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Simma Krishnamma v. Nakka Latchumanaidu And Others
Summary of Judgment — K. Subba Rao, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal arises from a partition suit originally filed as O.S. No. 555 of 1942 by Nakka Appala Naidu in the Court of the District Munsif, Srikakulam, which resulted in a preliminary decree for partition on 9‑9‑1944. The plaint did not seek a direction for the ascertainment of future (mesne) profits. The preliminary decree was modified on second appeal on 13‑10‑1949. The decree-holder transferred his rights under the preliminary decree and his claim for profits to the appellant; the transfer was recognised and, on the transferee's petition, a final decree was passed on 10‑12‑1951.
The judgment-debtors appealed the final decree (A. S. No. 51 of 1952) and the Subordinate Judge modified that final decree on 5‑2‑1952. While that appeal was pending, the appellant filed I.A. No. 736 of 1952 in the District Munsif's Court for ascertainment of future profits; this application was not brought to the appellate Court's notice and no direction about profits was obtained from the Subordinate Judge when disposing of the appeal. The District Munsif dismissed the application as not maintainable; the Subordinate Judge confirmed that dismissal. The present second appeal challenges those dismissals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the circumstances described (preliminary decree passed; final decree passed; application for ascertainment of future profits filed after the final decree but while an appeal from the final decree was pending), a petition for the ascertainment of future (mesne) profits is maintainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- In a partition suit there can be more than one final decree; accordingly, the claim for mesne profits is part of the subject-matter and not finally disposed of unless the Court so declares.
- So long as the claim for profits is not disposed of by the Court, the Court may make a subsidiary (supplemental) decree for ascertaining future profits and incorporate it in a later decree.
- Because the application for future profits was filed before the appeal against the final decree was disposed of, the dispute as to profits was still outstanding and the Court ought to have ascertained and awarded mesne profits.
Respondents' Arguments
- Relying on a recent Supreme Court decision (Md. Amin v. Vakil Ahmed), a Court has no power to give a direction for future profits in the absence of a prayer for that relief in the plaint.
- In any event, because the appellant did not seek or obtain any direction relating to future profits from the appellate Court when the appeal was disposed of, the application filed after the first Court's final decree was not maintainable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Basavayya v. Guravayya, ILR (1952) Mad 173; AIR 1951 Mad 938 (Full Bench, Madras) | Held that an enquiry into profits received during the pendency of a partition suit can be ordered either as part of the preliminary decree or subsequently as a step towards the final decree, and the result must be incorporated in the final decree; recognised possibility of more than one preliminary/final executable decree in proper cases. | The Court treated this Full Bench decision as binding and followed its principles: the Court accepted that profits can be ascertained after a preliminary decree and incorporated in a final (or supplemental final) decree. |
| Md. Amin v. Vakil Ahmed, 1952 SCR 1133; AIR 1952 SC 358 (Supreme Court) | Invoked by respondents to suggest limitations on a Court's power to award future mesne profits, particularly where there was no prayer in the plaint. | The Court distinguished and limited the application of this decision: it considered Md. Amin relevant to O.20, R.12 cases where there was no prayer in the plaint, but held it did not overrule or negate the Full Bench rule permitting ascertainment of profits after a preliminary decree. |
| Atchamma v. Rami Reddi, ILR 1957 Andh. Pra. 52; AIR 1958 Andh. Pra. 517 (Division Bench of this Court) | Considered Md. Amin and held the Supreme Court had not decided that courts have no jurisdiction to award future mesne profits absent a plaint prayer; reaffirmed the Full Bench position. | The Court expressly adopted and agreed with the Division Bench's view that Md. Amin did not overrule Basavayya; this judgment supported the conclusion that Basavayya still governs the issue. |
| Kasi v. Ramanatham Chettiar, 1947-2 Mad LJ 523 | Recognised that nothing in the Civil Procedure Code prohibits a court, in proper cases, from passing more than one preliminary decree and one final executable decree. | Used (via Basavayya) to support the proposition that, in a proper case, a supplemental final decree could be made to deal with profits not previously incorporated. |
| Gurraju v. Venkateswara Rao, 30 Mad LJ 379; AIR 1917 Mad 597 | Described appellate proceedings as a continuation of the suit and noted the general power of appellate courts (O. XLI, R. 33 and R. 4 C.P.C.) to make orders to meet ends of justice, but also emphasised the finality attached to the first Court's decree unless appellate power is exercised. | The Court relied on this authority to explain that, although an appeal continues the suit, the appellant must seek relief from the appellate Court (or have the appellate Court exercise its general power) to preserve rights not incorporated in the first decree; because the appellant did not obtain directions from the appellate Court, the first Court's decree became final as to profits. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the central question as whether, given the sequence of events, a petition for ascertainment of future mesne profits would lie. The Court proceeded through several analytical steps, grounded in precedent and statutory structure:
- The Court accepted the appellant's general proposition—drawing on the Full Bench decision in Basavayya v. Guravayya—that an enquiry into profits during the pendency of a partition suit may be ordered either as part of the preliminary decree or subsequently as a step towards the passing of the final decree, and that the result must be incorporated into the final decree. The Court treated Basavayya as a binding pre‑5‑7‑1954 Full Bench ruling.
