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Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd. v. Mst. Chhotibai And Others
Case Summary — Opinion by Shiv Dayal J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arose from a judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, which had awarded Rs. 9,000 as damages to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are the widow (Mst. Chhotibai) and five daughters (respondents 2 to 6) of the deceased, Laxmiprasad. The deceased had been employed as a Line Mazdoor in the Datla West Colliery run by the appellant company and was suffering from acute anaemia. He was admitted to the Barkuhi hospital, managed by the appellant-company, and died on or about June 2, 1962 in suspicious circumstances. A post-mortem and the evidence in the trial indicated death by poisoning. The trial Court found negligence by hospital staff (specifically an employee named Waghmare) caused the death and awarded Rs. 9,000 to the heirs.
The suit was instituted on August 27, 1963. The appellant appealed the trial Court's decision and the plaintiffs filed cross-objections seeking enhancement of damages. On appeal the appellant raised, among other contentions, a limitation defence. The appellate court (opinion authored by Shiv Dayal J.) dismissed both the appeal and the cross-objections, confirmed the award of Rs. 9,000, directed the appellant to pay costs of the appeal, and provided for recovery of court-fee on the cross-objection under the provisions cited from the Code of Civil Procedure.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 21 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and whether section 7 (and section 6) of the Limitation Act extended the period because some plaintiffs (daughters) were minors.
- Whether the plaintiffs could claim the benefit of section 7 of the Limitation Act despite the appellant's contention that, under section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act (as cited in the opinion—the text refers to both "1955" and "1855" in different paragraphs), Mst. Chhotibai alone could bring the sole permissible action.
- Whether the appellant-company (which managed the hospital) was liable for negligence of its staff, distinguishing between professional duties and ministerial/administrative duties.
- Whether the quantum of damages (Rs. 9,000 awarded by the trial Court) was excessive and required revision on appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The suit was time-barred because it was instituted more than one year after the death (death: June 2, 1962; suit: August 27, 1963); Article 21 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies.
- Section 7 of the Limitation Act did not apply because, relying on section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act (as cited), only one action is permissible and that suit could be brought by Mst. Chhotibai alone; therefore the minors could not claim an extension of limitation. Reliance was placed on Johnson v. The Madras Railway Company, ILR 28 Mad. 479.
- The appellant-company was not liable for negligence of hospital staff beyond the duty to employ competent staff; reliance placed on Charlesworth on Negligence and the decision in Hilljer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital (1909) 2 KB 820 (argument that hospital authority is not liable for negligent acts of professional staff where competence is not questioned).
- The damages awarded were excessive; specifically, contesting the trial Court's assumptions about the deceased's spare income and expenditure and arguing the deceased would have spent more on himself than allowed by the trial Court's calculation.
Plaintiffs' Arguments / Case at Trial
- The death of Laxmiprasad resulted from negligence of the Barkuhi hospital authorities and their staff. Witnesses (Garib Khan P.W.1 and Ramtahal P.W.2) testified that medicine was administered on the morning of June 2, 1962 by an employee (Waghmare), after which Laxmiprasad and others experienced tingling and burning symptoms; some patients died.
- Medical evidence: Dr. Grewal (Chief Medical Officer) admitted symptoms disclosed death by poisoning; the autopsy by Dr. K. P. Sengupta found death due to ingestion of toxic material/poisoning.
- The suggestion that poisoning was due to tea taken in the morning was rejected by the trial Judge as baseless.
