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A. Annamalai v. The State And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Aug 10, 1955
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Writ Application Relating to Chittoor–Nagari Route Permit

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an application for a writ of certiorari challenging the records and orders concerning a permit for the Chittoor–Nagari route. The challenged orders are: the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Chittoor order made at its meeting on 5 April 1951; the Central Road Traffic Board order in R. No. 18268–A2–51 dated 11 July 1951; and the Government of Madras order in G.O. Rt. No. 2763 dated 4 October 1951. The petitioner sought to quash those orders and the government order.

Procedural chronology (as set out in the opinion):

  • Notification R. No. 654–61–49 dated 4 June 1949 called for applications for the route. N. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu applied in the name of "Chittoor Express Service" (he was the proprietor).
  • The RTA on 12 September 1950 granted the permit to Chittoor Express Service, but on appeal the Central Road Traffic Board set aside that order.
  • Fresh applications were called under section 57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act by notification R. No. 9984–A2–50 dated 29 November 1950; no fresh application was filed by Chengalvaraya Naidu.
  • The petitioner later applied after the 29 November 1950 notification. At the RTA meeting on 5 April 1951, one permit was granted to Chittoor Express Service; by that date Neerajhakshmi Naidu claimed to be proprietor by transfer from Chengalvaraya Naidu.
  • The RTA rejected the petitioner's application as a "new entrant"; the Central Road Traffic Board and the Government of Madras confirmed the grant. The petitioner filed the writ application on 15 September 1952 (11 months after the government order of 4 October 1951).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a member of the Regional Transport Authority (here, N. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu) who participated in the RTA meeting could lawfully obtain or participate in the grant of a permit in his own favour (i.e., whether he could be a judge in his own cause).
  2. Whether the purported transfer of interest from Chengalvaraya Naidu to Neerajhakshmi Naidu produced a valid application by the transferee when no fresh application was filed after the fresh application notice (i.e., continuity/competence of the application after transfer).
  3. Whether the grant to Chittoor Express Service (and/or to the transferee) was unlawful because the transferee was in substance a "new entrant" and there was no reason to prefer him to the petitioner.
  4. Whether the Government of Madras' order confirming the decisions below was invalid for failure to state any reasons.
  5. Whether delay (laches) in filing the writ (11 months after the government order) bars the court from entertaining the petition, or whether the court may nonetheless intervene.
  6. Whether the Government of Madras acting under section 64–A (or section 64) of the Motor Vehicles Act is a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution and therefore amenable to the High Court's superintendence under Article 227.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The permit is invalid because N. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu, who applied as proprietor of Chittoor Express Service, was a member of the Regional Transport Authority that granted the permit (i.e., he participated in the decision benefiting himself).
  • If Neerajhakshmi Naidu was claimed to be proprietor by virtue of a transfer, there was no valid application made by him after the fresh call for applications (so no valid basis for the grant).
  • Neerajhakshmi Naidu (the transferee) was a new entrant and there was no reason to prefer him to the petitioner.
  • The Government's order confirming the decision of the Central Road Traffic Board and the RTA gave no reasons and is therefore invalid.

Respondent / Chittoor Express Service / Neerajhakshmi Naidu — Principal Contentions

  • In the counter-affidavit, it is stated that by the time of the RTA's remand hearing on 5 April 1951, Chengalvaraya Naidu had assigned all his interests in Chittoor Express Service to Neerajhakshmi Naidu, who was then the sole proprietor; Chengalvaraya had become President of Chittoor District Board and was an ex‑officio (non‑official) member of the RTA and had no interest in the service by 5 April 1951.
  • Respondents argued (through counsel) that the writ should be dismissed for delay/laches because the petitioner filed the writ over 11 months after the government order, and the petitioner only sought this remedy after an adverse decision in a similar writ (Writ No. 85 of 1952).
  • For the first time in this court, the respondent also advanced a contention that no fresh applications should have been called by the RTA after the 29 November 1950 notification and that the petitioner was not aggrieved and therefore lacked standing to appeal or seek revision; the court refused to permit this point to be raised for the first time before it.

