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Shidramappa Mutappa Biradar v. Mallappa Ramchandrappa Biradar
Court Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns a sequence of suits arising from substantially the same cause of action and the consequences of non-observance of a condition attached to an order permitting withdrawal with liberty to bring a fresh suit under Order XXIII, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Key procedural events as recorded in the opinion:
- June 11, 1919: The plaintiff instituted an original suit (first suit).
- August 28, 1920: The first suit was allowed to be withdrawn "with liberty to bring a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action" on the condition that "The plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs" and "The plaintiff will not be allowed to bring a fresh suit unless he pays the defendants' costs of this suit."
- June 25, 1925: The plaintiff instituted a second suit (Suit No. 154 of 1925) based on the same cause of action without paying the costs ordered in the first suit. The second suit was ordered withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit; the order noted the plaintiff was a minor and directed "Plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs, and bear his own."
- June 24, 1926: The costs in the first suit were paid to the defendants (three days after the second suit was withdrawn).
- June 29, 1926: The present (third) suit was instituted without payment of the costs of the second suit.
Judicial history in the lower courts:
- The learned Subordinate Judge held that the second suit (instituted without payment of the first-suit costs) was void ab initio and that the permission granted to bring a fresh suit was not valid in law.
- On appeal the District Judge, relying on Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad, held that the second suit was not bad ab initio, treated the first suit as pending until costs were paid, stayed proceedings under Section 10 and set aside the dismissal, remanding for trial.
- This appeal challenges the District Judge's order; the High Court opinion contains the judgments of Patkae, J. and Baker, J., both of which reverse the lower appellate court and restore the Subordinate Judge's order (i.e., dismissing the later suit(s)), with costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the legal effect of non-observance of a condition attached to an order permitting a plaintiff to withdraw a suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit under Order XXIII, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code?
- Specifically, where withdrawal is permitted on the condition that costs of the withdrawn suit be paid before instituting a fresh suit, does institution of a subsequent suit without payment render that subsequent suit void ab initio, or should the subsequent suit be stayed or otherwise treated as irregular until the condition is fulfilled?
- Whether the Court should follow the view that a suit remains pending until the condition (payment of costs) is complied with (the Calcutta view exemplified by Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad), or the view that withdrawal takes effect when the withdrawal order is passed and the condition relates only to the right to bring a fresh suit (the Madras view exemplified by Seshayya v. Subbayya).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad | Held that where permission to withdraw with liberty to bring a fresh suit is conditional on payment of costs, the original suit is not deemed withdrawn until those costs are paid; until payment the original suit is pending and a later suit need not be dismissed but may be stayed under Section 10. | The District Judge relied on this case to hold the second suit was not bad ab initio. Both Patkae, J. and Baker, J. discuss the decision and reject its reasoning for the present facts, preferring the Madras view; Patkae, J. expressly dissents from the Calcutta High Court view. |
| Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla | Held that a subsequent suit instituted without payment of costs before its institution was not ab initio void and that subsequent payment of costs cured the irregularity. | Cited as representing the Calcutta view and as authority for the proposition that non-payment before institution does not render a fresh suit void; the judgment is discussed and distinguished by Patkae, J. as part of the conflicting authorities, and is noted by Baker, J. as a Calcutta High Court ruling whose result was accepted in Shital Prosad though on somewhat different grounds. |
| Syed Qazi Muhammad Afzal v. Lachman Singh | Reported as the Patna High Court following the Calcutta High Court's view on this issue. | Cited to show that the Patna High Court followed the Calcutta approach. |
| Seshayya v. Subbayya | Madras High Court decision: withdrawal operates when the order is passed; permission relates only to the filing of the subsequent suit on conditions; where no date fixed, plaintiff is precluded from instituting a fresh suit unless costs are paid before its institution. | Both Patkae, J. and Baker, J. express agreement with the Madras view. Patkae, J. states he is "inclined to agree with the view of the Madras High Court and most respectfully dissent from the view of the Calcutta High Court." Baker, J. likewise adopts the reasoning of Seshayya v. Subbayya and follows Rachhpal Singh. |
