judicial, the competent authority must act judicially and give a reasonable and adequate opportunity to show cause before taking action adverse to a government servant. | The Court relied on and expressly agreed with this authority to hold that rule 152 requires the competent authority to hear the government servant in appropriate cases; applied it to conclude the impugned order (passed without hearing) contravened principles of natural justice and was justiciable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reproduced rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules in full (sub‑rules (1)–(5)), noting that the instant case is governed by clause (3) of the rule (which contemplates that in cases other than full exoneration the competent authority may prescribe a proportion of pay and allowances, and that the period of absence shall not be treated as on duty unless specifically so directed).
Although the rule on its face did not expressly require the presence of the employee before the authority when passing orders, the Court analysed the rule in context and concluded that, in the interest of justice, the person concerned must be heard before an order is passed under rule 152 in cases of the kind before the Court. The Court explained the policy reasons for this conclusion:
- It is necessary to determine whether an acquittal in the criminal court was on merits or merely a result of benefit of doubt; that factual determination can affect whether the employee should receive full pay/allowances or a lesser proportion.
- For accurate calculation of the suspension period and for deciding whether the period is to be treated as duty for various purposes, the employee has a vital interest and therefore must be heard.
- When an order affects vital interests of an employee and requires the authority to apply its mind to facts and material to reach a conclusion, the exercise is quasi‑judicial and demands observance of principles of natural justice (i.e., the right to be heard).
The Court relied on and expressly endorsed the decision in Vasant Raghunath Gokhale v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1963 Bombay 137) which held that rule 152 presupposes judicial action by the competent authority and therefore requires that the government servant be given a reasonable and adequate opportunity to show cause before adverse action is taken. The Court stated its complete agreement with those observations.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court noted that the departmental inquiry had imposed no penalty on the plaintiff—this increased the necessity for the competent officer to hear the plaintiff in order to decide whether he was completely exonerated and to compute suspension period consequences. The impugned order was admittedly passed without hearing the respondent. Therefore, the Court held that the order contravened the principles of natural justice; such an order is justiciable and is not barred by limitation.
Because there was no valid order of the competent authority passed in conformity with rule 152 (given the absence of hearing), the Court directed that the competent authority must now pass appropriate orders under rule 152 after hearing the plaintiff, leaving open the range of outcomes that rule 152 contemplates (including, after hearing, awarding full pay/allowances and treating the period as duty, or prescribing a proportion and not treating it as duty except for specified purposes).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was partly allowed. The Court set aside the decree awarded by the learned Assistant Judge in the amount of Rs. 2456.61. The Court, however, upheld the Assistant Judge's finding that the order passed by the competent authority under rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules was illegal and void because it was made in contravention of the principles of natural justice (having been passed without hearing).
Direct Consequences / Directions:
- The Port Officer, Veraval (the competent authority) is directed to pass appropriate orders under rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules after hearing the plaintiff.
- Because there was no valid order under rule 152, the competent authority must now apply rule 152 afresh and decide (after hearing) whether the period of absence should be treated as duty or what proportion of pay/allowances should be given, as the rule permits.
- The decree previously granted by the lower appellate court for Rs. 2456.61 is set aside; no immediate award of that sum was upheld by the High Court.
- Costs: In view of the facts, the parties were directed to bear their own costs of this appeal.
Broader implications: The Court reaffirmed that orders made under rule 152 affecting pay and duty-status of civil servants are quasi‑judicial in nature in appropriate cases and require the authority to afford a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The Court also clarified that such orders made in breach of natural justice are justiciable and not barred by limitation. The opinion did not purport to lay down any broader new legal doctrine beyond applying and endorsing the existing precedent (Vasant Raghunath Gokhale).
Final Disposition: Appeal partly allowed.
Dave, J.:— The facts giving rise to-this appeal are simple. The present respondent was serving as a store-keeper at Veraval under the State of Gujart and was drawing the salary of Rs. 108-50 as dearness allowance, per month in October, 1957. He was suspended from duty from 15th October, 1957 as a result of certain allegations made against him. A charge sheet was submitted against him by the appellant in the Court of the learned Special Judge, Junagadh for offences punishable under secs. 467, 471, 477A of the Indian Penal Code and sec. 5(1)(c) and (d) read with Sec. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He was, however, given benefit of doubt and acquitted in all the three cases. Some departmental inquiry was also held against him on 19th February, 1958 but no punishment was awarded to him thereunder. Thereafter, he was reinstated on duty from 8th May, 1959 by the order of the Port Officer. The period of suspension from 15th October, 1957 to 8th May, 1959 was treated as if he was on leave. However, that period was counted as on duty only for the purpose of pension and not for other purposes. According to the plaintiff, the said order, dated 4th Marsh, 1960 regularising the period of suspension was arbitrary, illegal, unauthorised and was passed without giving him an opportunity to show cause against the same. According to him, he was entitled to receive full salary for the whole period. He, therefore, filed a suit against the State of Gujarat and prayed for a decree of Rs. 2456.61 paise being the amount of salary and other emoluments which he would have been entitled to receive during the period of suspension. The State by its written statement, Ex. 14, admitted the facts stated in the plaint regarding suspension of the plaintiff and his subsequent reinstatement, as a result of acquittal in those cases. However, it contended that the impugned order regularising the period of suspension was lawfully passed. It stated that it was not penal and was not contrary to the provisions of the Bombay Civil Services Rules; that the said decision of the executive officer was not justiciable and the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation. The learned trial Judge raised several issues at Ex. 16. He held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was illegally suspended from service. In his opinion, he was not entitled to receive full salary including dearness allowance for the suspension period. He, also held that it was not a justiciable case and dismissed the suit. Against the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Junagadh, an appeal was preferred in the District Court; which was heard by the learned Assistant Judge, who held that the impugned order was justiciable and was penal in nature and was passed in breach of principles of natural justice. He also held that the claim was not time barred. He, therefore, allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiff's suit with costs. Against the said judgment and decree, the State has preferred the present appeal to this Court.