- On quantum, plaintiffs (by cross-objection) challenged the trial Court's estimate of the deceased's life expectancy (trial had used age to 45); they sought enhancement on the basis that he could have lived longer than the trial Court assumed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Johnson v. The Madras Railway Company, I L R 28 Mad. 479 | Relied upon by appellant's counsel in support of the contention that section 7 of the Limitation Act should not apply where only one suit is permissible. | The court noted the appellant relied on this authority but rejected the appellant's contention; the opinion does not adopt Johnson as controlling for the facts of this case. |
| Hilljer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, (1909) 2 K B 820 | Passage relied on by appellant suggesting that hospital authority is not necessarily liable for negligent acts of professional staff (distinction drawn between professional duty and administrative/ministerial duty). | The court found the quoted passage not apposite; it distinguished professional duties from ministerial/administrative duties and held that negligence in ministerial duties (as in this case) can render the hospital authority liable. |
| Lindsey C. C v. Marshall, (1937) A C 97 | Authority cited (per Lord Sankey) on the subject of hospital/authority responsibility for ministerial/administrative performance. | The court invoked Lord Sankey's observations as applicable and supportive of holding hospital authorities responsible for due performance of ministerial duties by servants. |
| Dr. Laxman Balkrishna Joshi v. Dr. Trimbak Bapu Godbole, A I R 1961 S C 128 | Defines the duties of a medical practitioner to a patient — duty of care in deciding to undertake a case, in deciding treatment, and in administration of treatment; breach gives right of action for negligence. | The court relied on and cited this Supreme Court decision to support the proposition that medical practitioners and hospital authorities can be held liable for negligent acts and that the trial Court and High Court in that case were correct in finding negligence; this authority reinforced the court's conclusion of liability in the present matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in structured stages, reflecting the discrete issues raised on appeal:
-
Limitation — The court acknowledged the suit was instituted after one year from the date of death. However, it examined section 7 of the Limitation Act (a proviso to section 6) which extends limitation where one of several persons jointly entitled to sue is under a disability. The court reproduced the two parts of section 7 and analysed their operation:
- The section applies when there are "several persons jointly entitled" to sue (i.e., the procedural right to sue is joint because the cause of action is common).
- The critical question is whether a claimant who is not under disability can give a "discharge" without the concurrence of those under disability. If yes, time runs against all; if not, the second part applies and time is not run against any until disability ceases.
- The court explained "discharge" is a release from liability and must be one that a joint claimant can give in his own right; an incidental power as guardian is insufficient for section 7 purposes.
-
Liability of the Hospital (Appellant-Company) — The appellant contended it was not liable for negligence of its staff beyond employing competent staff, citing Charlesworth and Hilljer. The court examined Hilljer's distinction between professional duties and administrative/ministerial duties. It observed:
- The Hilljer passage relied upon was not directly apposite; Hilljer itself recognised that hospital authorities may be responsible for ministerial or administrative duties (eg. nursing attendances, summoning medical aid, supply of proper food).
- The negligence in the present case was attributable to Waghmare, whose conduct was ministerial rather than a surgeon's professional act. The court therefore considered the hospital liable for performance of ministerial duties.
- The court also cited Charlesworth's later statement that the law holds hospitals liable for negligence of staff whether nurses or doctors and relied on Lindsey C.C. v. Marshall and the pronouncements in Dr. Laxman Joshi v. Dr. Godbole to support the duty of care and liability in medical contexts.
-
Quantum of Damages — The court reviewed the trial Court's method and figures:
- Deceased's age at death: 30 years; monthly earnings Rs. 68-79 (i.e., Rs. 68 and 79 paise as described in the text).
- The trial Court had assessed life expectancy to 45 years (i.e., 15 more years) and computed total potential earning for 15 years as Rs. 12,382-20 paise, deducted Rs. 2,382-20 paise as personal expenses, and arrived at an estimated loss of Rs. 10,000, awarding a lump sum of Rs. 9,000.
- The appellant argued the deceased would have spent more on himself; the appellate court observed the deceased would have spent at least Rs. 38-79 paise and thus could spare not more than Rs. 30 per month for dependents (as an alternative estimate).
- Plaintiffs' cross-objection contested the trial Court's life-expectancy assumption; the appellate court accepted that the deceased could have lived at least 25 years more and recomputed loss as Rs. 25 x 30 x 12 = Rs. 9,000, which coincidentally equalled the trial Court's award.
- Costs and Court-fees — The court ordered the appellant to pay all costs of the appeal. Because the plaintiffs were permitted to file cross-objections as paupers, the court directed that court-fee due on the cross-objection (Rs. 553-30 paise) be recovered from them by virtue of the provisions of Order 44, Rule 1 read with Order 33, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as cited in the opinion).
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Appeal and cross-objections dismissed.