| Shivappa v. Balappa and Shivappa v. Andaneppa | Where the order required payment of costs without specifying the time, it was held payment during the pendency of the second suit was not contravention where the Subordinate Judge construed payment before institution not to be a condition precedent. | Referenced to illustrate a category of orders (where time of payment is not specified) and to show that different fact situations may lead to different outcomes; the court notes the case did not require deciding which view (Madras or Calcutta) was correct. |
| Fischer v. Nagappa Mudaly | Where leave was granted to bring a fresh suit on payment of costs on or before a specified date and the condition was not fulfilled, the plaintiff was precluded from bringing a second suit and such a suit should be dismissed. | Patkae, J. places Fischer in the category where a date is specified; he treats the present case as falling under the second category (payment before institution) and refers to Fischer as authority for dismissal where a specified time was not complied with. Baker, J. cites Fischer as representing the Madras approach on the point where dates are fixed. |
| Peria Muthirian v. Karappanna Muthirian | Authority where time for payment was extended by the court which made the order for payment. | Referenced in distinguishing Fischer: Peria Muthirian shows courts may extend time for payment when appropriate. |
| Ambubai Hanmantrao…Defendant v. Shankarsa Nagosa…Plaintiff | Held that permission given in the original suit to withdraw and file a fresh suit on payment of costs would extend only to one fresh suit and not to a succession of fresh suits filed and dismissed for failure to pay costs. | Patkae, J. observes that Ambubai would govern the present case but for the fact that the second suit here was not dismissed but was itself allowed to be withdrawn with permission to bring another fresh suit. Baker, J. cites Ambubai for the proposition that original permission extends only to one fresh suit. |
| Hriday Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra Barna Sarma; Raj Kumar Mahton v. Ram Khelawan Singh | Support the proposition that an order for withdrawal with leave to institute a fresh suit made in circumstances not within the scope of the rule is not to be treated as an order made without jurisdiction; a fresh suit instituted upon leave is not incompetent. | Patkae, J. cites these cases as supporting that principle but states they "do not bear on the point under consideration" (i.e., the effect of non-observance of a specific condition relating to payment of costs). |
| Rachhpal Singh v. Sheo Ratan Singh (Rachhpal Singh) | Held that once a plaintiff accepts the terms imposed by the Court (upon withdrawal), the case is declared withdrawn and is no longer pending; strict compliance with the terms is required or the plaintiff is barred from filing a second suit. | Both Patkae, J. and Baker, J. refer approvingly to Rachhpal Singh. Baker, J. states that Rachhpal Singh reviews the authorities and supports the view that withdrawal causes the suit to cease to be pending and that the plaintiff must comply strictly with imposed terms. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion contains two judicial judgments (Patkae, J. and Baker, J.). Both judges analyze a conflict of authorities and apply legal reasoning to the facts of the three successive suits.
Patkae, J. — Reasoning
- Framed the central question as "the effect of non-observance of the condition under which a suit is allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit under Order XXIII, rule 1."
- Reviewed conflicting High Court authorities — principally the Calcutta view (Shital Prosad/Abdul Aziz Molla) and the Madras view (Seshayya v. Subbayya) — and stated a preference for the Madras view, expressly dissenting from the Calcutta reasoning.
- Explained that once a suit has been withdrawn it is "no longer pending," and the permission given by the Court relates to the bringing of the fresh suit rather than to the withdrawal itself.
- Classified conditions attached to withdrawal orders into three categories:
- Payment of costs before a certain specified date;
- Payment of costs before the institution of the second suit (i.e., a condition precedent to filing);
- Payment of costs where no time for payment is specified.
- Placed the present case in category (2): the order in the first suit required that "the plaintiff will not be allowed to bring a fresh suit unless he pays the defendants' costs of this suit" (i.e., payment before institution of any fresh suit was a condition precedent).
- Concluded that the costs ordered in the first suit were not paid before the institution of the second suit and were not paid during the pendency of the second suit; payment made only after withdrawal of the second suit (before institution of the third suit) did not satisfy the condition as a condition precedent to the filing of the second suit.
- Distinguished authorities (e.g., Abdul Aziz Molla) that allowed subsequent payment to cure irregularity, and treated Ambubai as relevant but not directly applicable because in Ambubai the second suit had been dismissed; in the present case the second suit had itself been allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to bring another fresh suit.
