Mishra J. -

The following question has been referred to us for opinion:

"Whether an appellate Court can take cognizance of subsequent events happening after a decree has been passed by the lower Court in favour of the plaintiff-landlord under section 12 (1) (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ?"

2. A Single Bench constituted by one of us (Mishra J.) which referred the above question, was confronted with two conflicting decisions of this Court on the aforesaid point. In Vishambharnath v. Mst. Ramdevi, Civil Second Appeal No. 209 of 1970 (Gwalior) decided on 22-12-1976, view taken is to the effect that events happening after passing of a decree in favour of the landlord, even if true, cannot be taken cognizance of by an appellate Court. Reliance has been placed on Rameshwar and other v. Jatram and others, A I R 1976 S C 49. On the other hand, a contrary view has been taken in Ramlal v. Vinod Cotton Mills Ltd., Civil Second Appeal No. 175 of 1978. (Indore) to the effect that events happening after passing of the decree can be taken cognizance of during the pendency of the suit even at second appellate stage, on the basis of cases reported in Pasupuleti Venkateshwarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 and Bhaiyalal v. Chhotalal Tiwari, 1971 M P L J Note 104.

3. The law on the impact of subsequent events has been laid dawn exhaustively by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 9 in Rameshwar's case (supra) as under : -

"The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action; second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its impotence to create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or un­serviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson v. State of Albania, (1934) 294 U S 600, 607 illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot he constitu­tive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation/except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdic­tion to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal, A I R 1941 F C 5=1940 F C R 84, falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs-cannot deny rights-to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, Courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately granted, the Court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. Venkateswarlu, read in its statutory setting, falls in this category. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the Court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine (See Chokalingam Chetty, A I R 1927 P C 252.) The law stated in Ramji Lal v. State of Punjab, A I R 1966 Punj. 374 is sound :

"Courts do very often take notice of events that subsequent to the filing of suits and at times even those that have occurred during the appel­late stage and permit pleadings to be amended for including a prayer for relief on the basis of such events but this is ordinarily done to avoid multiplicity of proceedings or when the original relief claimed has, by reason of change in the circumstances, become inappropriate and not when the plaintiff's suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment (See Steward v. The North Metropolitan Tramways Company, ( 1885) 16 Q B D 178, and a fresh suit by him would be so barred by limitation."

One may as well add that while taking cautious judicial cognizance of 'postnatal' events, even for the limited and exceptional purposes explained earlier, no Court will countenance a party altering, by his own manipula­tion, a change in situation and plead for relief on the altered basis."

After so laying down the law on the impact of subsequent happenings and having held that case of Pasupuleti Venkateshwarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, A I R 1975 S C 1409, read in its statutory setting falls in a different category, their Lordship proceeded to apply the law to the circumstances of the case of Rameshwar (supra) itself and observed in paras 10 and 11 thereof as under:

"10. The apparently divergent strains of the several decisions has persuaded us to dilate on this branch of processual jurisprudence. Let us now apply the law to the circumstances here. The legislation we are interpreting relates to agrarian reform, regarded as the vital base to build a new social order. The constitution has stressed not merely the supreme significance of this rural transformation but the fleet footed implementa­tion thereof, even going to the extreme extent of walling off litigative assaults on constitutionality by creation of the Ninth Schedule and the like. Moreover, the Act itself takes care to prevent future accumulation of lands or motivated slimming process by transfers, interfering with the scheme of surplus pool and settlement of ejected tenant and the like. Peasant proprietorship is a cherished goal of the statute and so it provides that even on the payment of the first instalment of the price the tenant gets the title of the landlord. To bold that, if the landlord dies at some dis­tant date after the title has vested in the tenant, the statutory process would be reversed if by such death, his children, on division, will be con­verted into small landholders, is to upset the day of reckoning visualized by the Act and to make the vesting provision 'a teasing illusion', a formal Festschrift to agrarian retorm, not a flaming programme of 'now and here'. These surrounding facts drive home the need not to allow futurism, in a dawdling litigative scene, to foul the quick legislative goals.