- The Court addressed the respondents' reliance on Md. Amin v. Vakil Ahmed (Supreme Court). It analysed whether that decision deprived courts of power to award future mesne profits where there was no prayer in the plaint. The Court concluded that Md. Amin did not expressly or impliedly overrule the Basavayya principle; Md. Amin may be relevant to applications under O.20, R.12 when there is no prayer in the plaint, but it did not negate the post‑preliminary decree power to ascertain profits as described in Basavayya.
- The Court observed that Basavayya itself (and the authorities it relies on, such as Kasi v. Ramanatham Chettiar) recognises the possibility, in proper cases, of more than one preliminary and one final executable decree — permitting supplemental final decrees to deal with outstanding matters like profits not previously incorporated.
- The Court then applied these principles to the facts: although the appellant filed an application for ascertainment of profits while an appeal from the final decree was pending, that application was not brought to the notice of the appellate Court and no direction was sought or obtained from the Subordinate Judge when disposing of the appeal. The Court treated the appeal as a continuation of the suit in general, but emphasised the limits: where the appellate Court does not exercise its general power to alter the decree in respect of matters not the subject of the appeal, the first Court's decree becomes final as to those matters.
- Because the appellant neither questioned the absence of any relief for profits in the appellate proceedings nor asked the appellate Court to make directions about profits, the lower court's decree became final on that point. Accordingly, despite the general power to make supplemental decrees, the appellant could not, after the appellate decree had been rendered without directions on profits, insist on reopening the matter in the original suit.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. In the words of the Court, the application for ascertainment of future mesne profits was not maintainable in the circumstances and the appeal fails; costs were awarded against the appellant.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The appellant's application for ascertainment of future profits is not allowed and the decision below (dismissing that application) is affirmed; the appeal is dismissed with costs.
- Precedential impact: The Court reaffirmed the continued applicability of the Full Bench decision in Basavayya v. Guravayya on the power to order enquiries into profits during the pendency of a partition suit and to incorporate the results in a final or supplemental decree. However, the Court made clear the procedural limitation that if a party does not bring the application to the attention of an appellate Court or obtain directions from it while an appeal is being decided, the first Court's decree may become final on matters not addressed on appeal. The judgment did not purport to set a new broad precedent overturning prior authorities; rather it applied existing authorities to the facts and dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds.
Date and bench information, formal citation and other administrative particulars were contained in the original opinion but are reproduced here only to the extent reflected in the provided text.
Judgement
K. SUBBA RAO, C.J. : -
This second appeal is directed against the decree and judgment of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam confirming that of the District Munsif, Srikakulam, dismissing the petition filed by the appellant for ascertainment of mesne profits.
2. One Nakka Appala Naidu filed O. S. No. 555 of 1942 in the Court of the District Munsif, Srikakulam, for partition of the plaint schedule property against defendants 1 to 3 and obtained a preliminary decree for partition on 9-9-1944. In the plaint, there was no prayer for the ascertainment of future profits. That decree was modified in Second appeal on 13-10-1949. The preliminary decree did not in terms give any direction for the ascertainment of future profits. The decree-holder transferred all his rights under the preliminary decree and also his claim for profits to the appellant, and the transfer was recognised by the Court. On a petition filed by the transferee decree-holder i.e., the appellant, a final decree was passed on 10-12-1951.
The judgment-debtors preferred an appeal against the final decree to the Subordinate Judges Court, Srikakulam, being A. S. No. 51 of 1952. The Subordinate Judges Court modified the final decree on 5-2-1952. Pending the said appeal, the appellant filed I. A. No. 736 of 1952 in the Court of the District Munsif for ascertainment of future profits. The filing of this application was not brought to the notice of the Subordinate Judge at the time of the disposal of the appeal against the final decree and no directions were obtained from him in this behalf. The final decree as modified did not contain any directions in regard to future profits. The District Munsif and, on appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that, as the final decree was passed, the present petition was not maintainable and, on the ground dismissed it. Hence, the second appeal.
