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Commissioner Of Income Tax, M. P., Nagpur And Bhandara v. Straw Products Ltd., Bhopal
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Pandey J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a reference under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act made by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Bhandara. The referral posed a single question asking whether, given paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949 and clause 8 of an agreement dated 20th September 1938 between the assessee and the State of Bhopal, the correct basis for computing the written-down value (WDV) of depreciable assets as at 1-11-1948 is that adopted by the Income-tax Officer or that adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The assessee is a public limited company incorporated in the erstwhile State of Bhopal in 1938 and commencing business on 30th May 1939. Under an agreement dated 20th September 1938, clause 8(a) granted the company immunity from paying any sum by way of taxation to the State for a period of ten years from taking over the land for business purposes (a period ending 31st October 1948). As a result, during that period the company was not subject to the Bhopal Income Tax Act: it neither filed returns nor was it assessed under that Act.
After the merger of Bhopal into the Union and extension of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 to the merged State, the company was assessed for the period 1-11-1943 to 31-12-1948 (assessment year 1949-50) and for subsequent years up to 1953-54. In these assessments depreciation was allowed on original cost in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949.
The Income-tax Officer later formed the opinion that excessive depreciation had been allowed (after reading about a Bombay High Court decision), and issued notices under section 34(1) for assessment years 1952-53 and 1953-54. By orders dated 4th March 1958 he reduced the depreciation allowances for those years on the ground that, although tax was exempted, depreciation must be treated as having been "actually allowed" during the exempt period. The company appealed and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeals by consolidated order dated 1st September 1958. The Department further appealed to the Tribunal, which affirmed the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by order dated 21st September 1959. The present reference seeks the Court's opinion on which basis for computing the WDV is correct.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in view of paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949, and clause 8 of the Agreement of 20th September 1938 between the assessee and the State of Bhopal, the correct basis for computing the written-down value of depreciable assets as at 1-11-1948 is the basis adopted by the Income-tax Officer or the basis adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
Arguments of the Parties
Department / Advocate-General (supporting the Income-tax Officer)
- The Advocate-General argued that by enacting the Income Tax Act, 1936 the Ruler of Bhopal had restricted his power to grant exemption except by legislation and, therefore, the agreement alone could not amount to a legislative order exempting liability to pay tax; any exemption should have been effected by a notification under section 65(1) of the Bhopal Act.
- Relying on authority (The Nandlal Bhandari Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Bharat), it was submitted that the agreement by itself was not a legislative order and that some official notification would be expected to sustain the exemption; accordingly the company all the while remained subject to the provisions of the Bhopal Act.
- Given that position, it was contended that the Explanation under clause 2 of the Taxation Laws (Part B States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950 (which deems certain carried-forward or taken-into-account allowances to have been "actually allowed") should inform the construction of clause 2 of the 1949 Order, and that the depreciation ought to be treated as having been actually allowed.
Income-tax Officer's Reasoning
- The Income-tax Officer took the view that the exemption related to liability to pay tax but the income remained assessable under the Bhopal Act; therefore, when computing net income exempt from tax it should be presumed that all admissible depreciation under that Act had been actually allowed — i.e., depreciation must be treated as having been allowed during the exempt period.
- On that basis the Officer reduced subsequent depreciation claims on the ground that earlier allowances (though not formally given) must be treated as having been actually allowed.
Assessee / Appellate Authority
- The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that where there was an exemption from taxation (as per the agreement), there could be no question that depreciation had been "actually allowed" during the exempt period; "actually allowed" does not mean a mere mental or deemed allowance and requires affirmative allowance in an assessment.