11. Moreover, the right of the respondents is fixed under sec­tion 18 (1)(4)and that cannot be uprooted by supervening circums­tances. We are not called upon to mould the relief but to reject the right. We are not asked to avoid multiplicity of suits but to non suit and thus stultify the agrarian law. We are not required to permit the appellate authority to re-assess the facts as they stood when the action was brought (that is part of appellate power) but to project the landholder's subsequent death backwards to refuse a right already acquired. A flash-back camera in this context, frustrates forensic objectives. Individual misfortune may be real but larger social changes will claim martyrs in law and in fact. How can we miss the sublime impact of the Passion of Christ for the Redemption of Mankind ? The great fact is that, if uniformly, relentlessly and swiftly enforced, neither landlord nor tenant can keep more than the 'permissible area'. That is the equity and equality of this agrarian law."

Section 18 (1) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Act X of 1953) (hereinafter referred for brevity as the 'Punjab Act'), referred to above, runs as under : -

"18 Right of certain tenants to purchase land :-

(1) Notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any law, usage or contract, a tenant of a land-owner other than a small land­owner.............

(i) ..............................

(ii) .............................

(iii) ……………………………..

shall be entitled to purchase from the land owner the land' so held by him ... in the case of a tenant falling within clause (i) or clause (ii) at any time, and in the case of a tenant falling within clause (iii) within? a period of one year from the date of commencement of this Act/r Sub-section (4) of section 18 of the Punjab Act reads as under :

(4) (a). The tenant shall be competent to pay the purchase price-either in a lump sum or in six monthly instalments not exceeding ten in the manner prescribed.

(b) On the purchase price or the first instalment thereof, as the ease' may be, being deposited, the tenant shall be deemed to have become the owner of the land, and the Assistant Collector shaft, where the tenant is not already in possession, and subject to the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887), put him in possession thereof."

(Emphasis supplied)

However, their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not permit giving effect to the subsequent event, viz., death of Teja, the landholder at appellate stage of the proceeding to be projected backwards, as in that case it would have meant to refuse the right already acquired by the tenants. Thus, the decision in Rameshwar's case (supra) turned on the nature of the aforesaid provisions and the object they had to achieve.

4. In the case of Venkatesharlu (supra) the principles regarding powers of the Courts to take notice of events happening after institution of suits have been laid down in para 4 thereof, which is extracted below:-

"4. We feel the submission devoid of substance. First, about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suit or institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for application of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right 6r remedy claimed by the partly just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions, the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the land­lord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into section 10(3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact."

4-A. In Nair Service Society v. K. C. Alexander, A I R 1968 S C 1165 the Jaw on the point has been summarised (in para. 29) thus :

"Now it is a fixed principle of law that a suit must be tried on the original cause of action and this principle governs not only the trial of suits but also appeals. Indeed the appeal being a continuation of the suit new pleas are not considered. If circumstances change they can form the subject of some other proceedings but need not ordinarily be consider­ed in the appeal. To this proposition there are few exceptions. Some­times it happens that the original relief claimed becomes inappropriate, or the law changes affecting the rights of the parties. In such cases Courts may allow an amendment pleading the changed circumstances. Sometimes also the changed circumstances shorten litigation and then to avoid circuity of action the Courts allow an amendment. The practice of the Courts is very adequately summarised in Ram Ratan Sahu v. Mohant Sahu, ( 1907) 6 Cal. L J 74, Mookerjee and Holmwood JJ.; have given the kind of changed circum­stances which the Courts usually take notice, with illustrations from decided cases. The judgment in that case has been consistently followed in India. In Raicharan Mandal v. Biswanath Mandal, A I R 1915 Cal 103, other cases are to be found in which subsequent events were noticed. The same view was taken by the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwarlal, 1940 F C R 84 at p. 87=A I R 1941 F C 5 at p. 6, follow­ing the dictum of Hughes C. J., in Patterson v. State of Alabama, ( 1934) 294 U S 600 at p. 607. In Surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand, 1958 S C R 548= A I R 1957 S C 875, this Court also took subsequent events into account and approved of the case of the Federal Court. In view of these decisions it is hardly necessary to cite further authorities."

