Prem Chand Pandit, J. - The premises in dispute are rented land, situate in Sonepat Town, District Rohtak. Ram Diwaya was in its occupation as a tenant before the said land was purchased by Kanhaya Lal, landlord. On 5th April, 1966, the landlord filed an application against the tenant under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, for the latter's eviction and the main ground, with which we are concerned in the present revision petition, was that he required the said land for his personal occupation. 2. The tenant pleaded that the requirement of the landlord was not bona fide and the eviction application had been filed merely to get the rent enhanced. 3. On 12th May, 1967, the Rent Controller granted this application held that the landlord's need was bona fide. Thereafter the tenant went in appeal before the Appellate Authority and there a point for the first time was taken by the tenant that the landlord had not given him a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating his tenancy and consequently, the application should be dismissed on that ground alone. When this objection was raised, the landlord prayed that the case should be remanded to the Rent Controller for fresh decision after giving the parties an opportunity to prove the service or the non-service of the requisite notice, because his case was that he had actually given the said notice and if the point had been originally taken by the tenant, he would have brought that evidence on the record, after an issue had been framed regarding it. 4. The request of the landlord was not objected to by the counsel for the tenant. As a result, on 28th January, 1969, the Appellate Authority set aside the order of the Rent Controller and remanded the case to him for redecision on all the points. It was directed that an opportunity should be given to the parties to prove or disprove the service of the requisite notice. 5. After remand, the parties suitably amended their pleadings and thereafter two fresh issues were framed regarding the notice under section 106, Transfer of Property Act. Evidence was then led thereon and the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that a valid notice had been given to the tenant and the same had not been waived by the acceptance of rent on behalf of the landlord. He also held that the landlord bona fide required the premises for his own needs. On these findings, the eviction application was accepted. 6. On Ist March, 1971, the tenant again went in appeal against that order and on 11th February, 1972, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal confirming the finding of the Rent Controller on the point that the landlord required the premises for his own use. It may be mentioned that no other point was urged by the tenant before the Appellate Authority. Against that decision, the present revision petition has been filed by the tenant. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, in the first instance, submitted that the order dated 28th January, 1969, passed by the Appellate Authority by which he set aside the order of the Rent Controller dated 12th May, 1967, and remanded the case to him for fresh decision, was without jurisdiction and consequently, all the proceedings taken thereafter would be illegal and void. Reliance for this submission was placed on a Bench decision of this Court in Krishan Lal Seth v. Shrimati Pritam Kumari, 1961 PLR 865, where it was held : "When the appellate authority is some how or other dissatisfied with the trial of an application for eviction of the tenant, it can make a further enquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Rent Controller, but it has no power to set aside an order of the Rent Controller and remand such an application to him for retrial and redecision." 8. Learned counsel also made a reference to three decisions, namely, Rameshur Singh end another v. Sheodin Singh and another ILR 12 All 510 (Full Bench), Palani Chetty v. Rangidoss Naidu, ILR. 32 Mad. 83 (Division Bench), and a Single Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Ram Asis Puri v. Munshi Lal and others, AIR 1920 Patna 86, in support of the proposition that all the proceedings after the order of remand which is found to be illegal, would be without jurisdiction. 9. In the first place, this point was not raised by the tenant before the Appellate Authority. As I have said, the only point that was argued before him was that the finding of the Rent Controller on the bona fide requirement of the land was not correct. Secondly, it would be noticed from what has been mentioned above that it was with the consent of the tenant that the Appellate Authority on 28th January, 1969, remanded the case to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision. That was because the point taken by the tenant before him was a new one, which had not been raised before the Rent Controller. Thereafter the case was tried by the Rent Controller, the pleadings were amended fresh issues on the said point were struck, evidence was lead and then a decision was taken on 1st March, 1971. When the appeal against the said order of the Rent Controller was filed, this point was not even raised in the grounds of appeal before the Appellate Authority. Thirdly, the tenant did not file any revision against the order of remand dated the 28th January, 1969. Under these circumstances, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to raise this point at this stage and say that all the proceedings taken after the order of remand were without jurisdiction. 10. Coming to the Bench Decision of this Court in Krishan Lal Seth's case, it is pertinent to mention that in the said authority, the Rent Controller had decided all the issues arising in the case and thereafter, the tenant had gone in appeal before the Appellate Authority. The said Authority was dissatisfied with the trial of the eviction application by the Rent Controller and, therefore, he remanded the same for redecision. Such is not the situation in the instant case. As I have already mentioned above, a particular point, on which the Appellate Authority had remanded the case, was not even taken by the tenant before the Rent Controller and, consequently, the landlord had no opportunity to rebut his allegations, with the result that no issue was framed thereon. The said point had been raised, for be first time, before the Appellate Authority and then with the consent of the parties, the case was remanded to the Rent Controller for giving a fresh decision. On the facts, therefore, the Division Bench authority relied on by the learned counsel, would not be applicable in the present case. 11. It may be mentioned that this Division Bench decision came up for discussion before Falshaw, C.J. in Civil Revision No. 676 of 1962 (Lajpat Rai v. Harkishan Dass) decided on 5th April, 1963. In that case, the Rent Controller had framed a number of issues and recorded evidence all of them, but, ultimately, he dismissed the landlord's application on the findings that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and the ejectment application was pre-mature. He, however, did not discuss any other points at all. When the matter came in appeal