- Therefore, held that the District Judge's reliance on Shital Prosad was incorrect and reversed the lower appellate court, restoring the Subordinate Judge's order (i.e., the view that the second suit was barred for non-compliance), with costs on the respondent.
Baker, J. — Reasoning
- Reviewed the same conflict of authorities and reiterated that the question had not been authoritatively decided in Bombay.
- Summarized the factual sequence (first suit withdrawn in 1920 on condition of paying costs; second suit filed in 1925 without payment; second suit withdrawn in 1926; costs of first suit paid June 24, 1926; present suit filed June 29, 1926 without paying costs of second suit).
- Considered the decisions of Calcutta and Madras High Courts and cited Mulla's summary; concluded that the Calcutta reasoning in Shital Prosad is not persuasive: he could not see how the former suit could be held to be pending until costs were paid when the withdrawal was ordered.
- Adopted the Madras view (Seshayya v. Subbayya and Rachhpal Singh): withdrawal takes effect when the order is passed and the permission given by the court relates to the right to bring a fresh suit subject to conditions imposed; thus a plaintiff must strictly comply with those conditions or be barred from filing a second suit.
- Noted that it is desirable to fix a date for payment of costs but that in the present case the order effectively required payment before filing a second suit and that this condition was not complied with.
- Addressed an argument advanced for the appellant (that the defendant had not accepted costs paid into court) and observed there was nothing in that point to change the outcome ("if the defendant had the right to refuse to accept the costs, he could, even if they were paid in time, prevent the plaintiff from bringing a fresh suit").
- Concluded that since the condition for instituting the second suit was not complied with, the plaintiff had no right to bring a second suit, which should have been dismissed; accordingly restored the decree of the First Court and set aside the order of the lower appellate court with costs on the plaintiff.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Both judges reversed the lower appellate court and restored the Subordinate Judge / First Court. The court held that where an order allowing withdrawal with liberty to bring a fresh suit makes payment of costs a condition precedent to instituting any fresh suit, failure to comply with that condition precludes the plaintiff from instituting the subsequent suit; payment made only after institution of the subsequent suit does not retroactively validate the act of filing that subsequent suit in such circumstances.
Implications (as expressly stated or directly supported by the opinion):
- The court adopts the Madras view (as represented by Seshayya v. Subbayya and by Rachhpal Singh) that a withdrawal order operates when made and that the permission granted by the Court relates to the right to institute a fresh suit subject to specified conditions.
- Where an order conditions the bringing of a fresh suit on payment before the institution of that suit (a condition precedent), the plaintiff must strictly comply with that condition; failing which the second suit is barred and should be dismissed (or treated as invalid in the circumstances described by the Subordinate Judge).
- The opinion acknowledges conflicting authority (notably the Calcutta decisions) but rejects that reasoning in the present facts; it also recognises that varying language in withdrawal orders may place cases into different categories and thus lead to different results depending on whether time for payment is specified or not.
- Direct effect on the parties in this case: the lower appellate court's order was reversed and the earlier court's dismissal/restraint was restored, with costs awarded against the plaintiff/respondent as detailed in the judgments.
Decree reversed. (Final words of the opinion: "Decree reversed." and the record shows costs awarded in favour of the respondent/plaintiff as set out in the separate judgments.)
Decree reversed.
Source: Opinion text provided for summary. No additional facts or authorities have been inferred beyond what appears in the supplied opinion.
Patkae, J.:—
This appeal raises an important question as to the effect of non-observance of the condition under which a suit is allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit under Order XXIII, rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code.
On August 28, 1920, a suit based on substantially the same cause of action as the present one in which the second appeal arises, was allowed to be withdrawn. The order was as follows:—
“The plaintiff is allowed to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. The plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs. The plaintiff will not be allowed to bring a fresh suit unless be pays the defendants' costs of this suit.”
On June 25, 1925, a second Suit No. 154 of 1925 was brought on the same cause of action without payment of the costs, and therefore, without fulfilling the condition attached to the permission given to bring a fresh suit. The order passed in that suit was as follows:—
“The plaintiff is a minor. In view of this and the defects mainly formal which are apparent I order the plaintiff to withdraw with liberty to bring a fresh suit for the same cause of action. Plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs, and bear his own.”