Thereafter, their Lordships proceeded to examine the application for amend­ment in para 32 and observed that:

"In the present case the amendment sought was not outside the suit. In fact issue No. 2 could have easily covered it if a proper plea had been raised. The Society was perhaps under ah impression that the fresh Kuthakapattom would be considered and the trial Judge had also said that the argument could not be shut out. Although it is not possible to say that parties went to trial in regard to the fresh Kuthakapattom, it cannot be gainsaid that the plaintiff had himself caused all the documents necessary for the plea to be brought on the record of the case. No doubt plaintiff tried to implead Government with a view to obtaining an injunc­tion but as no notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was given this was an exercise in futility. But the Society was under no disability except its own in action. If it had made a timely request it would have been granted."

Further in para 33 it has been observed that:

"In so far as the Court was concerned the amendment-would not have unduly prolonged litigation; on the other hand, it would have cut it short Without the amendment another suit based on the second; Kuthakapattom is inevitable. As we have shown above there is good authority in support of the proposition that subsequent events may be taken note of if they tend to reduce litigation. This is not one of those cases in which there is likelihood of pro-longed litigation after remand or in which a new case will begin. The amendment will prima facie allow the society to show to the Court that in addition to possession it has also-title. This will enable the Court to do complete justice, if the plea is found good, without the parties having to go to another trial."

4-B. The principles laid down in paras 4 and 5 of P. Venkateswarlu (supra) and para 9 of Rameshwar (supra) are, though expressed differently, similar to those laid down in the case Nair Service Society (supra).

4-C. Shortly, put the power of the Court to take cognizance of subse­quent events after the lis has been brought to the Court, can be exercised in cases where it has fundamental impact on the right to the relief, provided that (a) in doing so, the Court is not called upon to reject the right but to mould the relief or the manner of moulding the relief; and (b) if there is no inhibition in the enactment on which the proceeding is based, by it's scheme or otherwise, and (c) provided further that diligently brought into the notice of the Court. In order to exercise the power, it is not necessary that subse­quent event should be always an admitted fact. The Courts can, even in cases-where the parties are at dispute as to its existence allow amendment for taking its cognizance or permit filing of additional pleading for the purpose.

4-D. Now, the amendment for the purpose can be permitted by Courts in the following circumstances, as held in M/s Laxmi & Co. v. Dr. Anant R. Deshpande & another, A I R 1973 S C 171, viz.,--

"It is true that the Court can take notice of subsequent events. These cases are where the Court finds that because of altered circumstances like devolution of interest it is necessary to shorten litigation. Where the original relief has become inappropriate by subsequent events, the Court can take notice of such changes If the Court finds that the judgment of (he Court cannot be carried into effect because of change of circumstances the Court takes notice of the same. If the Court finds that the matter is no longer in controversy the Court also takes notice of such event. If the property which is the subject matter of suit is no longer available the Court will take notice of such event. The Court takes notice of subse­quent events to shorten litigation, to preserve rights of both the parties-and to subserve the ends of justice ........"

4-E. The amendment for the purpose of taking notice of subsequent events may not be permitted in the following circumstances (as stated in 13th Edn. of Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, Vol. I, page 728) :

"(1) Where the amendment is not necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties, as where it is-

(i) merely technical, or (ii) useless and of no substance.

(2) Where the plaintiff's suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment.

(3) Where the effect of amendment would be to take away from the defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time.

(4) Where the amendment would introduce a totally different, new and inconsistent case, and the application is made at a late stage of proceedings.

(5) Where the application for amendment is not made in good faith."

The aforesaid-may be termed as "permissible limits" for the exercise of powers under consideration. Even within the permissible limits, the exercise of power to take notice of subsequent events depends upon absence or pre­sence of provisions in the enactment on which the suit or proceeding is based inhibiting its exercise.

5. While dealing with the law regarding impact of subsequent events on the right of landlords to eject tenants in a proceeding based on another agrarian law, viz., the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (67 of 1948), the Supreme Court in a Seven Judges case, reported in Mohanlal v. Tribhuvan, A I R 1963 S C 358, permitted taking cognizance of subsequent events and observed as under:

"If the landlords had obtained an effective decree and had succeeded in ejecting the tenants as a result of that decree, which may have become final between the parties, that decree may not have been reopened and the execution taken thereunder may not have been recalled But it was during the pendency of the suit at the appellate stage that the second notification was issued cancelling the first. Hence, the Court was bound to apply the law as it found on the date of its judgment. Hence, there is no question of taking away any vested rights in the landlord"

.