- The Tribunal affirmed this view, interpreting clause 8(a) of the agreement as meaning that for the ten-year period the company shall not be assessed to tax (given the definition of "assessee" in the Bhopal Income Tax Act as one by whom income-tax is payable) and observing that during the ten-year period no notices or steps to assess the company had been taken by the Nawab's Government.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta v. Kamla Mills Ltd., Calcutta XVII (1949) I T R 130 | Establishes that the expression "actually allowed" is unambiguous and denotes an allowance actually given effect to (distinguished from a deemed allowance). | The Court relied on this authority to construe "actually allowed" in clause 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949 and to reject the Department's contention that depreciation should be treated as having been "actually allowed" when no allowance in fact took place. |
| The Nandlal Bhandari Mills, Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Bharat (C.A. Nos. 344–346 of 1960, Dated 17-7-1961) | Addresses the nature of a legislative order and indicates that a legislative order should be a general order emanating from the Sovereign Ruler and promulgated in the normal manner. | The Advocate-General invoked this authority to argue that the agreement could not by itself constitute a valid legislative exemption; the Court noted the argument but did not decide the factual question on the basis that the parties had accepted the agreement's validity for purposes of the reference. |
| Shrimati Hira Devi and others v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, AIR 1952 SC 362 = 1952 SCR 1122 | States that courts should not fill gaps or omissions in a statute by stretching the words used; the Court should not import provisions meant for another similar order. | The Court relied on this principle to refuse to import by construction the Explanation contained in the 1950 Order (concerning Part B States) into clause 2 of the 1949 Order concerning Merged States. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded on the mutual acceptance before the Tribunal that the agreement of 20th September 1938 was valid and, because the basis for treating it as a sovereign exemption or a notification under section 65(1) of the Bhopal Act involved factual controversy not raised or investigated by the taxing authorities, it would not entertain that issue for the first time in the reference.
The Court analysed the question in two alternative ways:
- Primary analysis on the accepted basis of the agreement's operation: The charging section (section 3) of the Bhopal Act taxed the total income of an "assessee", and "assessee" was defined as a person by whom income-tax is payable. Because under the agreement the company was not liable to pay any sum by way of taxation for the ten-year period, it was not an "assessee" within the meaning of the charging section and therefore was not subject to the provisions of the Bhopal Act during that period. On this ground alone the Department's contention fails.
- Alternate analysis assuming arguendo the company remained governed by the Bhopal Act: The computation of written-down value requires taking "the actual cost ... less all depreciation actually allowed to him under this Act or under any Act repealed thereby or under executive orders ...". Clause 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949 modifies this only to require that "all depreciation actually allowed under any laws or rules of a merged State" be taken into account. The Court emphasised that the expression "actually allowed" is unambiguous: it connotes an allowance actually given effect to, as opposed to a deemed allowance. Relying on Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kamla Mills Ltd., the Court held that since no depreciation had in fact been actually allowed prior to 1-11-1948, clause 2 of the 1949 Order afforded no support to the Department's position.
The Department's submission that clause 2 of the 1949 Order should be read in the light of the Explanation in the 1950 Order (which uses deeming language to treat carried-forward allowances as if they had been actually allowed) was rejected for two reasons stated by the Court:
- If it had been intended that the 1949 Order should carry the principle of the 1950 Explanation, there was no reason for not introducing it expressly in the 1949 Order; its omission suggested it was not intended.
- It could be a case of casus omissus, and the Court invoked Shrimati Hira Devi to emphasise that it is not the duty of the Court to fill statutory omissions by stretching words or importing a fiction intended for a different order.
For these reasons the Court concluded that the interpretation favouring the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's approach (that "actually allowed" requires an actual allowance and that the company was not an assessee during the exempt period) was correct.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court answered the reference by holding that, in the circumstances of this case, the correct basis for computing the written-down value of the company's depreciable assets as at 1-11-1948 is the one adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
Immediate consequences and directions:
- The Department is ordered to pay all costs of this reference.
- Hearing fee ordered: Rs. 75.
Broader implications: The opinion does not discuss broader precedent-creating effects; its direct effect is therefore the resolution of the parties' dispute in favour of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's computation method and the award of costs to the company. No broader implications were elaborated in the opinion.
Reference answered accordingly.
Pandey J.-
This is a reference under section 66 (I) of the Income Tax Act at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Bhandara. The question formulated and referred to this Court for opinion is as follows:
"Whether, on the facts of the case and having regard to the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949, and clause 8 of the Agreement made on 20th September 1938, between the assessee and the State of Bhopal, the correct basis for computing the written down value of the depreciable assets as at 1-11-1948 is the one which is adopted by the Income-tax Officer or the one adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner ?"
2. The assessee is a public limited company. It was incorporated in the erstwhile State of Bhopal in 1938 and it commenced business on 30th May 1939. The company had obtained under an agreement dated 20th September 1938 made between it and the then Government of Bhopal several concessions. One of these is contained in clause 8 (a) of the agreement which reads as follows:
"During the period of 10 years from the date on which the said Company takes over the land for its business purposes, the said Company shall not be liable to pay any sum by way of taxation to the State."
