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Amarendu Jyoti And Others v. State Of Chhattisgarh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant 1 (Amarendu Jyoti) married Respondent 2 (Smt. Kiran Sinha) on 21-4-2003 at Patna. The couple lived in Delhi from 27-4-2003 to 22-5-2003, after which Respondent 2 moved to her parents’ home in Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh. Approximately two-and-a-half years later, Respondent 3 (Madhusudan Sinha, father of Respondent 2) lodged FIR No. 798/2005 dated 31-12-2005 at Ambikapur, alleging cruelty by Appellant 1, his elder brother-in-law (Appellant 2) and elder sister-in-law (Appellant 3) under Section 498-A IPC.
The appellants filed an application under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court of Chhattisgarh, contending that only Delhi courts possessed territorial jurisdiction because every alleged act occurred there. The High Court dismissed the application on 19-12-2006, holding that cruelty was a continuing offence giving Ambikapur courts jurisdiction. The appellants obtained special leave and brought the matter before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the facts alleged in FIR No. 798/2005 constitute a “continuing offence” of cruelty under Sections 178 and 179 CrPC.
- If not a continuing offence, which court possesses territorial jurisdiction to try the offence—Ambikapur or Delhi?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- All overt acts constituting cruelty—including verbal abuse, dowry demands, and physical assault—were alleged to have occurred exclusively in Delhi between 27-4-2003 and 22-5-2003.
- No act amounting to cruelty was alleged at Ambikapur; therefore, the offence was complete in Delhi and cannot be treated as continuing.
- Relied heavily on the Supreme Court decision in Manish Ratan v. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262, wherein similar facts led the Court to reject the theory of a continuing offence.
Respondents’ Position
The opinion records that the High Court accepted allegations that threats, dowry demands, and mental cruelty continued after Respondent 2 reached Ambikapur, but it does not set out the respondents’ detailed legal submissions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Manish Ratan v. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262 | An offence of cruelty is not automatically “continuing” merely because the wife resides elsewhere after leaving the matrimonial home. | Primary authority relied upon to conclude that the alleged cruelty in the present case was complete in Delhi; Ambikapur lacked jurisdiction. |
| Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30 | Referenced among earlier decisions discussing territorial jurisdiction in matrimonial cruelty cases. | Cited collectively; no specific ratio extracted beyond supporting the principle adopted from Manish Ratan. |
| State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890 | Part of the earlier case law survey on continuing offences. | Used in conjunction with other cases to evaluate whether cruelty can be treated as continuing. |
| Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, (2004) 8 SCC 100 | Authority on the limits of territorial jurisdiction when the alleged offence occurs in a single location. | Reinforced the view that subsequent residence of the complainant does not extend jurisdiction. |
| Ramesh v. State of T.N., (2005) 3 SCC 507 | Another decision touching on cruelty and jurisdiction. | Cited as part of the comparative analysis but not discussed in detail. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the FIR and noted that every explicit allegation—verbal humiliation over dowry, monetary demands, beating, and abusive language—was situated in Delhi. The only statements relating to Ambikapur involved lack of contact, telephone threats, and failure to retrieve Respondent 2 from her parental home, none of which were supported by specific evidence.
Invoking Sections 178 and 179 CrPC, the Court held that an offence becomes “continuing” only when distinct ingredients of that offence occur in more than one locality. Because the FIR recited no overt act of cruelty at Ambikapur, the offence, if any, was complete in Delhi; the mere absence of reconciliation efforts or alleged telephone abuse did not extend its commission into Chhattisgarh. Consequently, the High Court’s characterization of cruelty as “continuing” was rejected as unsupported by the record and contrary to the principle reaffirmed in Manish Ratan.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed. The Supreme Court ruled that Delhi courts, not Ambikapur courts, have territorial jurisdiction over the alleged offence.
However, exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court permitted the Ambikapur court to continue trying the criminal case to avoid procedural delay.
Implications: The judgment reinforces that Section 498-A cruelty is not inherently a continuing offence; jurisdiction hinges on where specific acts occurred. While no new doctrine was created, the decision clarifies application of Sections 178-179 CrPC to matrimonial-cruelty prosecutions.
S.A Bobde, J.— Appellant 1, Amarendu Jyoti, who is the husband of Respondent 2, Smt Kiran Sinha, has challenged the order dated 19-12-2006 2007 Cri LJ 1511 (Chh) passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Miscellaneous Criminal Case (MCRL) No. 1104 of 2006 dismissing the appellants' application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) and holding that the first information report (FIR) for offence under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”), lodged by Respondent 3, Madhusudan Sinha, was liable to be tried by the Court at Ambikapur, which has jurisdiction to try the offence. The main contention of the appellants is that the incident of cruelty alleged by Respondent 2 has taken place only at Delhi, where the couple resided after which Respondent 2 went to stay with her parents at Ambikapur in the State of Chhattisgarh, therefore, the Court at Ambikapur has no jurisdiction to try the alleged offence against the appellants in the FIR under Section 498-A IPC, lodged by Respondent 3.
