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Ramjati Sharma v. M.P State Co-Operative Tribunal, Bhopal And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was filed against an order passed by the M. P. State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal.
The petitioner was an employee of respondent No.4 (District Co‑operative Central Bank Limited, Bhind), posted as Samiti Prabandhak at Sewa Sahakari Samiti, Pawai, District Bhind. While posted there, a show‑cause notice dated 29‑11‑1984 was served upon him levelling three charges:
- Non‑compliance of an order of transfer dated 22‑10‑1984;
- Remaining absent from duty in an unauthorised manner from 4‑10‑1984 onwards; and
- Defalcation of Rs. 2,032/‑.
The petitioner later deposited Rs. 2,032/‑ with respondent No.4. His services were terminated by an order dated 16‑3‑1985. The petitioner filed a dispute under section 55(2) of the M.P. Co‑operative Societies Act on 14‑3‑1986, which was admitted to be beyond thirty days from the date of termination.
The Assistant Registrar, Co‑operative Societies and the Joint Registrar held that the dispute was within time, treating limitation as commencing from the date of communication of the order, and they set aside the termination order. On second appeal before the Co‑operative Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the period for filing the dispute commenced from the date of the termination order, there was no provision to condone delay, and therefore the dispute was barred by limitation and dismissed. The petitioner filed this Article 227 petition challenging the Tribunal's order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the period of limitation under section 55(2) of the M.P. Co‑operative Societies Act commences from the date of passing of the order sought to be impugned or from the date of communication of that order to the aggrieved party.
- Whether the second proviso to section 55(2) (which excludes time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order) operates so as to extend the period where communication of the order by service is delayed.
- Whether a finding of fact on the question of limitation (i.e., whether the cause of action/knowledge arose on the date of passing or date of communication) is a finding of fact not open to interference in second appeal.
- What role, if any, formal service in the manner provided by section 86 of the Act plays when the employee has in fact acquired knowledge of the order.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner's application under section 55(2) was within thirty days from the date of communication of the order; the order was communicated by letter dated 14‑2‑1986, received on 15‑2‑1986, and the dispute filed on 14‑3‑1986 was therefore timely.
- The period of limitation should commence from the date of communication of the order and not from the date of passing of the order, because until communication the petitioner would not acquire knowledge of the order.
- The Assistant Registrar and the Joint Registrar had found that notice of termination was not served in accordance with law and that service (per section 86 of the Act and rule 75 of the M.P. Co‑operative Societies Rules, 1962) was required; thus the communication requirement should govern limitation.
- Reliance was placed on the second proviso to section 55(2) (time for obtaining copy to be excluded) and on authorities which hold that limitation starts from communication where there is no notice to the aggrieved party.
Respondent No.4's Arguments
- The period of limitation under section 55(2) commences from the date of passing of the order and does not commence from the date of communication of the order.
- The Tribunal found (para 12 of the impugned award) that the petitioner was informed on 17‑4‑1985 that his services had been terminated and thereafter, if the petitioner wanted to raise a dispute, he ought to have done so immediately; once the petitioner had acquired knowledge of the termination from service or other means, he could not rely on a later formal communication to extend limitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jange Singh and others vs. Board of Revenue and another (1978 RN 28) | Held that if a party aggrieved has no notice (actual or constructive) of the order, limitation starts from the date of communication of the order (considering section 50 of M.P. Land Revenue Code and Order XXII, Rule 1 CPC). | The court noted this authority as recognizing commencement of limitation from communication when the aggrieved party had no notice; the judgment was considered though the court ultimately emphasised the clear language of section 55(2) in the present Act. |
| Sher Khan vs. State of M.P. and others (2000 (3) MPLJ 331) | Held that limitation for appeal against order cancelling a firearm licence commences from date of communication of the decision in writing to the licensee; considered rules 55 and 46 of the M.P. Arms Rules. | The court recorded this case to show instances where legislation/rules clearly provided that limitation commences from issue/communication of order; but the court contrasted such express legislative language with the clear wording of section 55(2). |
| Barkatkhan vs. Board of Revenue and others (1979 RN 118) | Held that when an order is not formally communicated, the starting point of limitation shall be the date of formal communication of the order (considering section 77(3) relating to appeals). | The court cited this decision as authority for the proposition that formal communication may be required to start limitation where the order is not communicated; nonetheless the court relied on the explicit wording of section 55(2) to reach its conclusion for the present statutory context. |