3. The only question in the second appeal is whether, in the aforesaid circumstances, a petition for the ascertainment of future profits would lie.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that, in a partition suit, there can be more than one final decree, that the claim for mesne profits is part of the subject-matter of the suit, that so long as the claim is not disposed of by the Court, a subsidiary decree for ascertaining future profits could be made and that, in the present case, an application for future profits was filed before the appeal against the final decree was disposed of and, therefore, the Court had to ascertain mesne profits and to incorporate the same in a subsidiary decree.
Learned counsel for the respondents counters this argument thus : In view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court, a Court has no power to give a direction for future profits and that, in any view, as the appellant did not ask for any direction in regard to that relief when the appeal against the final decree was disposed of, the application filed after the final decree made by the first Court was not maintainable.
5. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court held in Basavayya v. Guravayya, ILR (1952.) Mad 173 : (AIR 1951 Mad 938) (A), that an enquiry into profits received or realised by one or the other of the parties during the pendency of the suit for partition can be ordered by the Court either as part of the preliminary decree itself, or, subsequently as a step towards the passing of the final decree and, in either case, the result of the enquiry has to be incorporated in the final decree. After considering the relevant provisions and the decided cases on the subject, Viswanatha Sastri J., who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Full Bench, summarised the law at p. 185 (of ILR) : (at p. 943 of AIR) :
"A partition suit in which a preliminary decree has been passed is still a pending suit and the rights of the parties have to be adjusted as on the date of the final decree. In such a suit the Court has not only to divide the common properties but has also to adjust the equities arising between the parties out of their relation to the common property, the property to be divided. The preliminary decree determines the moieties of the respective parties and thereby furnishes the basis upon which the division of the property has to be made. There are other matters in addition to the moieties of the parties that have to be considered and decided before an equitable final partition can be effected.
Among them are the realisation of common outstandings, the discharge of common liabilities, the distribution of the profits of the properties realised pending the suit, either in cash or by allotment of property of the requisite value, the grant of owelty, the provision of maintenance to parties entitled thereto, the allotment of lands on which improvements have been effected to the sharer who has improved them, the allotment of alienated lands to the share of the alienor and other similar matters. Even after the passing of the preliminary decree it is open to the Court to give appropriate directions regarding all or any of these matters either suo motu or on the application of the parties.
Order 20, R. 18, Civil Procedure Code does not prohibit the Court from issuing such directions after the stage of a preliminary decree. It is open to the Court in order to prevent multiplicity of litigation and to do complete justice and effect an equal division of all the common assets and properties among the parties, to direct an enquiry into the profits received or realised by one or some of them during the pendency of the suit and to award the others their proper share of such profits under its final decree. This enquiry can be ordered either as part of the preliminary decree itself or, subsequently as a step towards the passing of the final decree, and in either case the result of the enquiry has to be incorporated in the final decree." We have extracted the summary in extenso as it clearly and succinctly enunciates the principles governing the ascertainment of profits received or realised by one or other of the parties during the pendency of the suit for partition. The judgment, being that of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court delivered before 5-7-1954 is binding on us. But it is said that the correctness of this decision is open to doubt in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Md. Amin v. Vakil Ahmed, 1952 SCR 1133 : (AIR 1952 SC 358) (B). This argument was considered by another Division Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member in Atchamma v. Rami Reddi, ILR 1957 Andh. Pra. 52 : (AIR 1958 Andh. Pra. 517) (C). After considering the facts of that case and the relevant passage in that judgment the Division Bench observed at p. 56 (of ILR) : (at p. 519 of AIR) :
"It is not clear from the aforesaid observations that the Supreme Court was dealing with the question of future mesne profits. That apart, their Lordships did not purport to lay down as a proposition of law that a Court had no jurisdiction to award future mesne profits if there was no demand for the same in the plaint. As the Full Bench of the Madras High Court pointed out, the relief of future mesne profits is a discretionary one and it is open to the Court to refuse to exercise the discretion in suitable cases. We cannot, therefore, hold that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held that a Court has no jurisdiction to award future mesne profits unless there was a prayer for that relief in the plaint. In our view, the Full Bench decision still holds the field and no part of the judgment has been either expressly or impliedly overruled by the judgment of the Supreme Court."
We entirely agree with the aforesaid observations. That apart, the observations made by the Supreme Court may have relevance to the question of the power of a Court to give a direction under O. 20, R. 12 when there was no prayer in the plaint for the said relief. But, they have none in the context of the power of the Court to give directions for the ascertainment of profits after the preliminary decree in the partition suit was made. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court, therefore, still holds the field.
