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Hitesh Narendra Doshi v. Jesal Hitesh Doshi .

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Mar 24, 2000
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Judgment Summary — B. Subhashan Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision arises from an order dated 4-8-1999 passed by the Family Court, Hyderabad in I.A. (SR) No. 2876 of 1999 in O.P. No. 433 of 1999. The parties were married on 7-6-1993 according to Hindu rites. Strain developed between them in 1995 and they have been living separately since then. On 5-7-1999 they filed a petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking divorce by mutual consent and, at the same time, applied for dispensation of the statutory six months waiting period on the ground that, after dissolution, both parties wanted to pursue future activities abroad. The Family Court refused to dispense with the six-month waiting period, relying on the Division Bench decision in Re: Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthy (1992) 3 Andh LT 381. The present civil revision challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the minimum six-month waiting period prescribed by Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is mandatory or directory.
  2. Whether a trial court has the power to relax or waive the six-month waiting period under Section 13-B(2) in a petition for divorce by mutual consent.
  3. Whether the Family Court was correct to refuse dispensation of the six-month period in the facts of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petition under Section 13-B(2) sought divorce by mutual consent; an interlocutory application sought waiver of the mandatory six-month waiting period so the parties could proceed earlier because they intended to pursue future activities abroad after dissolution.
  • The petitioner's counsel (Mr. K. S. Murthy) relied on several judicial decisions in support of the application; specific authorities cited included K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini (AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167), Re: G. V. Chitti Abbai and G. Padma Lakshmi ((1998) 5 Andh LT 618; AIR 1999 Andh Pra 91), and Smt. Roopa Reddy v. Prabhakar Reddy (AIR 1994 Kant 12), among others.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments in opposition to the petitioner's application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Re: Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthy, (1992) 3 Andh LT 381 (Division Bench) Held that the trial court has no power to relax the statutory six-month waiting period under Section 13-B(2); the period was fixed by Parliament to allow introspection and reconciliation. The High Court follows this Division Bench decision and treats the six-month wait as mandatory; it forms the principal precedent supporting dismissal of the prayer to dispense with the period.
K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini, AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167 (Division Bench) Deals with a factual situation where, during an appeal, an application was made to convert the petition to a consent petition; did not adjudicate whether Section 13-B(2) waiting period is mandatory or directory. The court distinguishes this case as factually different and notes it did not decide the mandatory/directory question; therefore it is not authoritative on the present issue.
Re: G. V. Chitti Abbai and G. Padma Lakshmi, (1998) 5 Andh LT 618; AIR 1999 Andh Pra 91 (single Judge) The single Judge held that the six-month wait under Section 13-B(2) was directory (i.e., could be dispensed with). The High Court disagrees with that view, finding that judgment was rendered without reference to the Division Bench decision in Jakkula and therefore rejects its conclusion that the period is directory.
Smt. Roopa Reddy v. Prabhakar Reddy, AIR 1994 Kant 12 (Karnataka High Court) Held that the six-month waiting period under Section 13-B(2) is directory and not mandatory. The High Court respectfully disagrees with this decision, noting it did not consider the later Division Bench authority in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthy.
Re: M. Sailaja, AIR 1995 Andh Pra 325 (single Judge) Followed the Division Bench in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthy and held that the six-month period cannot be waived; treated the period as mandatory. The High Court relies on this single-judge decision as consistent with the Division Bench in Jakkula and as supportive of the mandatory interpretation.
Arvind Sharma v. Dhara Sharma, 1998 (1) CCC 22 (Delhi High Court) Discussed authorities on the question; cited cases including K. Omprakash, Smt. Roopa Reddy, and Dhanjit Vadra but did not cite Jakkula. Noted by the High Court as a precedent cited to the single Judge in G. V. Chitti Abbai; the High Court points out that Jakkula was not brought to attention in that line of authorities.
Dhanjit Vadra v. Smt. Beena Vadra, AIR 1990 Delhi 146 One of the authorities cited in Arvind Sharma; the opinion references it as part of a cluster of decisions discussed in other courts. Referred to as background authority in the chain of decisions but not treated as dispositive on the mandatory/directory issue in this opinion.
Smt Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, AIR 1992 SC 1904 (Supreme Court) Explained the purpose of the 6-to-18-month interregnum under Section 13-B: to give parties time to reflect, seek advice and possibly reconcile; emphasized that filing does not authorize an immediate decree. The High Court extracts and relies on the Supreme Court's discussion (quoted passage) to support the conclusion that the waiting period has a definite purpose and is compulsory.
Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri, AIR 1997 SC 1266 (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court did not dissent from Sureshta Devi's view on the waiting period; dealt with issues about resiling beyond six months and used Art. 142 in the particular facts. The High Court notes that Ashok Hurra did not overturn Sureshta Devi's articulation of the waiting period's purpose; therefore Sureshta Devi's principles remain intact and supportive of the mandatory reading.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeds by first stating the factual matrix and the procedural posture: a petition under Section 13-B was presented on 5-7-1999 and an interlocutory application sought dispensation of the six-month wait; the Family Court denied that application relying on the Division Bench decision in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthy.

