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P. Ramayya & Others v. C. Krishnaiah And Others
Judgment Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The property in dispute originally belonged to the plaintiffs' joint family. For arrears of cist, the zamindar of Venkatagiri caused the properties to be sold; on 25-12-1937 the 1st defendant purchased the properties at auction for Rs. 170/- as representative of his joint family. The 2nd and 3rd defendants are his brothers. The 5th defendant later purchased one-third of the properties from the 1st defendant (under Ex. B-1 dated 16-8-1944).
The plaintiffs' case alleged that the 1st defendant bought the property for the benefit of the plaintiffs' family, that the purchase price should be treated as a loan by the 1st defendant, and that the 1st defendant should recoup that loan from property income and then restore possession to the plaintiffs. An oral agreement said to have been made in 1937 was later reduced to writing (a month later), but that written document was lost and, according to the plaint, the 1st defendant then evaded executing the contract. A registered notice dated 2-6-1944 was issued and refused. By mediation, an arrangement of 15-8-1944 (Ex. A-1) was entered into, under which the 1st defendant was to convey two-thirds of the property to the plaintiff on receipt of Rs. 400/-. Alleged non-fulfilment of those terms led to the plaintiffs' suit (O.S. No. 271/47).
The defendants' case at trial was that the agreements pleaded were untrue and that Ex. A-1 was not genuine. The trial court dismissed the suit. On first appeal the Subordinate Judge (Nellore) reached the opposite conclusion on the genuineness of the agreement and Ex. A-1 but concluded that Ex. A-1 could not be enforced because of the plaint's averments; nevertheless he granted larger relief based on the alleged earlier (1937) agreement and decreed the suit as prayed. Defendants 1 to 3 and 5 brought this second appeal against that judgment and decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs could recover judgment on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint (i.e., whether the pleadings supported the relief claimed).
- Whether a decree could be founded on the alleged 1937 oral agreement, in view of limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act and related facts.
- Whether the alleged earlier agreement of 1937 was superseded (merged) by the subsequent written agreement Ex. A-1, and the consequences of such merger for the plaintiffs' cause of action.
- Whether the plaintiffs could claim specific performance based on Ex. A-1 when the plaint itself alleges that Ex. A-1 was vitiated by coercion, undue influence and fraud (i.e., the effect of a plaintiff repudiating the very document on which specific performance is sought).
- Whether the conduct of the plaintiff (including repudiation/denial of the agreement) estops him from seeking specific performance (with reference to the principle discussed in Srish Chandra Roy v. Banomali Roy).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments
- The defence at trial was that the agreements pleaded by the plaintiffs were untrue and that Ex. A-1 was not a true and genuine document.
- Implicit in the appeal is the contention that the trial court's dismissal should be sustained and that the Subordinate Judge erred in decreeing the suit on the basis of the earlier agreement.
Plaintiff / Respondent Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The plaint pleads an earlier oral agreement (circa 1937) and alternatively pleads Ex. A-1 (15-8-1944) as a renewal. The plaint also contains an alternative prayer seeking relief under Ex. A-1 if the court finds the plaintiffs are not entitled to the higher relief under the first agreement.
- Mr. Krishnarao, for the respondents, argued that the Subordinate Judge misapplied the Privy Council decision in Srish Chandra Roy v. Banomali Roy and that repudiation of a contract will not automatically debar a party from seeking specific performance unless the repudiation was absolute (i.e., amounted to renunciation or absolute refusal to perform).
- To support that proposition Mr. Krishnarao relied on Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor Benzon and Co. (1884) 9 AC 434 and Freeth v. Burr (1874) 9 CP 208.