The appellate court held that:
- The suit was within time: section 7 of the Limitation Act applied to extend the period because some of the plaintiffs (the daughters) were minors and, given their status as tenants-in-common, a non-disabled co-heir could not give a discharge binding on them.
- The appellant-company (hospital manager) was liable for negligence of its staff in respect of ministerial or administrative duties; the death of Laxmiprasad was held to be due to such negligence.
- The trial Court's award of Rs. 9,000 was confirmed after recalculation on an accepted longer expectancy for the deceased; no enhancement was made.
- The appellant was directed to pay the costs of the appeal; the court-fee on the plaintiffs' cross-objection (permitted as paupers) was to be recovered in the manner indicated.
Implications: The decision applies settled principles concerning (i) extension of limitation under section 7 where co-claimants are under disability and cannot be discharged by a non-disabled co-claimant, and (ii) hospital liability for negligence in ministerial/administrative duties by staff. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities to the facts of this case.
Disposition: Appeal and cross-objections dismissed; Rs. 9,000 award confirmed; appellant to pay costs; court-fee of Rs. 553-30 recoverable from plaintiffs as ordered.
SHIV DAYAL J.-This appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, awarding Rs. 9,000/- as damages to the plaintiffs. Gross objections have been filed by the plaintiffs for enhancing the amount of damages.
2. Respondent No. 1, Mst. Chhotibai, is the widow, and respondents 2 to 6 are the daughters, of deceased Laxmiprasad, who was employed as Line Mazdoor in the Datla West Colliery belonging to the appellant-Company. He was suffering from acute anaemia. He was admitted to the Barkuhi hospital which is managed by the appellant Company. He died on or about June 2, 1962 in suspicious circumstances. The post-mortem examination revealed that he died of poisoning. Dr. Grewal (respondent No. 7) is the Chief Medical Officer of that hospital.
3. The plaintiffs' case was that Laxmiprasad died due to utter negligence of the Barkuhi hospital authorities. Garib Khan (P. W. 1) who was an indoor patient in the hospital stated that on the morning of June 2, 1962, Waghmare, an employee of the hospital, administered some medicines to some patients after taking which Laxmiprasad died. He and Premchand felt tingling sensation in hands and feet. Ramtahal also complained some sensation in hands and feet and had burning in the throat. Premchand fell from his cot and died. Laxmiprasad also died. Ramtahal (P. W. 2) corroborated him. Dr. Grewal admitted that symptoms disclosed that the death of Laxmiprasad was due to poisoning. An autopsy was performed by Dr. K. P. Sengupta who found that death was due to ingestion of toxic material and poisoning. There was a faint suggestion from the appellant that since Laxmiprasad had taken tea in the morning, there was some possibility that poisoning was due to it. But this was rightly rejected by the learned trial Judge as baseless.
4. The trial Court found that death of Laxmiprasad was due to negligence of the hospital staff. It awarded Rs. 9000/- as damages to his heirs.
5. It is first contended for the appellant that the suit was barred by time as it was instituted on August 27, 1963 while the death of Laxmiprasad occurred on June 2, 1962. Article 21 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies. This objection was not taken in the written statement nor in the memorandum of appeal in this Court. However, it being a question of-law, we permitted the appellant to raise that question inspite of the respondents' opposition.
6. It is true that the suit was instituted after the expiry of one year from the date of Laxmiprasad's death, but on the date of the suit, all the five daughters of the deceased were minors, being between 6 to 17 years. Thus section 7 of the Limitation Act is attracted.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that section 7 has no application inasmuch Smt. Chhotibai (respondent No. 1) could alone bring the suit on behalf of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Reliance is placed on section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1955, which reads thus:
"Provided always that not more than one action or suit shall be brought for, and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint."
The argument is that since only one suit is permissible and such a suit could be brought by Mst. Chhotibai, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefit of extension of time under section 7 of the Limitation Act. Shri Sen relied on Johnson v. The Madras Railway Company, I L R 28 Mad. 479. In our opinion, this contention is not tenable. The main section 7 of the Limitation Act has two parts. We will reproduce them separately as follows:-
"Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and
(a) a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but,
(b) Where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased."