Three days after the suit was withdrawn, that is, on June 24, 1926, the costs in the first suit were paid to the defendants and, on June 29, 1926, the present suit was instituted without paying the costs of the second suit.
The learned Subordinate Judge held that the second suit, which was instituted without paying the costs of the first suit the payment of which was a condition precedent to the filing of the suit, was void ab initio, and that the permission granted to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit upon which the present suit was based was not valid in law.
On appeal, the learned District Judge, relying on the decision in the case of Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad, held that a suit which was instituted without fulfilment of the condition imposed by the withdrawal order could not be dismissed but ought to be stayed under section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code inasmuch as the permission was not operative until the costs were paid and so there was no withdrawal with liberty to bring a fresh suit, and that until there was such withdrawal the former suit was still pending, and held that the second suit was not bad ab initio, and that the order of withdrawal in the second suit could not be disregarded, and that the plaintiff fulfilled the condition precedent in the first suit and its withdrawal was complete, and therefore set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case for trial according to law.
There is a conflict of decisions on the question as to the result of non-observance of the condition attached to the permission to bring a fresh suit under Order XXIII, rule 1. In Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla it was held that where a suit was withdrawn under section 373 of the Civil Procedure Code, corresponding to Order XXIII, rule 1, of the present Code, with liberty to bring a fresh suit on payment of costs, a subsequent suit in respect of the same cause of action was not ab initio void if the costs were not paid before its institution, and that the subsequent payment of costs cured the irregularity. It was held that the only persons who were prima facie precluded from bringing a fresh suit were those who withdrew from the former suit without permission to bring a fresh suit. A reference was made to Order XXVI, rule 4, of the Supreme Court Rules, 1883, and it was considered to be a fair rule for the Courts to follow in the absence of a statutory enactment in the matter. In Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad, where a suit was allowed to be withdrawn by the plaintiff with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action on condition of paying costs to the defendant, it was held that the second suit could not be dismissed for non-payment of the costs, and that inasmuch as the permission to withdraw and bring a fresh suit was made conditional on a certain payment, the original suit could not be deemed to be withdrawn until those costs were paid, and therefore it must be deemed to be a pending suit which became disposed of as soon as the payment was made. It was observed (p. 531):—
“When a plaintiff has obtained leave to withdraw upon payment of costs, it is his duty to pay the costs at once, for until they are paid there is no withdrawal with the permission of the Court. In that view when the case came before the Munsiff he was not entitled to dismiss it. All he could do was to regard section 10 as a bar to his proceeding with the trial of the suit.”
The view of the Calcutta High Court was followed by the Patna High Court in Syed Qazi Muhammad Afzal v. Lachman Singh.
The High Court of Madras has in Seshayya v. Subbayya dissented from the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. Under Order XXIII, rule 1, sub-rule (1), a plaintiff may withdraw his suit at any time without the permission of the Court, and under sub-rule (3) if the plaintiff withdraws from a suit without the permission given under sub-rule (2), he would be precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter, and under sub-rule (2) the Court may grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit. In Seshayya v. Subbayya, it was held that as the withdrawal of the suit does not require the permission of the Court, it must be taken that the first suit is withdrawn when the order is passed and that the permission granted refers only to the filing of the subsequent suit on certain conditions, and that if the first suit was considered as pending, it would be open to the plaintiff, instead of complying with the condition of the permission, to go to the Court and demand that the trial on the first suit should be proceeded with however long the interval might be.
I am inclined to agree with the view of the Madras High Court and most respectfully dissent from the view of the Calcutta High Court. When once a suit has been withdrawn, it is no longer pending, and the permission given by Court relates to the bringing of the fresh suit.
In Shivappa v. Balappa and Shivappa v. Andaneppa, the condition in the order allowing the suit to be withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit was to pay the costs of the defendant without specifying the time within which the payment was to be made, and it was held that the payment of costs during the pendency of the second suit was not in contravention of the condition imposed by the first suit as the same Subordinate Judge who ordered the withdrawal held that the payment of costs before the institution of the second suit was not a condition precedent to the filing of the second suit, and it was not necessary to go into the question whether the view in the case of Seshayya v. Subbayya, or that in the case of Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad, was the correct view to take.
