Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Shantaya Kotraya Bannadnula v. Mallappa Basappa Shettar

Bombay High Court
Dec 6, 1937
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two appeals arising from a suit in which the plaintiffs sought (a) a declaration that certain alienations made by defendant 1 (the plaintiffs' father) were not binding on the plaintiffs and (b) possession of the suit property, or alternatively partition and possession of the plaintiffs' shares. The properties in question include Survey No. 32 (sold by defendant 1 to Adiveyya on 10 May 1912 — the subject of Appeal No. 87) and Survey No. 31/2 (alienated in 1924, 1925 and 1928 — the subject of First Appeal No. 164 of 1934).

The plaintiffs pleaded, among other grounds, a family partition in 1924, absence or inadequacy of consideration, absence of antecedent family debts, and that some alienations were for immoral or illegal purposes (the last ground was abandoned at hearing). The trial Court found the partition unproved, rejected the defendants' contentions that later-born plaintiffs could not challenge the 1912 alienation and that the alienation was for antecedent debts, and held that the purchaser (Adiveyya) had not inquired about antecedent debts or family necessity; it decreed recovery of a three-fourths share for the plaintiffs in Survey No. 32. The appeals followed from that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alienation of Survey No. 32 in 1912 by defendant 1 was binding on the plaintiffs or could be set aside on grounds of absence/inadequacy of consideration, absence of antecedent family debts, or other family necessity.
  2. Whether the suit challenging the 1912 alienation was barred by limitation (Article 126 of the Limitation Act) and, if so, whether Section 7 of the Limitation Act operated to run time against all the plaintiffs because of the existence or conduct of other joint family members.
  3. Whether only those plaintiffs in existence at the date of the alienation (or specifically only plaintiff 1) could challenge it and, if so, to what extent (i.e., only to the extent of their share as at the date of alienation).
  4. Whether the alienations affecting Survey No. 31/2 (mortgages and a subsequent court-sale) remained open to challenge by the plaintiffs or whether the 1928 execution sale extinguished plaintiffs' equitable interest and locus standi.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (defendants 2 to 5 and others)

  • The 1912 sale (Survey No. 32) was legally justified — either by antecedent debts or by being for the benefit/management of the family.
  • The suit was barred by limitation under Article 126, Limitation Act; possession by the alienee was immediate in 1912 and more than 12 years had elapsed; Section 7 of the Limitation Act would operate to run time against all co-owners.
  • Only plaintiff 1 (who was alive at the date of the alienation) could challenge the 1912 alienation and then only to the extent of his share as it stood at that date.
  • As to the alienations of Survey No. 31/2 (1924, 1925) and the sale in execution (1928), the execution sale in 1928, subject to prior mortgages, bound the plaintiffs and extinguished any personal interest of the plaintiffs such that they lacked locus standi to press challenges to earlier mortgages.

Plaintiffs (as reflected in the plaint and trial Court findings)

