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Dilip Kaushal And Another v. State Of M.P And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This full bench reference arose from an order dated 21-8-2007 made by a division bench in Writ Petition No. 5807 of 2006. Two petitioners (described in the opinion as a corporator of the Indore Municipal Corporation and a mechanical engineer) filed a public interest litigation under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the lay-out sanctioned by the Indore Municipal Corporation for construction of a building belonging to respondent no. 4.
On 21-3-2006 the division bench issued notices and directed that the interim prayer be considered after service on the respondents. Respondent no. 4 raised a preliminary objection that an alternative remedy was available to the petitioners under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 to apply to the district court for an injunction for removal or alteration of the building. The petitioners' counsel drew attention to an earlier division bench decision in Radhakishan Sharma v. Pravin Kumar (1996 MPACJ 55), which had construed "any other person" in S.307(5) as limited to persons directly affected in respect of their individual property rights.
The division bench in W.P. No. 5807 of 2006 concluded that Radhakishan Sharma required reconsideration and referred the following question of law to the full bench for opinion:
"Whether the locus-standi under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the Act is restricted to a person affected by the violation complained of or encompasses all persons resident within the area to which the Act applies?"
The full bench heard counsel for the petitioners, the State, the Indore Municipal Corporation, and respondent no. 4 before delivering the opinion summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the locus-standi under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 is restricted to a person directly affected by the violation complained of (i.e., someone with an individual property interest), or whether it encompasses all persons resident within the area to which the Act applies.
- Whether an alternative statutory remedy under sub-section (5) of section 307 is available to the petitioners in the underlying writ petition (raised as a preliminary objection by respondent no. 4).
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent no. 4's Arguments
- Raised a preliminary objection that an alternative remedy was available under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 — i.e., the petitioners could apply to the district court for injunction for removal or alteration of the building.
- Counsel for respondent no. 4 (Mr. A. K. Chitle) relied on Supreme Court decisions interpreting the word "any" (cited in the opinion) to support their position concerning interpretation of statutory language.
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners' counsel (Mr. Vivek Dalai) relied on the earlier division bench decision in Radhakishan Sharma v. Pravin Kumar (1996 MPACJ 55), which had held that the expression "any other person" in S.307(5) should be read to mean a person directly affected in respect of his individual property right, and therefore the petitioners might not have an alternative statutory remedy under S.307(5).
Other Parties
The opinion records appearances by counsel for the State (Mr. Ashok Kutumble) and for the Indore Municipal Corporation (Mr. Anand Agrawal) but does not set out detailed, distinct arguments by them in the text of the opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Radhakishan Sharma v. Pravin Kumar (1996 MPACJ 55) | Held that "any other person" under sub-section (5) of section 307 should be construed, with aid from the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to mean only such person who might feel directly affected in respect of his individual right to property. | The full bench reviewed this earlier division bench decision and concluded that it had taken a narrow view by importing principles of the Specific Relief Act and CPC into S.307(5). The full bench overruled Radhakishan Sharma, finding its narrower construction incorrect in the context of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. |
| Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M. N. Shanmugham Chetty and others, (1987) 2 SCC 707 | Interpreted the word "any" (relying on Black's Law Dictionary): "any" has diverse meanings and its meaning in a statute depends on context; it can indicate "all" or "every" as well as "some" or "one". | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the word "any" in S.307(5) should be interpreted with regard to context and subject-matter, permitting a wide meaning in the present statute. |
| Lucknow Development Authority v. M. K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243 | Held that the word "any" may be used in a wider sense (from one to all), depending on context and subject-matter; cited Black's Law Dictionary for the same principle. | The court cited this decision for the same interpretive rule and used it to justify construing "any other person" in S.307(5) broadly to include all persons within the municipal area, given the context of building-control provisions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The full bench proceeded through a stepwise analysis constrained by the text of the opinion:
- Textual reading of S.307(5): The court quoted and emphasized the statutory language of sub-section (5) of section 307, noting that it expressly provides that "the corporation or any other person" may apply to the district court for injunction for removal or alteration of a building that contravenes the Act or the byelaws.
- Interpretation of the word "any": The court referred to Supreme Court authorities (Shri Balaganesan Metals and Lucknow Development Authority) relying on Black's Law Dictionary to observe that the meaning of "any" is variable and must be determined by context and subject-matter; in some contexts it may mean "all" or "every".
- Context and subject-matter of the statute: Section 307 is located in Chapter XXIV titled "building control", which contains regulatory provisions governing construction within the municipal area. The court reasoned that the legislative purpose — providing remedies for contraventions of the Act and byelaws — supports conferring a remedy on the corporation and on "any other person".
- Legislative intent and scope of remedy: Because the Act and byelaws impose obligations on buildings generally, the court concluded the legislature intended to provide a remedy for contraventions that is available not only to the corporation but also to any other person. Therefore, the context supports a wide meaning of "any other person" (i.e., all persons other than the corporation).