The conditions attached to the permission to bring a fresh suit after the withdrawal of the first suit may fall under different categories according to decided cases, (1) that the plaintiff shall pay the costs before a certain date specified in the order, (2) that the plaintiff shall pay the costs before the institution of the second suit, and (3) that the plaintiff shall pay the costs without specifying the time of the payment. The present case falls under the second category as the condition imposed by the permission allowing the bringing of the second suit after the withdrawal of the first was to pay the costs before the institution of the second suit. In Fischer v. Nagappa Mudaly, where leave was granted to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit on payment of the defendant's costs on or before the specified date and he failed to do so, it was held that he was precluded from bringing a second suit and if such a suit is brought it should be dismissed. The case in Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla was distinguished but was not dissented from, and reference was made to Peria Muthirian v. Karappanna Muthirian(5) where time for payment was extended by the Court which made the order for payment. In Seshayya v. Subbayya, where leave was granted to bring a fresh suit on payment of the defendant's costs without specification of any date and therefore fell under the third category, the plaintiff was held precluded from bringing a second suit unless the costs were paid before the institution of the second suit. In Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla, where the payment of costs was not expressly made but was assumed to be a condition precedent to the institution of the second suit, it was held that the non-payment of costs before the institution of the second suit did not render the fresh suit bad ab initio, and the payment of costs before the trial of the first suit cured the irregularity. In Ambubai Hanmantrao…Defendant v. Shankarsa Nagosa…Plaintiff ., where the plaintiff was allowed to withdraw his suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on payment of the defendant's costs before the filing of the fresh suit, and filed a second suit which was dismissed on the ground of his failure to fulfil the condition on which liberty was given to bring a fresh suit, and brought a third suit after fulfilling the condition, it was held that the permission granted by the Court in the original suit would only extend to the filing of one fresh suit and not to the filing of any number of fresh suits which might be dismissed each in its turn without any trial on the actual merits of the case between the parties for failure to pay the costs of the first suit. The ground of the decision in Ambubai's case would be opposed to the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad. The present case would be clearly governed by the decision in Ambubai Hanmantrao…Defendant v. Shankarsa Nagosa…Plaintiff . but for the fact that the second suit was not dismissed but permission was given therein to bring a fresh suit.
The decisions in the cases of Hriday Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra Barna Sarma and Raj Kumar Mahton v. Ram Khelawan Singh, support the proposition that an order for withdrawal of a suit with leave to institute a fresh suit but in circumstances not within the scope of the rule cannot be treated as an order made without jurisdiction, and a fresh suit instituted upon leave so granted is not incompetent, but do not bear on the point under consideration. The order in the second suit allowing withdrawal of the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit cannot be considered to affect the order in the first suit which imposed the condition that the costs of the first suit were to be paid before the institution of the fresh suit. The question, therefore, in this case is whether that condition has been fulfilled. The order in the first suit was that the plaintiff would not be allowed to bring a fresh suit unless he paid the defendants' costs in the first suit. The costs were not paid before the institution of the second suit as it was incumbent on the plaintiff to do according to the condition imposed in the first suit, and they were not paid even during the pendency of the second suit. It is difficult to hold that the payment of the costs before the institution of the third suit and after the withdrawal of the second suit fulfilled the condition, imposed by the order passed in the first suit, as a condition precedent to the filing of the second suit. The question has been considered in the case of Rachhpal Singh v. Sheo Ratan Singh, in which the view of the Calcutta High Court in Shital Prosad's case was not accepted, and it was held that once the plaintiff has accepted the terms imposed by the Court, the case is declared to be withdrawn and is no longer pending, and the plaintiff must comply with those terms strictly or take the consequences of being barred from filing a second suit.
The costs ordered to be paid in the first suit ought to have been paid before the institution of the second suit, and it cannot be said that the condition imposed in the first suit is fulfilled by payment of the costs after the disposal of the second suit when the costs ought to have been paid before the institution of the second suit.
I think, therefore, that the view taken by the learned District Judge based on the decision in Shital Prosad's case is not correct.
I would, therefore, reverse the order of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the Subordinate Judge with costs throughout on the respondent.