  • The alienations by defendant 1 were not binding on them because of an alleged family partition in 1924, lack or inadequacy of consideration, and absence of antecedent family debts.
  • Plaintiffs sought recovery by partition and possession of their asserted three-fourths share in the suit property (the trial Court ultimately awarded recovery of a three-fourths share in Survey No. 32 before the present modification by the appellate Bench).
  • The plaintiffs initially alleged immoral and illegal purposes for some alienations but abandoned that ground at hearing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
43 IA 249 Recitals in deeds — the significance of a recital increases with lapse of time; a recital coupled with circumstances and the purchaser's honest conduct and inquiry can be sufficient evidence of necessity where direct proof is impossible (quotation of Lord Buckmaster). The Court relied on these principles to evaluate the probative value of the vague recital in the 1912 sale-deed and whether, given the lapse of 18 years, the recital plus circumstances could sustain the deed despite limited independent evidence.
45 Bom 446 Held that where one co-heir attained majority and became manager, suit was barred against him and under S.7 against minors because he could give discharge without concurrence of minors. The Court distinguished this case on facts because Rudrappa (an elder brother) had never been a manager and so the precedent did not apply to bar the plaintiffs' suit.
46 All 882 When an alienation is not justified by necessity, a cause of action arises in favour of all other members; there is one cause of action for others (successive causes do not arise with births). Used in the limitation analysis to explain the principle that cause of action may be single and accrue at date of alienation, impacting time-bar consideration for later-born members.
52 IA 69 Held that when youngest plaintiff was not in existence at date of alienation, suit was barred against all since cause of action arose before birth; no new cause arose on birth. The Court cited this to outline the effect of such authorities that in some situations all plaintiffs' suits will be time-barred when the oldest attained majority long before suit.
53 IA 365 Where an elder brother had taken no steps to question an alienation, a younger brother suing within three years of attaining majority to avoid the alienation is not time-barred. The Court relied on this principle to hold that Rudrappa's inactivity did not render the plaintiffs' suit time-barred and that an elder's mere inactivity does not necessarily amount to capacity to give discharge under S.7.
31 All 156 Case of certified guardian selling minors' property without sanction; discussion whether an elder was capable of giving a discharge; held that remaining inactive did not make him capable of giving discharge under relevant statute. Cited by the Court in support of the view that inactivity by an elder brother (or other co-heir) does not always amount to the ability to give a discharge that would run limitation against minors.
33 All 2837 Held that a member born after the alienation cannot question the validity of that alienation. The Court used this to interpret the phrase “the other members” as meaning those in existence at the date of alienation when considering who may challenge an alienation.
35 Mad 47 Full Bench: the mortgagee of a Hindu father can proceed against the share of a son born subsequently in family property mortgaged by the father (i.e., purchaser may get interest not diminished by later births). Referred to in the comparative discussion of Madras and Bombay approaches; the Court noted Bombay decisions align with this Full Bench decision.
14 Mad 408 Full Bench earlier view that purchaser takes an uncertain/fluctuating interest convertible on partition — purchaser stands no better than alienor and may have his share diminished by later births. The Court contrasted this view with decisions it preferred (Bombay line) and declined to follow the later Madras Division Bench that returned to 14 Mad 408.
25 Mad 690 Held that the death of the coparcener who made the alienation did not divest the interest of the alienee; the quantum of interest vesting in the alienee is not affected by subsequent changes in numbers of coparceners. Quoted (White C.J.) to support the proposition that an alienee's interest is determined at the date of the alienation and not reduced by later births or deaths.
10 Cal 626 Privy Council: purchaser by execution sale acquired the share/interest of the judgment-debtor as it would have been allotted had partition taken place at time of sale (i.e., purchaser gets the father's share as determined at sale-date). Cited as a controlling authority for the proposition that a purchaser acquires the share which the alienor would have had at the date of alienation/ sale.
3 Cal 198 Earlier case cited in support of the principle applied in 10 Cal 626 (agreement on measure of interest acquired by purchaser). Referred to as part of the line of authorities confirming the measure of the alienee's interest at the date of sale.
5 Cal 148 Earlier case cited in the same line (agreement with the principle adopted in 10 Cal 626). Referred to as confirmatory authority for the Privy Council's approach.
56 Mad 534 Division Bench dissented from the Full Bench in 35 Mad 47 and followed the view in 14 Mad 408 (i.e., purchaser's position not better than alienor). The Court expressed inability to follow the ground of that decision and preferred the Bombay line of authorities which accord with 35 Mad 47.
49 Mad 596 Held that an auction-purchaser of an undivided share got only a mere equity to partition, not an immediate tenancy-in-common with other members. Cited to explain a contrasting Madras principle; used to highlight differences between Madras and Bombay positions.
41 Bom 347 Held that a purchaser of the interests of one coparcener is a tenant-in-common with the others even before partition; the alienee acquires the share which the alienor would have had if partition had occurred at the date of alienation. The Court treated this decision as binding for the Bombay Presidency and applied it to hold that plaintiff 1's share at the date of the 1912 alienation was one-fourth; used to reduce the plaintiffs' recovery accordingly.
5 Bom 621 Remarks that if certain plaintiffs were born after the alienation they could not sustain the suit; an obiter note about the unsustainability of suits by persons not in existence at alienation date. Referred to as supporting authority for the proposition that birth after alienation may affect a plaintiff's right to challenge.
21 Bom 797 Referential authority indicating the rights of alienee determined at the time of alienation (obiter comment discussed). Cited in the chain of Bombay authorities relied on to determine the measure of the alienee's interest and the plaintiffs' entitlement.
11 Bom HCR 72 Cited as one of the earlier Bombay decisions pointing to the alienation date as the relevant time to determine rights. Referred to in support of the proposition that the alienee's rights are fixed at the alienation date.
12 Bom HCR 138 Cited alongside other Bombay decisions as indicating the period of alienation as determinative. Referred to as part of the Bombay line of authority on which the Court relied.
23 IA 3721 Referenced in the discussion of authorities about consequences of alienation. Used in the analytical chain contrasting positions and supporting the Court's adherence to the Bombay approach.
Naro Gapal v. Paragauda Identified as a binding decision (Bombay line) relevant to determining the share an alienee acquires and the coparcener shares at the date of alienation. The Court stated it was bound by this decision and applied it to hold plaintiff 1's share at the date of the 1912 alienation was one-fourth, thereby limiting plaintiffs' recovery to that extent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate Court reviewed the trial Court's findings and the parties' contentions and proceeded in a sequence of legal analyses limited to the material facts and authorities cited in the opinion.