- Distinction from Specific Relief Act remedies: The court examined the reasoning in Radhakishan Sharma which had imported principles of the Specific Relief Act (notably section 41(j)) limiting injunctions to persons with personal interest. The full bench held that remedies under S.307(5) are independent of the Specific Relief Act and that the Specific Relief Act's rules concerning individual civil rights do not restrict the statutory right created by the municipal legislation.
- Relation to Section 91, CPC: The opinion notes that the earlier division bench had suggested recourse to section 91, CPC (public-nuisance/public-wrongful-act suits). The full bench observed that section 91(1) is not exhaustive and section 91(2) preserves rights of suit existing independently; thus, S.307(5) provides an independent statutory remedy beyond section 91.
- Conclusion of error in earlier decision: On the basis of the textual language, contextual purpose (building-control regime), and the independence of the statutory remedy from principles applicable to private injunctions, the court held that the view in Radhakishan Sharma was incorrect and deserved to be overruled.
Holding and Implications
Holding — The reference is answered as follows: The locus-standi under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 is not restricted to a person affected by the violation complained of; it encompasses all persons resident within the area to which the Act applies.
Consequences and immediate effects:
- The full bench expressly overruled the contrary decision of the earlier division bench in Radhakishan Sharma (1996 MPACJ 55).
- By this ruling, any person (other than the corporation) resident in the municipal area may invoke S.307(5) and apply to the district court for an injunction for removal or alteration of a building alleged to contravene the Act or the byelaws.
- The opinion emphasizes that the statutory remedy under S.307(5) is independent of remedies under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and of section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
- The matter (the underlying writ petition and related proceedings) was directed to be placed back before the division bench for further orders in accordance with this opinion.
No broader constitutional or doctrinal implications beyond those recorded in the opinion are discussed in the provided text; the court confined itself to interpreting the statutory language and answering the referred question of law.
A.K. Patnaik, C.J.:-
This is a reference made to this full bench by order dated 21 - 8 - 2007 passed by a division bench of this court in w. P. No. 5807 of 2006.
2. The two petitioners, a corporator of the indore municipal corporation and a mechanical engineer, have filed this public interest litigation under art. 226 of the constitution questioning the lay out sanctioned by the indore municipal corporation for construction of a building of the respondent no. 4. On 21 - 3 - 2006, the division bench issued notices in the writ petition and directed that the interim prayer shall be considered after service of notices on the respondents. Thereafter, the respondent no. 4 appeared and raised a preliminary objection that an alternative remedy was available to the petitioner under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the m. P. Municipal corporation act, 1956 (for short 'the act of 1956') to apply to the district court for an injunction for removal or alteration of the building. The counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, brought to the notice of the division bench that in radhakishan sharma v. Pravin kumar and two others, 1996 mpacj 55, on a reference made by learned single judge of this court, a division bench has held that under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956, the expression 'any other person' who has been conferred with the right to apply to the district court for injunction for removal or alteration of any building will mean such person who might feel directly affected by the building in regard to his individual right to property and, therefore, the two petitioners in writ petition no. 5807 of 2006 may not have an alternative statutory remedy under sub - section (5) of section 30 of the act of 1956.
3. The division bench hearing w. P. No. 5807 of 2006, however, found that in the earlier case of radhakishan sharma (supra) , the division bench had taken the aid of the provisions of the specific relief act, 1963 and the code of civil procedure, 1908 to construe sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 and had held that the expression 'any other person' in sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956, who has been conferred with the right to apply to. The district court for an injunction for the removal or alteration of any building, would mean only such person who might feel directly affected by the building in regard to his individual right to property. The division bench hearing w. P. No. 5807 of 2006 was, however, of the opinion that sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 did not suffer from any ambiguity either in language or in meaning and provides for remedy to 'any other person' in addition to the corporation to apply to the district court for an injunction for the removal or alteration of any building and the decision of the division bench in radhakishan sharma (supra) requires reconsideration and accordingly has referred the following question of law for our opinion : " whether the locus - standi under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act is restricted to a person affected by the violation complained of or encompasses all persons resident within the area to which the act applies?
4. We have heard mr. Vivek dalai, learned counsel for the petitioners, mr. Ashok kutumble, learned additional advocate general for the state, mr. Anand agrawal, learned counsel for the indore municipal corporation and mr. A. K. Chitle, learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 4 and in our considered opinion, the view taken by the earlier division bench in radhakishan sharma (supra) that under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 besides the corporation, only such person who may feel directly affected by the building in regard to his individual right to property can only file application before the district court for injunction for removal or alteration of the building, is not correct for the reasons which will now follow.
5. Sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956, which we are called upon to interpret is quoted below :
" section 307 power to require removal or alteration of work not in conformity with byelaws or any scheme or any other requirement. (5) nothing in this section shall affect the right of the corporation or any other person to apply to the district court for an injunction for the removal or alteration of any building on the ground that it contravenes any provision of this act or the byelaws made thereunder, but if the building is one in respect of which plans have been deposited and the plans have been passed by the commissioner, or notice that they have been rejected has not been given within the prescribed period after the deposit thereof, and if the work has been executed in accordance with the plans, the district court on granting an injunction shall have power to order the corporation to pay to the owner of the work such compensation as the district court thinks just, but before making any such order the district court cause the commissioner if not a party to be joined as a party to the proceeding."
