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Todarmal v. Chironjilal

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jan 2, 1956
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Factual and Procedural Background

These applications arise under Article 133 of the Constitution of India and section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking leave to appeal from decisions in two Civil First Appeals Nos. 4 and 5 of 1951. Both appeals were heard together but decided by separate judgments. In Civil First Appeal No. 4 of 1951, plaintiffs Todarmal and Shifarishmal sued defendants Chironjilal and Ramjidas for Rs. 5,225-8-0 based on an acknowledgment and account adjustment. The defendants contended that their liability was superseded by a novated contract evidenced by four documents. The trial court held the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable due to novation and dismissed it, a decision affirmed on appeal.

In Civil First Appeal No. 5 of 1951, plaintiffs Madholal and Basantilal sued the same defendants for Rs. 7,211-10-6 on a similar basis. During the suit, they amended the plaint to alternatively rely on the novated agreement and added other creditors as defendants. The trial court allowed the amendment and granted a reduced money decree based on the novated agreement. On appeal, the court held that the original liability was extinguished by the novated contract, the money decree was unwarranted, and the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by limitation for specific performance. The appeal court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. Both suits involved a composition agreement between defendants and creditors, including the plaintiffs, supported by consideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the liability of defendants under the original acknowledgment was extinguished by the novated contract embodied in the documents.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs’ amended suit constituted a suit for specific performance of the novated agreement.
  3. If so, whether such suit was barred by limitation.
  4. Whether leave to appeal to the Supreme Court should be granted under Article 133 of the Constitution, considering pecuniary thresholds and the nature of the claims.
  5. Whether multiple suits and appeals could be consolidated for pecuniary valuation for the purpose of leave to appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments (Madholal and Basantilal)

  • The amount in dispute in Civil First Appeal No. 5 was below Rs. 20,000 but the case fell under clause (b) of Article 133(1) as it involved a claim or question respecting property of value Rs. 20,000 or upwards when combined with another pending suit.
  • The appeals from both suits should be consolidated for pecuniary valuation, which would exceed Rs. 10,000 necessary for appeals arising from suits instituted before the Constitution came into force.
  • The case was fit for appeal to the Supreme Court given the legal questions involved.

Court's Response to Arguments

  • The court rejected the application of clause (b) of Article 133(1) since the suit was for money and did not involve any claim or question respecting property in the judgment appealed against.
  • There was no affidavit supporting the nature and value of the claim in the pending suit relied upon for the combined valuation argument.
  • Order 45 Rule 4 prohibits consolidation of suits decided by separate judgments; the suits and appeals were distinct and separately decided.
  • The legal questions raised were primarily factual and did not constitute substantial questions of law or questions of considerable importance warranting Supreme Court certification.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ratha Krishna Ayyar vs. Sunderfwcmy Iyer (922 P.C. 257) Interpretation of clause (b) of Article 133(1) regarding claims or questions respecting property. The court did not accept the applicability of clause (b) in the present case, distinguishing the precedent on the basis that the suit was for money, not property.
Chinnom Rajamannaru vs. Lingamallu Radhakrishiah (1918 Madras 1178) Support for the interpretation of Article 133(1) clause (b) in relation to property claims. Referenced but court did not find the precedent applicable to the money suit before it.
Secretary of State vs. Sannidhiraju Subbaryudu (1929 Madras 780) Clarification on claims or questions respecting property for appeal purposes. Referenced but court held that the judgment in the present case did not decide any property question.
Hirjibhai vs. Jamshedji (21 Indian Cases 783) Interpretation of paragraph 2 of section 110 C.P. Code analogous to clause (b) of Article 133(1). Supported the court’s view that clause (b) has no operation where the suit is for money and the relief sought is the same in appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the facts and documents evidencing the novated contract and concluded that the defendants’ original liability was extinguished and replaced by a new contract (a composition between defendants and creditors). The plaintiffs’ suits based on the original acknowledgments were not maintainable. The amended suit in Civil First Appeal No. 5 was effectively a suit for specific performance of the novated agreement but was barred by limitation and improperly framed. The court further held that the pecuniary valuation requirements for leave to appeal under Article 133 were not met because the suits were for money and did not involve any claim or question respecting property. The argument to consolidate appeals for valuation was rejected as the suits and appeals were separately decided and could not be consolidated under Order 45 Rule 4. The legal questions raised were factual in nature and did not amount to substantial questions of law or importance warranting certification for appeal to the Supreme Court.