It is significant to note that in the enactment on which the proceedings in Mohanlal's case (supra) were based there was no provision corresponding to section 18 (1) and (4) of the Punjab Act conferring any substantive right on the tenants. Accordingly, the presence or absence of a provision like section 18 (1) and (4) of the Punjab Act, providing for acquisition of owner­ship on a party is the pivotal point. In absence of such a provision, the power to take cognizance of subsequent events and mould the relief and make it correspond to the current realities, can be exercised, unless the exercise thereof is inhibited by the enactment, on which the suit or proceeding is based, either by its scheme or others.

6. Having thus examined to the principles of law regarding impact of subsequent events, we may turn to examine the field of operation of the ratio of the cases of Rameshwar and Venkateswarlu.

7. From what has been stated above, it is clear that the ratio of both the cases Rameshwar and Venkateshwarlu (supra) have different fields to operate, the field of their operation being carved out according to the nature of the provisions of the particular enactment, on which the proceedings were based and the object which that enactment had to achieve.

8. Now, we may examine case of Vishambharnath (supra). The judg­ment in the case of Vishumbharnath (supra) halts at para 8 of Rameshwar's case (supra) and does not proceed to take into consideration what has been said in para 9 thereof. This supplies the reason of failure to give effect to the alleged subsequent events taking place during pendency of the second appeal in case of Vishambharnath. The alleged subsequent happening con­sisted of acquisition, by purchase, "of two other shops by the landlord, in one of which his son Madan Mohan was already carrying on business and other shop was alleged to have been let out so that the need, on the basis of which eviction was sought, had vanished Had the judgment in Vishambharnath proceeded to take into consideration para 9 of Rameshwar, then notice of alleged subsequent events would have certainly been taken, into notice and filing of additional pleading under Order 8, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, would have been permitted. This was the procedure adopted in the case of Venkatesuarh (supra) vide para 6 thereof. Declining to notice of subsequent events having material bearing on right to relief is clearly acting contrary to law laid down by the Supreme Court in the three Judges case of Venkateswarh. To do so will also be forbidding parties from entering permissible zones and prohibiting the Courts from exercising power within the permissible lira ts elaborately carved out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Besides this, the case of Vishambharnath proceeds on the theory that in case of appeal by tenant against decree for eviction, the Courts 'cannot take notice of sub­sequent events, even if true. To our mind, passing of the decree or the dis­missal of the suit for eviction governed by the M. P. Accommodation Control Act 1961 does not vest the successful party with any substantive right. No immunity from further challenge by filing appeal is conferred on the decree for eviction, if passed. On filing of appeal finality of the decree appealed against is destroyed. The matter becomes sub-judice. We cannot read any new restriction into the provisions of Civil Procedure Code and M. P. Accommo­dation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 1961, Act) to the effect that the power to take cognizance of subsequent events is not exercis-able in appeal against the decree for ejectment. To do so will be rendering the remedy of appeal illusory and will be negation of powers expressly conferred by Order 7, Rule 7 read with Order 6, Rule 17, section 107, Order 41, Rule 27 and Order 41, Rule 33, Code of Civil Procedure on difference between case of appeals.

Where the suit stands decreed or dismissed in respect of relief of eject­ment, it cannot be regarded to proceed on legally correct premises. The law does not make any such differentiation. The powers of the Courts are exercisable alike in appeal by landlords or by tenants in the matter of taking notice of updated events.