In view of this immunity, which the company enjoyed for 10 years ending on 31st October 1948, it was not subjected to any tax under the Income Tax Act, 193(3, which was in force in the State of Bhopal. Indeed, throughout this period, neither it was required to submit any return of its income nor was its income assessed under that Act. On 1st August 1949, that State merged in the Union of India and was constituted a Chief Commissioner's Province. By the Taxation Laws (Extension to Merged States and Amendment) Act, 1949, the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the Act), was extended to the merged State of Bhopal. The company was first assessed to tax for the assessment year 1949-50 on the total income for the period 1st November 1943 to 31st December 1948. There were subsequent assessments for the years 1950-51, 1951-52, 1952-53 and 1953-5i. In all these assessments, depreciation on machinery, buildings and other assets was allowed on the basis of the original cost in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949.
3. It transpired that subsequently the Income-tax Officer, Bhopal, read about a decision of the Bombay High Court and formed the opinion that in these cases excessive depreciation was allowed. Thereupon, he initiated action under section 34 (1) of the Act for the assessment years 1952-53 and 1953-54 and issued notice to the company, which, appearing in response to the notices, raised without any success several objections. Ultimately, by two separate orders dated 4th March 1958, the Income-tax Officer reduced the depreciation allowance for the assessment year 1952-53 from Rs. 2,71,961 to Us. 1,29,883 and for the year 1953-54 from Rs. 2,87,285 to Rs. 1,72,673. This is what the Income-tax Officer stated:
"It has thus been asserted on behalf of the company that no depreciation was ever actually allowed to the company during the period it was exempt from Bhopal Income Tax Act. Thus whatever depreciation has been claimed by the company in the subsequent years on original cost of assets is correct. The argument of the company appears to ignore one important fact and it is that what was exempted from tax under the Bhopal Income Tax Act was the net income of the company. Thus the depreciation due under that Act should be taken to have been allowed. It has to be remembered that the exemption which was conferred upon the company by the Bhopal Government was an exemption from tax, that is to say, the Act was applicable to the asseesee-company, but even if there was any profit during the period of 10 years mentioned in the agreement, the tax to be demanded was to be nil. It has also to be borne in mind that assess ability of income and liability to pay tax are two different conceptions. In this case, the company's income was assessable even during the period of 10 years mentioned in the agreement and the Bhopal Income Tax Act was applicable to it; but under the agreement no tax was to be demanded even though there might have been profits during this period of 10 years. Thus in computing the net income of the company which was exempt from tax, it will have to be presumed that all admissible depreciation under the Bhopal Income Tax Act was actually allowed.
4. The company preferred two separate appeals which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed by a consolidated order dated 1st September 1958. He took the view that if there was exemption from taxation, there could be no question of depreciation having been actually allowed at any time because the expression "actually allowed" would not imply depreciation allowed by a mental process or one deemed to have been allowed.
5. The Department appealed against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but the Tribunal affirmed the view taken by him. In its order dated 21st September 1959, the Tribunal inter alia stated:
"Regarding the second contention, clause 8 of that agreement states that during the period of 10 years from the date on which the assessee-company takes over the land for its business purposes the said company shall not be liable to pay any sum by way of taxation to the State. It may at once be stated that under the Sovereignty vested in the then Nawab of Bhopal he could grant any exemption or immunity from the operation of the provisions of any Act, taxation or otherwise. This position is not controverter by the Department either. Therefore, the only question now is what is the scope of this clause 8 (a). The assesssee has been defined in the Bhopal Income Tax Act, section 2 (2) as under assessee means a person by whom income-tax is payable.
Applying this definition, if we read this sub-clause, it would mean that during the period of 10 years this company shall not be assessed to tax. It may mean that this company for a period of 10 years shall not be subjected to the process of assessment, levy or collection of any tax as the liability is consequential to such assessment, levy or collection. There is also the fact that for the period of these 10 years the Nawab or his Government had not issued any notices or taken any steps to call upon the company to submit its return or make assessments under the Act."
6. The learned Advocate-General proceeded to support the reference in this manner. By enacting the Income Tax Act, 1936, the Ruler of Bhopal has restricted his own power to grant, save by legislation, exemption from the liability to pay tax on income and he could do so only under section 65 of that act. It was not shown that there was any firm in or legislative order exempting the company from the liability to pay tax on income. The agreement, by itself, was not, and could not be, such an order more particularly because, as recently indicated by the Supreme Court in The Nandlal Bhandari Mills, Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Bharat C. A. Nos. 344 to 346 of 1960, D/- 17-7-1961 (now Madhya Pradesh), a legislative order should be a general order emanating from the Sovereign Ruler and promulgated in the same manner as any other rule. In the circumstances, so the learned Advocate-General further submitted, a notification in the Ja-rida under section 65 (1) of the Bhopal Act was likely to have been issued to sustain the exemption granted by the agreement. In this view, the company all the while remained subject to the provisions of the bhopal act and, although no depreciation was actually allowed, it must be deemed to have been so allowed on the principle underlying a provision in pari materia namely the Explanation under clause 2 of the Taxation Laws (Part B States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950.
