Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Vidyadhar Pande v. Vidyut Grih Siksha Samiti, Korba Through Its Secretary And Others

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jan 22, 1972
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.P. Sen J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a teacher employed at Vidyut Grih Higher Secondary School (run by Vidyut Grih Siksha Samity, Korba, a society registered under the M. P. Non-trading Corporation Act, 1962), sought a declaration enforcing Chapter XII of the Board of Secondary Education, Madhya Pradesh Regulations, 1965 against the Society. The petitioner alleged that under Regulation 71 he had become a permanent employee and that his termination breached Regulation 79; he sought a writ of mandamus directing withdrawal of the termination order and reinstatement.

Procedural chronology (as stated in the opinion): the petitioner was appointed Head Master on probation on 31-7-1968 (w.e.f. 3-7-1968) and later appointed Principal temporarily on 1-9-1969. Both appointments contained a clause that the appointments would be governed by rules and regulations of the State Education Department. The second order provided that the appointment could be terminated on one month's notice or pay in lieu. On 23-6-1971 the Managing Committee dispensed with the petitioner's services with immediate effect and gave him one month's salary in lieu of notice. The petitioner represented to the Divisional Superintendent of Education, who by memo dated 24-6-1971 threatened withdrawal of recognition of the school as the termination was claimed to be in breach of Regulation 79. That action had no effect, and the petitioner filed the present writ petition in the High Court. The petition was ultimately dismissed by the Court with costs; counsel's fee of Rs.100 was fixed and any outstanding security to be refunded to the petitioner.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the termination of the petitioner's service was validly effected by a Managing Committee constituted in accordance with Regulation 61(m), and whether the meeting and resolution effecting termination were validly called and held (including issues of nomination of the Divisional Superintendent's nominee and service of notice on the petitioner as a member).
  2. Whether the petitioner's service conditions were governed by Chapter XII of the Board's Regulations and, if so, whether Regulation 71 had operated to confirm him in service.
  3. Whether the termination of the petitioner's service violated Regulation 79, thereby rendering the termination invalid and entitling the petitioner to a writ of mandamus for reinstatement.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The termination was not effected by a Managing Committee duly constituted under Regulation 61(m); alternatively, if the Society's Executive Committee was to be treated as the Managing Committee, the meeting that passed the resolution terminating him was invalid because (a) there was no nominee of the Divisional Superintendent of Education at that meeting, and (b) the petitioner, being a member, was not served with notice.
  • The petitioner's service conditions were governed by Chapter XII of the Board Regulations and under Regulation 71 he had been confirmed in service.
  • Consequently, the termination amounted to a breach of the protection conferred by Regulation 79 and was therefore illegal, void and inoperative; he sought a declaration and consequential writ of mandamus directing withdrawal of the termination order and reinstatement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan, 1970 (1) SCC 75 Authority for the proposition that subordinate regulations/ordinances made without statutory power do not have statutory force; limits the scope of rule-making bodies where the impugned regulation is not within the statutory head of power. The Court relied on this decision to hold that the Board's Chapter XII Regulations (in particular Regs. 71 and 79) have no statutory force because the enabling provision (section 28(2)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1965) did not authorize regulation of conditions of service of private-school teachers.
Krishna Rao Bire v. Guru Singh Sabha and others, Misc. Petition No. 257 of 1971 (25-10-1971) This Division Bench decision took a contrary view on the validity/effect of similar regulations. The Court stated that the correctness of that decision is open to question; because it conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi, it is "not good law."
Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A.L. Pande and another, 1970 M P L J 983 = (1965) 2 S C B 713 Illustrates a case where ordinances had statutory force because the relevant University Act (Sagar University Act) explicitly empowered the making of ordinances regulating conditions of service of university teachers (sec. 32(h)). The Court observed that reliance on this decision by the Division Bench (in Krishna Rao Bire) was misplaced because there the statute expressly empowered regulation of service conditions, whereas section 28(2)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Act did not.
New Bhopal Textiles Limited, Bhopal v. Ramdutt Kanhaiyalal, 1961 M P L J 229 Proposition that in cases of wrongful dismissal the servant's remedy is an action for damages for breach of contract, and not a right to reinstatement. The Court applied this principle to hold that the petitioner, if wrongfully dismissed, is confined to contractual remedies (damages) and cannot claim specific enforcement (reinstatement) by writ.
Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, 1971 (2) SCC 192 Sets out the three recognized exceptions to the general rule denying specific relief (reinstatement) in master-servant disputes: (1) public servants under Article 311(2) of the Constitution; (2) cases under influx-trial law; and (3) acts of statutory bodies in breach of mandatory statutory obligations. The Court relied on this statement to conclude that the present case does not fall within any of those exceptions; consequently, specific relief (declaration and mandamus for reinstatement) was inappropriate.
K. N. Mishra v. Vice-Chancellor, Jiwaji University, Gwalior and others, Misc. Petition 476 of 1967 (decided 23-4-1970) A case involving termination in breach of a statutory restriction; cited as distinguishable. The Court held that K. N. Mishra is distinguishable on its facts because there termination breached an actual statutory restriction, whereas the present case does not.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) the legal status of Chapter XII Regulations and (B) the appropriate remedy for wrongful termination in the circumstances of this case.