9. In the case of Vishambharnath (supra), it has also been stated that 'even if true' events happening after passing of a decree in favour of the land­lord cannot be taken cognizance of. This proposition of law appeals to be too broadly stated. On this logic, the Courts cannot take notice of any subsequent happening, e. g., Later recovery of reasonably suitable house of his own during pendency of suit based on section 12 (1) (e) of the Act, even if true, although it is brought diligently to the notice of the Court. This will be acting clearly against the ratio of P. Venkateswarlu's case (supra). No doubt, there may be cases where subsequent events, even if true, may not have fundamental impact on right to the relief or on the manner of moulding the relief, yet there may be cases where it has a fundamental impact on the right to relief. In the former type of cases, it will be wholly unnecessary to take notice of the subsequent events; but in the later type of cases, it will be duty of the Courts-almost in nature of jurisdictional obligation to take cognizance of any change either in facts or in law. Accordingly, if it was intended to be laid down in Vishambharnath's case that in no case cognizance of subsequent events, even if true, can be taken, we will be constrained to express our dissent to it. Thus, the case of Vishambharnath acts either in oblivion or in disregard of law and procedure laid down by the Supreme Court, particularly in paras 32 and 33 of Nair Service Society's case (supra), para 6 of Venkateswarlu, and para 9 of Rameshwar's case (supra) and in para 7 of Mohanlal's case (supra). The position of law flowing from, and the procedure indicated in, these cases may be shortly stated thus:

(i) If a subsequent event is diligently brought to the notice of the Courts, it may be taken notice of by the Courts, provided that (a) thereby the Courts are not asked to reject the right but only to mould the relief or the manner of granting the relief and (b) taking of cognizance and giving effect to subsequent happening is not inhibited by the Act, by its scheme or otherwise, on which the proceeding is based.

(ii) If the subsequent event having fundamental impact on the right to relief is admitted, it may be given effect to.

(iii) If such subsequent happening, having fundamental impact on the right to relief, although brought diligently to the notice of the Court, is disputed the Courts may allow amendment of pleading or permit filing of additional pleading for the purpose.

10. Accordingly, we do not find ourselves in a position to agree with ratio of Vishwambharnath's case (supra). So far as Ramlal's Case is concerned, it affords a proper illustration of the exercise of the power to take cognizance of updated events as per proposition of law and procedure at No. (ii) above. But it in that case it was intended to lay down that the subsequent happening in order that its cognizance may be taken, should only be an admitted fact, we will be constrained to say that it will not be correct to limit the powers of the Courts to take notice of 'admitted' events only. To do so will be leav­ing party at the mercy of the opposite party, who, by falsely disputing it, may oust the power of the Courts to mould the relief, which exists for making it to accord with current relations. This cannot be the law and justice of the situation.

11. Now, let us take some illustrations. Suppose a landlord files a suit for eviction of his tenant on the ground that he has substantially damag­ed the suit premises, but later on, the tenant inducts a sub-tenant in the suit premises and the plaintiff wants to incorporate this as a ground in the suit, should the plaintiff be driven to file another suit ? Refusal to allow such an amendment will add to multiplicity of suits. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid principles, the landlord should be allowed leave to amend the plaint for the purpose of introduction of the ground, which has become available to him after the institution of the suit. Differently put, if the ground for recovery of possession arises after the filing of the ejectment suit, then that ground can also be combined with the cause of action on which the suit had already been instituted. If a landlord may on the strength of such a new cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the suit, which is pending, bring a new suit, then where is the bar and what is the propriety of not permitting him to include such a ground in the pending suit ? The object underlying the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly Order 2 and Order 7, appears to be that not only the claim based on the cause of action must be wholly included but also all the causes of action against the same defendant may also be impleaded in the same suit. Let us analyse the position. On the one hand, the landlord may apply for incorporating the ground in the suit and urge this ground to enlarge the existing 'cause of action. On the other hand, he would be entitled to file a fresh suit ignoring the ground which forms the basis of the suit already instituted. In practice, the landlord would be well advised in amending the suit for eviction rather than filing a separate one, for pursuing two separate eviction suits on two different grounds through vicissitudes of litigation would lead to uncertainty and possibility of injustice. The subsequently filed suit may be stayed on the principles embodied in section 10 or section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, termination of tenancy being in issue in both of them. Thus, the landlord will be deprived of the opportunity of proving his case in the subsequent suit till the previously instituted suit is finally decided. This will result in delaying the trial of the subsequent suit. Human memories fade. Evidence is likely to disappear. Multiplicity of proceeding may ensue and attainment of final decision may be delayed indefinitely, if not infinitely, which itself may lead to injustice. All these can be avoided if the ground arising subsequent to the institution of the suit is allowed to be added and tried with the pre-existing ground in the existing suit for eviction. Similar is the view of Bhachawat J. in Mst. Saritabai v. Laxmichand, 1979 M P R C J Note 26.