  1. Evaluation of justification for the 1912 alienation:
    • The sale-deed (Ex. 50) recited that the sale was "for the purpose of my family and its required management." Defendant 2 gave particulars of alleged debts and family needs totaling about Rs. 2,300–2,350, including shop debts, rent arrears, wages, bullocks/seed/fodder and three bonds (Exs. 84–86).
    • The trial Court held that Exhibits 84 and 85 (passed in 1907) were time-barred in 1912; the appellate Bench observed endorsements of acknowledgment made in 1910 on those bonds, a fact which the trial Court may have overlooked, though no endorsement as to satisfaction appeared on the bonds and the sale-deed did not specifically state any bonds were being satisfied.
    • Defendant 2 admitted neither he nor his father made inquiries into the alleged shop debts and that no pressure was being exerted on defendant 1 to pay debts; the two witnesses examined likely had no direct knowledge of the debts. Given the vagueness of recitals and the value of the land, the Court held that Adiveyya (the purchaser) should reasonably have inquired further or ensured documentary satisfaction of the bonds. Applying the passage from 43 IA 249 (Lord Buckmaster), the Court concluded the recital was too vague and the circumstances did not justify overturning the trial Court's finding that insufficient legal grounds were made out to justify the sale.
  2. Limitation analysis under Article 126 and Section 7 of the Limitation Act:
    • Article 126 (Limitation Act) — twelve years runs from the alienee's taking possession. Possession in the present case was immediate on execution of the deed in 1912. The suit was filed on 17 October 1930.
    • Plaintiffs noted that plaintiff 1 became a major in April 1927 (less than three years before suit). The appellants argued (by analogy to Section 7) that if Rudrappa (a step-brother) had been capable of bringing suit earlier and was presumed to be a major in 1924, time would have run and thus run against all co-heirs.
    • The Court examined authority (45 Bom 446, 46 All 882, 52 IA 69) and the exceptions such as in 53 IA 365 and 31 All 156. It found that Rudrappa had never acted as family manager and therefore could not be held to have had the capacity to give a discharge without concurrence of the others; accordingly Section 7 did not operate to bar the present plaintiffs' suit.
  3. Who may challenge the alienation and to what extent:
    • The Court accepted the legal proposition (citing Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law) that an alienation by a father not justified by necessity or antecedent debt may be set aside by one of the sons, "partially or wholly according to the province in which the question arises."
    • Applying the Bombay line of authorities (notably 41 Bom 347 and Naro Gapal v. Paragauda), the Court held that only the coparceners in existence at the date of the alienation may challenge it, and the measure of the share is the share the challenging coparcener would have received had partition occurred at the date of alienation. In the present fact pattern (family consisting in 1912 of defendant 1, defendant 11 (the mother), plaintiff 1 and Rudrappa), plaintiff 1's share at that date would have been one-fourth. As defendant 11 (the mother) could not challenge the alienation in this suit and Rudrappa did not, plaintiff 1 alone could challenge to the extent of that one-fourth; accordingly the Court concluded that the plaintiffs collectively could not claim more than that one-fourth share in Survey No. 32.
  4. First Appeal No. 164 (Survey No. 31/2) — effect of execution sale of 1928:
    • The Court summarized the chain of alienations and mortgages relating to Survey No. 31/2 (mortgage 1924 for Rs.700; mortgage 1925 for Rs.2400 transferred in 1930; execution sale 1928 to defendant 10 subject to previous mortgages).
    • Because defendant 10's title arose by court sale in execution in 1928 and the plaintiffs admitted that the trial Court's conclusion that the execution sale bound them was correct, the Court held the plaintiffs' equity of redemption had been lost. Consequently plaintiffs no longer had any personal interest in the property and lacked locus standi to contest the earlier mortgages in the present proceedings. The Court therefore refused to interfere with the trial Court's decree on that subject and dismissed Appeal No. 164 with costs.
  5. Disposition of the trial Court's orders and consequential modifications:
    • The trial Court had awarded the plaintiffs a three-fourths share in Survey No. 32; the appellate Court reduced that fractional recovery to one-fourth in accordance with the date-of-alienation rule applied under Bombay authorities.
    • The trial Court's declaration that the mortgage held by defendant 9 was binding on the plaintiffs was set aside because the appellate Court did not decide on the validity of that mortgage in the present judgment.
    • The trial Court's award of a one-eighth share to defendant 11 (the mother) was set aside because the mother would not be entitled to a share in the present suit under the circumstances described in Mulla (paras. 315–316) and the Court's application of authorities.
    • The inquiry as to future mesne profits ordered by the trial Court is retained, but the operative date for computation is shifted from the trial Court's original date to the date of the present decision.
    • Costs: appellants largely succeeded in Appeal No. 87 and were awarded two-thirds of the costs in that appeal; Appeal No. 164 was dismissed with costs.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • First Appeal No. 164 of 1934 is dismissed — the execution sale of 1928 bound the plaintiffs, their equity of redemption was lost, and they no longer had locus standi to challenge the earlier mortgages in this suit.
  • First Appeal No. 87 of 1934 is allowed in part — the trial Court's decree awarding the plaintiffs a three-fourths share in Survey No. 32 is modified: the plaintiffs' collective recovery is reduced to one-fourth (the share plaintiff 1 would have had at the date of the 1912 alienation). The trial Court's declarations that defendant 9's mortgage was binding on the plaintiffs and that defendant 11 (the mother) was entitled to one-eighth are set aside.