- Notwithstanding the alternative relief in the plaint, the plaint also affirmatively alleges that Ex. A-1 was obtained by coercion, undue influence and fraud and therefore not binding on the plaintiff.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Article 113, Limitation Act | Rule that a suit for specific performance must be filed within three years from the date fixed for performance, or if no date is fixed, within three years from when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. | The court applied Article 113 to hold that the suit (filed 16-8-1947) was time-barred as it was instituted beyond three years from the 1st defendant's refusal (notice dated 2-6-1944). |
| Srish Chandra Roy v. Banomali Roy, ILR 31 Cal 584 (Privy Council) | Principle that a party who has repudiated or sought to rescind an agreement may, depending on the circumstances, be precluded from later insisting on specific performance; not an absolute bar in every case, but factual conduct may estop a party. | The Subordinate Judge relied on this authority to find the plaintiff's conduct ended the agreement; the High Court (court in this opinion) considered the principle and concluded that the plaintiff's repudiatory allegations against Ex. A-1 meant he could not seek specific performance of that document. |
| Blackett v. Bates (1865) 1 Ch A 117 | Authority cited by the Privy Council to the effect that it is inconsistent for a party to deny an agreement and later seek specific performance (authority forming part of the reasoning in Srish Chandra Roy). | Cited within the Privy Council reasoning discussed by the court; used as part of the broader principle that inconsistent conduct (repudiation then seeking performance) may bar relief in particular circumstances. |
| Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor Benzon and Co. (1884) 9 AC 434 | Authority relied upon by counsel for the respondents to support the proposition that repudiation is not necessarily fatal to a later claim for specific performance. | The court noted counsel's reliance on this case but rejected the broader proposition as dispositive here because the plaintiffs' pleading affirmatively repudiated Ex. A-1 and failed to show readiness and willingness to perform. |
| Freeth v. Burr (1874) 9 CP 208 | Another authority relied on by respondents' counsel for a similar proposition regarding repudiation and specific performance. | The court recorded the reliance but found it did not assist the plaintiff given the pleadings: the plaint pleaded fraud/undue influence and therefore repudiated Ex. A-1, which was inconsistent with seeking specific performance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps tied closely to the pleadings and applicable legal principles:
- Limitation (Article 113): The court first examined whether a decree could rest on the alleged 1937 agreement. The plaint alleges an oral agreement prior to the 1937 sale which was reduced to writing a month later, and that the 1st defendant refused to stand by the contract before the registered notice dated 2-6-1944. The suit was filed on 16-8-1947. Applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act (as set out in the opinion), the court found the suit was not brought within three years of the refusal and therefore the claim based on the earlier agreement was time-barred.
- Merger / Supersession: The court observed that the plaint itself makes clear the 1937 agreement was subsequently superseded by Ex. A-1 (the 15-8-1944 agreement). As a result the alleged 1937 agreement lost independent existence and any rights arising from it were merged in Ex. A-1. Therefore the lower appellate court erred in granting relief on the basis of the 1937 agreement.
- Effect of the Plaintiffs' Pleadings on Ex. A-1 (Repudiation vs. Claim for Specific Performance): The court turned to whether a decree could be claimed based on Ex. A-1. The plaint contains explicit averments that Ex. A-1 was obtained by coercion, undue influence and fraud and is not binding on the plaintiff; indeed the plaint states the plaintiff is entitled to ignore Ex. A-1 and sue for possession under the original title and the prior agreement.
- Readiness and Willingness: The court reiterated the established requirement in suits for specific performance that the plaintiff must allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. While such readiness need not be pleaded in formulaic words, the essence of the plaint's allegations must demonstrate such readiness.
- Inconsistency and Estoppel in Pleadings: The court found that, far from showing readiness and willingness, the plaintiff had repudiated Ex. A-1 unequivocally by pleading fraud, undue influence and coercion. The court held it was inconsistent for the plaintiff to assert that Ex. A-1 was unenforceable and at the same time ask for a decree on the basis of it; such conduct precluded relief under Ex. A-1 in the present case.
- Application of Authorities: The court reviewed the Privy Council decision in Srish Chandra Roy v. Banomali Roy (and related authorities) concerning the consequences of attempting to rescind an agreement and then seeking its enforcement. While recognizing that repudiation will not in every case be an absolute bar to specific performance, the court concluded that on the facts and pleadings before it the plaintiff's repudiatory conduct justified refusal of specific performance based on Ex. A-1.
- Incidental Observation on Relief Scope: The court noted in passing that even if Ex. A-1 had been enforceable, the plaintiff could at most have obtained a decree for a one-third share of the 1st defendant's interest in the properties (since the properties were originally acquired for the joint family and Ex. A-1 was not executed on behalf of the joint family). However, the court did not pursue this point further given its primary conclusions.
Holding and Implications
SECOND APPEAL ALLOWED; SUIT DISMISSED.
Consequences and direct effects on the parties:
- The second appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs' suit (O.S. No. 271/47) was dismissed.
- The parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout.
- The petition for amendment of the pleadings was dismissed in view of the court's reasoning.
The opinion does not purport to lay down any new, general precedent beyond applying established principles (limitation under Article 113; merger/supersession of agreements; requirement of readiness and willingness for specific performance; and the effect of a plaintiff's repudiatory pleadings). The court confined itself to the facts and pleadings before it in denying relief.
Judgement
Defendants 1 to 3 and 5 have brought this second appeal from the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Nellore, setting aside the decree of the trial court dismissing O.S. No. 271/47. The facts giving rise to this second appeal may be briefly narrated :
2. The property originally belonged to the joint family of the plaintiffs. For arrears of cist, the zamindar of Venkatagiri brought the properties to sale and they were purchased in auction by the 1st defendant as representing his joint family for a sum of Rs. 170/- on 25-12-1937. The 2nd and 3rd defendants are his brothers. The 5th defendant is a subsequent purchaser of 1/3rd of the properties thus acquired, under Ex. B-1, dated 16-8-1944.