6. Thus, the language of sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is clear that besides the corporation, 'any' other person can apply to the district court for injunction for removal or alteration of a building there under. In shri balaganesan metals v. M. N. Shanmugham chetty and others, (1987) 2 scc 707 : (air 1987 sc 1668) , cited by mr. Chitle, learned counsel for respondent no. 4, the supreme court has held relying on black's law dictionary: " the word 'any' has the following meaning : , some; one of many; an indefinite number. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity. Word 'any' has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate 'all' or 'ever' as well as 'some' or 'one' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject - matter of the statute. It is often synonymous with 'either', 'every' or 'all'. Its generality may be restricted by the context; (black's law dictionary, 5th edn.). " similarly in lucknow development authority v. M. K. Gupta, (1994) 1 scc 243 : (air 1994 sc 787) cited by mr. Chitle, the supreme court again relying on black's law dictionary has held: " in black's law dictionary it is explained thus, 'word 'any' has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate 'all' or 'every' as well as 'some' or 'one' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject - matter of the statute'. The use of the word 'any' in the context it has been used in clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all. " the word "any" which has diverse meanings, therefore, has to be interpreted depending on the context and the subject - matter of the statute in which it is used.
7. Sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 itself makes it clear that the right of the corporation or any other person to apply to the district court for injunction for the removal or alteration of any building can be only on the ground that it contravenes any provision of the act of 1956 or the byelaws made thereunder. Chapter xxiv of the act of 1956 in which section 307 is located is titled "building control" and contains provisions regulating the construction of buildings within the area of the municipal corporation. There are various other provisions in the act of 1956 and the byelaws made thereunder relating to buildings within the area of the corporation which have to be complied with. Legislature has, therefore, to provide for some remedy if the provisions of the act of 1956 or the byelaws thereunder in respect of a building are violated. It is only for this reason that under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956, a right has been conferred not only on the corporation but on any other person to apply to the district court for injunction for removal of a building or alteration of any building on the ground that it contravenes any provisions of the act or the byelaws made thereunder. Hence, not only the corporation but every other person has been given the right to apply to the district court for injunction for the removal or alternation of any building on the ground that it contravenes any provisions of the act or the byelaws made thereunder. The context and the subject - matter of the statute in which the word 'any' has been used is thus wide enough to include all persons other than the corporation or every other person other than the corporation or any other person other than the corporation.
8. The division bench delivering the opinion in radhakishan sharma (supra) has lost sight of the context and subject - matter of the act of 1956 in which the word "any" was to be construed and has taken a narrow view that only a person who might feel aggrieved directly by the building in regard to his individual right to his property relying on section 41 (j) of the specific relief act, 1963 which provides that an injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. The reliefs under the specific relief act, 1963 are granted for the purpose of enforcing individual civil rights as will be clear from section 4 of the specific relief act, 1963. Accordingly, injunction under part iii of the specific relief act, 1963 is granted to the plaintiff either to prevent a breach of an obligation in favour of the plaintiff, or to compel the performance of an obligation in his favour. Unless, therefore, there is an obligation in favour of the plaintiff which needs to be enforced, the court cannot grant injunction. Hence, it is provided in section 41 (j) of the specific relief act, 1963 that an injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. What the division bench has failed to appreciate is that the provisions of the specific relief act, 1963 do not apply to the right conferred on the corporation and any other person under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956. Under the provisions of the act of 1956, every building must comply with the provisions of the act of 1956 and the byelaws made thereunder and hence if there is any breach of the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye - laws made thereunder, sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 confers a right not only on the corporation but also any other person to apply to the district court for an injunction for removal or alteration of a building on the ground that there has been the contravention of the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye - laws made thereunder. This remedy under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is independent of and different from the remedies under the specific relief act, 1963.
9. We also find from para 16 of the opinion of the division bench in radhakishan sharma (supra) that the division bench has held that in the event of. Wrongful act affecting the public, recourse to suit in terms of section 91 of the code of civil procedure, 1908 (for short ,'the cpc') becomes necessary. Sub - section (1) of section 91, c. P. C. Provides that in case of public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting or likely to affect the public, a suit for declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances may be instituted and sub - section (2) of section 91 of the c. P. C. States that nothing in the section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist independently of its provisions. Thus, it is clear that section 91 (1) of the; c. P. C. Is not exhaustive of the remedies that are available to a party even in case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting or likely to affect the public. The remedy of the corporation and any other person under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is independent of the provisions of section 91 of the c. P. C. And not only the corporation but any other person can apply to the district court for injunction for removal or alteration of a building on the ground that the provisions of the act of 1956 or the byelaws made thereunder have been contravened.
10. In the result, we are of the opinion that the locus standi under sub - section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is not restricted to a person affected by the violation complained of but encompasses all persons resident within the area to which the act of 1956 applies. The reference is answered accordingly and the decision of the division bench in radhakishan sharma (supra) to the contrary is overruled. The matter will now be placed before the division bench. Order accordingly.
Order accordingly.
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