Holding and Implications

The petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in both Civil First Appeal Nos. 4 and 5 of 1951 are rejected with costs.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiffs cannot appeal further to the Supreme Court against the dismissal and reversal of their suits based on the original acknowledgments. The court’s decision confirms that the novated contract extinguished the original obligations, and the plaintiffs’ remedy lies in enforcing the novated agreement through a properly constituted suit within limitation. No new precedent was set beyond the application of existing principles regarding novation, limitation, and the scope of Article 133 for leave to appeal.

Show all summary ...

Dixit J,-

1. These are two applications under Article 133 of the Constitution of India and section 110 C. P. Code for leave to appeal from our decisions in Civil First Appeal No. 4 of 1951 and Civil First Appeal No. 5 of 1951. Both these appeals were heard together and decided by separate judgments. On the circumstances giving rise to the present petitions, jt is necessary to consider them together.

2. In Civil First Appeal No. 4 of 1951 the plaintiffs Todarmal and Shifarishmal sued to recover from the defendants Chironjilal and Rsmjidas Rs. 5,225-8-0 on the basis of adjustment of accounts and an acknowledgement signed by the defendants. The main ground on which the defendants contested the suit was that the plaintiffs' suit on the basis of the acknowledgement was not maintainable inasmuch as the defendants' liability for the debt in respect of which the acknowledgement was given had been superseded by a subsequent agreement embodied in four document? Ex. D. 1. Ex. D. 2, Ex. D. 4 and a document bearing the date of 27th .March 1934. The learned Civil Judge, First Class. Shivpuri, who tried the suit, held that there had been a novation of the contract sued upon and that the plaintiffs' suit on the basis of the acknowledgement was, therefore, not maintainable. Accordingly he dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. In appeal we affirmed the decision of the trial Court holding that on the execution of the said documents, the defendants' liability to pay the amount acknowledged by them was wiped out and substituted by a new contract, namely. a composition between the defendants and their creditors, and that the plaintiffs could not, therefore, sue on the original cause of action and that their remedy was to compel the performance of the novated agreement. In Civil First Appeal No. 5 of 1951 the plaintiffs were Madholal and Basantilal. They sued the defendants Chironjilal and Ramjidas for the recovery of Rs. 7,211-10-6 on the basis of an acknowledgement signed by the defendants. In this suit also, the defence of the defendants was the same as that which they took in the suit instituted by Todarml and Shifarishmal, During the pendency of the suit Madholal and Basantilal sought leave to amend the plaint so as to base their claim for the recovery of the money alternatively on the agreement represented by the documents referred to above, and to add some other creditors of the defendants as defendants to the suit The trial Judge allowed them to amend the plaint. In their reply to the amended plamt, the defendants Chironjlal and Ramjidas reiterated the stand taken by them with regard to the extinguishment of their original liability and added that the plaintiffs could not get any money decree on the basis of the novated agreement; that they could not get even the relief of enforcing that agreement as they had failed to implead other creditors who were necessary panics as plaintiffs in the suit and as the suit on that footing was barred by time. The trial Judge accepted the plea of the defendants that subs-quant to the acknowledgement there was a complete contract extinguishing the old contract and bringing into existence a new one. He further held that it was not necessary to join other creditors as plaintiffs to the suit in order to give Basantilal and Madholal a relief on the basis of the subsequent agreement and that on the novated agreement the plaintiffs could get a money decree, On these findings the trial Judge scaled down the amount claimed by the plaintiffs applying the ratio existing in the novated agreement between the total liabilities of the defendants to all the creditors and the value of the property intended to be given for the satisfaction of the debts and gave the plaintiffs a decree for Rs. 3,488 besides interest and costs. The defendants Chironjilal and Ramjidas then appealed to this Court. The plintiffs Basantilai and Madholal also filed cross-objections. In appeal we agreed with the finding of the trial Court that the defendants' liability on the acknowledgement had been extinguished by a new contract embodied in the documents relied upon by them. We further held that the money decree passed by the learned Civil Judge was altogether unwarranted in law and inconsistent with his finding that there was a novated agreement superseding the defendants original obligation; that the plaintiffs' only remedy was to enforce the novated agreement in a properly constituted suit and to ask for a decree compelling the defendants to hand over to the plaintiffs and other creditors the properties mentioned in Ex. D. 1 one of the documents executed by the parties and other creditors of the defendants. We also came to the conclusion that the amendment made by the plaintiffs did not convert their suit into one by the plaintiffs and other creditors of the defendants, who were parties to the novated agreement for specific performance of that agreement and that even if it could by some stretching of the language of the amendment, be regarded as one for specific performance of the new contract, it was barred by limitation. On these findings we reversed the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit of Madholal and Basantilal for the recovery of Rs. 7,211-10-6 from the defendants Chironjilal and Ramjidds. It may be added that in both Civil First Appeals Nos. 4 and 5 of 1951 the agreement embodied in Ex. D. 1 and Ex. D. 4 was regarded b; us as a composition between Chironjilal, Ramjidas and their creditors in eluding the plaintiffs in the two suits which was fully supported by consideration.

