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State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Atmaram

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Nov 24, 1967
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff erected a pan-thela on one side of a road in Balaghat. The Tahsildar, Balaghat, in Revenue Case No. 15/A-68 of 60-61 found that the plaintiff was in unauthorised occupation and, by an order dated 4-1-1961 passed under section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, directed removal of the pan-thela. The plaintiff sued the State of Madhya Pradesh seeking a declaration that the Tahsildar's order was illegal, void and without jurisdiction. The plaintiff's grounds were that he had permission from the Municipal Committee, Balaghat, and that because the road lay within the Municipal Committee limits, the Tahsildar lacked jurisdiction under section 248.

The courts below held that the occupation was wholly unauthorised but concluded that, because the road fell within the limits of the Municipal Committee, the Tahsildar lacked inherent jurisdiction under section 248. On that basis the trial court (3rd Civil Judge, Class II, Balaghat) granted the declaration prayed for by the plaintiff; this judgment was confirmed by the Additional District Judge, Balaghat. The State appealed to the present Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tahsildar had jurisdiction under section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 to summarily eject the plaintiff from the road in Balaghat.
  2. Whether the existence of municipal powers (under the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, particularly sections 38, 93 and 94) over public streets and the Nazul Rules impliedly or expressly excluded the Tahsildar's jurisdiction under section 248.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (State)

  • The State, as appellant, sought to uphold the Tahsildar's order and disputed the lower courts' conclusion that the Tahsildar lacked jurisdiction; the appeal thus challenged the declaration that the Tahsildar's order was invalid.
  • Implicit in the appeal (and in the Court's summary of the issues) was reliance on section 248 of the Land Revenue Code as a statutory source of authority for the Tahsildar to eject unauthorised occupants of unoccupied land set apart for roads.

Respondent (Plaintiff) and Representative Arguments (as reported)

  • The plaintiff contended he was in authorised occupation, having obtained permission from the Municipal Committee, Balaghat.
  • He also contended that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction because the road lay within the Municipal Committee's limits and, accordingly, the Committee alone could take action under the Municipal Act.
  • Counsel for the respondent (Shri Khare) argued that sections 93 and 94 of the Municipalities Act showed that the Committee alone was authorised to remove encroachments on streets; he also contended that section 248 did not on its own terms authorise the Tahsildar to act in the circumstances and that the Nazul Rules either took away or controlled the Tahsildar's power.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Committee, Raigarh v. Ramkaran Ganeshilal, 1958 M P L J 585 = AIR 1958 M.P. 335 Interpretation of the word "vest" in section 38 of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 — that "vest" has limited effect so as to give the municipality the least interest compatible with proper exercise of its powers. The Court relied on this decision to conclude that vesting under section 38 confers a limited interest on the municipality and does not extinguish the ownership rights of the landowner (State) to sue trespassers or take action.
Bashiruddin v. Ramprasad, 1961 M P L J Note 311 (S.A. No. 31 of 1958) Held that a municipality cannot claim general ownership of roads and had no power to lease out any portion for private construction (interpreting municipal ownership rights). The Court cited it to support the view that municipal rights over streets do not amount to complete ownership that would exclude the rights of the landowner to pursue remedies against trespassers.
The Municipal Board, Manglaur v. Mahadeoji Maharaj, 1965 S.C. 1147 Described the legal position of rights in relation to a road: municipality manages and controls the surface and necessary subsurface/supersurface for maintenance, and has certain property rights permitting possessory action, but the owner of the soil generally remains the occupier and can maintain an action for trespass. The Court used this statement of law to conclude that the State, as owner of the soil, retained sufficient interest to take steps (including summary ejection by a revenue officer) against unauthorised occupiers.
Municipal Council, Palia through the Commissioner of Municipal Council, Palia v. T. J. Joseph, AIR 1963 S.C. 1561 Demonstrated that enabling provisions in an earlier Municipal Act and a later statutory scheme (Motor Vehicles Act in that case) may coexist; the later Act will supersede only in case of direct conflict when action is taken under both. The Court applied the principle to hold that sections 93 and 94 of the Municipal Act (enabling) can coexist with section 248 of the Land Revenue Code (also enabling); absence of municipal action meant no conflict arose, and in any event the later Code would prevail if there were a conflict.
Sheikh Mahiruddin v. Collector of Goruckpore, (1870) 4 B. L. R. 36 (P.C.) Authority for the proposition that the area of a village remains a revenue unit (a division of a pargana/tahsil) despite inclusion within municipal limits. The Court relied on this authority to support the concession (and its own conclusion) that Balaghat is a "village" for purposes of the Land Revenue Code and hence the road there could be treated as 'unoccupied land' within a village for section 248 to apply.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of steps closely tied to statutory language and the parties' concessions:

  1. Preliminary factual concessions: the parties agreed that the land of the road is owned by the State, the road is a public street within the Balaghat Municipality, and that the plaintiff's occupation was unauthorised. The sole point argued before the Court was the Tahsildar's jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.
  2. Statutory framework examined: the Court considered provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (notably section 38 and clauses identifying municipal property, and sections 93 and 94 dealing with encroachments) and the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (particularly section 248 and definitional provisions).
  3. Construction of municipal vesting: clause (g) of section 38(1) was noted to vest "public streets" in the Committee but contains the exception "not being open spaces or lands owned by the Government." The Court relied on authority (Municipal Committee, Raigarh) to interpret "vest" as conferring only a limited interest on the municipality necessary for exercise of municipal powers, not full ownership.
  4. Ownership and rights: citing The Municipal Board, Manglaur v. Mahadeoji Maharaj and Bashiruddin v. Ramprasad, the Court explained that while a municipality has exclusive management and control of the street surface (and possessory rights against trespassers), the owner of the soil retains sufficient rights to maintain actions for trespass or to take steps against unauthorised occupation.
  5. Analysis of section 248: the Court set out the text of section 248(1) and identified two conditions for Tahsildar jurisdiction: (i) the subject-matter must be "unoccupied land, abadi, service land or land set apart for any special purpose under section 237", and (ii) the person must be unauthorisedly in possession. The Court noted that the plaintiff's unauthorised possession was admitted, satisfying the second condition.
  6. Application of definitions and deeming provisions: the Court examined the Code's definitions — section 2(k) defining "land", section 2(z-3) defining "unoccupied land", and the definition of "village". It accepted the concession that Balaghat is a "village" for revenue purposes and observed that the road was mentioned in the Nistar Patrak as set apart for road; by the deeming provision in the Second Proviso to section 261 of the 1959 Code, that land must be treated as set apart under section 237. Thus the first condition for section 248 was satisfied: the road constituted "unoccupied land" and land set apart for a special purpose (road).
  7. Interaction between municipal powers and section 248: the Court rejected the argument that municipal sections 93 and 94 impliedly ousted the Tahsildar's power. It held that the mere existence of municipal power to remove encroachments does not divest the landowner (State) of power to remove unauthorised occupants. Because the statutory provisions are enabling and framed affirmatively, they can coexist; if conflict were to arise, the later statute (the Land Revenue Code) would prevail. The Court relied on Municipal Council, Palia v. T. J. Joseph to support the doctrine of continuity and coexistence of enabling statutes and the principle that later statutory provisions supersede earlier ones only in case of actual conflict.
  8. Nazul Rules: the Court noted the contention that Nazul Rules either took away or controlled the Tahsildar's power but observed that the Nazul Rules were conceded not to be statutory. Consequently, non-statutory rules cannot negate or control the positive provisions of a statute like section 248.
  9. Conclusion of reasoning: both textual conditions for the applicability of section 248 were found satisfied; municipal powers did not exclude the Tahsildar's statutory power; and non-statutory rules could not override the statute. Therefore the Tahsildar had jurisdiction to order ejectment under section 248.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The Court held that the Tahsildar had jurisdiction under section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 to order the ejection of the plaintiff. The judgments and decrees passed by the courts below were set aside and the plaintiff-respondent's suit was dismissed with costs throughout.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff's declaration that the Tahsildar's order was illegal was reversed; the plaintiff's suit was dismissed and the prior ejectment order stands as within the Tahsildar's jurisdiction.
  • On statutory interaction: the Court's reasoning confirms that municipal powers to manage streets and the State's revenue powers under section 248 can coexist; where both are enabling provisions, coexistence is permissible and a later statute (the Land Revenue Code) would prevail in case of a direct conflict when both Acts are acted upon.
  • Broader precedent: the opinion applies existing authorities to the facts and does not announce a novel general principle beyond the application of those authorities. The opinion itself does not claim to set a new rule beyond its fact-specific holdings.
Show all summary ...