| Amirtlal vs. Board of Revenue (1966 RN 31) | Interpreting section 50 of M.P. Land Revenue Code (third proviso to section 50(1)), held that time starts running "from the date of the order" and that expression cannot be construed as "from the date of the communication of the order". | The court relied on this authority's construction to support the proposition that where the statute uses the term "date of the order" without a provision like section 47's specific communication clause, limitation runs from the date the order is passed. |
| Dhar Central Co-operative Bank vs. Board of Revenue (7955 WN, Note No. 28) | Held that the dispute shall be filed within thirty days from the passing of the order and not from the date of communication of the order. | The court cited this decision directly in support of holding that the thirty‑day period runs from the date of passing of the order under the relevant statutory provision. |
| Saraswati Devi deceased through L.Rs. Rajendra Kumar Sharma and another vs. Krishnaram Baldeo Bank Ltd. and another (1998 (2) MPLJ 195) | Considering section 100 CPC, held that conclusion about limitation is a finding of fact and is not open for interference in second appeal. | The court recorded this authority to note that conclusions on limitation can be treated as findings of fact not ordinarily disturbed in a second appeal, a point relied upon by the petitioner but ultimately not sufficient to overturn the Tribunal. |
| Rajendra Vipnan Sahakari Samiti Ltd. vs. Harcharan Kada and another (1994 MPLJ 851) | Held that cause of action accrues to the employee on the date when he was not allowed to rejoin duties; but considering first proviso to section 55(2), limitation is to be computed from the date of the order. | The court relied on this decision’s reasoning to show that while cause of action may arise on an operative event (e.g., not being allowed to rejoin), the statute's specific proviso makes the date of the order the relevant date for computing limitation under section 55(2). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
- Interpretation of section 55(2): The court began by reproducing section 55(2) and its provisos. It held that the plain language of the first proviso is clear and unambiguous: the Registrar (or prescribed officer) shall not entertain a dispute unless presented within thirty days of the date of the order appealed against. Thus, the period of limitation is tied to the date of passing of the order.
- Role of the second proviso: The court observed that the second proviso excludes from computation the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order. Thus, if a party applies for and waits to obtain a copy, that interval may be excluded when computing limitation, but that proviso does not convert the general rule that limitation begins from the date of the order.
- Precedents recognising communication as start point where there is no notice: The court acknowledged authorities (e.g., Jange Singh, Barkatkhan, Sher Khan) which hold that when an aggrieved party had no notice (actual or constructive) of an order, limitation may commence from formal communication. The court noted these authorities but treated them as distinguishable or subject to the particular statutory wording in those contexts.
- Acquisition of knowledge by the petitioner: The court relied on factual findings in the impugned award (para 12) and the petitioner's own admission (Annexure P/6) that he had noted the termination order on or about 16‑4‑1985 when he went to join duty after leave. The court treated that admission as prima facie evidence of knowledge of the order.
- Effect of section 86 (service) and rule 75: The court reasoned that compliance with the service procedure under section 86 or rule 75 is not decisive where the aggrieved party has in fact acquired knowledge of the order. Acknowledgment under section 86 is prima facie proof of service, and where knowledge has been acquired, service formalities are immaterial for the starting point of limitation.
- Duty to apply for copy if aware: Once the employee had acquired knowledge of termination, it was the employee’s duty to apply for a copy of the order if he wished to claim exclusion of time under the second proviso. The petitioner could not claim the benefit of postal communication time where he had already acquired knowledge.
- Legislative history and wording: The court observed that the thirty‑day limitation was introduced by Act No. 14 of 1976 (with effect from 5‑12‑1975) and emphasised the significance of the word "order" in the first proviso to section 55(2). Because the statute expressly ties limitation to the date of the order, the court gave primacy to that expression.
- Conclusion of law applied to facts: Applying the statutory construction and the factual finding that the petitioner had noted the order on 16‑4‑1985, the court held that the Tribunal did not err in concluding that the dispute filed on 14‑3‑1986 was barred by limitation.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petition dismissed. The Article 227 petition fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.
Implications:
- The Co‑operative Tribunal's finding that the dispute under section 55(2) was filed beyond the thirty‑day limitation period stands, and the Tribunal's dismissal of the dispute as barred by limitation is upheld.
- The court emphasised that, under section 55(2) as worded, limitation ordinarily commences from the date of passing of the order; the second proviso only excludes time for obtaining a copy of the order once sought.
- The decision's direct effect is limited to the parties: the petitioner's challenge to the Tribunal's limitation finding is rejected. The opinion does not purport to establish a new broad rule beyond the court's statutory construction and application to the admitted facts in this case.
End of summary based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion.
This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed against the order passed by M. P. State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal.
