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Ram Kishun And Others v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Ganga Prasad obtained an agricultural loan of Rs 8,425 from Union Bank of India on 20-3-1982. Chuni Lal—the appellants’ late father—stood as guarantor. After the borrower died in 1985 and the guarantor in 1986, the bank asked the District Collector, Banda, to recover the dues as arrears of land revenue. A recovery certificate dated 13-1-1986 for Rs 10,574.45 (plus 10% collection charges) was issued.
Three bighas and two biswas of the debtor’s land were auctioned and realised only Rs 6,000, leaving a shortfall. To meet the balance, the Collector auctioned 1 bigha 10 biswas of the appellants’ land on 15-3-1993; Respondent 4 purchased it for Rs 25,000, and a sale certificate followed.
The appellants’ objections under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act were rejected as time-barred by the Commissioner (27-7-1992) and, in revision, by the Board of Revenue (20-3-2001). The Allahabad High Court dismissed their writ petition on 20-1-2004. They appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the guarantor’s heirs could be made solely liable when the principal debtor allegedly left sufficient assets.
- Whether the auction of the appellants’ entire land, and its confirmation, complied with legal requirements relating to valuation, reserve price, and proportionality of sale.
- Whether delay in filing objections justified dismissal without examining the merits.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The principal debtor’s heirs possessed movable and immovable assets adequate to satisfy the debt; hence recovery from the guarantor’s heirs was improper.
- Two guarantors existed, so entire liability should not have been fastened on their father’s estate.
- Their land, allegedly worth about Rs 2 lakh, was sold for only Rs 25,000 without following proper procedure or selling a smaller portion.
- All authorities rejected objections solely on limitation, ignoring substantive illegality.
Respondent 4’s Arguments
- The co-extensive liability of a guarantor allows recovery directly from the surety; the appellants never raised contrary pleas below.
- Sale was fair: the debtor’s brother bid Rs 20,000, indicating market value; no procedural lapses occurred.
- Respondent 4 has been in possession for over two decades and improved the land; disturbing his title now would be inequitable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad (AIR 1969 SC 297) | Liability of surety is co-extensive with debtor; creditor need not first sue debtor. | Used to reject appellants’ plea that bank should have exhausted remedies against debtor first. |
| Maharashtra SEB v. Official Liquidator (1982) 3 SCC 358 | Same co-extensive liability principle. | Reinforced guarantor liability. |
| Union Bank of India v. Manku Narayana (1987) 2 SCC 335 | Co-extensive and immediate liability of surety. | Cited in the same context. |
| SBI v. Indexport Registered (1992) 3 SCC 159 | Co-extensive liability. | Same application. |
| SBI v. Saksaria Sugar Mills Ltd. (1986) 2 SCC 145 | Surety’s liability is immediate; creditor need not wait. | Supports right to proceed directly against guarantor’s estate. |
| Industrial Investment Bank of India Ltd. v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala (2009) 9 SCC 478 | Affirms immediacy of surety’s liability. | Same. |
| United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110 | Co-extensive liability reiterated. | Same. |
| Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram (2007) 10 SCC 448 | Property can be taken only in accordance with statute—right to property as human right. | Forms backdrop for requirement of statutory compliance before auction. |
| State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan (2011) 7 SCC 639 | Same constitutional/property rights principle. | Cited to emphasise due process in dispossession. |
| State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal (1972) 2 SCC 36 | Highest bidder’s right accrues only after fair confirmation; avoid collusion. | Underpins scrutiny of auction fairness. |
| Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills (2002) 3 SCC 496 | Best-price obligation in sale of public property. | Guides assessment of adequacy of sale price. |