3. Dealing first with the application of Madholal and Basantilal for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our decision in Civil First Appeal No. 5 of 1951, it is obvious that the amount of the subject-matter in dispute was below Rs, 20,000 in the Court of First instance and in the apoeal to this Court. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta learned counsel for the applicants did not dispute this. He, however, argued that his case fell under clause (b) of Article 133 (1) which allows an appeal where the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the value of Rs. 20,000 or upwards. It was said that another suit instituted by Madholal and Basantilal against Chironjilal and Ramjidas for the recovery of Rs. 13,527-11-6 on the basis of an acknowledgement signed by the said defendants is pending in the Court of District Judge, Gwalior; that in that suit also Chironjilal and Rsmjidas have pleaded that the plaintiffs' suit is not maintainable because of the novated agreement on which they relied in the suit out of which this application arose; that the decision in the pending suit must follow what has been found by us in the judgment - intended to be appealed against; and that if the value of the claim in the suit dismissed by us and in the suit which is pending in the Court of District Judge is added, then our judgment in Civil First Appeal No. 5 of 1951 involves indirect by “some claim or question respecting property of the value exceeding Rs, 2,000 “. Mr. Bhapwardas Gupta relied on Ratha Krishna Ayyar vs. Sunderfwcmy Iyer ( 922 P. C. 257); Chinnom Rajamannaru vs. Lingamallu Radhakrishiah (1918 Madras 1178); and Secretary of State vs. Sannidhiraju Subbaryudu (1929 Madras 780). I do not find myself able to accept this contention. Quite apart from the fact that the petitioners have not sworn in any affidavit the statements with regard to the nature and value of the claim in the suit that is said to be pending between them and Chironjilal and Ramjidas in the Court of : District Judge Gwalior, it appears to me that clause (b) of Article 133 (1) has no application to the present case. The reason is that the suit out of which Civil First Appeal No. 5 of 1951 arose was a suit for money. Therein no claim respecting any property was made or any question respecting property arose. Our judgment in that appeal did not decide any claim or question respecting property. No doubt in that appeal we held that the agreement embodied in Ex. D. 1 and Ex. D. 4 was a composition between Chironjilal and Ramjidas and their creditors including Basantilal and Madholal which was fully supported by consideration and which had the effect of wiping out the defendants' liability to pay the amount acknowledged by them and of substituting a new contract and that the plaintiffs Basantilal and Madholal's only remedy was to enforce the novated agreement in a properly constituted suit asking for a de. cree to compel the defendants to hand over to them and other creditors, the properties mentioned in Ex. D. 1. We rejected the claim of Basantilal and Madholal for the specific performance of the novated agreement on the ground that their suit as framed was not one for specific performance of that agreement and that even if it could be regarded in that light it was barred by time. This finding was not an adjudication with respect to any claim or question respecting property. We did not say anything as to whether the plaintiffs were or were not entitled to the possession of any property under the novated agreement. If their suit had been properly framed and if it had been in times then it would have been necessary for us to decide the question respecting property dealt with by the novated agreement, But we did not do so for the reason that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation and was also not one for specific performance of the novated agreement. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the judgment sought to be appealed against involves directly or indirectly some claim or. question respecting any property. The suit out of which Civil First Appeal No. 5 of 1951 arose was a suit for money and the plaintiffs sought in appeal precisely the same relief both in kind and quantity as in the court of first instance In my view clause (b) of Article 133(1) has no application where the suit is for money. I am fortified in this view by a decision of the Bombay High Court in Hirjibhai vs. Jamshedji (21 Indian Cases 783) where the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court have observed in connection with the analogous words of paragraph 2 of section 110 C. P. Code that they have no operation where the suit is for money and the plaintiff seeks in appeal precisely the same relief both in kind and quantity as in the court of first instance. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for me to consider the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the applicants where it has been held that a claim or a question respecting property cannot be said to be involved in the judgment, decree or final order unless such judgment, decree or final order has the effect of estopping either by the rule of resjudicata or otherwise the party from claiming rights in or agitating the same question in respect of such property. Nor is it necessary to express any opinion on the point whether our judgment in Civil First Appeal No, 5 01 1951 has the effect of so estopping the applicants from claiming the recovery of certain amount from Chironjilal and Ramjidas on the basis of ati acknowledgement or from seeking to enforce specifically the novated agreement in the pending suit.

4. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta also argued that the appeal which Madholal and Basantilal wish to take to the Supreme Court and the appeal which Todarmal and Shifarishmal wish to file should be consolidated for the purposes of pecuniary valuation and when so consolidated the valuation of the claims in the suits and in the appeals in this Court would exceed Rs. 10,00 the valuation necessary for appeals arising oat of suits instituted before the coming into force of the Constitution. This argument is devoid of and substance. Under Order 45 Rule 4 there can be no consolidation of suits decided by separate judgments. The suits instituted by the applicants Madholal, Basantilal, Todarmal and Shifarishmal were decided by the trial Court by separate judgments; the appeals amigo there from Were also decided by us by separate judgments. From what has been said earlier in this order it is plain that though one of the questions, namely, the question of there being a novated contract was common in the two suits, the separate judgments delivered in those cases were not only in name but in substance also different. No appeal lay before 26th January 1950 to the Federal Court from the decisions of this Court. There can thus be no question of any right of appeal already accrued to the applicant in a suit the subject matter of which in the original court and in appeal was Rs. 10,000 or upwards but less than Rs. 20,000 being saved under Article 133 or Article 135 of the Constitution of India.

5. It was then contended that the applicants case was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. I do not agree with this contention. The only questions that arose for consideration in Civil First Appeal No. 5 of 1951 were (1) whether the liability of the defendants Chironjilal and Ramjidas to pay the amount acknowledged by them had been extinguished by a novated contract: (2) whether the plaintiffs' suit as amended was one for specific performance of the novated agreement; (3) and if so whether it was within limitation. The question whether the parties intended to substitute a new contract for the old one and whether the novated contract by itself operated as an absolute discharge of the original obligation, giving to the plaintiffs thereafter only the remedy by way of specific performance of the contract was a question of fact which we decided upon the construction of the documents, Ex. D. 1 and Ex. D. 4, on the intention of the parties, their conduct and the surrounding circumstances and on the application of the settled principles of section 62 of the Contract Act. The question whether the plaintiffs' suit as amended was one for specific performance of the new contract, was one which depended on the construction of the plaint, and the question whether if the plaintiffs' suit was one for specific performance of the contract, it was within time turned solely on Article 11 of the Gwalior Limitation Act Samvat 1974 corresponding to Article Il3 of the Indian Limitation Act. I do not think it required any argument to say that none of these questions is a substantial question of law and a question of considerable importance, public or private, There does not appear to me any ground on which the case can be certified as a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

6. In regard to the petition presented by Todarmal and Shifarishmal for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from our affirming judgment in Civil First Appeal No. 4 of 1951, that too, must be rejected. The proposed appeal does not satisfy the requirements of the valuation; it does not involve any substantial question of law or any question on which the case could be certified as a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

7. For the above reasons I am of the opinion that both these petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court must be rejected with costs.

Shinde C. J.-I agree.