before the Appellate Authority, he came to the conclusion that on two points the decision of the Rent Controller was not correct. He, therefore, accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the Rent Controller for decision. Against that order, the tenant filed a revision petition, which came before the learned Chief Justice. The principal argument raised before him was that the Appellate Authority could not remand the case and in support of that submission reliance was placed on the Bench decision in Krishan Lal Seth's case. While dealing with that ruling, the learned Chief Justice distinguished It and observed : "I do not, however, consider that decision applies to the present case in which it is not so much a matter of the learned Rent Controller not having dealt satisfactorily with some point which arose in the case as of his not having dealt with the merits at all after accepting certain preliminary objections. In my opinion, there is nothing in the words of the section which prohibits a remand in such a case." 12. As I have already said the remand, in the instant case, was on the basis of a point, which was not taken up at all by the tenant before the Rent Controller and it was raised for the first time before the Appellate Authority and, therefore, with the consent of the parties, the matter was remanded to the Rent Controller for redecision and a direction was given that an opportunity be given to the parties to lead evidence on the new point. 13. So far as the three rulings relied on by the learned counsel. for the proposition that if the remand, order was invalid, then the proceedings taken thereafter would be without jurisdiction, are concerned, it is to be noticed that none of those cases was under the Rent Restriction Act, Secondly it is mainly on the basis of the Bench decision of this Court in Krishan Lal Seth's case that an argument was raised before me that the order of remand in the instant case was without jurisdiction. But a perusal of that authority would, however, show that the learned Judges had not even mentioned the word 'jurisdiction' in their decision. But be that as it may, have already stated that the said authority does not apply to the facts of the instant case. That being so, the other quest on as to whether the order of remand in the present case was without jurisdiction and further that all the proceedings taken thereafter were, therefore, void, would not arise for determination. In view of what I have said above, I would repel the first contention of the learned counsel. 14. It was then submitted that the notice, Exhibit A/3, under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the tenant somewhere in the year 1963 and after the service of that notice, the landlord accepted rent from him without any protest or reservation. It was, therefore, contended that the said notice would, under those circumstances, be deemed to have no effect and the contractual tenancy against came into being between the landlord and the tenant and the same could be ended only by issuing a fresh notice. In that connection, he referred to certain money order receipts, Exhibits R/2 to R/7, to show that the rent was accepted by the landlord without any protest. 15. This point, again, was not raised before the Appellate Authority, although the Rent Controller had decided the same against the tenant. Secondly, as has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Bhaiya Ram Mahavir Parshad, 1968 P. L. R. 1011 that waiver is a deliberate and conscience act an the part of a person as distinguished from estoppel, which can be created by law. In the present case, however it has not been found by the Rent Controller that the money order receipts, referred to by the learned counsel related to the payment of rent regarding the premises in question. Besides, it has been held that the mere acceptance of rent would not amount to waiver, and would not be considered as an assent to a new contractual tenancy. In this connection, reference be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik, Chandra Das and others, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1067, where it was observed that where a contractual tenancy to which the rent control legislation applied had expired by efflux of time or by determination by notice to quit the tenant continued in possession of the premises by virtue of statutory protection, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after the expiration or determination of the contractual tenancy would not afford ground for holding that the landlord bad assented to a new contractual tenancy. Moreover, waiver is not always a pure question of law. It depends on circumstances and facts as well. In the instant case, the Rent Controller, after discussing the evidence produced in the case, came to the conclusion that the petitioner's tenancy was validly terminated before the filing of the eviction application by the landlord and that the notice under section 106, Transfer of Property Act, had not been waived. In the present case, it has not been shown that this finding was in any erroneous. I, therefore, hold that there is no merit in the second contention as well. 16. Learned counsel lastly contended that the finding of the Appellate Authority on the question of bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord was not correct. 17. Regarding this argument also, I find that there is no-substance in it. The Appellate Authority had found that the landlord was a cloth merchant and used to sell handloom cloth. He wanted to fix handlooms for preparing cloth and also wished to open a factory and a sale depot. He possessed sufficient funds, because, even according to the tenant, he was rich man. He could, therefore, afford to fix the handlooms and also open a factory. There was nothing on the record to show that his claim was in any way mala fide. Reference was made to the notice, Exhibit A/3, in which it was mentioned by the landlord at that time that he wanted to construct a residential house and a shop on the rented land. On that basis, it was urged that the present position taken by him that he wanted to open a factory and install handlooms on the land was not genuine. This argument was rightly repelled by the Appellate Authority by observing that the landlord can in suitable cases change his mind about his requirement. Moreover, in the earlier notice also it was not stated that the rented land was required only for constructing a house. At that time even, his idea was to build a shop as well, presumbly for doing some business. Fixing of handlooms for preparing cloth and opening a factory would also came under the heading 'business'. The Appellate Authority, after considering all the circumstances and the evidence in the case, came to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide. This again is a finding of fact and no valid ground has been made out for my interference in the same. 19. In view of what I have said above, I would dismiss this petition, but make no older as to costs. The tenant is, however, allowed one month's time to vacate the premises provided he gays the arrears of rent up-to date on or before 20th April, 1972. Petition dismissed.