| SIPCOT v. Contromix (P) Ltd. (1995) 4 SCC 595 | Maximum public participation secures best price. | Quoted within Jagdamba Oil Mills discussion. |
| State of U.P. v. Shiv Charan Sharma 1981 Supp SCC 85 | Defines “reserve price”. | Referenced in reserve-price analysis. |
| Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2004) 8 SCC 671 | Reserve price vs. valuation; limits auctioneer’s power. | Forms part of valuation/reserve discussion. |
| Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2000) 1 SCC 633 | Explains reserve-price concept (cited in Anil Kumar). | Same. |
| Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (1984) 1 SCC 467 | Meaning of “value”. | Supports need for correct valuation. |
| Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalak Rubber Industries (1996) 2 SCC 626 | Further elaboration on “value”. | Same. |
| Desh Bandhu Gupta v. N.L. Anand (1994) 1 SCC 131 | Sale proclamation must reflect application of mind and fairness. | Cited for procedural safeguards. |
| Gajadhar Prasad v. Babu Bhakta Ratan (1973) 2 SCC 629 | Similar safeguard requirements. | Same. |
| S.S. Dayananda v. K.S. Nagesh Rao (1997) 4 SCC 451 | Application-of-mind in auction sales. | Same. |
| D.S. Chohan v. State Bank of Patiala (1997) 10 SCC 65 | Procedural fairness in auction. | Same. |
| Gajraj Jain v. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 151 | Same auction-sale safeguards. | Same. |
| Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao 1989 Supp (2) SCC 693 | Only so much property as necessary should be sold. | Used to hold that selling entire land was irregular. |
| Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma (1977) 3 SCC 337 | Reinforces principle of proportionate sale. | Same. |
| S. Mariyappa v. Siddappa (2005) 10 SCC 235 | Same proportionate-sale rule. | Same. |
| Navalkha & Sons v. Ramanya Das (1969) 3 SCC 537 | Confirmation requires proper valuation; court may interfere for material irregularity. | Guides review of confirmed sale. |
| Kayjay Industries (P) Ltd. v. Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. (1974) 2 SCC 213 | Same confirmation principles. | Same. |
| Union Bank of India v. Official Liquidator (2000) 5 SCC 274 | Same. | Same. |
| B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India (2007) 5 SCC 745 | Same. | Same. |
| Transcore v. Union of India (2008) 1 SCC 125 | Same. | Same. |
| Divya Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India (2000) 6 SCC 69 | Confirmed sale can be set aside for material irregularity/fraud; court not functus officio. | Cited to show possibility of setting aside sale. |
| Valji Khimji & Co. v. Official Liquidator (2008) 9 SCC 299 | Sale should only be set aside for fundamental error or fraud. | Benchmarks standard for interference. |
| FCS Software Solutions Ltd. v. La Medical Devices Ltd. (2008) 10 SCC 440 | Sale set aside where valuation/reserve price absent. | Illustrates effect of valuation defects. |
| State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 | Long-standing possession after purchase should not be disturbed belatedly. | Supports refusal to evict Respondent 4. |
| Brij Lal v. Board of Revenue (1993) 2 SCC 544 | Same. | Same. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reiterated that, under Sections 128 and 146 of the Contract Act, a guarantor’s liability is co-extensive and, where multiple guarantors exist, is shared equally unless contracted otherwise. Although documents hinted at a second guarantor, the appellants had never raised or proved that fact below.
On valuation, reserve price and proportional sale, the Court reviewed the governing jurisprudence and found that, while Rs 25,000 was not a throw-away price (the debtor’s larger land sold earlier for only Rs 6,000 and the debtor’s brother bid Rs 20,000), the authority should have sold only one-third of the appellants’ land to recover the outstanding Rs 8,500. Moreover, any surplus of about Rs 16,500 should have been refunded to the appellants, and the record was silent on such refund—amounting to a material irregularity.
Nevertheless, the auction purchaser had been in possession for over twenty years and had improved the property. Consistent with precedent discouraging belated disturbance of such possession, the Court refused to set aside the sale. It also noted the appellants’ failure to implead either the creditor bank or the debtor’s heirs, hampering further relief.