12. Let us take yet another cage. Suppose a landlord files a suit for eviction of his tenant on the ground of unlawful sub-letting. At the time of institution of the suit, the plaintiff is residing in his own house, but during pendency of the suit, either at the trial stage or at the appellate stage, the house falls down, for reasons beyond his control. There is no other house of his own in possession of the plaintiff. Thus, a new cause of action has arisen for seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit house. Now, the question is, should the plaintiff be driven to a new suit ? To drive him to a new suit is to be technical with a vengeance. It will simply be adding to multiplicity of proceedings, which must be avoided. In such a case, the only question of consequence is that of court-fees, a matter with which the parties are not concerned and the other party is not deprived of any defence, which is open to him. Now, let us take a converse case, where the plaintiff landlord files a suit for eviction on the basis of bona fide requirement for his personal residence. Now, during pendency of appeal, by his tenant, the plaintiff comes into possession of another reasonably suitable residential accommodation. It is obvious that in such a case, the Courts will not, and cannot decline, to take notice of such a subsequent event, which has the; effect of vanishing need of the plaintiff-landlord. These and similar other i illustrations can go to demonstrate the logic of and establish the necessity for the power to Jake notice of the happenings after a lis has been brought to the Court.

13 Now, what has to be examined is the impact of the special law contained in the 1961 Act on the power to take cognizance of subsequent events. We may first examine the object which the Act has to achieve. Unlike the agrarian law enacted by the Punjab Act, the 1961 Act does not provide for any acquisition of ownership by tenants in the suit pre­mises. It simply provides for regulation and control of letting and rent of accommodations and eviction of tenants therefrom. This is what is clear from its preamble. Its object is not to provide for acquisition of ownership and to bring about any reform of the character which the Punjab Act aimed at. This is clear from omission in the 1961 Act of the provision like sec­tion 18 (1) and (4) of the Punjab Act section 12 of the 1961 Act falls in Chapter 111-Control of Eviction of Tenants- and its heading is "Restriction on eviction of tenants". The preamble of section 12 (1) of the 1961 Act reads as under :-

"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, ... ... ... ... ..."

Thus, the aim of the said section is to put restriction on the right of land­lords to evict tenants. To put it differently, section 12 puts a procedural restriction on the right of landlords to evict tenants from accommodation situate in areas to which the 1961 Act applies. It casts a procedural dis­ability on the plaintiff landlords. A substantially similar preamble of sec­tion 3 of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (U. P. Act No 3 of 1947) came up for consideration before their Lord­ships of the Supreme Court in Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly., (1974) 1 S C C 202. The aforesaid preamble runs as under:

"No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accom­modation except on one or more of the following grounds.................."

In para 20 of Qudrat Ullah's case (supra), interpreting the aforesaid preamble, their Lordships observed that:

"It is more a procedural disability that is cast, not a substantive cause of action that is created."

Further, concluding in para 27, it was observed :

"(a) that a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinary law may not necessarily be transmuted into a sub­stantive right in the defendant."

Accordingly, the restrictions enacted by section 12 (1) of the 1961 Act create essentially a procedural disability on the landlord's right, to evict his tenant, under the general law or contract of lease. It does not create a substantive right in the tenant. Use of the word 'notwithstanding' in the preamble of section 12 (1) of the 1961 Act, indicates that what is intended thereby is to enact a prohibition. Where a contractual tenancy is properly determined, notwithstanding the landlord's right to possession under the Transfer of Property Act or the contract of lease, he cannot evict the tenant unless he files a suit for eviction on one or more of the grounds specified in section 12 (1) and satisfies the Court about the availability of one or more of the grounds. So construed, the object, which section 12 of the 1961 Act seeks to achieve, is to put procedural restrictions on the right of landlords to evict and not to confer substantive right on the tenants.