This suit is instituted on the allegations that the 1st defendant purchased the property for the benefit of the plaintiffs family which was not possessed of sufficient means to avert the sale, that the amount paid for the acquisition of the properties should be treated as a loan by the 1st defendant and that the latter should recoup himself of the money so advanced out of the income from the property and as soon as the debt stood discharged he should put the plaintiffs in possession of the property.
In order to give effect to this oral agreement, a document was executed a month later, but that was lost. Coming to know of the loss of the document and taking advantage of it, the 1st defendant was evading to execute the contract. This necessitated the plaintiffs issuing a registered notice on 2-6-1944 which was refused by the addressee. Soon after, and as a result of the mediation an arrangement was entered into between the parties on 15-8-1944 by and under which the 1st defendant had to convey 2/3rds of the property purchased by him in auction to the plaintiff on receipt of Rs. 400/-. This was embodied in Ex. A-1. As the 1st defendant had not fulfilled the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was obliged to file the suit.
3. The defence to the suit was that the agreements pleaded were untrue, and that Ex. A-1 is not a true and a genuine document.
4. The trial court upheld the defence and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge came to the opposite conclusion regarding the agreement and genuineness of Ex. A-1. But he thought that Ex. A-1 could not be enforced because of the averments in the plaint and the suit could not be decreed on that basis. Curiously enough, he gave the larger relief based upon the alleged earlier agreement. In the result, the suit was decreed as prayed for. The aggrieved defendants have preferred this second appeal.
5. The main point for consideration is whether the plaintiffs could recover judgment on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint. I will first deal with the question whether the view of the learned Judge that a decree could be founded on an agreement said to have been reached in 1937 is sustainable. The case set up in the plaint is that the oral agreement was prior to the date of the sale and this was reduced to writing a month later. The 1st defendant indicated his refusal to stand by the contract some time prior to the issue of his notice dated 2-6-1944.
The suit was filed on 16-8-1947. This shows that the institution of the suit was beyond three years of the refusal of the 1st defendant. Article 113, Limitation Act, required a suit for specific performance of a contract to be filed within three years from the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. It is the case of the plaintiff that because the 1st defendant was not willing to abide by the agreement he had issued the notice. Clearly the suit was not brought within 3 years of the refusal envisaged in Art. 113. In these circumstances, the suit is obviously barred.
6. There is another reason why the earlier contract could not furnish any cause of action to the plaintiff. It is evident from the plaint that the agreement of 1937 was superseded by Ex. A-1. Therefore, the alleged agreement of 1937 can have no independent existence. Any rights which he might have had on the basis of the alleged agreement were merged in Ex. A-1. The lower appellate court was therefore in error in giving a relief to the plaintiff on the basis of this agreement.
7. This leads me to the question whether a decree could be claimed by the plaintiff by reason of Ex. A-1. This in its turn depends upon certain recitals in the plaint. Paragraph 9 of the plaint re-cites :
Thus taking advantage of the situation and putting the plaintiff under coercion and undue influence the 1st defendant executed an agreement dated 15-8-1944 in favour of the plaintiff in renewal of the prior agreement, stipulating therein that he should be entitled to a 1/3rd share in the scheduled mentioned property and the plaintiff to the remaining 2/3rd share........"
8. Again it is stated in paragraph 10 as follows: The agreement dated 15-8-1944 obtained by the 1st defendant is vitiated by coercion and undue influence and is not binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to ignore the said agreement and sue for possession of the schedule mentioned property and other reliefs for himself and for the benefit of defendants 6 to 13." In paragraph 13 of the plaint, the plaintiff submits that
"the agreement dated 15-8-1944 not being enforceable against him for the reasons above stated, fee is entitled to recover possession of the entirety of the scheduled mentioned property from the 1st defendant in pursuance of the original title and the provisions of the prior agreement."
9. In view of the above statements, the Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff by his conduct put an end to the agreement and thus disabled himself from using Ex. A-1 for claiming specific performance. In support of this conclusion he placed reliance on the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Srish Chandra Roy v. Banomali Roy, ILR 31 Cal 584 (A). There a compromise was entered into between two parties by which the title of one of the parties to the properties in dispute was acknowledged as the adopted son and the other party was to be granted a lease of the property for a number of years on certain conditions. Shortly thereafter, the latter repudiated the compromise by filing a suit to set aside the adoption and alleging that the agreement was obtained from him by fraud. This attempt proved unsuccessful as the EKRAR in favour of the adopted son and the rights flowing therefrom were upheld by courts.