Finally, as the lower fora dismissed the matter on limitation and no compelling legal error was shown, the Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings but preserved the appellants’ right to seek refund of any surplus sale proceeds.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The auction sale remains undisturbed; Respondent 4 retains possession. The appellants may apply to the Collector for refund of any surplus (about Rs 16,500) with 9% interest, to be paid within three months if found due. No new legal precedent was set, but the judgment reinforces existing principles on surety liability, proportional sale, and belated challenges to confirmed auctions.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr B.S Chauhan, J.— This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 20-1-2004 in Ram Kishun v. Board of Revenue CMWP No. 22420 of 2001 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Allahabad, by which it has affirmed the judgment and orders passed by the Board of Revenue and other revenue officials in respect of the recovery of bank dues from the appellants as their predecessor-in-interest was the guarantor of bank loan.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that: one Ganga Prasad had taken an agricultural loan to the tune of Rs 8425 from Union Bank of India (Banda Branch) on 20-3-1982 and Chuni Lal, the father of the appellants stood as guarantor. Ganga Prasad, the debtor died in 1985 and Chuni Lal died in 1986. Chuni Lal could not pay the loan during his lifetime. Therefore, the bank initiated the proceedings for recovery and ultimately sent the matter to the District Collector, Banda for realisation of the loan amount as an arrear of land revenue.
3. The Collector issued citation/recovery certificate on 13-1-1986 for an amount of Rs 10,574.45 plus 10% collection charges against Ganga Prasad. In order to make the recovery, land measuring 3 bighas 2 biswas belonging to the said Ganga Prasad was put to auction and it could fetch only a sum of Rs 6000. In order to recover the balance amount the proceedings were initiated against the appellants as their father stood guarantor.
4. It is evident from the record that the appellants raised objections that instead of putting their property to auction, the loan amount be recovered from the legal heirs of Ganga Prasad as he had left movable/immovable properties and livestock and other assets to meet the recovery of the bank loan. Their objections were not accepted and the land of the appellants measuring 1 bigha and 10 biswas was put to auction on 15-3-1993. Respondent 4 purchased the said land for Rs 25,000. In respect of the same, sale was confirmed and the sale certificate was issued by the Collector in favour of Respondent 4 and he was put in possession.
5. The appellants raised various objections under the provisions of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 before the Commissioner, Jhansi, but their objections stood rejected vide order dated 27-7-1992 only on the ground of delay as the objections were not filed within limitation and no sufficient cause could be shown for the inordinate delay.
6. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the Board of Revenue, U.P by filing Revision No. 2 Cell/92-93. However, the same was dismissed vide order dated 20-3-2001 as the Revisional Authority did not accept the explanation for condonation of delay. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the High Court challenging the said revisional order of the Commissioner by filing Writ Petition No. 22420 of 2001 which has been dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 20-1-2004 CMWP No. 22420 of 2001. Hence, this appeal.
7. Shri D.K Garg, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that no recovery could have been made from the appellants as Ganga Prasad, debtor had left huge movable/immovable properties and other livestock which could satisfy the demand of the bank loan. More so, there were two guarantors and the father of the appellants was not the only guarantor. Thus, the entire liability of the remaining unpaid amount could not have been fastened upon them. The properties of the appellants were worth rupees two lakhs which had been sold in the auction at a throwaway price of Rs 25,000 only, that too, without following the procedure prescribed by law. For recovery of the balance amount of loan, only a part of the suit land could be sold. The objections filed by the appellants had been rejected by all the authorities/courts below on the ground of delay without considering the same on merit. Hence, the said orders are liable to be set aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed.