Implications and consequences:

  • The practical effect is a narrower recovery for the plaintiffs in Survey No. 32: they may recover only the one-fourth share corresponding to plaintiff 1's allocable interest as it stood in 1912, rather than the three-fourths previously awarded by the trial Court.
  • The plaintiffs have lost any personal interest in Survey No. 31/2 by reason of the 1928 execution sale and therefore cannot pursue challenges to the earlier mortgages in these proceedings.
  • The trial Court's mesne-profits inquiry remains in place but the period for computation is reset to the date of this appellate decision.
  • The Court applied established authorities (Bombay line of decisions and Privy Council authorities) and did not purport to lay down a new principle of law; the decision follows and applies existing precedents to the facts of the case rather than creating novel precedent.

Note: This summary strictly reflects only the information and legal reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion. No facts or legal conclusions beyond those appearing in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

Sen, J.:— These two appeals are by defendants 2 to 5 and by plaintiffs respectively in a suit for a declaration that the alienations made by defendant 1, the father of the plaintiffs, are not binding on the plaintiffs and for possession of the suit property, or in the alternative for partition and possession of the plaintiffs' shares in the suit property which is stated to be a three-fourth share. One of the suit properties, Survey No. 32 in the village of Ingalahalli in Hubli taluka, was sold by defendant 1 to Adiveyya, father of defend, ants 2 and 3 and grandfather of defendants 4 and 5, on 10th May 1912, and this alienation is the subject-matter of Appeal No. 87. At the time of this alienation the members of defendant 1's family were himself, his wife, defendant 11, plaintiff 1 and Rudrappa, defendant 1's son by a former wife. The grounds alleged in the plaint for the contention that the alienations are not binding on the plaintiffs are: the partition of the family property in 1924, the absence or inadequacy of the consideration, the absence of antecedent family debts and the immoral and illegal nature of the purposes for which the alienations were made.

2. The contention as to immoral purposes was given up at the hearing and the trial Court held that the partition was not proved. The contentions of defendants 2 to 5 that plaintiffs 2 to 6 who had not been born at the time of the alienation had no right to challenge it and that the alienation was for antecedent debts were overruled by the trial Court, which also held that Adiveyya had purchased the land without making any inquiry as to the existence of antecedent debts or family necessity; and it passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs directing their recovery of a three-fourth share in the suit property. The other alienations in the suit concern survey No. 31/2 and took place in 1924, 1925 and 1928. They affect defendants 7 to 10 and are the subject-matter of First Appeal No. 164 of 1934.

