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Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani And Others v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
Thirteen individuals were tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Pandharpur for offences related to rioting and the murder of one Sankonda Birajdar. The trial court convicted four accused (A-1, A-8, A-12 and A-13) under Sections 302/34 IPC and the remaining nine under Sections 304 (Part II)/34 IPC. Additional convictions were recorded under Sections 325/34 IPC (against A-5 and A-10) and Sections 323/34 IPC (against eight others).
On appeal, the High Court acquitted A-5 and A-10 but affirmed the convictions of the other accused. Two Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were then filed in the Supreme Court. Leave to appeal was granted only to the seven convicts who had been found guilty under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC and, in some cases, Sections 323/34 IPC.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the seven appellants, who did not physically participate in the fatal assault, could nevertheless be held liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Sections 304(Part II)/34 IPC.
- Whether the reliance placed by the trial court on Mer Dhana Sida v. State of Gujarat (1985) 1 SCC 200 justified sustaining the appellants’ convictions under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mer Dhana Sida v. State of Gujarat (1985) 1 SCC 200 | Liability under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC when multiple accused assault the deceased. | The trial court relied on this case to convict the appellants, but the Supreme Court held the reliance to be misplaced because, unlike in Mer Dhana Sida, the appellants had not committed any assault or criminal act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that Section 34 IPC can apply only if the accused, acting with a common intention, commit a criminal act together. On the trial court’s own findings, the seven appellants merely stood at the scene while the fatal attack was carried out by others; no evidence established that they performed any act contributing to the victim’s death. Consequently, the essential ingredients for constructive liability under Section 34 were absent.
The Court further observed that, after the appellants’ acquittal on the rioting charge, there was no basis to invoke Section 149 IPC. The precedent in Mer Dhana Sida was distinguished because, in that case, the convicted accused had themselves assaulted the deceased, whereas here the appellants had not engaged in any assault.
However, the Court found no infirmity in the convictions of certain appellants under Sections 323/34 IPC, as their participation in assaults on a prosecution witness was supported by evidence.
Holding and Implications
Appeal allowed in part. The convictions and sentences of all seven appellants under Sections 304(Part II)/34 IPC were set aside, while the convictions under Sections 323/34 IPC were affirmed. Because the sentences for the latter offence had already been served, the Court ordered the immediate release of all appellants.
The decision affects only the parties by removing the more serious convictions; it does not articulate a new legal precedent beyond reaffirming the necessity of a proven criminal act for liability under Section 34 IPC.
Order
1. Thirteen persons were arraigned before the Additional Sessions Judge, Pandharpur for rioting, murder and other cognate offences. On conclusion of the trial the trial Judge convicted four of them (A-1, A-8, A-12 and A-13) under Sections 302/34 IPC and the other nine under Sections 304 (Part II)/34 IPC. Besides two of them (A-5 and A-10) were convicted under Sections 325/34 IPC and eight others under Sections 323/34 IPC. In appeals preferred by them the High Court acquitted two of them (A-5 and A-10) while maintaining the convictions and sentences of the others. Assailing the judgment of the High Court the convicts filed two special leave petitions in this Court, one of which was filed by A-1, A-8, A-12 and A-13 and the other by the seven other convicts. While refusing leave to the former group of convicts this Court granted leave to appeal to the latter.
2. In distinguishing the case of the seven appellants from that of the other four convicts regarding the common charge framed against them under Sections 302/34 IPC for the murder of Sankonda Birajdar, the trial court observed that though the appellants did not participate in the murder and were only present at the spot, still it could be presumed that they had knowledge that due to their acts some of them could cause the death. It further observed that they (appellants) had knowledge that they were likely to cause injuries which could cause death. Accordingly, the trial court convicted the appellants under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC and the four others, who actually caused the murder under Sections 302/34 IPC. In recording the above finding against the appellants the trial court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Mer Dhana Sida v. State of Gujarat (1985) 1 SCC 200. In upholding the conviction of the appellants under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC the High Court however did not advert to this aspect of the matter.
3. In our considered view the above reasoning of the trial court to convict the appellants under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC is patently wrong. Before a person can be convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC the ingredients that are required to be satisfied are that he along with others committed a criminal act and that such act was done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. On the own showing of the trial court the appellants were merely standing when the act of murder was committed by the other four. Indeed no evidence was laid by the prosecution to prove that any of the appellants committed any criminal act which resulted in the death of the victim. The reliance of the trial court on Mer Dhana Sida (1985) 1 SCC 200 was wholly misplaced for in that case the persons who were convicted under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC committed a criminal act, in that, they assaulted the deceased. While on this point, it is pertinent to mention that consequent upon their acquittal of the offence of rioting the question whether the appellants can be convicted with the aid of Section 149 IPC for the above death does not arise.
4. For the foregoing discussion the conviction of the appellants under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC cannot be sustained. We do not, however, find any such infirmity in the conviction of some of the appellants under Sections 323/34 IPC as their participation in the assaults on one of the prosecution witnesses stands fully established. We, therefore, allow the appeal in part by setting aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC, while maintaining the conviction and sentence for the offence under Sections 323/34 IPC. Since those of the appellants, who have been convicted for the above offence, have already served out the sentence imposed for the above conviction we direct that all the appellants be released forthwith.
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