This second appeal arises on the following facts.

2. The plaintiff erected a Pan-thela on one side of a road in Balaghat. This led to Revenue Case No. 15/A-68 of 60-61, in which the Tahsildar, Balaghat, found that the plaintiff was in unauthorised occupation and ordered him to remove the Pan-thela. This order, which is dated 4-1-1961, was passed under section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The plaintiff then filed the present suit against the State of Madhya Pradesh for a declaration that the order of the Tahsildar is illegal, void and without jurisdiction and cannot be executed against him. The grounds on which this relief is claimed by him are that he was in authorised occupation having obtained permission from the Municipal Committee, Balaghat, and that, in any case, as the road is within the limits of the Municipal Committee, the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to take any action under section 248 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959. The Courts below have held that the plaintiff's occupation of the road is wholly unauthorised but they have further held that as the road is within the limits of the Municipal Committee, Balaghat, the Tahsildar lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass any order under section 248 of the Code. The plaintiff, on this finding, obtained the declaration as prayed by him from 3rd Civil Judge, Class II, Balaghat, which was confirmed in appeal by the Additional District Judge, Balaghat. The State now appeals to this Court.

3. The only point argued before me is about the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar in passing the order impugned in the suit.

4 The learned counsel appearing for the parties are agreed that the land of the road is owned by the State, and that the road is in the nature of a public street within the area of the Balaghat Municipality. It is also now agreed that the plaintiff is and has always been in unauthorised occupation.

5. The question under consideration depends upon the construction of certain provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, which was in force at the time when the Tahsildar passed the order, and the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code of 19159.

6. My attention is first drawn to section 38 of the Municipalities Act. The section declares that the property of the nature specified in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1), if situated within the limits of the Municipality “shall vest in and be under the control of the Committee". One class of property is specified by clause (g) which is as under:-

“(g) all public streets, not being open spaces or lands owned (by the Crown), and the pavements, stones and other materials thereof, and also all trees, erections, implements and things provided for such streets."

[N. B.-In view of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, the word Government' has to be read in place of the word 'Grown'.]

Then reference is made to sections 93 and 94, which prohibit encroachments (immovable or movable) upon streets without the written permission of the Committee and authorise the Committee to take action for their removal. After reference to these sections, it is contended by Shri Khare, the learned counsel for the respondent, that the scheme of these sections is to vest all public streets in the Committee and authorise the Committee alone to take action for removal of encroachments upon streets.

7. Clause 'g' of section 38 (1) of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act no doubt has the effect of vesting all public streets in the Committee, but this provision, which I have already quoted, contains an exception within its language in the words "not being open spaces or lands owned by the Government". Thus, if the land, over which the road or street exists, is owned by the State Government, this provision has not the effect of vesting the road or street in the Municipal Committee. But assuming that even such a street vests, the effect of the provision is not to vest the ownership in the Committee. The words "shall vest in and be under the control of the Committee" as they find place in section 38 (1), were construed in Municipal Committee, Raigarh v. Ramkaran Ganeshilal., 1958 M P L J 585=A I R 1958 M.P. 335. where a Division Bench of the High Court (Naik and Chaturvedi JJ.) observed as follows:

“From the cases, referred to above, and all the discussion therein it will be clear that the word "vest" in section 38 of the Central Provinces and Beiar Municipalities Act, 1922, has only a limited effect. So far as public sewers, drains, public streets and roads etc. within the area of the Municipality, are concerned, the vesting section (section 38) must be so construed as to give the Municipality the least interest in the property that is compatible with the proper exercise of the powers in relation to these things given to the Municipality under the Act."