3. The contentions in Appeal No. 87 are that the sale had sufficient legal justification, that the suit was barred by limitation, and that as only plaintiff 1 out of the plaintiffs was in existence at the time of the alienation, at most only he can get the alienation set aside to the extent of his share. It is not denied that the property was a coparcenary property as to the alienation of which defendant 1 had not only the powers of a manager, i.e the right to alienate it for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family, but also the special powers of a Hindu father to sell or mortgage the joint family property, including his sons' interests therein, to discharge debts contracted by himself for his own personal benefit, and that such alienation would bind the sons provided that such debts were antecedent to the alienation and that they were not incurred for immoral purposes: Mulla's Hindu Law, Edn. 8, Ss. 256 and 259. The ground as to immoral purposes having been given up, it is sufficient for the appellants to show that the alienation was justified by antecedent debts or by the benefit of the family. The trial Court has held that no such debts or purposes have been made out or were found by the alienees on enquiry to have existed at the time of the alienation. The sale-deed (Ex. 50) states the grounds of the sale as “for the purpose of my family and its required management”. Defendant 2 in his evidence has given details of these purposes. They are a debt of Rs. 1000 due-from his father's grocery shop, Rs. 300 to Rs. 350 due for rent of the land which has not been paid on account of bad harvest, Rs. 200 owed to agricultural employees, Rs. 300 required for purchasing bullocks, cotton-seed, fodder, etc., and about Rs. 500 due on three bonds (Exs. 84, 85 and 86). The aggregate of these amounts comes to Rs. 2300 to Rs. 2350. Defendant 2 has examined two witnesses, one Ramchandra Shankar Kulkarni, who identified defendant 1 before the Sub-Registrar and who had been a talati of the village for two years and one Fakkiraddy, one of the attesting witnesses. The trial Court held that Exhibits Nos. 84 and 85 which had been passed in 1907 had become time-barred in 1912. In this it seems to have been in error as these bonds bear endorsements of acknowledgment made in 1910, and this fact seems to have escaped its notice. At the same time the sale-deed does not specifically mention any bonds as satisfied nor is there any endorsement on these three bonds as to satisfaction. Defendant 2 admits that no pressure was being put on defendant 1 to pay his debts and that the sale was not specifically for the satisfaction of the previous bonds. He also admits that neither he nor his father made any inquiry as to the alleged debts of defendant 1's shop, and he does not say whether any inquiries were made regarding the other debts. It also appears likely that the two witnesses had no direct knowledge of the debts. Ramchandra says. “No other debt was mentioned”, apparently implying that the debts which are alleged were mentioned by defendant 1. Fakirraddy states: “defendant 1 did not say how much he owed to Neeli's and how much to Kattewadi,” the two villagers to whom defendant 1 alleged that he owed shop balances. Defendant 1 has admitted that Neeli kept accounts, but no accounts have been produced. In these circumstances the trial Court held that no sufficient reasons had been made out as legal justification of the sale. We have to consider whether there is any reason for us to take a different view.

4. The alienation was made eighteen years before the suit and defendant 1 being dead, defendant 2 could perhaps rely only on the two witnesses who have been mentioned above. But defendant 2 has admitted that he was working under his father at the time of the sale-deed and that therefore he had knowledge of the details of the transaction. We have been referred in this connexion to certain passages in Mayne's Hindu Law, Edn. 9. At p. 482 it is stated that the presumption proper to be made as to the existence of legal grounds for the transfer will vary with circumstances, and must be regulated by and dependent on them. Reference is made at p. 484 of the same book to 43 IA 249,1 from which the following remarks by Lord Buckmaster may be quoted (p. 253):

If the deeds were challenged at the time or near the date of their execution, so that independent evidence would be available, the recitals would deserve but slight consideration, and certainly should not be accepted as proof of the facts. But as time goes by and all the original parties to the transaction and all those who could have given evidence on the relevant points have grown old or passed away, a recital consistent with the probability and circumstances of the case assumes greater importance and cannot lightly be set aside; for it should be remembered that the actual proof of the necessity which justified the deed is not essential to establish its validity. It is only necessary that a representation should have been made to the purchaser that such necessity existed, and that he should have acted honestly and made proper inquiry to satisfy himself of its truth. The recital is dear evidence of the representation, and if the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable Relief that an inquiry would have confirmed its truth, then, when proof of actual inquiry has become impossible, the recital, coupled with such circumstances, would be sufficient evidence to support the deed.

5. In the present case, though eighteen years had elapsed before the suit was brought, defendant 2 was twenty-nine years of age at the time of the alienation, and he admits that he knew all the details of the transaction and also that he and his father made no inquiries as to the alleged debts of the grocery shop. He does not say that he made inquiries as to any of the other alleged debts and necessities. It is true that defendant 1 had been taking loans from his father since 1907 and therefore defendant 1 and Adiveyya were not strangers. But in this case the recitals in the deeds are of the vaguest description, and it would be reasonable to require that Adiveyya, who was purchasing a land of considerable value, should have made some inquiries as to the alleged debts and should have been careful either to see that the satisfaction of the three bonds were specifically mentioned in the sale-deed or to get entries made in the documents themselves that they have been satisfied. We do not think that sufficient grounds have been made out in appeal to justify our taking a view different from that of the trial Court on this point.

