Kamat Reddy Narayan Reddy v. Kamat Reddy Narayan Reddy And Another

Judgement

in which he has concurred with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court and held that the suit was within limitation.

2. The only point involved in this appeal is whether the suit on the facts of the case can be said to be beyond time. In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, it may be mentioned that the Second Talukdar of Bhongir by his judgment D/-13th Khurdad 1346F. held that the respondents were entitled to the kothwal patel watan of Anantawaram village. As a result of this judgment, the respondent became the incumbent of the watan and began to discharge the duties of police patel and enjoy the emoluments thereof.

3. The appellants being aggrieved by the order of the Second Talukdar went up in appeal to the Collector of Nalgonda, who by his order dated 12th Meher 1346 F., allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Second Talukdar. On a further appeal, the Subedar of Medak by his order dated 30th Aban 1347F. concurred with the view taken by the Collector. On revision being taken by the respondents, the then Revenue Member upheld the orders both of the Subedar as well as the Collector.

4. The respondents after having failed in the Revenue Department filed the instant suit on 2nd Ardibihisht 1354F. alleging that they had been in enjoyment of the watan up to 2nd Khurdad 1348F. and were dispossessed on the said date, and this date they said was the starting point of limitation.

5. The appellant in his reply contended that the limitation began in the year 1293H. All the Courts who had occasion to deal with the case held that since the suit was within six years from the admitted dat3 of dispossession, it will be deemed to be within limitation having regard to the provisions of Art. 106, Hyderabad Limitation Act corresponding to Art. 120, Indian Limitation Act.

6. The learned advocate for the appellant contended that the limitation if not from 1293 would start from the adverse judgment of the Talukdar which was delivered on 12th Meher 1340F. and therefore, the suit would be clearly time-barred. In support of his contention he has referred to Ketireddi v. Abdul Gafoor, 1355 Nazair-e-Hyderabad 363 (A); Babaji v. Bhuvanrao, 24 Dec LR 393 (B) and Venkamina v. Lachmanaraj, 39 Dec LR 235 (C). The learned advocate for the respondents on the other hand relied upon Jitendra Nath Ghose v. Monmoban Ghouse, AIR 1930 PC 193 (D); Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan, AIR 1930 PC 270 (E); Annamalai Chettiar v. Kuthukaruppan Chettiar, AIR 1931 PC 9 (F) and Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh, AIR 1931 PC 89 (G).

7. After giving our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced before us, we do not see any reason to differ from the view taken by the Courts below on the question of limitation. It is admitted on all hands that Art. 106, Hyderabad Limitation Act corresponding to Art. 120, Indian Limitation Act applied to the facts of this case. That Article provides a period of six years, for suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the first schedule, from the date when the right to sue accrues.

The Privy Council in the case of AIR 1930 PC 270 (E), has held that there can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. It is thus to be seen when the infringement of the right which had accrued to the respondents by reason of the judgment of the Second Talukdar took place.

The learned advocate for the appellant contends that the infringement of the right would be deemed to have occurred on the date when the Collector decided against the respondents, that is to say in 1346F. The advocate for the respondent, on the other hand, urges that the right to sue accrued to him when he was dispossessed or in other words deprived of the emoluments of the watan, which admittedly occurred in 1348F.

In view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below, it must be taken as proved that the respondents lost the watan in other words the enjoyment of emoluments in 1348F. If the starring point of limitation is 2nd Khurdad 1348F. the suit would be well within time. The learned advocate for the appellant has not been able to satisfy us as to why the starting point of limitation should be taken from the date of the order of the Collector when the proved fact is that the appellant had been in enjoyment of the watan. In our view the right to sue accrued to the appellant on 2nd Khurdad 1348F. when he was deprived of the emoluments of the watan.

8. In these circumstances, we do not see any reason to differ from the view taken by our brother Ansari, J. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.