Government / Other Procedural Points

  • The Government of Madras gave the brief rejection of revision in the words: "the government see no reason to interfere."
  • Government instructed not to take part in the dispute between competing private parties; consequently, no order for costs in favour of the government was made.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Visakkapatnam Motor Transport v. Bangaru Raju, (1953) 1 M.L.J. 533; 1 L.R. (1954) Mad. 36 Affirmed the principle that "no man shall be a judge in his own cause" — member of authority cannot participate in decision benefiting a body of which he is president (or which he represents). The court followed this decision directly and held Chengalvaraya Naidu could not lawfully participate in, and grant, a permit in his own favour; the permit was held illegal and void on this ground.
Rex v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, (1924) 1 K.B.D. 256 (Lord Hewart) Principle that justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly appear to be done; "nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice." Cited to support the conclusion that even the appearance of bias or a substantial personal interest (or close relationship) by a decision-maker renders the grant void; used to invalidate permit even if pecuniary interest was denied.
Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 9) — cited passages; and Order 64, Rule (7) R.S.C. Referenced for the English practice that the period for certiorari is six months and the existence of discretionary power to extend time under R.S.C. Order 64, r. 7. Used in the court's consideration of delay; the court noted the English limitation but observed discretionary power to extend time and considered delay in the light of local authorities and the seriousness of the illegality alleged.
Rao Bahadur A. Nathamooni Chetti v. M. R. Viswanatha Sastri, (1950) 2 M.L.J. 448 Principle that courts should not generally exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction where there has been long delay in bringing the petition. Cited by respondent to argue dismissal for delay; the court considered it but held no rigid rule exists and exercised discretion to entertain the petition given the gravity of the alleged illegality.
O. A. O. A. M. Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, (1951) 1 M.L.J. 417 Authority where writ was entertained despite long delay; used as an example that delay is not an absolute bar where explanation exists. Cited to demonstrate that delay alone is not dispositive; the court relied on such authorities in deciding not to dismiss the petition for delay.
Y. Venhateswarlu v. The State of Madras, (1954) 1 M.L.J. 244 Another instance where writs were entertained despite long delay, where adequate explanation existed. Referred in support of the court's discretionary approach to delay.
Chamba Valley Transport Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, A.I.R. 1953 H.P. 8; S. Mahadeva Iyer v. State, A.I.R. 1954 T.C. 469; Lala Raja Kishore v. District Board of Saharanpur, A.I.R. 1954 All. 675 Authorities where writs were entertained despite long delay. Referred to illustrate that the court may exercise discretion to entertain delayed writ petitions in appropriate circumstances.
A. Vedachala Mudaliar v. The State of Madras, (1951) 2 M.L.J. 411 (Subba Rao, J.) Held that when a tribunal sets aside an order of a subordinate tribunal it should give succinct reasons; principle that judicial orders should disclose that the mind applied to facts and law. Cited and extended by the court to require that even confirming orders should disclose reasons; used to criticise the Government's terse "see no reason to interfere" and as ground for quashing.
Haripada Dutta v. Ananta Mandal, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 526 (Chakravartti, J.) Definition of "tribunal" in Article 227: a person or body other than a court set up by the State for deciding rights between contending parties in accordance with rules having the force of law, doing so by determining questions (not executive action). Adopted by the court to conclude that bodies like the RTA and Central Road Traffic Board perform judicial/quasi-judicial functions and can be "tribunals" under Article 227; supported the exercise of superintendence over the government acting under section 64-A.
Sabitri Motor Service Ltd. v. Asansol Bus Association, A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 255 Held that a commissioner acting as appellate authority under the Motor Vehicles Act was a tribunal within Article 227. Used to support that appellate/adjudicatory authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act are tribunals subject to Article 227 superintendence.
Annamalai Mudaliar, in re, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 362; Gangala Kurthi Pattisam, in re, (1954) 1 M.L.J. 165 Decisions dealing with the meaning and scope of "tribunal" under Article 227; adoption of the definition referred to above. Followed and relied upon in construing "tribunal" and the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction.
Dr. M. Krishnamoorthy v. The State of Madras, (1951) 1 M.L.J. 709 Held (in that case) that neither the government nor the disciplinary proceedings tribunal would fall within Article 227 (no reasons given in that decision for the conclusion). The court distinguished that decision on the basis that the present case involves judicial powers under the Motor Vehicles Act; the earlier decision was considered inapplicable to facts here.
Union of Workmen of R.S.N. & I.G.N. and Railway Co. Ltd. v. The River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. & Ors., A.I.R. 1951 Assam 96 Held provincial government acting under s.7–8 of the Industrial Disputes Act is not a tribunal under Article 227 (turns on particular statutory language). Distinguished by the court as inapposite because it hinged on specific statutory language in the Industrial Disputes Act; did not govern the present case under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in the following steps (stated consistent with the opinion):