14. Now, the nature of restrictions imposed by the section 12 of the 1961 Act may be spelt out. The preamble of the section 12 (1), does not, in terms require that the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (p) should exist prior to the filing of the suit for eviction. We cannot read such a require­ment into the language employed in all of its clauses. It is only the pre-existence of the facts constituting grounds like (a), (c), (d) or (o) that has beep made, by their language, postulate of the Jaw. It is a well settled principle of interpretation of statutes that by process of construction the Courts cannot add/or read anything more into any provision of a statute.

15. In order to reach the conclusion that all the grounds enumerated in section 12 (1) of the 1961 Act, should exist prior to filing of the suit for eviction, one will have to read into grounds other than those tailing under the clauses (a), (c), (d) and (o) a further requirement to the effect they should exist before filing of the suit for eviction. We are afraid such a construction is legally not permissible. Accordingly, so far as the grounds other than (a), (c), (d) and (o) are concerned, it is not the postulate of law that they should exist before the institution of the suit.

16. As a logical corollary of the aforesaid position of law, it has to be stated that if the landlord wants to introduce in the plaint by amendment, any ground other than those falling under section 12 (1) (a), (c) (d-) and (o), becoming available after institution of the suit, the inclusion thereof is not inhibited by the Act, either by its scheme or otherwise. Even where the landlord omits inadvertently to base the suit on a pre-existing ground falling in clauses (a), (c), (d) or (o) of tire section 12 (1), there is no prohibition in law against their introduction by amendment of the plaint. Amendments generally relate back. After the amendment, the suit which was for ejectment continues to be one for ejectment, though based on additional ground so introduced.

17. In order to resist the conclusions we have reached, reliance cannot be usefully placed on the ratio of Ratanlal v Damodar Das, 1961 M P L J 7. It has to be noted that the suit in that case was instituted under M. B. Accommodation Control Act, 1950. During pendency thereof, M. P. Accommodation Con­trol Act 1955 came into force, with its section 17, which provided that no decree for eviction can be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 4 of the 1955 Act. On the construction of the provisions of section 4 read with section 17 of the 1955 Act, it was held in that case that in a suit instituted after corning into force of the Act, the landlord cannot evict the tenant on the ground of denial of the title, unless the denial is before the institution of the suit. In order to be successful in the suit, the denial must be shown to have taken place before the institution of the suit. Reliance was placed on the ratio of Jalbai v. Phirojsha, 1960 M P L J 595 and Maharaja Jey pore v. Rukmani, A I R 1919 P C 1 for arriving at this conclusion. Towards the end of the case, answering the question referred, it was held by the Division Bench of this Court that the landlord cannot avail himself of the denial of his title by the tenant in his written statement for obtaining a decree for eviction under section 4 of the Act. It would, of course, be open to the plaintiff landlord to amend the plaint so as to allege that there was in fact denial of the title before the suit was instituted.

18. From the aforesaid analysis, it is clear that the applicability of the ratio of Ratanlal's case (supra) is confined to and cannot extend beyond, the grounds like (a), (c), (d) and (o) of the 1961 Act, existence of which prior to institution of the suit for eviction is postulate of the law. In a case decided by Vijayvargiya J. reported in Ram Dus v. Kusumbai, 1979 M P R C J 22, it has been held that subsequent events (in that case of subletting the suit premises during pen­dency of suit) could not be permitted to be introduced in the suit by amend­ment in view of the language of section 12 of the Act. On the basis of the ratio of Ratanlal's case, in the case of Ram Das (supra) it has been concluded that the preamble of the section 12 (1) inhibits the exercise of power of the Courts to take notice of subsequent events and permit amendment for the purpose. As such, a ground becoming available after institution of the suit, cannot be allowed to be made ground for eviction, in that suit. As observed by us above, barring the case of subsequent availability of the grounds such as those under section 12 (1) (a), (c), (d) or (o), no such inhibition can be read into the section or the Act, either by its scheme or otherwise. While deciding the case of Ram Dan (supra), the distinction between the cases of grounds existence of which prior to institution of suit for eviction is a. legal requirement and the cases of grounds pre-existence of which is not postulate of the law, has been completely overlooked. Moreover, the ratio of P. Venkateswarlu's case has not been properly appreciated. The procedure expressly adopted in and permitted vide para 6 thereof has been utterly disregarded. Accordingly, the case reported in Ram Das v. Kusumbai does not lay down correct law and is hereby overruled.