6. Even so, it is contended by the respondents that an order for ascertaining profits should be made before the final decree is passed and incorporated therein, and if no such relief is given in the final decree, it is not open to the Court to ascertain the profits thereafter. For this proposition, the last sentence of the same passage from the Full Bench judgment on which the appellant has relied upon is invoked, namely :
"This enquiry can be ordered either as part of the preliminary decree itself or subsequently as a step towards the passing of the final decree, and in either case the result of the enquiry has to be incorporated in the final decree."
The said observations must be read along with the other observations made by the Full Bench. The following observations are found at P. 178 (of ILR) : (at p. 940 of AIR) :
"Ordinarily, there will be one preliminary and one final decree but, as pointed out in Kasi v. Ramanatham Chettiar, 1947-2 Mad LJ 523 (D), there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which can be construed as a prohibition against the Court, in a proper case, passing more than one preliminary decree and one final executable decree in a suit. The relevant provisions of the Code and the earlier rulings of this and the other High Courts are reviewed in the judgment of Patanjali Sastri J. with which we are in respectful agreement."
The Full Bench recognised that there was nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which can be construed as a prohibition against the Court in a proper case passing more than one preliminary decree and one final executable decree in a suit. In a proper case, therefore, where a supplemental final decree can be made, the Full Bench does not preclude the Court from ascertaining the profits and including the same in the supplemental decree. If a party to a partition suit files an application for the ascertainment of future profits and the Court, without disposing of that application, makes a final decree in respect of the other matters and without incorporating any relief for profits, the legal position is that the entire subject-matter of the suit has not been finally disposed of and, on that basis, it may be open to the Court to make another supplemental final decree in regard to profits. That would have been the position if the appellant filed his application for ascertainment of profits before the Subordinate Judges Court made the final decree.
7. But, in the present case, the application for ascertainment of profits was not made pending the final disposal of the suit but was made only after the final decree was made in the suit before the disposal of the appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that an appeal is only a continuation of a suit and, therefore, as he filed the application before the appeal was disposed of, to that extent the dispute as regards the subject-matter of the suit, namely, profits was still outstanding and, therefore, the Court should have made a decree subsequently in respect of profits, it is true that an appeal is a continuation of the suit and in a sense the appellate Courts decree is a decree in the suit.
See Gurraju v. Venkateswara Rao, 30 Mad LJ 379 : (AIR 1917 Mad 597) (E). It may also be that, in extraordinary cases, an appellate Court can make an order to meet the ends of justice in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed an appeal and even though the appeal is as to a part only of the decree. See O. XLI, R. 33 and O. XLI, R. 4 C.P.C. But, notwithstanding the general power given to an appellate Court, there is a finality attached to the first Courts decree subject to the result of the appeal. So long as the general power is not exercised by the appellate Court, the appeal is confined only to that part of the subject-matter of the appeal and in respect of the parties to the appeal. In other respect i.e., in respect of that part of the decree not appealed against, the rights of the parties are finally decided by the decree of the first Court.
A party aggrieved by any part of the decree has to file an appeal paying the requisite Court-fee questioning the correctness of the decree that went against him or he may invoke the Courts extraordinary power at the time of the passing of the appellate decree to give him relief in his favour in respect of the matter not appealed against. In the present case, the decree was not questioned on the ground that it did not incorporate any relief in regard to future profits. Though the appellant filed an application pending the appeal, he did not seek or obtain from the appellate Court, a direction for enquiry into future profits. In the circumstances, the decree of the lower Court had become final and, in view of the Full Bench decision, it is no longer open to the appellant to claim profits in the suit.
8. The same view was expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in ILR 1957 Andh. Pra. 52 : (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 517 (C) though, in that case, the question related to an enquiry under O. 20, R. 12, C. P. C. There, pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioner filed in the trial Court a petition under O. 30, R. 12, C. P. C, for assessment and for recovery of future mesne profits due to her from date of the plaint till the date on which she took possession. Before the dismissal of the appeal to the Supreme Court, the question of mesne profits was not raised before that Court and no directions in respect of that relief were given in the judgment of the Supreme Court. The petition was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that it was not maintainable. Adverting to the argument similar to that advanced before us, the Division Bench observed at p. 58 (of ILR) : (at p. 520 of AIR) :
"But in our view the fact that the Supreme Court appeal was pending would not help the petitioner as she did not bring the fact of the existence of this application to the notice of the Supreme Court and did not seek to get incorporated in the decree any directions in regard to the said relief by the Supreme Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court had become final and the petitioner cannot now seek to reopen it."
The same observations apply mutatis mutandis to the present case. The suit had been filed and disposed of and it ended in a final decree. The appeal against that final decree was confined to a relief unconnected with profits. No directions were given in the appellate decree in regard to profits. In the circumstances, following the Pull Bench decision we must hold that the application is not maintainable.
9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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