6. The next point taken by the learned advocate for the appellants is one of limitation. The suit was filed on 17th October 1930, the alienation in favour of Adiveyya having been made on 10th May 1912. It is admitted that in this case Article 126, Limitation Act, applies, under which Article the period of limitation is 12 years from the date of the alienee's taking possession. Possession in this case was taken immediately on the passing of the deed, but plaintiff 1 became a major on 22nd April 1927, i.e less than three years before the suit. The point taken however is that Rudrappa, plaintiff 1's step-brother who appears to have separated from the family in 1924, was presumably a major at that date and that if he had brought a suit on the date of the present suit for getting the sale set aside, it would have been time-barred. That being so, it is contended that under Section 7 of the Limitation Act, time will run against plaintiffs 1 to 6 also and the present suit will also be time-barred. Section 7 of the Limitation Act, runs thus:

Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all: but where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

7. Reliance has been placed on 45 Bom 446,2 46 All 8823 and 52 IA 69.4 In the first of these cases three brothers sued to get an alienation made during their minority by their mother set aside, plaintiffs 1 and 2 being minors and plaintiff 3 being over 21 years of age at the date of the suit. It was held that the suit was barred against plaintiff 3 and also against plaintiffs 1 and 2 under S. 7 inasmuch as plaintiff 3, on his attaining majority became the manager of the joint family and as such could give a valid discharge and acquittance of all claims against the defendants without the concurrence of the minor plaintiffs. As Rudrappa was never a manager of the family property, this case has no application, in our opinion, to the facts of the present case. In 46 All 882, which was a suit brought by two brothers for setting aside an alienation made by their father, it was held that when an alienation was made which was not justified by necessity, a cause of action arose in favour of all the other members to have it set aside and to recover possession from the alienee, but that there was only one cause of action in favour of the other members of the family and that successive causes of action could not arise as new members were born year after year. In 52 IA 69 four brothers forming a joint Hindu family sued to set aside their father's alienation, three of them being over and the fourth being under 21 years of age. It was held that the suit was barred against all of them as the cause of action arose when the youngest plaintiff was not in existence and no new cause of action arose upon his birth. The effect of the last two cases is that where several brothers seek to set aside an alienation and the oldest of them attained majority more than three years before suit, the suit of all the brothers will be time, barred. It was however held in 53 IA 365 that where an older brother had taken no steps to question the alienation, a suit brought by a younger brother within three years of his attaining majority to avoid the alienation is not time-barred. In that case their Lord, ships of the Privy Council confirmed the decision of the High Court of Allahabad which had followed their own decision in 31 All 156.6 In that case the certified guardian of two Hindu minors had sold a certain property of the minors without the sanction of the District Judge. Within three years of his attaining majority the younger of the two minors, who were brothers, sued to avoid the sale. The elder however had come of age several years earlier and had taken no steps to repudiate the transaction. It was held that the suit was not barred by limitation. It was argued in this case that plaintiff 1, who was the older brother, must be deemed to be the managing member of the family who would have a right to give a discharge. Their Lordships said (p. 160):

The powers of the manager of a Hindu family are undoubtedly very extensive, but there is nothing in the present case to show that plaintiff 1 ever acted as the manager. In the present case all that he did was to remain quite inactive without taking any step to recover possession of the property or to set aside the transaction which was completely against the interest of himself and his minor brother. On the whole we have come to the conclusion that plaintiff 1 was not capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of plaintiff 2 within the meaning of S. 8 of Act 16 of 1877. The consequence is that time did not run against either of the plaintiffs and the suit is maintainable.

8. On the same principle we must hold that Rudrappa, who never acted as the manager, could not have given a valid discharge without the concurrence of the plaintiffs, and that the latter's suit cannot be said to have become time-barred. The third point taken by the learned advocate for the appellants is that only plaintiff 1, who had been born at the time of the alienation out of all the plaintiffs, can challenge the alienation and that he can do so only for the purpose of setting it aside to the extent of his share. In our opinion, this contention must be upheld, his share meaning his share as it stood at the time of the alienation. The law applicable on this point has been thus set out by Mulla at p. 318 in his Principles of Hindu Law, Edn. 8:

…. an alienation made by a father who has sons then living, not being one for legal necessity, or for payment of an antecedent debt, if made without their consent, may be set aside by one of those sons — partially or wholly according to the province in which the question arises.

9. The word “partially” in this sentence is meant to apply to the provinces of Bombay and Madras where a coparcener may alienate for value his undivided interest in the coparcenary property without the consent of the other coparceners. At p. 312 of the same book, para. 268, it is stated:

Where a member of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara law as administered in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies sells or mortgages more than his own interest in the joint family property, the alienation not being one for legal necessity or for payment by a father of an antecedent debt, the other members are entitled to have the alienation set aside to the extent of their own interests therein.