19. Prior to pronouncement of P. Venkateswarlu (supra) decided on 18-3-1975, in Shivdayal v. Babybai, C. R. No. 270 of 1974 decided on 27-2-1975, it was held that

"if a landlord seeks to eject a tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in section 12(1) of the 1961 Act, then the ground must exist on the date of suit. If on any of the grounds mentioned in section 12 (1) a suit is filed and during the pendency of that suit there arises any ground for ejectment, then certainly that ground cannot be included in the pending suit. Because of this subsequent event if a landlord is entitled to evict tenant, then he may, if the law permits him, file another suit for ejectment, but certainly the ground which has arisen subsequent to the filing of the suit cannot be availed for ejectment of the tenant in the pending suit."

However, this view can no longer hold the field after laying down of the law in the case of P. Venkateswarlu's case (supra) by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and also in view of the law we are taking. Even prior to the pronouncement of P. Venkateswarlu's case (supra), power to take notice of subsequent events and give effect to them had been permitted to be exercised at second appellate stage in the case reported in Savitridevi v. Ramsarup, 1954 M B L J 1719. In that case eviction was sought on the basis of personal requirement of the landlord. The law on the point was laid down thus by P. V. Dixit, J., (as he then was):

"But the continued existence of the genuine requirement is an essential requisite for giving to the plaintiff the relief of ejectment If, therefore, this requirement disappears before the relief could be granted, the Court cannot but take notice of the altered circumstances and decline to give to the plaintiff the relief to which by his own act, he has disentitled him­self."

Similar was the view of A. P. Sen, J. (as he then was) in Bhaiyalalv. Chhotelal Tiwaris, 1971 M P L J Note 104, relevant portion whereof is extracted below:-

"There can be no doubt that if the suit was under section 12 (1) (e) or (f) of the Act, that is, with the personal requirement of the landlord, that need would come to an end with the transfer of the dismissed premises."

20. After pronouncement of law in the case of P. Venkateswarlu (supra), this Court has permitted bringing into notice of the Court subsequent events, both at the instance of tenant and landlord, as the case may be. Acting upon the ratio of P. Venkateswarlu's case (supra), in second appeal by tenant, C. P. Sen, J., Ramdulari v. Kanchan, 1976 (Vol. I) M P W N 51, B. R. Dube, J., in Bhojraj Sajwant v. The Binod Mills Company Ltd., Ujjain, 1977 (Vol II) M P W N 54,and Bajpai J., in Bhailal v. Pittobai, 1978 (Vol. II) M P W N 263, permitted bringing to notice of the Court subsequent events for the purpose of showing that the need of the plaintiff landlord had vanished. Subsequent events were permitted to be brought to the notice of the Court, at the instance of plaintiff landlord in second appeal filed by tenant by C. P. Sen, J., in Bhailal v. Deomani, 1977 M P L J Note 10. In this case, the plaintiff landlord was permitted to bring to the notice of the Court subsequent events for the purpose of making up deficiency of the cause of action, which arose on death of husband of the plaintiff-respondent. Similar is the view of Malik, J., in Jamunabai v. Padmawati, 1978 J L J Note 12 relying on the ratio of P. Venkateswarlu's case (supra). Of course, the Courts should be cautious in the matter of taking cognizance of updated events and should not permit the parties to make it an easy handle Jo get the trial re-opened by merely alleging that some subsequent event has taken place since judgment was rendered by the lower Court.

21. Accordingly, we answer the reference in affirmative. The appel­late Courts can take cognizance of subsequent events happening after a decree has been passed by the lower Court. Provided that the alleged subse­quent events have fundamental impact, as discussed above, on the right to the relief of ejectment or the manner of moulding that relief and further if it is diligently brought to the notice of the Court.

Reference answered.

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