  1. Continuity of the application and identity of the applicant: The court held that the original application made by N. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (filed pursuant to the 4 June 1949 notification) remained on record and was the application considered by the RTA on 5 April 1951. The court relied on the reasoning in an earlier writ (No. 85 of 1952, Subba Rao, J.) which held that the "service" is not a legal entity and an assignee of buses could not come on record and prosecute the application filed by the owner. Consequently, Chengalvaraya Naidu continued to be the applicant when the permit was granted.
  2. Participation of Chengalvaraya Naidu at the RTA meeting: The court found (on evidence produced by the government) that Chengalvaraya Naidu was one of the four members present at the RTA meeting on 5 April 1951 and that he participated in the meeting which granted the permit. The counter-affidavit did not deny his participation; it asserted only that Chengalvaraya had no interest by that date because he had allegedly transferred his interest.
  3. Disqualification for bias; appearance of justice: The court applied the principle that "no man shall be a judge in his own cause" as affirmed in Visakkapatnam Motor Transport v. Bangaru Raju, and reinforced by the dicta in Rex v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy about the necessity that justice must appear to be done. On that basis the court held that Chengalvaraya Naidu should not have participated in the meeting and that the grant was "absolutely illegal and void."
  4. Effect of alleged transfer to a close relation: The court addressed the contention that the permit was actually granted to the transferee, Neerajhakshmi Naidu. Even if the transfer were accepted, the court held that participation by Chengalvaraya Naidu in a grant to his close relation would still give rise to a reasonable suspicion of bias and thus invalidate the grant. The court noted that no authority was cited to support the proposition that participation in favour of a close relative would be acceptable.
  5. Lack of fresh application by transferee and RTA reasoning: The court observed that no fresh application had been made by Neerajhakshmi Naidu after the 29 November 1950 notification, and the RTA's reasoning in its order treated Chengalvaraya Naidu as proprietor owning three buses. There was no reference in the RTA order that the transferee had become the owner or had any preferential rights. This supports the conclusion that the orders (RTA, Central Road Traffic Board, Government) were flawed.
  6. Requirement of reasons in confirming or setting aside inferior tribunal orders: The court emphasised (drawing on Subba Rao, J.'s observations in A. Vedachala Mudaliar) that judicial orders should disclose succinct reasons demonstrating application of mind to facts and law. The court extended the safeguard to include confirming orders (not only reversing orders), holding that the Government of Madras' terse statement "the government see no reason to interfere" was inadequate.
  7. Delay/laches: The court considered the respondents' plea to dismiss the writ for delay (11 months). It acknowledged authorities that caution against entertaining writs after long delay but held there is no rigid rule and exercised discretion to interfere in a case involving a grave violation of the principle that a decision-maker must not judge his own cause. Precedents where delayed writs were entertained were cited in support.
  8. Alternative jurisdiction under Article 227: The court analysed whether the High Court could act under Article 227 (superintendence) if Article 226 relief were inappropriate due to delay. After considering definitions of a "tribunal" (Haripada Dutta et al.) and authorities applying Article 227 to Motor Vehicles Act authorities, the court concluded that the Government of Madras exercising powers under section 64–A exercised judicial powers and was a "tribunal" under Article 227. The court therefore held that even if Article 226 were unavailable, Article 227 jurisdiction justified intervention.
  9. Permits after expiry and justiciability: The court noted that although the period for which the impugned permit was sought had expired, prior decisions (Writ No. 893 of 1953) held that the validity of a renewed permit depends on the validity of the original permit and a court may decide whether the original grant was rightly made even after expiry. Thus, the court proceeded to decide validity.
  10. Relief against the 5th respondent: The petitioner impleaded A. Kuppusami Naidu as 5th respondent but gave no reasons or arguments as to why the permit granted in his favour should be set aside; accordingly, that part of the writ was dismissed with costs (advocate's fee Rs. 100).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Writ issued quashing the permit granted in favour of the 4th respondent (Chittoor Express Service / Neerajhakshmi Naidu).