8. Per contra, Mr T.N Singh, learned counsel appearing for Respondent 4 has submitted that the grievance of the appellants that they could not be fastened with the total liability of unpaid loan amount had not been raised before the courts below. The liability of the guarantor is coextensive with that of the debtor. The auction-sale has been confirmed and sale certificate has been issued in favour of Respondent 4. He had been put in possession more than two decades ago and since then he has made a lot of developments and improved the land. The auction was held fairly and the property had fetched a fair price. The real brother of Appellant 1 himself had participated in the auction and given the bid for Rs 20,000, though Respondent 4 had purchased it for Rs 25,000. Thus, it is not permissible that the appellants should canvass that the auction has not been conducted fairly or the appellants had not been given a chance to bring the best buyer or a part of the property could be sold to meet the demand. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
9. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition of law that in view of the provisions of Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter called “the Contract Act”), the liability of the guarantor/surety is coextensive with that of the debtor. Therefore, the creditor has a right to obtain a decree against the surety and the principal debtor. The surety has no right to restrain execution of the decree against him until the creditor has exhausted his remedy against the principal debtor for the reason that it is the business of the surety/guarantor to see whether the principal debtor has paid or not. The surety does not have a right to dictate terms to the creditor as to how he should make the recovery and pursue his remedies against the principal debtor at his instance. (Vide Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad AIR 1969 SC 297, Maharashtra SEB v. Official Liquidator (1982) 3 SCC 358, AIR 1982 SC 1497, Union Bank of India v. Manku Narayana (1987) 2 SCC 335, AIR 1987 SC 1078 and SBI v. Indexport Registered (1992) 3 SCC 159, AIR 1992 SC 1740.)
11. In SBI v. Saksaria Sugar Mills Ltd. (1986) 2 SCC 145 this Court while considering the provisions of Section 128 of the Contract Act held that liability of a surety is immediate and is not deferred until the creditor exhausts his remedies against the principal debtor. (See also Industrial Investment Bank of India Ltd. v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala (2009) 9 SCC 478 and United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110, AIR 2010 SC 3413.)
12. Section 146 of the Contract Act provides that co-sureties are liable to contribute equally. Thus, in case there are more than one surety/guarantor, they have to share the liability equally unless the agreement of contract provides otherwise.
Recovery of public dues
13. Undoubtedly, public money should be recovered and recovery should be made expeditiously. But it does not mean that the financial institutions which are concerned only with the recovery of their loans, may be permitted to behave like property dealers and be permitted further to dispose of the secured assets in any unreasonable or arbitrary manner in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions.
14. A right to hold property is a constitutional right as well as a human right. A person cannot be deprived of his property except in accordance with the provisions of a statute. (Vide Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram (2007) 10 SCC 448 and State of M.P v. Narmada Bachao Andolan (2011) 7 SCC 639) Thus, the condition precedent for taking away someone's property or disposing of the secured assets, is that the authority must ensure compliance with the statutory provisions.
15. In case the property is disposed of by private treaty without adopting any other mode provided under the statutory rules, etc. there may be a possibility of collusion/fraud and even when public auction is held, the possibility of collusion among the bidders cannot be ruled out. In State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal (1972) 2 SCC 36, AIR 1972 SC 1816 this Court held that a highest bidder in public auction cannot have a right to get the property or any privilege, unless the authority confirms the auction-sale, being fully satisfied that the property has fetched the appropriate price and there has been no collusion between the bidders.
16. In Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills (2002) 3 SCC 496, AIR 2002 SC 834 this Court considered this aspect and while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Sipcot v. Contromix (P) Ltd. (1995) 4 SCC 595 held that: (Sipcot case (1995) 4 SCC 595)
“12. In the matter of sale of public property, the dominant consideration is to secure the best price for the property to be sold. This can be achieved only when there is maximum public participation in the process of sale and everybody has an opportunity of making an offer.” (emphasis supplied)
17. Therefore, it becomes a legal obligation on the part of the authority that property be sold in such a manner that it may fetch the best price. Thus essential ingredients of such sale remain a correct valuation report and fixing the reserve price. In case proper valuation has not been made and the reserve price is fixed taking into consideration the inaccurate valuation report, the intending buyers may not come forward treating the property as not worth purchase by them, as a moneyed person or a big businessman may not like to involve himself in small sales/deals.
Valuation and reserve price
18. The word “value” means intrinsic worth or cost or price for sale of a thing/property. (Vide Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (1984) 1 SCC 467 and Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalak Rubber Industries (1996) 2 SCC 626, AIR 1996 SC 3057.)
19. In State of U.P v. Shiv Charan Sharma 1981 Supp SCC 85, AIR 1981 SC 1722 this Court explained the meaning of “reserve price” explaining that it is the price with which the public auction starts and the auction bidders are not permitted to give bids below the said price i.e the minimum bid at auction.