7. Having heard the counsel at some length, we find it difficult to accept the argument advanced by the learned Advocate-General. As we have indicated earlier, both parties accepted before the Tribunal that the agreement dated 20th September 1938 was valid, without raising any dispute about the basis on which it has to be so regarded. It is also obvious that there is now a serious controversy about that basis involving questions of fact, one party claiming that the immunity from taxation was granted in the exercise of the Sovereign powers of the Ruler and the other explaining it as an exemption attributable to a notification issued under section 65 (1) of the Bhopal Act. Since this aspect of the matter was not raised before, or investigated by, the taxing authorities, it cannot be permitted to be raised before us for the first time. In dealing with this reference, we would proceed on the accepted basis that there was a valid agreement dated 20th September 1938 and that, under one of its terms, the company was not liable to pay for 10 years any sum by way of taxation of the State.
8. The charging section 3 of the Bhopal Act subjected to tax the total income of an assessee, who, according to clause (2) of section 2 of that Act was a person by whom income-tax was payable. Since the company was, in virtue of the agreement dated 20th September 1988, not liable to pay any tax, it was not an assessee within the meaning of the charging section and was not, therefore, subject to the provisions of the Act. This by itself is a sufficient answer to the contention put forward on behalf of the Department.
9. Even if we accept that, notwithstanding the agreement dated 20th September 1938, the company continued to be governed by the provisions of the. Bhopal Act, we are of the view that, in this case, the depreciation had to be calculated on the basis of the actual cost. Under the relevant provision of the Act governing computation of the written down value,
"the actual cost to him when he first acquired those assets less all depreciation actually allowed to him under this Act or under any Act repealed thereby or under executive orders issued when the Indian Income Tax Act, 1886 (II of 1886) was in force."
had to be taken into account for allowing depreciation. This has been partially modified by clause 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949, which reads as follows:
"In making any assessment under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, all depreciation actually allowed under any laws or rules of a merged State relating to income-tax and super-tax, shall be taken into account in computing the aggregate depreciation allowance referred to in sub-clause (c) of the proviso to clause (vi) of sub-section (2), and the written down value under clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 10 of the said Act;
Provided that where in respect of any asset, depreciation has been allowed for any year both in the assessment made in the merged State and in British India, the greater of the two sums allowed shall only be taken into account."
It is obvious that the only modification introduced by the clause is that all depreciation actually allowed under any law or rules of a merged State relating to income-tax and super-tax and not merely those under the Act must be taken into account. Now, the expression "actually allowed" is unambiguous and connotes the idea that, the allowance was actually given effect to: Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta v. Kamla Mills Ltd., Calcutta XVII (1949) I T R 130. It must be contradistinguished from what is deemed to be actually allowed as provided by the Explanation under clause (c) of section 10 (5) of the Act. Since it is accepted that, in this case, no depreciation was actually allowed before 1st November 1948, clause 2 of the Order is of no avail to the Department.
10. It is, however, urged that clause 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949, should be construed in the light of the Explanation under clause 2 of the Taxation Laws (Part B States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950. That Explanation is as under:
"Explanation.-For the purpose of this paragraph, the expression 'all depreciation actually allowed under any laws or rules of a Part B State' means and' shall be deemed always to have meant the aggregate allowance for depreciation taken into account in computing the written down value under any law or rules of a Part B State or carried forward under the said laws or rule a."
We are unable to accept this contention for two reasons. In the first place, unless it was intended not to apply the principle underlying the Explanation, we see no good reason for not introducing it under clause 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949. Secondly, it may be a case of casus omissus. In Shrimati Hira Devi and others v. District Board, Shahjahanpur AIR 1952 SC 362 = 1952 SCR 1122, the Supreme Court pointed out that it is certainly not the duty of the Court to fill in gaps and omissions in an Act by stretching the words therein used. Much less can this be done by importing a fiction intended expressly for another similar order concerning income-tax in Part B States.
11. In the view we have taken of this case, our answer to the question referred to us must be that, in the circumstances of this case, the correct basis for computing the written-down value of depreciable assets of the company is the one adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We also direct that the Department shall pay all costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 75.
Reference answered accordingly.
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