Clearly enough, section 7 is a proviso to section 6. It extends the period of limitation prescribed in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act on the ground of disability of one or more of several persons who are jointly entitled to sue, (or apply for execution). The first requisite of the section, therefore, is that there must be more than one person who are 'jointly entitled' to institute the suit, which expression refers to cases in which the cause of action is common to them. In other words it applies when the procedural right to sue is joint, irrespective of whether the substantive right is or is not joint.
8. Now, it is the requirement of section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 that only one suit can be brought although the legal representatives of the deceased may have distinct interest. Thus, in the present case, on the death of Laxmiprasad, the plaintiffs-respondents, who are his heirs, have different and distinct interests. They are tenants-in-common, not joint tenants.
9. Once it is found that section 7 of the Limitation Act applies to a suit because one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit is under any such disability as is described in section 6 of the Limitation Act, the next and significant question to be asked is whether one of such persons, who is not under a disability can give a discharge without the concurrence of the person or persons under disability. If the answer is in the affirmative, the first part of section 7 will apply; but, if the answer is in the negative, the second part of that section will apply. In other words, under this section, limitation is either extended with reference to the entire body of persons jointly entitled to sue, or limitation is not extended at all. Limitation is not extended merely with reference to persons under disability. For the purposes of this section all swim together; either they cross through together, or sink together. If a discharge can be given by a claimant, who is free from disability without the concurrence of those who are under disability, then time runs against all of them, and limitation is not extended with reference to any of the joint claimants. On the other hand, if such discharge cannot be given, the second part of the section comes into play and limitation will be extended with reference to all the joint claimants.
10. The question whether a claimant, who is free from disability, can or cannot give a discharge without the Concurrence of those who are under disability depends upon the substantive law applicable to the case. One of several co-heirs, who are in the position of tenants-in-common, cannot, generally speaking, give such discharge. The reason is plain enough. In the case of tenants-in-common, the interest of each one of them is separate and distinct. Therefore, one person can give discharge in respect of his own right, but he cannot give discharge in respect of the right of any other. The case of joint tenants may be different. For instance, in the case of Mitakshara Hindu joint family, the manager may be entitled to give discharge in respect of a claim on behalf of the entire family. The word 'discharge' when used with reference to a legal obligation means a release from such obligation......The power must be to release a person from liability.
11. It is equally clear that the discharge contemplated by section 7 of the Act is one which can be given by adjoint claimant in his own right as such joint claimant. The power, therefore, which a joint claimant has, as a guardian of another claimant, to give a discharge on the latter's behalf is not sufficient for the purposes of this section.
12. Section 7 of the Act makes a clear distinction between a joint substantive right of the parties and a joint right to sue. There may be three kinds of cases :
(i) Where there is a joint substantive right based on the substantive law, but the right to sue is not joint.
(ii) Where the substantive right is joint and the right to sue is also joint ; and
(iii) Where the substantive right is not joint but the right to sue is joint.
In the first case, section 7 will have no application because of its opening words. In the second case, the first part of section 7 may apply. In the third case, it is the second part of section 7 which will apply. Judged by these propositions in the present case, since the plaintiffs-respondents, who are co-heirs, as tenants-in-common, having distinct shares, and since Mst. Chhotibai could not under the Hindu Law give a discharge in her own right in respect of the rights of her daughters, the third proposition applies so that the second part of section 7 comes into play. Therefore, limitation was extended in favour of the entire body of the plaintiffs who had a joint right to sue. It must, therefore, be held that the suit was within limitation.
13. It is next contended before us that the appellant Company who runs and manages the hospital is not liable for negligence of the staff. All that the appellant Company could do was to employ competent hospital staff. Reliance is placed on Charlesworth on Negligence, third edition, paragraph 768, and the decision in Hilljer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, (1909) 2 K B 820, where Kennedy L. J. said :
"I see no ground for holding it to be a right legal inference from the circumstances of the relation of hospital and patient that the hospital authority makes itself liable to damages if members of its professional staff, of whose competence there is no question, act negligently towards the patient in some matter of professional care or skill, or neglect to use, or use negligently, in his treatment the apparatus or appliances which are at their disposal"(Page 829.)