A. Validity and Statutory Force of the Board Regulations

- The Regulations in Chapter XII were promulgated purportedly under section 28(2)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1965, which empowers the Board to make regulations "for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act" and lists matters in respect of which regulations may be made, including "the conditions of recognition of institutions ... and framing of a School Code to ensure a minimum standard of efficient and uniform management of such Schools."

- The Court observed that the enabling provision does not expressly authorize the Board to frame regulations regulating the conditions of service of teachers of private educational institutions.

- Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan, the Court concluded that where a rule-making power does not extend to regulating service conditions, purported regulations in that field lack statutory force. Applying that principle, the Court held that Regulations Nos. 61(1), 61(m), 71 and 79 (in Chapter XII) have no statutory force and cannot be treated as regulations framed under the Act.

- The Court further explained that an earlier Division Bench decision (Krishna Rao Bire) that reached a contrary conclusion was in conflict with the Supreme Court precedent and therefore not good law; it also noted that the Division Bench's reliance on Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh was inapt because the Sagar University Act expressly empowered regulation of service conditions (which the Madhya Pradesh Act does not).

B. Remedy and Merits

- On the merits the Court held that even if the termination were wrongful, the appropriate remedy in the ordinary master-servant relationship is an action for damages and not reinstatement. The Court cited New Bhopal Textiles and Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai to emphasize the settled principle and the narrow exceptions to it.

- The Court examined whether any of the well-recognized exceptions to denying specific relief applied (public servants under Article 311(2), influx-trial law, or acts of statutory bodies in breach of mandatory statutory obligations) and found that the present case did not fall within any of those exceptions.

- In addition, the Court relied on the basic public/private distinction: the school is an educational institution run by a private body. Consequently, there is no public office-holder against whom the Court could issue a mandamus to perform a public duty; the reinstatement sought would effectively require specific enforcement of contractual rights against a private society, which the Court held to be inappropriate by way of writ.

- On these combined bases (lack of statutory force of Chapter XII Regulations; unavailability of specific relief in master-servant disputes in the absence of an exception; and the private nature of the Society), the Court concluded that the petitioner's claims for a declaration and mandamus must fail.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE PETITION IS DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and practical implications as stated in the opinion:

  • The Court held that Chapter XII of the Board of Secondary Education Regulations, 1965 (in particular Regulations 71 and 79), do not have statutory force under section 28(2)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1965, and therefore cannot be enforced against the Society as statutory regulations.
  • The petitioner is not entitled to the declaratory relief or the writ of mandamus directing reinstatement; the appropriate remedy for wrongful dismissal (if any) is a suit for contractual remedies (damages), not reinstatement by writ.
  • The Court expressly found that the petition did not fall within the recognized exceptions permitting specific relief in master-servant disputes and emphasized that no writ of mandamus can be issued to compel reinstatement against a private society in these circumstances.
  • The petition was dismissed with costs; counsel's fee of Rs.100 was directed to be paid and any outstanding security amount, if any, was to be refunded to the petitioner.

The Court did not express opinions on other questions raised by the parties and limited its decision to the points expressly decided above.

Show all summary ...

A.P. Sen J.-

This is a petition by a Teacher of a private educational institution, seeking to enforce Chapter XII of the Board of Secondary Educa­tion, Madhya Pradesh Regulations 1965, against the Society which runs the School where he was employed. The petitioner seeks a declaration that he became a permanent employee of the Society by virtue of Regulation 71 and that his termination of service was in breach of Regulation 79 and, therefore, illegal, void and inoperative and prays for a consequential writ of Mandamus directing the Society to withdraw the order of termination and to re-instate him in service.

2. Shortly stated, the facts are these. Vidyut Grih Siksha Samity, Korba, a body registered under the M. P. Non-trading Corporation Act, 1962, runs Vidyut Grih Higher Secondary School at Korba, which was previously a high school. The Society under its bye-laws has a Foundation Committee which is its Governing body, and an Executive Committee, i.e., its Managing Committee.