Baker, J.:— This appeal raises a point of law on which the rulings of the various High Courts are conflicting and which does not appear to have been decided in Bombay. The facts, which are simple, are that the plaintiff brought a suit on June 11, 1919, and withdrew it in 1920 with permission to bring a fresh suit on condition of paying the costs of the defendant. The plaintiff did not pay the costs, but he brought a fresh suit in 1925, which he withdrew on June 21, 1926, also with permission to bring a fresh suit. On June 24, 1926, he paid the costs of the first suit, and on June 29, 1926 he brought the present suit. The Joint Subordinate Judge of Bijapur held that the second suit of 1925, which was brought without paying the defendants' costs of the previous suit as required by the order in the first suit, was bad, and the second suit, was barred. This being so, the permission granted to the plaintiff in that suit to bring a fresh suit was not valid. The suit was, therefore, untenable, and was dismissed. On appeal, the District Judge of Bijapur, relying on Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad held that the Judge was wrong in holding that the suit was bad ab initio, and held that the second suit was good, and that the order of withdrawal in that suit, which was binding on the parties, could not be disregarded in these proceedings. The plaintiff had fulfilled the condition precedent in the first suit, and therefore its withdrawal was complete. He, therefore, set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the suit for trial on the merits. Defendants make this second appeal.
The view of the Calcutta High Court in Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad has been dissented from by the Madras High Court in Seshayya v. Subbayya and Fischer v. Nagappa Mudaly. The Calcutta High Court view was followed by the Patna High Court in Syed Qazi Muhammad Afzal v. Lachman Singh, and the Madras view has been followed in the recent case reported in Rachhpal Singh v. Shea Ratan Singh, in which all the decisions are reviewed. The question is discussed in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, 9th Edition, p. 812, in which the position is summarised as follows:—
“The High Court of Madras has held that where leave is granted to a plaintiff to bring a fresh suit on payment of the defendant's costs on or before a specified date, and he fails to do so, he is precluded from bringing a second suit, and if such suit is brought, it should be dismissed.”
That is the ruling in Fischer v. Nagappa Mudaly, but that will not apply to the facts of the present case, as no date was fixed for payment of the costs in the order of the first suit allowing its withdrawal. In Seshayya v. Subbayya the Madras High Court held that if leave is granted to bring a fresh suit on payment of the defendant's costs (without specifying any date), the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a second suit unless the costs are paid before the institution of the second suit. The payment of the costs after the close of the trial in the second suit is not a compliance with the condition. The Calcutta High Court has taken a different view in Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla,(6) where leave was granted to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit on payment of the defendant's costs, and it was held that though the payment of costs was a condition precedent to the institution of a second suit, non-payment of costs before the institution of the second suit did not render the fresh suit bad ab initio, and, further, that payment of costs before the trial of the fresh suit cured the irregularity. In Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad, Sir Lawrence Jenkins, while agreeing with the result of the ruling in Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla, based his decision on somewhat different grounds. In that case also permission was granted to the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit on payment of the defendant's costs. The plaintiff did not pay the costs and brought a second suit. The suit was dismissed by the Munsiff for non-payment of costs. The plaintiff appealed to the Subordinate Judge. Pending the appeal the plaintiff paid the defendant's costs. The Subordinate Judge thereupon sent back the case to the Munsiff for trial on the merits. It was held that inasmuch as the permission to withdraw and bring a fresh suit was made conditional on a certain payment, the original suit could not be deemed to be withdrawn until those costs were paid, and it must, therefore, be deemed to be a pending suit which became disposed of as soon as payment was made. In the judgment it is stated (p. 531):
“When a plaintiff has obtained leave to withdraw upon payment of costs, it is his duty to pay the costs at once, for until they are paid there is no withdrawal with the permission of the Court. In that view when the case came before the Munsiff he was not entitled to dismiss it. All he could do was to regard section 10 (of the Code) as a bar to his proceeding with the trial of the suit… On the payment of those costs there was the withdrawal complete under section 373 of the Code or Order XXIII”