2. Mr. G.T Nanavaty who appeared on behalf of the State submitted that the only material question which arose in this appeal is whether it was incumbent on the State to give an opportunity to the plaintiff of being heard before necessary orders were pissed under rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. He urged that rule 152 did not require the presence of the person concerned and it was quite competent to the authority to pass necessary orders. He submitted that it cannot be said that the order was not passed properly and that such an order passed without hearing the person concerned cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. He urged that if the plaintiff had no inherent right of being heard, it would not be proper to say that the principles of natural justice were violated.
3. In order to appreciate the submissions made by Mr. Nanavaty, it will be worthwhile to refer to rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. It says—
“(1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order:—
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty, and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.
(2) Where the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended as the case may be.
(3) In other cases, the. Government servant shall be given such proportion of such pay and allowances as such competent authority may prescribe:
Provided that the payment of allowance under clause (2) or clause (3) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.
(4) In a case falling under clause (2), the period of absence from duty shall be treated as a period on duty for all purposes.
(5) In a case falling under clause (3), the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless such competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose.”
4. The instant case will be governed by clause (3) of this rule. Apparently, the rule does not require the presence of the employee concerned before passing any necessary orders. However, if the rule is scrutinised closely, it will be clear that in the interest of justice, the person concerned must be heard before any order is passed under rule 152. While passing any order, the competent authority will be required to hold as to whether his case will fall under clauses (1), (2) or (3) of the said rule. Sometimes, it may happen that even though the criminal Court on merits may have acquitted the accused and yet the final order may disclose as if benefit of doubt was given to him and he was acquitted. Therefore, in order to decide whether the person concerned was acquitted on merits or whether he was given benefit of doubt, it is essential that the person concerned should be heard by the competent authority. If without giving him an opportunity, any order is passed behind his back, there was every likelihood of injustice being done to him. Even for the purpose of calculation of the actual suspension period, it would be necessary to hear the person concerned. Naturally, he would be vitally interested in any order which may be passed against him. If he is vitally interested in an order, it goes without saying that any order which may be passed would be of a quasi judicial nature. In such a case, if he is not given an opportunity of being heard and if the order is passed behind his back even though the order may not be said to be completely without jurisdiction, it can well be said that the principles of natural justice were violated. I am supported in my view by the case of Vasant Raghunath Gokhale v. The State Of Maharashtra*, AIR 1963, Bombay, 137, wherein the Division bench of the Bombay High Court observed that—
“Rule 152 is one of the rules framed or continued under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution of India and is, therefore, a statutory rule. Rule 152 finds place in Chapter VIII of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. Chapter VIII is headed as “dismissal, removal and suspension”. Apparently, the Chapter deals with determination of the pay and allowances payable to Government servants who are either dismissed or removed from service or who are suspended. Under rule 152, what is required is that the competent authority must act judicially in exercise of its power under the rule. This itself postulates that before any action adverse to the interests of Government servant concerned is taken, he must be given a reasonable and adequate opportunity to show cause against the action to be taken against him. Under rule 152, the decision whether the Government servant concerned is or not fully exonerated or whether the suspension order is justified or unjustified in whole or part, is a matter of serious consequences to the Government servant concerned. The competent authority is required to apply its mind to the facts of each case and all material on record and to come to a definite conclusion as to whether or not it would come to an opinion that the Government servant is fully exonerated or whether the period of his suspension was not wholly justified………………………………………………………………………………………………In the absence of such opportunity being given the competent authority has not exercised its powers under rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules in the manner in which it is required to exercise.”
5. With respect, I am in complete agreement with the observations made by the Bombay High Court. In the instant case, in the departmental inquiry it was not deemed necessary to inflict any penalty on the plaintiff, it was all the more necessary for the competent officer therefore to hear the plaintiff in order to decide whether he was completely exonerated or not and in order to calculate the period for which he was under suspension.
6. Admittedly, the impugned order was passed without hearing the present respondent. The learned Assistant Judge therefore, was right in holding that the said order was passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice. Such an order passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice is justiciable and such an order would not be barred by limitation.
7. ………
8. The result of this declaration is that there is no order of the competent authority under rule 152 of the said Rules. In that case, it will be necessary for the competent authority to pass appropriate orders under the said rule. After hearing the plaintiff, it will be open to the competent authority to pass appropriate orders as laid down under rule 152 of the rules. I, therefore, pass the following order:—
The appeal is partly allowed. The decree of the learned Assistant Judge for Rs. 2456.61 paise is hereby set aside. However, his finding that the order passed by the competent authority under rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, was illegal and void being in contravention of the principles of natural justice is upheld. The Pore Officer, Veraval is directed to pass appropriate orders under rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules after hearing the plaintiff. In view of the facts of this case, parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.
9. Appeal partly allowed.
Bombay Civil Services Rules.Alert