3. On 31-7-1968, the petitioner was appointed by the Managing Com­mittee as Head Master of the High School on probation for a period of one year, on a pay-scale of Rs.250-10-290-15-350-EB 20-450, w. e. f. 3-7-1968. Meanwhile the High School became a Higher Secondary School. So, on 1-9-1969, the Managing Committee appointed him as Principal temporarily on a pay-scale of Rs.275-25-300-15-405-EB-20-550 25-700, w. e. f. 3-7-1968. Incidentally both the orders of appointment were subject to the following condition-

"The appointment will be governed by the rules and regulations laid down by the Edu­cation Department of Madhya Pradesh Government for the recognised Schools in the State unless and otherwise specified from time to time."

The 2nd Order, i.e. the one appointing the petitioner as Principal further provided-

"The appointment can be terminated on one month's notice or pay thereof on either side." On 23-6-1971, the Managing Committee dispensed with the petitioner's services with immediate effect by giving him one month's salary in lieu of notice. Being aggrieved, the petitioner represented to the Divisional Superintendent of Education who by his Memo dated 24-6-1971 threatened the Society with withdrawal of recognition of the school on the ground that the termination of the petitioner was wrongful being in breach of Regulation 79. But that had no effect and consequently, the petitioner has moved the present writ petition.

4. It is urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that he is entitled to the declaration sought and to the consequential writ of Mandamus, on three grounds-

(1) The termination of service is not by a Managing Committee, duly constituted under Regulation 61 (m). Alternatively, if the Executive Com­mittee of the Society could be regarded as a Managing Committee, the meeting at which the resolution was passed, was not validly called because firstly, there was no nominee of the Divisional Superintendent of Education and secondly, the petitioner, who was a member, was not served with a notice.

(2) The service conditions of the petitioner were governed by Chap­ter XII of the Regulations and, under Regulation 71, he was a confirmed employee

(3) Consequently, the termination of his service was invalid being in breach of the protection conferred by Regulation 79.

There is, in our opinion, no force in the contentions.

5. The Regulations were framed under section 28 (2) (d) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1965, which reads as follows:

"28. Powers of Board to make Regulations-(1) The Board may make Regulations for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.

(2) In particulars and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Board may make Regulations providing for all or any of the following matters, namely:-

(d) the conditions of recognition of institutions for the purposes of admission to the privileges of the Board and framing of a School Code to ensure a minimum standard of efficient and uniform management of such Schools."

Admittedly, there is no provision in the Act which authorises the Board to frame any regulations for regulating the conditions of service of teachers of private educational institutions. However, the Board purported to fare certain regulations on the subject, i. e., those contained in Chapter XII there­of. Regulations 61 (1) and (m), 71 and 79, with which we are concerned, read as follows:

"61. No Educational Institution shall be recognized, or continue to be recognized, unless it complies with the following requirements, namely:-

(1) that the educational institution shall comply with the editions laid down in Chapter XII of these Regulations;

(m) that there shall be a Managing Committee as defined under the Adhiniyam con­sisting of not more than 10 members of which two shall be the Head of the institution and a nominee of the Educational Officer concerned and that the Governing Body or Managing Committee shall be registered under the Societies Registration Act;

71. All Principals, Headmasters, Lecturers, and teachers, except those appointed tem­porarily for a period of less than one year, shall be on probation for a term of one year which may be extended to two years. If after two years service any incumbent is continued in his appointment, he shall, unless the appointing authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing, otherwise directs, be deemed to have been confirmed is that appointment. On confirmation the incumbent shall sign a contract of service in the Forms I or II (appended to these Regulations) as the case may be, as soon as practicable.

79. (1) The Managing Committee shall not terminate the services or reduce the pay of Principal or Headmaster appointed on written contract without first obtaining Director's sanction for holding a full enquiry into the charges against him. The incumbent shall be given in writing a statement of the charges against him, and also be afforded an opportunity of defending himself. His previous services and character with reference to his confidential file and service book shall also be taken into consideration before arriving at a decision.

(2) No decision as to termination of services or reduction of a Principal or Headmaster shall be valid, unless passed at special meeting by a majority of two-thirds of its members of the Managing Committee. No such resolution shall be valid, if passed at an adjourned meeting.

(3) The Principal or Headmaster shall have a right of appeal to the Director a'-taints the decision of the Managing Committee. The decision of the Director shall be final."