14. It is clear to us that the above passage from the judgment of Lord Kennedy, L. J. is not apposite to the present case. A distinction was drawn by the Lord Justice between professional duty and administrative or ministerial duty. In the same case, the Lord Justice observed as follows :
''It may well be, and for my part I should, as at present advised, be prepared to hold, that the hospital authority is legally responsible to the patients for the due performance of their servants within the hospital of their purely ministerial or administrative duties, such as, for example, attendances of nurses in the wards, the summoning of medical aid in cases of emergency, the supply of proper food, and the like."
See also per Lord Sankey in Lindsey C. C v. Marshall, (1937) A C 97, 114. The latter observations apply to the present case. It was negligence of Waghmare which caused the death of Laxmiprasad, and not of the surgeon. The negligence was in performance of a purely ministerial duty. That is sufficient for the present case, although, as stated in the following paragraph (771) in Charlesworths's treatise:
"The distinction drawn by Kennedy L. J. between professional duties and ministerial or administrative duties has been disapproved, and the law now is that hospitals are liable for the negligence of the members of the hospital staff whether they are nurses or doctors."
15. This matter has been considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dr. Laxman Balkrishna Joshi v. Dr. Trimbak Bapu Godbole, A I R 1961 S C 128, who have laid down thus:
"The duties which a, doctor owes to his patient are clear. A person who holds himself out ready to give medical advice and treatment impliedly undertakes that he is possessed of skill and knowledge for the purpose. Such a person when consulted by a patient owes him certain duties, viz., a duty of care in deciding whether to undertake the ease, a duty of care in deciding what treatment to give or a duty of care in the administration of that treatment. A breach of any of those duties gives a right of action for negligence to the patient. The practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge and must exercise a reasonable degree of care. Neither the very highest nor a very low degree of care and competence judged in the light of the particular circumstances of each ease is what the law requires: (of. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. 26, p 17). The doctor no doubt has a discretion in choosing treatment which he proposes to give to the patient and such discretion is relatively ampler in cases of emergency................. In our view, there is no reason to think that the High Court was wrong in its conclusion that death was due to shock resulting from reduction of the fracture attempted by the appellant without taking the elementary caution of giving an aesthetic to the patient. The trial Court and the High Court were, therefore, right in holding that the appellant was guilty of negligence and wrongful acts towards the patient and was liable for damages."
The second contention must also be rejected.
16. It is then contended that the quantum of damages awarded by the trial Court is excessive. The age of the deceased at the time of his death was 30 years. He was drawing Rs. 68-79 paise per month. The trial Court assessed the expectation of the life of the deceased at 45 years, so that the loss of earning was for 15 years. The deceased would have earned Rs. 68-79 x 12 x 15= 12,382-20 paise. Out of this amount, the deceased would have spent atleast Rs. 2,382-20 paise during the above period. Thus the loss of earning was estimated at Rs 10,000 out of which a lump sum amount of Rs. 9,000 was awarded, as the plaintiffs could deposit that amount and earn Rs. 1,000 by way of interest. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the deceased would have spent on himself much more than was estimated by the trial Court. We are of opinion that he would have spent atleast Rs. 38-79 paise for himself so that for his heirs he could spare not more than Rs. 30 per month.
17. Cross-objections have been fried by the plaintiffs. They challenge the assessment of the trial Court that the deceased could have lived only upto the age of 45 years. We accept this contention and it would be only fair to estimate that he would have lived for atleast 25 years more. A fresh calculation on this basis would be as follows. Rs. 25 x 30 x 12 = Rs. 9,000.
18. In the result, we have reached the same figure which was allowed by the trial Court. Therefore, the appeal and the cross objections are both dismissed. The appellant shall pay to the plaintiffs-respondents all costs of this appeal. Since the plaintiffs-respondents were allowed to file the cross-objections as paupers, court-fee due on the cross-objection, that is Rs. 553-30 p. would be recovered from them by virtue of the provisions of Order 44, rule 1, read with Order 33, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Appeal and cross-objections dismissed.
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