Having failed in this attempt the legal representatives of the original parties who were to be given a lease of the properties filed a suit for enforcing the terms of the original EKRAR. This suit was dismissed on the ground that the conduct of his predecessor-in-interest was at variance with and amounted to a subversion of the relation intended to be created by the compromise and that specific performance of the agreement could not be granted to a party who had tried to rescind the agreement or to his heirs as there was failure of consideration.
This was confirmed by the High Court of Calcutta and the Judicial Committee on appeal and further appeal. The High Court sustained the judgment of the trial court on the principle of Blackett v. Bates, (1865) 1 Ch A 117 (B), stated by Lord Cranworth L. C. in these words :
"It is a strange thing to say that after a party has denied the validity of an agreement and taken proceedings to set it aside, he can, when the result of those proceedings has proved adverse, turn round and insist on specific performance.
The learned Judges observed that, though there might be cases in which an attempt to avoid the agreement may not be a ground for refusing specific performance the case before them did not Belong to that category, because ever since the date of the compromise the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff therein directed all his efforts to annul its effects. The Privy Council while affirming the judgment of the High Court remarked :
"Their Lordships are not prepared to lay down as an abstract proposition that there is any necessary inconsistency in a party, who has unsuccessfully tried to rescind an agreement afterwards claiming performance of it. But in the present case they think that Krishna not only tried to deprive Banwari Lal of the benefit of the agreement, but in a large measure succeeded in doing so.
The security of his title to the zamindari was of immeasurably greater importance to Banwari Lal than the mere question of the PATNI. And their Lordships have already expressed their opinion that the principal consideration to Banwarilal for the agreement was to obtain such security and immunity from future attacks. In short they do not give the EKRAR the restricted effect suggested by the learned counsel, but they think that its language necessarily imports an agreement by Krishna to abstain from questioning the validity of the adoption for the future."
10. Mr. Krishnarao for the respondents urges that the lower appellate court misapplied the decision of the Privy Council to the present case. The observations extracted above clearly indicate, argues the learned counsel, that it is not an absolute proposition that in every case where the party adopts an inconsistent attitude specific performance should be refused. In the case under citation, the plaintiff was non-suited for the reason that his predecessor-in-interest agreed to abstain from questioning the validity of the adoption and having gone back upon it the plaintiff could not sue on the basis of the agreement.
The situation is different here. The plaint contains a prayer that a decree could be granted on the basis of Ex. A-1 if, for any reason the court could come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to the higher relief in accordance with the first agreement. In order to debar a party from claiming specific performance of an agreement, repudiation of the contract by him should be absolute; in other words, the conduct of the party should amount to a renunciation or absolute refusal to perform the contract, continues the counsel.
11. To substantiate this proposition, reliance was placed by him on Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor Benzon and Co., (1884) 9 AC 434 (C) and Freeth v. Burr, (1874) 9 CP 208 (D). The proposition as stated by Mr. Krishnarao is unacceptable. In order to shut out a party from asking for specific relief it should be shown that he has abandoned the contract altogether and the mere fact that he was not willing to abide by one of the terms of the contract at an earlier stage may not be sufficient to non-suit him.
12. But, that does not help the plaintiff in this case. In a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is true that it need not be stated in so many words and the purport of the allegations in the plaint should amount to his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.
That is a sufficient compliance with the requirements in that behalf. Now, in this case, is it possible to spell out such a thing? Far from stating that ha was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract that he has repudiated and renounced the document forming the basis of the suit in no uncertain terms. He had alleged that Ex. A-1 was the result of fraud, undue influence and coercion and could not be enforced against him. How is it open to him to claim specific performance of this document? In my- opinion, it does not lie in his mouth to say that a particular document is vitiated by fraud, undue influence and coercion and therefore unenforceable and at the same time should ask for a decree on the basis of it if on other issues the court should find against him.
The attitude adopted by the plaintiff seems rather novel. No decree, in the circumstances, could be passed in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of Ex. A-1. It may be mentioned here that even if Ex. A-1 was enforceable the plaintiff could get only a decree for 1/3rd share of the 1st defendant out of the properties acquired in 1937 because admittedly the property was acquired for the benefit of the joint family and Ex. A-1 was not executed by the 1st defendant as representing) the joint family. Therefore, the shares of 2nd and 3rd defendants are unaffected even assuming a decree could be granted on the basis of this document. This need not, however, be pursued in the view I have expressed above.
13. In the circumstances, the second appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs throughout.
14. The petition for amendments of the pleadings is dismissed in the view I have taken above.
Appeal allowed.
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