Consequences and implications as stated in the opinion:

  • The permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority on 5 April 1951 is illegal and void because a member of the RTA (N. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu) participated in the meeting and obtained (or facilitated) a permit in his own favour (or in favour of a close relative), contravening the principle that no person should be a judge in his own cause and creating an appearance of bias.
  • Even if a transfer to a close relative were accepted, the lack of a fresh application by the transferee and the appearance of bias render the grant vulnerable and subject to quashing.
  • The orders of the RTA, the Central Road Traffic Board, and the Government of Madras are liable to be quashed for the reasons given (including absence of adequate reasoning by the Government in confirming the decision).
  • The court exercised its discretion to entertain the writ despite an 11-month delay because of the gravity of the breach of basic judicial principle and, alternatively, exercised its Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction by treating the government action under section 64–A as judicial/tribunal action.
  • The writ application against the 5th respondent was dismissed with costs (advocate's fee Rs. 100) for failure to advance grounds; as between the petitioner and the 4th respondent, each will bear their own costs; no costs awarded in favour of the government because it did not take part in the dispute.
  • No new precedent in the sense of departing from established principles was claimed; rather, the court applied existing authorities (notably Visakkapatnam Motor Transport v. Bangaru Raju and Rex v. Sussex Justices) to the facts and reaffirmed the principles that disqualify a decision-maker from judging his own cause and require judicial orders to disclose reasons.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the contents and findings of the provided opinion. No information has been invented or inferred beyond the text of the opinion.

Show all summary ...

(1) This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the order of the regional transport authority, chittoor regarding the route ghittoor to nagari, passed at its meeting held on 5th april, 1951 at madanapalle; the order of the central road traffic board in r. No. 18268 - a2 - 51 dated 11th july, 1951 and the order of the government in g. O. Rt. No. 2763 dated 4th october, 1951 and quash the said g. O and the orders passed by the regitional transport authority and central road traffic board. The case of the petitioner was that the regional transport authority chittoor, by its notification r. No. 654 - 61 - 49 dated 4th june, 1949, called for applications for the route chittoor to nagari and that one n. P. Chengalvaraya naidu put in an application in the name of chittoor express service, of which he was the sole proprietor. The regional transport authority, chittoor, at its meeting held on 12th september, 1950, granted the permit for the said route to chittoor express service. But, on appeal, the central road traffic board set aside the order of the regional transport authority. Fresh applications were called for by the regional transport authority under section 57 (2) of the motor vehicles act by its notification r. No. 9984 - a2 - 50 dated 29th november, 1950. No fresh application was made by n. P. Chengalvaraya naidu.

(2) The petitioner however applied for a permit after applications were called for by the notification dated 29th november, 1950. When the matter came up before the meeting of the regional transport authority on 5th april, 1951, one permit was granted to chittoor express service, of which neerajhakshmi naidu became the proprietor by reason of a transfer effected by chengalvaraya naidu before 5th april, 1951. The regional transport authority rejected the application of the petitioner on the ground that he was a new entrant. The permit was granted to chittoor express service in the following words : -

"no. 7 was granted the route by this regional transport authority at the last meeting. He has two buses remaining idle now on routes temporarily, one of the buses ran for six months between madras and chittoor and the other between chittoor and kalahasti for 18 months. By the cancellation of the permit he has been hard hit. He has also been applying for a route for long. Even at the last meeting of the regional transport authority his claims for a route were considered but was deferred to complete the quota of three buses to others. Hence he is considered to have the best claim for a route and he is given one bus."