10. The words “the other members” in this sentence appear to mean members who exist at the date of the alienation. In 33 All 2837 it was held that a member of a joint Hindu family who was born after the alienation of the family property by another member of that family cannot question the validity of that alienation. In 35 Mad 478 a Full Bench considered the question whether the mortgagee of a Hindu father is entitled to proceed against the share of a son subsequently born in family property mortgaged by the father. The answer was in the affirmative. The Full Bench decision dissented from the Full Bench decision of the same High Court in 14 Mad 408,9 where the following view had been held (p. 418):

…the purchaser, who can only take what can he lawfully sold, most be taken to purchase an uncertain and fluctuating Interest with the right of converting it at any moment after the purchase by partition into definite separate property.

11. It referred to a later decision in 25 Mad 69010 in which it had been held that the death of the coparcener who had made the alienation did not divest the interest of the alienee; and White C.J said (p. 53):

…it seems to me that when once it has been held that the death of the alienor does not create any right of survivorship in the other coparceners, it follows, almost as a necessary corollary, that the quantum of the interest which vests in the alienee is not affected by subsequent changes in the number of coparceners.

12. Benson J. said that the question was really concluded by the decision of the Privy Council in 10 Cal 626.11 In that case a judgment-creditor had bought in execution and obtained possession of the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in a certain property which belonged to him and his minor son jointly; and their Lordships had held, agreeing with 3 Cal 19812 and 5 Cal 14813 at p. 166 that the property which had passed to the purchaser was the share and interest of the father which would have been allotted to him if a partition of the family property had taken place at the time of the execution sale.

13. In a later case, 56 Mad 534,14 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dissented from the Full Bench case in 35 Mad 47, and went back to the Full Bench decision enunciated in 14 Mad 408. With great respect we are unable to follow the ground on which the last decision was reached. One ground for decision may be that, as held in 49 Mad 596,15 an auction-purchaser of the undivided share of a coparcener of a joint Hindu family in the Madras Presidency got by his purchase a mere equity to a partition of the joint family property and did not become a tenant-in-common with the other members of the family. In Bombay however as stated in Mayne's Hindu Law at p. 496 (Edn. 9), it is held that even before partition, a purchaser of the interests of one coparcener is a tenant, in-common with the others: 41 Bom 347.16 The Bombay decisions on the question under consideration are in accordance with 35 Mad 47, and not with 14 Mad 408, or 56 Mad 534. In 5 Bom 62117 the father of the plaintiffs, two of whom were minors, sold some lands belonging to the joint family to the defendant's father. Plaintiffs in that case failed to establish any case entitling them to set aside the sale. Their Lordships however remarked (page 629):

Lastly, although in the view that we take of this case, the question is not now of importance, it ought to have been ascertained whether either plaintiff 2 or 8 had been born before 26th May 1868 [the date of the alienation]. If, as is extremely probable, they were not so, this suit would have been unsustainable by them, as they never could have had a vested Interest in the lands.

14. In 41 Bom 347 two brothers sued to set aside the sale by their father to defendant 1 of a certain piece of land belonging to the joint family. One of the brothers had been born subsequently to the date of the alienation. It was held that defendant 1 had acquired the one-half share in the alienated property to which defendant 2 had been entitled at the date of the alienation owing to the fact that the minor plaintiff had not then been born. Their Lord, ships referred to 21 Bom 797,18 in which Sir Charles Farran C.J had remarked that two previous decisions of the Bombay High Court, 11 Bom HCR 7219 and 12 Bom HCR 138,20 pointed to the period of the alienation by a Hindu coparcener, whether voluntary or compulsory, as that at which the rights of the alienee were to be determined, but that the Court nevertheless in 21 Bom 797 had laid down obiter, following 14 Mad 408, the proposition that the purchaser of the coparcenary share stood in no better position than his alienor and was consequently, like the latter, liable to have his share diminished by the birth of other coparceners, if he stood by and did not insist on an immediate partition. This conclusion was held by their Lordships to be inconsistent with the proposition that an alienation by the joint tenant effects a severance as a result of which the alienee before division by metes and bounds, becomes a tenant-in-common: (23 IA 3721 at p. 44 and 11 Bom HCR 72 at p. 81.) We are bound by the decision in Naro Gapal v. Paragauda, and must therefore hold that at the time of the alienation in 1912, when the plaintiff's family consisted of defendant 1, defendant 11, plaintiff 1 and Rudrappa, plaintiff 1 would have got a one-fourth share in the property on partition and that as defendant 11 cannot challenge and Rudrappa has not chosen to challenge the alienation, plaintiff 1 is entitled to question the alienation to the extent of only such one fourth share in survey No. 32. In this one-fourth share defendant 11 will have no share, as she would have been entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son only if the partition had taken place between her husband and his sons or between the sons after her husband's death: Mulla's Hindu Law, Edn. 8, paras. 315 and 316.