20. In Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P (2004) 8 SCC 671 this Court considered the scope of fixing the reserve price and placing reliance on its earlier judgment in Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P (2000) 1 SCC 633, explained that reserve price limits the authority of the auctioneer. The concept of the reserve price is not synonymous with valuation of the property. These two terms operate in different spheres. An invitation to tender is not an offer. It is an attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained with a margin. The valuation is a question of fact, it should be fixed on relevant material. The difference between the “valuation” and “reserve price” is that, fixation of an upset price may be an indication of the probable price which the property may fetch from the point of view of intending bidders. Fixation of the reserve price does not preclude the claimant from adducing proof that the land had been sold for a low price.
21. In Desh Bandhu Gupta v. N.L Anand (1994) 1 SCC 131 this Court held that in an auction-sale and in execution of the civil court's decree, the Court has to apply its mind to the need for furnishing the relevant material particulars in the sale proclamation and the records must indicate that there has been application of mind and principle of natural justice had been complied with. (See also Gajadhar Prasad v. Babu Bhakta Ratan (1973) 2 SCC 629, AIR 1973 SC 2593, S.S Dayananda v. K.S Nagesh Rao (1997) 4 SCC 451, D.S Chohan v. State Bank of Patiala (1997) 10 SCC 65 and Gajraj Jain v. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 151.)
22. In view of the above, it is evident that there must be an application of mind by the authority concerned while approving/accepting the report of the approved valuer and fixing the reserve price, as the failure to do so may cause substantial injury to the borrower/guarantor and that would amount to material irregularity and ultimately vitiate the subsequent proceedings.
Decision to sell whole or part of the secured assets
23. In Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao 1989 Supp (2) SCC 693, AIR 1990 SC 119) this Court dealt with a case where in execution of a money decree for Rs 2400 the land was sold for Rs 17,000. The Court set aside the sale observing that there is a duty cast upon the Court to sell only such property or a portion thereof as necessary to satisfy the decree. (See also Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma (1977) 3 SCC 337 and S. Mariyappa v. Siddappa (2005) 10 SCC 235.)
24. Thus, in view of the above, it is evident that law requires a proper valuation report, its acceptance by the authority concerned by application of mind and then fixing the reserve price accordingly and acceptance of the auction bid taking into consideration that there was no possibility of collusion of the bidders. The authority is duty-bound to decide as to whether sale of part of the property would meet the outstanding demand. Valuation is a question of fact and valuation of the property is required to be determined fairly and reasonably.
Setting aside auction-sale—after confirmation
25. In Navalkha & Sons v. Ramanya Das (1969) 3 SCC 537, AIR 1970 SC 2037 this Court while dealing with the confirmation of sale by court, held that there must be a proper valuation report, which should be communicated to the judgment-debtor and he should file his own valuation report and the sale should be conducted in accordance with law. After confirmation of sale, there should be issuance of sale certificate. The court cannot interfere unless it is found that some material irregularity in the conduct of sale has been committed. The Court further held that it should not be a forced sale. A valuer's report should be as good as the actual offer and the variation should be within limit. Such estimate should be done carefully. The Court further held that unless the court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion. [See also Kayjay Industries (P) Ltd. v. Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. (1974) 2 SCC 213, AIR 1974 SC 1331, Union Bank of India v. Official Liquidator (2000) 5 SCC 274, AIR 2000 SC 3642, B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India (2007) 5 SCC 745 and Transcore v. Union of India (2008) 1 SCC 125.]
26. In Divya Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India (2000) 6 SCC 69, AIR 2000 SC 2346 this Court held that a confirmed sale can be set aside on the ground of material irregularity or fraud. The court does not become functus officio after the sale is confirmed. In Valji Khimji and Co. v. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Ltd. (2008) 9 SCC 299, the Court held that auction-sale should be set aside only if there is a fundamental error in the procedure of auction e.g not giving wide publication or on evidence that property could have fetched more value or there is somebody to offer substantially increased amount and not only a little over the auction price. Involvement of any kind of fraud would vitiate the auction-sale.