2. The marriage of Appellant 1 to Respondent 2 took place on 21-4-2003 at Patna. The couple resided at Delhi from 27-4-2003 to 22-5-2003 when Respondent 2, wife left Delhi for her parents' place at Ambikapur. After about 2½ years, her father, Madhusudan Sinha, Respondent 3 filed an FIR at Ambikapur alleging that Respondent 2, Kiran Sinha has been subjected to cruelty by her husband, Appellant 1, elder brother-in-law, Appellant 2 and elder sister-in-law, Appellant 3, who are therefore to be punished under Section 498-A IPC.
3. The appellants approached the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur under Section 482 of the Code questioning the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Ambikapur to try the offence alleged against the appellants. Respondent 3 has alleged cruelty in the FIR dated 31-12-2005. However, according to the appellants each of the alleged incidents, which constitute cruelty, has taken place when the couple resided together in Delhi between 27-4-2003 to 22-5-2003, before Respondent 2 shifted to Ambikapur to stay with her father, Respondent 3. Thus, according to the appellants the territorial jurisdiction to try the offence cannot be with the Court at Ambikapur, where no incident is alleged to have taken place. This argument did not find favour with the High Court, which dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Code.
4. The High Court held, having regard to the provisions of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code that after Respondent 2 had left the appellant's society at Delhi and gone to Ambikapur to reside with her father, the acts of cruelty continued and therefore the offence of cruelty was a continuing offence. The High Court relied on the fact that Respondent 2 was made to abandon her husband's company because of cruel treatment and compelled to stay at Ambikapur; further, that Respondent 2 was subjected to cruelty by telephone calls over which she was threatened and demand of dowry was made. The letters written by Respondents 2 and 3 showing the sufferings of the wife at Ambikapur were relied on and the High Court noted that despite the respondent's plight the appellant made no effort to take her back to the matrimonial home. Accordingly, the High Court held that the offence of cruelty was a continuing offence and the Court at Ambikapur had jurisdiction to try.
5. Aggrieved by the rejection of the application under Section 482 of the Code, the appellants have approached this Court by way of special leave to appeal. The main contention on behalf of the appellants was that the FIR did not disclose a continuing offence. The offence, if any, was alleged to have been committed only at Delhi and there was no question of any offence having been committed after Respondent 2 went to stay at Ambikapur. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision of this Court in Manish Ratan v. State of M.P (2007) 1 SCC 262
6. In Manish Ratan case (2007) 1 SCC 262, in the complaint, the incident was said to have taken place in Jabalpur. The wife had left her matrimonial house and started residing at Datia. The criminal revision filed by the accused, questioning the jurisdiction of the Court at Datia, was dismissed opining that the offence was a continuing one, and therefore, the Datia Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance. The High Court held that the Court at Datia also has jurisdiction to try the case since the harassment to the wife continued at the place where she was residing with her father “since she was forced to live at her father's place on account of the torture of the in-laws and as such it can safely be said that there was also a mental cruelty.” This conclusion of the High Court was dubbed as curious by this Court since the High Court found earlier that “there is nothing in the complaint to show that any maltreatment was given to the appellant at Datia. The allegations, which I may repeat here, are that the maltreatment was given within a specific period at Jabalpur.” After looking at the decided cases on the point i.e Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997) 5 SCC 30, State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1972) 2 SCC 890, Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police (2004) 8 SCC 100 and Ramesh v. State of T.N (2005) 3 SCC 507, this Court held that the order of the High Court was unsustainable, and therefore, set it aside. It is not only that in the interest of justice, while setting aside the order of the High Court, this Court also directed the transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia, where the wife was staying with her father to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur (vide para 18).
7. Relying on the judgment of this Court in Manish Ratan case (2007) 1 SCC 262, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the offence in the present case cannot be considered to be a continuing offence, if any, and must be taken to have been complete at Delhi and no cause of action can be said to have arisen at Ambikapur. As must necessarily be, the application of law and the consequences must vary from case to case.
8. The core question thus is whether the allegations made in the FIR constitute a continuing offence.
9. We find from the FIR that all the incidents alleged by the complainant in respect of the alleged cruelty are said to have occurred at Delhi. The cruel and humiliating words spoken to the second respondent, wife by her husband, elder brother-in-law and elder sister-in-law for bringing less dowry are said to have been uttered at Delhi. Allegedly, arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees in dowry have been made in Delhi. The incident of beating and dragging Respondent 2 and abusing her in filthy language also are said to have taken place at Delhi. Suffice it to say that all overt acts, which are said to have constituted cruelty have allegedly taken place at Delhi.
10. The allegations as to what has happened at Ambikapur are as follows:
“No purposeful information has been received from the in-laws of Kiran even on contacting on telephone till today. They have been threatened and abused and two years have been elapsed and the in-laws have not shown any interest to call her to her matrimonial home and since then Kiran is making her both ends meet in her parental home. To get rid of the ill-treatment and harassment of the in-laws of Kiran, the complainant is praying for registration of an FIR and request for immediate legal action so that Kiran may get appropriate justice.”
11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this case the mental cruelty inflicted upon Respondent 2 “continued unabated” on account of no effort having been made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and the threats given by the appellants over the telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
12. However, we consider it appropriate, in the interest of justice to permit the Court at Ambikapur to proceed with the trial of criminal case arising out of FIR No. 798 of 2005 dated 31-12-2005, in exercise of powers conferred on this Court by Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
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