15. In First Appeal No. 164 of 1934 the facts are as follows: On 17th September 1924, defendant 1 mortgaged survey No. 31/2, which belonged to the joint family, to the father of defendants 7 and 8 for Rs. 700. On 5th December 1925, defendant 1, on behalf of himself and his minor sons, the plaintiffs, mortgaged the same land as well as a house with a yard to one Andanappa for Rs. 2400. Andanappa transferred his right to defendant 9 on 6th January 1930 for Rs. 3500. Lastly, in 1928 defendant 10 having obtained a money decree against defendant 1 purchased the land, survey No. 31/2, in execution. The plaintiffs, appellants seek to get these alienations set aside. The last of these alienations by which defendant 10 purchased survey No. 31/2 in execution, subject to the previous mortgages, is not challenged by the present appellants, as the learned advocate on their behalf admits that the ground of the trial Court's decision as to the alienation being binding on them is correct. The plaintiffs questioned this alienation in the suit, inter alia, on the ground that the alienation was for immoral and illegal purposes, but subsequently gave up this ground. That being so, and the right, title and interest of defendant 1 having been sold at a court sale in execution, the plaintiffs being sons of the judgment-debtor are necessarily bound by the court sale. A question as to res judicata has been raised as regards the first alienation in favour of defendants 7 and 8, but we do not think that it would be proper on our part to go into the validity of the alienations of 1924 and 1925, so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, in view of the legal consequence of the execution sale of 1928. The plaintiffs having now no personal interest left in the suit property as the result of the sale, they cannot be said to have any locus standi in First Appeal No. 164 of 1934. We there, fore think that we cannot interfere with the decree of the trial Court as regards the subject-matter of this appeal, which will accordingly be dismissed with costs. As regards First Appeal No. 87 of 1934, the order of the trial Court as regards survey No. 32 is that the plaintiffs do recover by partition a three-fourths share in the property. In the view that we have taken this fraction will have to be reduced to one-fourth. The declaration of the trial Court that the mortgage held by defendant 9 is binding against the plaintiffs will be set aside, as we have not gone into the question of the validity of the mortgage. The trial Court has also awarded defendant 11 a one-eighth share in the plaint property. As the mother will not be entitled to any share in the present suit, this part of the trial Court's decree will also be set aside. The Court has further ordered an inquiry as to future mesne profits as regards survey No. 32 from the date of the suit till recovery of the possession or till the expiry of three years from the date of the trial Court's decree. That date will be replaced by the date of the present decision. The rest of the order of the trial Court will stand.

16. The appellants have largely succeeded in Appeal No. 87 and we think the proper order will be that they will be entitled to two thirds of the costs in that appeal.

Broomfield, J.:— I agree with the orders proposed by my learned brother. I have to add only a few remarks on two points. First, as to the quantum of the share which the plaintiffs are entitled to get as a result of holding that the sale of land No. 32 in the year 1912 is not binding on their interest. The law in Bombay as settled in this Presidency by 41 Bom 347 is that the alienee gets the share which the alienor would have got if a partition had taken place at the date of the alienation. That share would actually have been one-fourth in this case, the family consisting of defendant 1, defendant 11, mother of plaintiff 1, plaintiff 1 himself and Rudrappa. But Rudrappa who accepted the alienation in 1924 when he took his share and went out of the family has no right to challenge it, nor has the mother, defendant 11. It is conceded that only a coparcener can do so. The plaintiffs who are in effect suing to evict persons who have been in possession since 1912 can take no more between them than the share to which plaintiff 1 would have been entitled to in 1912. Defendant 11 can claim no share in this suit. If the plaintiffs should partition their one-fourth share, which they have not sought to do so far, she would get the share of a son, i.e one-seventh in that.

17. In Appeal No. 164, the plaintiffs raised the question of the validity of the mortgages executed by defendant 1 in favour of the father of defendants 7 and 8 and in favour of defendant 9 so far as their interests in the property are concerned. But in this suit the consideration of these questions is academic and premature. Defendant 10 purchased the property in 1928 at a court sale subject to the mortgage rights of defendants 7, 8 and 9. Plaintiffs' equity of redemption is therefore lost and they have no interest in the property. The mortgagees could not proceed against them. If they sue defendant 10, it might be open to him to contend that the mortgages are not effective against the whole of the property. Plaintiffs cannot call upon the Court to go into that question now. They apparently hoped to be able to set aside the court sale. But they have had to admit that the sale is binding on them. It necessarily follows that their interest in the property is gone and they have no locus standi to challenge the mortgages either.

R.M/R.K

18. Order accordingly.