Similar view was taken in Bashiruddin v. Ramprasad., 1961 M P L J Note 311 (S.A. No. 31 of 1958 decided on the 15th March 1961). where S. B. Sen J., in interpreting section 48 of the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1954, held that the Municipality cannot claim general ownership of roads and has no power to lease out any portion of it for construction of Goomtis. The law regarding the rights of the public, municipality and owner inter se in relation to a road or highway has been reviewed by their Lordships in The Municipal Board, Manglaur v. Mahadeoji Maharaj . 1965 S.C.1147, at Page 1149, Para 9. and the. legal position has been stated as under:-

"xx xx xx xx xx, but the Municipality does not own the soil. It has the exclusive right to manage and control the surface of the soil and "so much of the soil below and of the space above the surface as is necessary to enable it to adequately maintain the street as a street". It has also a certain property in the soil of the street which would enable it as owner to bring a possessory action against trespassers. Subject to the rights of the Municipality and the public to pass and repass on the highway, the owner of the soil in general remains the occupier of it and, therefore, he can maintain an action for trespass against any member of the public who acts in excess of his rights."

8. From a consideration of these cases, it is clear, that if the road or street vests in the Municipal Committee, the Committee can manage it and can also bring possessory action against trespassers but the owner of the soil also retains sufficient interest to "maintain an action for trespass against any member of the public who acts in excess of his rights".

9. The occupation of the road in the present case by the plaintiff has been found to be wholly unauthorised and therefore the State, as owner of the soil, could take proper steps for removal of this unauthorised occupation notwithstanding that the Committee could also act under sections 38 and 39 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act for the same purpose.

10. Next, it is argued by Shri Khare that section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, did not on its own terms authorise the Tahsildar to take action against the plaintiff even though he was in unauthorised occupation.

11. Section 248 (1) of the Code reads as under:-

"248(1).-Any person who unauthorisedly takes or remains in possession of any unoccupied land, abadi, service land or any land which has been set apart for any special purpose under section 237, may be summarily ejected by order of the Tahsildar and any crop which may be standing on the land and any building or other work which he may have constructed thereon, if not removed by him within such time as the Tahsildar may fix, shall be liable to forfeiture. Any property so forfeited shall be disposed of as the Tahsildar may direct and the cost of removal of any crop, building or other work and of all works necessary to restore the land to its original condition shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue from him. Such person shall also be liable at the discretion of the Tahsildar to pay the rent of the land for the period of unauthorised occupation at twice the rate admissible for such land in the locality and to a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. The Tahsildar may apply the whole or any part of the fine to compensate persons, who may, in his opinion, have suffered loss or injury from the encroachment.”

12. The section as quoted above shows that the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to summarily eject a person is dependent on the following conditions:

(i) the subject-matter in respect of which proceedings are taken is “unoccupied land, abadi, service land or any land which is set apart for any special purpose under section 237";

(ii) the person against whom proceedings are taken is one who has unauthorisedly taken or is unauthorisedly remaining in possession.