Reference has been made by the learned counsel for the appellant to Ambubai Hanmantrao…Defendant v. Shankarsa Nagosa…Plaintiff .. The facts of that case, however, are different. There the plaintiff withdrew the suit with permission of the Court and was ordered to pay defendant's costs before filing a fresh suit. Without paying the defendant's costs he filed a fresh suit. He paid the costs three days before the day fixed for the hearing of evidence. The Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit being filed without previous costs having been paid was bad ab initio. The plaintiff, however, considering the permission given him by the Court in the original suit as still surviving in spite of the second suit being dismissed, filed this third suit on the same cause of action. It was held that the permission granted by the Court in the original suit would only extend to the filing of one fresh suit, and not to the filing of any number of fresh suits, which might be dismissed each in its turn, without any trial on the actual merits of the case between the parties, for failure to pay the costs of the first suit. When the plaintiff had refused to comply with the condition on which alone he could file a second suit, he could not avail himself of the original permission of the Court for filing a third suit. That permission no longer remained in force. If the decisions of the lower Courts were upheld, it would be illegally extending the provisions of Order XXIII, rule 1, in favour of the plaintiff, who would thus be allowed to harass the defendants with a succession of suits. The point, therefore, in that case was whether the permission originally granted to withdraw and file a fresh suit on payment of the costs would extend only to the subsequent suit filed or to a third suit, and the second suit in that case was dismissed. In the present case the second suit was not dismissed, but was allowed to be withdrawn with permission to file another suit. The case, however, is an authority for the proposition that permission granted under Order XXIII, rule 1, extends only to the filing of one suit, and not to a succession of suits, and it is admitted in the present case that the plaintiff relies not on the permission originally given in the first suit, but on the permission given in the second suit filed in 1925. The question, therefore, is whether we should adopt the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad, or the view of the Madras High Court in Seshayya v. Subbayya. Under Order XXIII, rule 1, clause (1), the plaintiff has an absolute right to withdraw his suit if he likes, and the permission granted under Order XXIII, rule 1, clause (2), relates not to the withdrawal but to the right to bring a fresh suit. With respect, I am unable to follow the reasoning in Shital Prosad v. Gaya Prosad. I do not see how where permission is given to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit on condition of payment of costs, the former suit can be held to be pending until the costs are paid. In my opinion the permission relates not to the withdrawal but to the bringing of the fresh suit, and with respect I agree with the view of the Madras High Court in Seshayya v. Subbayya that the latter part of Order XXIII, rule 1, clause (2)(b), must be read as referring not to permission to withdraw a suit as well as permission to institute a fresh suit, but merely as allowing the Court to give permission to institute a fresh suit in place of the one which has been withdrawn. Inasmuch as the, withdrawal of the suit does not require the permission of the Court, it must be taken that the first suit is withdrawn when the order is passed and that the permission granted refers only to the filing of the subsequent suit on certain conditions. In my opinion, it would be inconvenient to consider a suit which has been withdrawn as still pending, and with respect, the reasoning in the Madras cases commends itself to me rather than the reasoning in the Calcutta case. The whole question has been discussed in detail in Rachhpal Singh v. Sheo Ratan Singh, and I agree with the view taken in that case as to the suit being withdrawn and ceasing to be a pending suit, and with respect, I agree with the view of the learned Judge who tried that case that there is no reason why if the permission to file a second suit had been granted subject to a condition, the plaintiff should not be held strictly to that condition and his second suit dismissed if he attempts to file it without having fulfilled the condition on which he secured permission. That judgment refers to all the authorities, and his conclusion, with which I agree, is that once the plaintiff has accepted the terms imposed by the Court the case is declared to be withdrawn and is no longer pending, and the plaintiff must comply with those terms strictly or take the consequences by being barred from filing a second suit. No doubt, it is desirable, as has been laid down in most of these cases, that a date should be fixed within which the costs should be paid, but in the present case the order was in effect that the costs should be paid before a second suit was filed, and this condition was not complied with, the costs not being paid until the second suit had been withdrawn. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that his client did not accept the costs which were paid into Court. I do not think there is anything in this point, as if the defendant had the right to refuse to accept the costs, he could, even if they were paid in time, prevent the plaintiff from bringing a fresh suit.
However, in the present case, I am of opinion that the condition on which the plaintiff was allowed to bring a second suit not having been complied with, the plaintiff had no right to bring a second suit, which should have been dismissed, and therefore the permission in that suit is of no avail.
I would therefore restore the decree of the First Court and set aside the order of the lower appellate Court, with costs throughout on the plaintiff.
Decree reversed.
J.G.R
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