2. Petitioner was an employee of respondent No. 4-District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Bhind. Petitioner was posted as Samiti Prabandhak and Sewa Sahakari Samiti. Petitioner was a cadre employee of respondent No. 4-bank. While the petitioner was posted at Sewa Sahakari Samiti Pawai, district Bhind, a show-cause notice dated 29-11-1984 was served upon him levelling three charges. The charges were as under : -
(i) non-compliance of order of transfer dated 22-10-1984;
(ii) remaining absent from duty in an unauthorised manner from 4-10-1984 onwards; and, (iii) defalcation of Rs. 2.032/-.
3. The petitioner later deposited the amount of Rs. 2,032/- with the respondent No. 4-bank. Petitioner's services were terminated vide order dated 16-3-1985. Petitioner filed a dispute under section 55(2) of M. P. Cooperative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). This dispute was filed on 14-3-1986. Admittedly, the dispute was filed beyond thirty days from the date of termination.
4. Petitioner contended that his application under section 55(2) of the Act was well within thirty days from the date of communication of the order. Petitioner contended that the order was communicated to him by letter dated 14-2-1986, which was received by him on 15-2-1986, therefore, dispute filed on 14-3-1986 is well within time. The Assistant Registrar Co-operative Societies and Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies held that dispute is well within time and period shall commence from the date of communication of the order and not from the date of passing of the order. Assistant Registrar as well as Joint Registrar allowed the application and set aside the order of termination. In second appeal before Co-operative Tribunal, the Co-operative Tribunal has held that the period for filing dispute shall commence from the date of termination order and there is no provision for condoning the delay in filing the dispute. Therefore, Tribunal held that the dispute was filed beyond limitation and application under section 55(2) of the Act was dismissed as barred by limitation.
5. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in second Appeal finding of fact on the question of limitation could not be set aside by the Tribunal. Secondly, it was contended that the limitation shall commence from the date of communication of the order and not from the date of passing of the order. Counsel for petitioner further submitted that until and unless the order is communicated to the petitioner, petitioner will not acquire knowledge of the order of termination. Therefore, the order which was not communicated to the petitioner itself is bad in law. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the finding has been recorded by the Assistant Registrar as well as Joint Registrar that notice of termination was not served upon the petitioner in accordance with law. Counsel for the petitioner invited attention to section 86 of the Act and submitted that notice is required to be served in a manner provided under section 86 of the Act. Petitioner also invited attention to rule 75 of M. P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') for procedure for service of notice upon respondents. Counsel for petitioner, therefore, submitted that period of limitation shall commence from the date order was communicated. Counsel for petitioner placed strong reliance upon second proviso to Section 55, sub-section (2) of the Act.
6. Counsel for respondent No. 4 supported the order and submitted that period of limitation shall commence from the date of passing of the order and shall not commence from the date of communication of the order. Counsel for respondents further invited attention to para 12 of the impugned award, wherein finding is recorded that the petitioner was informed on 17-4-1985 that his services have been terminated and thereafter if petitioner wanted to raise the dispute, he ought to have raised the dispute immediately thereafter. Petitioner cannot get benefit of communication of order once he has acquired knowledge of the order of termination from service.
7. To appreciate the controversy, section 55(2) of the Act is reproduced below :-
"55(2) Where a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society arises between a society and its employees, it shall be referred to the Registrar or any other officer appointed by him not below the rank of Assistant Registrar, the Registrar or such officer as the case may be shall decide the dispute and his decision shall be binding on the society and its employees :
Provided that the Registrar or the officer referred to above shall not entertain the dispute unless presented to him within thirty days of the date of order appealed against:
Provided further that in computing the period of limitation under the foregoing proviso, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order shall be excluded."
8. In the case of Jange Singh and others vs. Board of Revenue and another reported in 1978 RN 28, the Court interpreted the scope of section 50 of M. P. Land Revenue Code, and has held that if the party aggrieved having no notice of the order either actual or constructive, limitation starts from the date of communication of the order while considering the scope of Order XXII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this judgment was referred while considering the scope of section 17 of the Indian Forest Act.
9. Counsel for the petitioner then referred to the judgment in the case of Sher Khan vs. State of M. P. and others reported in 2000(3) MPLJ 331. In this case, it is held that limitation for filing appeal against the order cancelling fire-arm licence shall commence from the date of communication of the decision in writing to the licensee. The Division Bench of this Court has considered the scope of rules 55 and 46 of the M. P. Arms Rules. Language of rule 55 of the M. P. Arms Rules is clear, wherein it is provided that the person aggrieved by such order may, within thirty days from the date of issue of the order, prefer an appeal. Thus, in the facts of the case, Legislature has intended that limitation shall commence from the date of issue of the order under rule 55 of M. P. Arms Rules.