6. In our judgment, these Regulations have no statutory force In Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with Ordinance No. 65 framed by the Rajasthan 1970 (1) SCC 75, University under a like provision contained in the University of Rajputana Act, 1946, observed as follows:-

''...The Syndicate of this University constituted under section 21 of the Act is empowered under section 29 read with section 30 to make ordinance, consistent with the Act and statutes, to provide for the matters listed in section 29. These matters include in clause VI 'emolu­ments and conditions of service of University teachers'. But on this basis alone it is not easy for us to hold that Ordinance No. 65 is a provision under an Act, regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to Rajasthan Medical Service, as contemplated by Article 309 of the Constitution. Shri Gokhale referred us to entry 41 in List II of 7th Schedule of 1he Constitution which deals with the subject, interlaid, of 'State Public Services' and submitted that the Act fell within this entry and therefore came within the purview of Article 309. We are not impressed by this submission. In our opinion, on a consideration of the pith and substance of the Act and on a comparison of the language used in the entries Nos. 11 and 49 of List II, the field of legislation of the Act more appropriately falls under entry No. 11 which deals with the subject of education including University'. The appoint­ments of Dr. Ojha, Dr Mathur and Dr. Geisha thus seem to us to be fully justified by the Collegiate Branch Rules and their appointments cannot be held to be invalid by reason merely of non compliance with the provisions of Ordinance No. 63 in regard to the condition of teach­ing experience. The field of ration of this Ordinance appears to us to be restricted to the question of affiliation of the colleges concerned with the Rajasthan University. It is note­worthy that the University has not thought fit to object to these appointments. If there is any violation of a provision of this Ordinance then that may appropriately be taken into account by the Rajasthan University for the purpose of withdrawing or refusing to continue affiliation of the colleges in question. But clearly that would not render the impugned appointments null and void a fortiori that cannot confer any right on Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi to approach the High Court by means of petition for writ of quo warrantor to challenge the appointments of these three persons..."

7. T he correctness of the decision relied upon in Krishna Rao Bire v. Guru Singh Sabha and others Miscellaneous Petition No 257 of 1971 decided on 25th October 1971, wherein a Division Bench of this Court has taken a contrary view, is open to question. There is no need to refer the matter to a larger Bench as the view taken by the Division Bench being in conflict of their Lordships' decision in Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan and others (supra), is not good law. Besides, the Division Bench was, in our view, wrong in relying upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A.L. Pande and another 1970 M P L J 983 = (1965) 2 S C B 713, which turned on the provisions of the University of Sager Act, 19-16, which permitted by sec­tion 32 (h) of the making of an Ordinance for regulating the conditions of service of University teachers. Ordinance No. 20 made by the Sager Univer­sity had, therefore, statutory force. That is not so under section 28 (2) (d) of the Act and, therefore, the Regulations contained in Chapter XII of the Board of Secondary Education, Madhya Pradesh Regulations, 1965 and in particular, Regulations Nos. 71 and 79, have no statutory force and cannot be given the status of Regulations framed under the Act.

8. On the merits, the reliefs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted. It is well settled both on authority and principle that in case of a wrongful dismissal, the remedy of the servant is by an action for damages he may have sustained in consequence of the breach of the master's contract to employ him but he has no right to any reinstatement. See: New Bhopal Textiles Limited Bhopal v. Ramdutt Kanhaiyalal 1961 M P L J 229. In Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai†. 1971 (2) SCC 192, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have stated as follows:

"...There were only three well recognised exceptions to the general rule under the law of master and servant where such a declaration would be issued, namely: (1) case of public-servants falling under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, (2) cases falling under the influx-trial law, and (3) cases where acts of statutory bodies are in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute...."

The present case does not fall under any one of the said three exceptions. To grant the declaration sought and the writ of mandamus prayed for would be tantamount to specifically enforce the contract of service. The decision in K. N. Mishra v. Vice-Chancellor, Jiwaji University, Gwalior and others Miscellaneous Petition 476 of 19S7 decided on the 23rd April 1970, is distin­guishable on facts. There, the termination of service was in breach of a statutory restriction.

9. Besides, the petition must fail on another ground. Admittedly, the school is an educational institution run by a private body. That being so, no writ of mandamus can be issued. There is no question of making an order requiring any specific act to be done or performed by any person holding a public office. There is also to question of compelling the performance of any public duty. Nor can we make an order against the Society compelling the reinstatement of the petitioner which is a matter in the realm of contractual rights and obligations. The remedy of the petitioner, if any, lies by way of a suit.

10. On the view we have taken, we do not think it proper to express any opinion on the other questions raised.

11. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs.100/. The outstanding security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner.

Petition dismissed.