27. In FCS Software Solutions Ltd. v. La Medical Devices Ltd. (2008) 10 SCC 440 this Court considered a case where after the confirmation of auction-sale it was found that valuation of movable and immovable properties, fixation of reserve price, inventory of plant and machineries had not been made in the proclamation of sale, nor disclosed at the time of sale notice. Therefore, in such a fact situation, the sale was set aside after its confirmation.
28. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that the recovery of the public dues must be made strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The liability of a surety is coextensive with that of the principal debtor. In case there are more than one surety the liability is to be divided equally among the sureties for unpaid amount of loan. Once the sale has been confirmed it cannot be set aside unless a fundamental procedural error has occurred or sale certificate had been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.
29. The learned counsel for the parties are not in a position to point out the specific rules under which the recovery was to be made. Thus, the aforesaid legal principles have been considered on general principles of law as argued by them. The instant case is required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.
30. Admittedly, the father of the appellants stood as guarantor when Ganga Prasad took loan from the bank. Though there are some documents to show that there were two guarantors but who was the other guarantor is not evident from the record, nor had such a plea ever been taken by the appellants before the courts below. As the appellants had inherited the estate of the guarantor, they are liable to meet the liability of unpaid amount.
31. The appellants' land admeasuring 1 bigha and 10 biswas was sold for Rs 25,000. It cannot be held, even by any stretch of imagination, that the land had been sold at a cheaper rate, for the reasons, that the land belonging to Ganga Prasad (principal debtor) measuring 3 bighas and 2 biswas in the same village in a close proximity of time had been sold for a sum of Rs 6000 only. More so, the elder brother of Appellant 1, Ram Swaroop had participated in the auction and given the bid of Rs 20,000 for the land in dispute. In view of the above, the submission made by Shri Garg that property worth Rs 2,00,000 had been sold at a throwaway price of Rs 25,000 is not worth acceptance.
32. No fundamental procedural error had been pointed out which would vitiate the order of confirmation of sale and issuance of sale certificate.
33. The total amount of loan sanctioned in favour of Ganga Prasad was Rs 8425. The Collector issued citation for recovery of Rs 10,574 on 13-1-1986 and the total amount to be recovered including principal amount, interest, collection charges, etc. came to Rs 14,483.15p. The property of Ganga Prasad had been sold for a sum of Rs 6000. So, the total amount to be recovered remained about Rs 8500. The appellants' land had been sold for Rs 25,000 i.e three times the amount which was to be recovered. In the facts and circumstances of this case, instead of putting this whole land admeasuring 1 bigha and 10 biswas, the sale of 1/3rd of this land could have served the purpose. Therefore, there had been material irregularity in putting the entire property to auction.
34. In case the auctioning authority had received Rs 25,000 from Respondent 4 as a sale consideration after adjusting the outstanding dues of Rs 8500, the balance amount of Rs 16,500 ought to have been paid to the appellants. There is nothing on record to show that the authorities had ever adopted such a course.
35. In view of the above, the auction-sale stood vitiated and all the consequential proceedings are liable to be quashed.
36. However, for the reasons best known to the appellants, they have neither impleaded the bank (creditor) nor any of the legal heirs of Ganga Prasad (principal debtor). In such a fact situation, it becomes difficult to proceed with the case any further.
37. Be that as it may, Respondent 4 had been put in possession of the land more than two decades ago and he had made the improvements. This Court has consistently held that such a possession should not be disturbed at a belated stage for the reason that such a person would have spent his whole life savings in improving the land and making developments thereon which may include the construction of residences, etc. (See State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 and Brij Lal v. Board of Revenue (1993) 2 SCC 544, AIR 1994 SC 1128.)
38. The courts below have rejected the case of the appellants only on the ground of delay. Nothing had been pointed out before us as to on what basis the aforesaid judgment and orders warrant any interference. In view of the above, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
39. However, the appellants may move an application before the Collector, Banda/authority concerned, in case the excess amount had not been paid to them, for recovery of the same. If such an application is filed and the authority comes to the conclusion that excess amount had not been paid to them, it shall be refunded within a period of 3 months from the date of making the application with 9% interest.
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