10. In the case of Barkatkhan vs. Board of Revenue and others reported in 7979 RN 118, Division Bench of this Court considering the scope of section 77(3) of the Act has held that when order is not formally communicated, starting point of limitation shall commence from the date of formal communication of the order. Thus, it is held that there should be communication of the order. The Division Bench was examining the scope of sub-section (3) of section 77 of the Act. Section 77 relates to an appeal.
11. While interpreting the scope of section 50 of M. P. Land Revenue Code, Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of section 50 of M. P. Land Revenue Code in the case of Amirtlal vs. Board of Revenue reported in 1966 RN 31, wherein third proviso to section 50(1) of M. P. Land Revenue Code was considered and it was held that time shall start running "from the date of the order". It is further held that on no principle of construction, this expression can be construed as meaning "from the date of the communication of the order to the party concerned". Division Bench considered the intention of Legislature and observed that under section 47 of the Code specific provision is made regarding commencement of limitation from the date of communication of the order appealed from but no such provision has been made in regard to revision under section 50 of the code, therefore, it was held that period shall commence from the date of passing of the order.
12. In the case of Dhar Central Co-operative Bank vs. Board of Revenue reported in 7955 WN, Note No. 28, it is held that the dispute shall be filed within thirty days from the passing of the order and not from the date of communication of the order.
13. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Saraswati Devi deceased through L.Rs. Rajendra Kumar Sharma and another vs. Krishnaram Baldeo Bank Ltd. and another reported in 1998 (2) MPLJ195, wherein the Court considering the scope of section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, held that conclusion about limitation is a finding of fact and is not open for interference in second appeal.
14. From bare perusal of section 55(2) of the Act it is clear that limitation shall commence from the date of passing of the order. The language is clear and unambiguous. Second proviso to section 55(2) excludes the period of limitation for the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order. Thus, when copy of order is applied, time required for obtaining copy shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Proviso No. (1) is specific and prohibits Registrar from entertaining the dispute unless presented to him within thirty days from the date of order sought to be impugned.
15. Contention of counsel for the petitioner that the order must be communicated in the manner provided under section 86 of the Act, shall have no force if the petitioner has acquired knowledge of the order. If the petitioner has acquired knowledge of the order, it was his duty to apply for copy of the order and he was entitled for exclusion of time for the period required in obtaining copy of the order. Service of notice will be immaterial in the case where intention of Legislature is that the employee must raise the service dispute from the date of passing of the order. In para 12 of the impugned award, it is apparent that the order was communicated and noted by the petitioner that his services have been terminated on 17-4-1985 and this fact is admitted by the petitioner in his evidence, which is filed as Annexure P/6 with the petition. This witness has categorically stated that when he went to join his duty after leave on 16-4-1985 at Branch Umri, he has noted the order that his services have been terminated. Thus, it is apparent that the order was communicated to the petitioner in person and he has noted the order. Even under section 86 of the Act, it is provided that the acknowledgment purported to be signed by such person is a prima facie proof of service. In the present case, petitioner himself has admitted that he has noted the order of termination on 16-4-1985. Thus, from the statement of petitioner himself second Appellate Court has not committed any error in holding that the petitioner has acquired knowledge of order of termination of his services. Once the employee has acquired knowledge of termination of his service, it is for him to apply for copy of the order to claim exclusion of time in getting the copy of order under second proviso to section 55(2) of the Act. The petitioner cannot take benefit of the order sent to him by post and take advantage of the time. First Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 55 is clear, wherein it provides that Registrar shall not entertain the dispute unless presented to him within thirty days from the date of the order sought to be impugned.
16. Limitation of thirty days has been introduced in the Art by act no. 14 of 1976 with effect from 5-12-1975 and word "order" is very much significant in first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 55 of the Act.
17. In the case of Rajendra Vipnan Sahakari Samiti Ltd. vs. Harcharan Kada and another reported in 1994 MPLJ 851, it is held that the cause of action shall accrue to the employee on the date when he was not allowed to rejoin the duties and it is this date which 'is material and limitation should be computed from the date when he was not allowed to join, but considering the scope of first proviso to section 55(2) of the Act it is very clear that the limitation shall commence from the date of order. The petitioner had cause of action twice. Firstly, when the order is passed and secondly when he was not permitted to join on 16-4-1985 and on that date he has noted the order about termination of his service. As such, from the date from 15-4-1985 the dispute ought to have been filed within thirty days from that date. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the letter communicating him order of termination. As such, no error is committed by the Co-operative Tribunal in dismissing the application under section 55(2) of the Act as barred by limitation.
18. In the result, petition fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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