The court then reviews the authorities cited before it and assesses their relevance:

  • It distinguishes K. Omprakash (AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167) on the basis that that case arose in an appellate context where the parties had already spent time litigating (more than six months), and that Division Bench did not address whether a trial court could relax the statutory waiting period. Therefore K. Omprakash is not authority for permitting trial courts to waive the six-month wait.
  • The Division Bench decision in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthy is identified as the authority that squarely decided that a trial court lacks power to alter the statutory six-month waiting period under Section 13-B(2). The reasoning in Jakkula emphasizes that Parliament fixed the period to enable introspection and reconciliation.
  • Single-judge decisions that held the period to be directory (notably Re: G. V. Chitti Abbai and the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Roopa Reddy) are critically examined. The court notes that those decisions did not bring the Jakkula Division Bench authority to notice and, accordingly, this court cannot accept the view that the six-month period is directory.
  • The court invokes the legislative purpose of Section 13-B(2): the six-month waiting period (and the broader 6-to-18 month window) was enacted to provide an interregnum for reflection and the possibility of reconciliation, and Parliament could have provided express exceptions had it intended them. The court therefore rejects any implied relaxation of the statutory requirement.
  • The court refers to Supreme Court authority (Sureshta Devi) which explicitly explains the interregnum's purpose and views the period as an intended interval for reflection; Ashok Hurra is cited as not dissenting from that view and therefore the principle remains authoritative.

On this basis the court concludes that the six-month minimum waiting period under Section 13-B(2) is mandatory and not directory, and that courts do not have the power to relax that requirement.

Because the statutory six-month period had elapsed by the time of this decision, the court notes there is no obstacle to the lower court considering the petition in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 13-B.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition is DISMISSED. The court holds that the minimum six-month waiting period under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is mandatory and the trial court has no power to relax or waive that period.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Family Court was correct to refuse dispensation of the six-month waiting period; now that the statutory six months had elapsed, the Family Court is free to consider the petition under sub-section (2) of Section 13-B.
  • Costs: The revision is dismissed with no order as to costs (explicitly stated by the court).
  • Precedential effect: The opinion affirms and follows the Division Bench authority in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthy and Supreme Court reasoning in Sureshta Devi; it expressly disagrees with single-judge and some High Court authorities that treated the six-month period as directory. The decision reinforces the view that Parliament's prescribed waiting period must be observed and not read down as subject to judicial relaxation.

Disposition: Revision dismissed.

Show all summary ...

Judgement

B. SUBHASHAN REDDY, J. :- This revision is directed against the Order dated 4-8-1999 passed by the Family Court, Hyderabad in I.A. (SR) No. 2876 of 1999 in O.P. No. 433 of 1999.

2. The matter arises under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 7-6-1993 according to Hindu rites. But, strain developed in the relationship in the year 1995 and they have been living separately since then and finding that the marriage is incompatible, they had invoked S. 13-B(2) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking divorce by mutual consent and filed a petition to that effect in the Family Court, Hyderabad on 5-7-1999. They have filed an application seeking dispensing with the mandatory six months time wait on the ground that after dissolving the marriage, both the parties want to engage themselves in future activities by going to foreign countries. But, the said plea of dispensing with the mandatory period of six months was negatived by the Court below basing on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Re : Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthy, (1992) 3 Andh LT 381.