13. As stated earlier, it is now admitted before me, that the plaintiff has been throughout in unauthorised possession hence the second condition for operation of section 248 is satisfied. But, it is further to be seen whether the first condition is also satisfied. Section 2 (K) of the Code defines 'Land' to mean 'any portion of the Earth's surface' and is deemed to include 'all things attached to or permanently fastened to anything attached to such land'. Section 2(Z-3) defines 'unoccupied land' to mean 'land in a village other than the abadi or service lands or the land field by a Bhumiswami, a tenant or a Government lessee.' Definition of 'village' which finds place in section 2 (Z-5) need not be quoted for it has been conceded before me that Balaghat, where the road in dispute is situated, is a village according to this definition and continues to be so, although its area is included within the Balaghat Municipality. This concession is correct for the idea of an Indian village is that it represents a division of a Pargana (tahsil) and is demarcated as such in a revenue survey. [See Sheikh £ahiruddin v. Collector of Goruckpore., (1870) 4B. L. R. 36 (P.C) at Pages 48, 49. The area of a village continues to be a revenue unit in spite of its inclusion within the limits of a Municipality, for, there is nothing in the Municipal Act which destroys the identity of a village if its area is declared to be or is included within a Municipality. From the foregoing provisions, it is clear, that the road in dispute is land' in a village and not being abadi or service land or land held by a Bhumiswami, a tenant or a Government lessee, is 'unoccupied land' as defined in the Code. Further, this land was mentioned in Nistar Patrak (Ex. D-3) prepared under the Land Revenue Code of 1954 as set apart for road and by the deeming provision contained in the Second Proviso to section 261 of the Land Revenue Code of 1959, must be deemed to have been set apart for road under section 237 of this code. Thus the road in dispute is 'unoccupied land' and also 'land which has been set apart for any special purpose (which includes road) under section 237' within the meaning of these expressions as they occur in section 248. In this view of the matter, the first condition for the applicability of section 248 is also satined. The Land Revenue Code of 1959 in which section 248 finds place applies to the whole of the State and no exception is made for areas included within Municipalities. I, therefore, find that both the conditions for applicability of section 248, which I have mentioned above, were satisfied and the Tahsildar had jurisdiction to eject the plaintiff under this provision.

14. The learned counsel, Shri Khare, then again reverts to sections 93 and 94 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, which confer power on the Municipal Committee for removal of encroachments from public streets and argues that it should be held that such a power is impliedly outside the provisions of section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959.

15. I have already shown that mere existence of a power in a Municipality to eject trespassers from public streets does not takeaway the power of the owner of land over which the street exists to sue in trespass against any member of the public who acts in excess of his rights. The Tahsildar, when he acts under section 248 of the Land Revenue Code, to eject persons in unauthorised occupation, in effect, acts on behalf of the State and it cannot be said that sections 93 and 94 of the Municipal Act impliedly negative such a power. These sections of the Municipal Act, 1922 and section 248 of the Land Revenue Code are all enabling provisions and the language used is affirmative; therefore, they can stand together without any conflict. In Municipal Council, Palia through the Commissioner of Municipal Council, Palia v. T. J. Joseph., A I R 1963 S.C. 1561. it has been held by the Supreme Court that a provision in a Municipal Act authorising the Municipal Committee to provide for bus stands did not conflict with a later Motor Vehicles Act which authorised the State Government to do the same The reasoning at p. 1566 (Para. 17) of the report is that the provisions in the later Act are to be read "in continuity ', with the provisions in the earlier Act and the two sets of provisions can coexist -"because both are enabling ones"-a conflict can arise only when action is taken under both the Acts and, in such a case, action taken under the later Act, will supersede action taken under the earlier Act. Similar reasoning applies to sustain both sets of provisions under consideration in the present case, i. e. sections 93 and 94 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 and section 248 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. No action was taken by the Municipal Committee under the Municipalities Act and, therefore, there was no question of conflict when the Tahsildar took action under section 248 of the Land Revenue Code. Moreover, the Code is a later Act and in case of conflict would prevail over the earlier Municipalities Act.

16. Lastly, it is contended that the power of the Tahsildar under section 248 of the Code is either taken away or controlled by the Nazul Rules. (5) AIR 1963 S.C. 1561. It was, however, conceded that the Nazul Rules are not statutory, and, if that is so, the positive provisions of a statutory enactment like section 248 of the Code cannot be negatived or controlled by such rules.

17, I hold, that the Tahsildar had jurisdiction to order ejectment of the plaintiff under section 248 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, and the Courts below have erred in law in declaring that order as invalid and void.

18. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiff-respondent's suit is dismissed with costs throughout.

Appeal allowed.