3. Mr. K. S. Murthy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, cited the decisions of this Court in K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini, AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167 and Re, G. V. Chitti Abbai and G. Padma Lakshmi, (1998) 5 Andh LT 618 : (AIR 1999 Andh Pra 91), as also the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Roopa Reddy v. Prabhakar Reddy, AIR 1994 Kant 12. Insofar as the judgment rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in Re : G. V. Chitti Abbais case (supra) is concerned, no judgment of this Court was cited before the learned single Judge. In fact, there is yet another judgment of another learned single Judge in Re : M. Sailaja, AIR 1995 Andh Pra 325, in which both the Division Bench judgments in K. Omprakashs case (AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167) (supra) and Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthys case (1992 (3) Andh LT 381) (supra) have been considered and the learned single Judge has followed the latter Division Bench judgment in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthys case (supra) holding that the 6 months wait period contemplated under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be waived or relaxed. Before the learned single Judge in Re : G. V. Chitti Abbais case (AIR 1999 Andh Pra 91) (supra) only one judgment was cited i.e. of Delhi High Court in Arvind Sharma v. Dhara Sharma, 1998 (1) CCC 22, in which, again the judgments in K. Omprakashs case (AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167) (supra); Smt. Roopa Reddys case (AIR 1994 Kant 12) (supra) and Dhanjit Vadra v. Smt. Beena Vadra, AIR 1990 Delhi 146, were cited, but not the latter judgments i.e. Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthys case (1992 (3) Andh LT 381) (supra), which was again followed by a learned single Judge in Sailajas case (AIR 1995 Andh Pra 325) (supra).

4. In K. Omprakashs case (AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167) (supra), the facts are different than the instant case. In fact, the Division Bench was considering an appeal against rejection of the plea of divorce and during the pendency of the appeal, application was filed under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. to convert the petition for divorce to one under the consent divorce under Sec. 13-B of the Act and what was available for the Division Bench was the point for consideration as to whether 6 months wait is necessary in the appellate Court after spending all that time in the litigation, which was more than 6 months and as the marriage had irretrievably broken down. The facts of the said case did not warrant any adjudication with regard to the power of the trial Court to relax the 6 months wait period and as to whether the said period of 6 months was directory or mandatory. That was correctly pointed out by the latter Division Bench judgment in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthys case (1992 (3) Andh LT 381) (supra). The facts situation in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthys case (supra) necessitated the adjudication with regard to the power of the trial Court to relax 6 months wait period under Section 13-B(2) of the Act. In the said case, a petition under Section 13-B of the Act was filed praying for a decree of divorce by mutual consent on 20-7-1992 and the said petition was posted to 20-1-1993 i.e. after 6 months as contemplated under Sec. 13-B(2) of the Act. But, an interlocutory application was filed seeking advancement of the case from 20-1-1993 to 22-7-1993 and on rejection of the said application, C.M.A. was filed and then the pertinent question was as to whether the provision of 6 months was mandatory or directory and distinguishing the earlier Division Bench judgment in K. Omprakashs case (AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167) (supra), it was held that the trial Court has no power to alter the statutory time-limit indicated in Section 13-B(2) of the Act, as the said time has been fixed by the Parliament to enable the parties to have introspection before finally opting for snapping the marital tie. The said legal principle enunciated by the Division Bench in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthys case (1992 (3) Andh LT 381) (supra) has been followed by the learned single Judge in Re : M. Sailajas case (AIR 1995 Andh Pra 325) (supra). These two judgments were never brought to the notice of the learned single Judge later disposing of G. V. Chitti Abbais case (AIR 1999 Andh Pra 91) (supra). As such, we cannot uphold the view of the learned single Judge in G. V. Chitti Babus case (supra) that the provision contained under Sec. 13-B(2) of the Act to wait for 6 months is directory and not mandatory. We are also in respectful disagreement with the similar view taken by the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Roopa Reddys case (AIR 1994 Kant 12) (supra), wherein it was held that the provision of 6 months time wait under Section 13-B(2) was held to be directory and not mandatory. It is pertinent to mention that even in Smt. Roopa Reddys case (AIR 1994 Kant 12) (supra), the earlier judgment of K. Omprakashs case (AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167) (supra) was cited, but the fact that it was distinguished by a later Division Bench of this Court in Jakkula Venkata Ramana Murthys case (1992 (3) Andh LT 381) (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Court.

5. Section 13-B was incorporated in Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by 1976 amendment. Before the said amendment, obtaining of divorce was very strict and only on proof of the grounds enumerated therein like desertion, cruelty etc., the divorce could be granted and on no other ground. On a slightest doubt of collusion between the parties, the Court was empowered to reject the plea of divorce. On passage of time, the Parliament has taken note of the hardship in the cases where the grounds stated could not be proved, yet the parties will stay separately making the very marriage institution counter-productive. As such, amendment was brought forth facilitating the decree by mutual consent by satisfying the Court that the marriage is irretrievably broken because of incompatibility. Here also, the Court should be satisfied that there is no collusion between the parties and the decree by mutual consent was not being sought for as a matter of course. The timeframe of 6 months wait has been set in the provision under Sec. 13-B(2) with a definite purpose and object of giving time to the parties for introspection and reconciliation. Within that 6 months wait period, it may be possible for the parties to reunite by setting aside their differences and even the elders, relatives and friends can also try for rapprochement; otherwise there was no purpose or object for the Parliament to fix up the 6 months time wait. That purpose and object stares at us so clearly by the language expressed in Section 13-B(2) of the Act robbing away the right of the Court from considering the petition earlier than 6 months or later than 18 months after its date of presentation and subject to further conditions of the petition not being withdrawn in the meantime and the Court being satisfied that the averments in the petition are true. Had the Parliament intended to create an exception to this compulsory time wait of 6 months, it could have done so as is provided in Proviso to Section 14 of the Act traceable to some of the clauses provided for obtaining involuntary divorce decree under Sections 13(1) and 13(1-A) of the Act. No such relaxation or exception can be read into Section 13-B of the Act in which obtaining of divorce decree by mutual consent is fettered with three pre-conditions, viz., (i) that the marriage has been solemnized in accordance with the Hindu Marriage Act, (ii) that for one year before the presentation of the petition for divorce by mutual consent, the parties had been living separately, and (iii) that even after compulsory wait of 6 months, the parties could not enter any reconciliation to reunite and opted for the grant of divorce by mutual consent. When the law prescribes the said manner for exercising jurisdiction and confers powers for that purpose, it has to be exercised in the same manner. In fact, the judgments pronounced by the Apex Court in Smt Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash., AIR 1992 SC 1904 and Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri., AIR 1997 SC 1266, clearly indicate that the time wait of 6 months is compulsory as the said time-frame has got a definite purpose i.e. enabling the parties to reunite. It is apt to extract the relevant passage from Sureshta Devis case (AIR 1992 SC 1904) (supra), which reads (Para 13) :

"From the analysis of the Section, it will be apparent that the filing of the petition with mutual consent does not authorise the Court to make a decree for divorce. There is a period of waiting from 6 to 18 months. This interregnum was obviously intended to give time and opportunity to the parties to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. In this transitional period one of the parties may have a second thought and change the mind not to proceed with the petition."

In the latest Supreme Court judgment in Ashok Hurras case (AIR 1997 SC 1266) (supra), this view taken in Sureshta Devis case (AIR 1992 SC 1904) (supra) relating to the wait period has not been dissented to, but was of the view that beyond 6 months wait period, a spouse may not be entitled to resile from the consent given earlier. But the Apex Court did not adjudicate on that issue and instead proceeded to snap the marital ties invoking the extraordinary power under Art. 142 of the Constitution. The result is that the legal principles enunciated by the Apex Court in Sureshta Devis case (AIR 1992 SC 1904) (supra) still hold the field.

6. In view of what is stated supra, we hold that the minimum of 6 months wait period from the date of presentation of the petition for snapping the marital ties between the parties by mutual consent under Sec. 13-B(2) of the Act is mandatory and not directory and that the Court has no power to relax the said compulsory time wait of 6 months. Now, that the statutory period of 6 months is also over, there is no embargo for the lower Court to consider the motion in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, with no order as to costs.

Revision dismissed.