(3) On appeal, the claim of the petitioner herein was dismissed on the same ground, viz; that he was a new entrant. The claim of the fourth respondent herein, i. E. , chitoor express service was confirmed on the ground that he had three buses and that he also operated on this route on a temporary permit. A revision petition was filed to the government of madras and it was rejected on 4th october, 1951, in the following words : - "the government see no reason to interfere. "

(4) The petitioner herein filed the writ application on 15th september, 1952, i. E. , 11 months after the passing of the order by the government of madras. The petitioner contends that the permit granted to the fourth respondent chittoor express service is invalid on the ground (1) that chengalvaraya naidu who applied for the permit as the proprietor of chittoor express service was one of the members of the regional transport authority which granted the permit ; (ii) that if neerajhakshmi naidu was the proprietor of chittoor express service by reason of the transfer affected by chengalvaraya naidu, there was no valid application made by him for the issue of a permit ; (iii) that he was also a new entrant and there was no reason to choose him in preference to the petitioner herein and (iv) that the order of the government was invalid as no reasons whatsoever were stated for confirming the decision of the central road traffic board and the regional transport authority. It is conceded that chittoor express service is not a legal entity.

(5) The proprietor of chittoor express service was chengalvaraya naidu. He filed the application in pursuance of the notification dated 4th june, 1949. His application continued on record and it was considered by the regional transport authority, chittoor, at its meeting held on 5th april, 1951. Neerajhakshmi naidu, brother - in - law of ghengalvaraya naidu, to whom the rights in chittoor express service are alleged to have been transferred did not file any fresh application subsequent to the notification dated 29th november, 1950. He did not file an application to come on record and continue the original application made by ghengalvaraya naidu on behalf of chittoor express service. When a similar question came for consideration in writ petition no. 85 of 1952, mr. Justice subba rao (as he then was) held as follows : - -

"mr. Bhujanga rao the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the chittoor express service was the applicant and the mere fact that the original proprietor of the service transferred his bus to the petitioner would not preclude the central road traffic board from issuing the permit to the present proprietor of the service. But it is conceded that the service is not a legal entity. There is also no provision in the motor vehicles act or in the rules framed thereunder which enables an assignee of the buses to come on record and to prosecute the application filed by the owner before the transfer. In the circumstances, the application must be deemed to have been filed by chengalvaraya naidu who happened to be the proprietor of a particular service. Obviously he did not press his application and even now the petitioner who is not an applicant for a permit, cannot rely upon an application filed by ghengalvaraya naidu. The fact that the petitioner purchased the same bus would not in law entitle him to prosecute an application filed by his vendor."

So, in the circumstances, it must be held that ghengalvaraya naidu who filed the application, continued on record as the applicant when the permit was granted by the regional transport authority on 5th april, 1951. It appears from paragraph 9 of the affidavit that ghengalvaraya naidu became the district board president of ghittoor, and consequently a non - official member of the regional transport authority, chittoor. It is stated in paragraph 9 as follows : -

"it will also be seen that by this time, the said n. P. Chengalvaraya naidu had become the non - official of that regional transport authority and that he actually participated at the said meeting held on 5th april, 1951, when the grant was made in his favour. In effect, the grant of the permit has been made to the regional transport authority member himself, which is highly irregular, improper and illegal and in contravention of the provisions of the motor vehicles act."

(6) In the counter affidavit that was filed on behalf of ghittoor express service by neerajhakshmi naidu, the brother - in - law of ghengalvaraya naidu, it is not denied that ghengalvaraya naidu took part in the meeting held on 5th april, 1951, in paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit it is stated as follows : -

" the regional transport authority dealt with the matter on remand on 5th april, 1951. By that time, n. P. Chengalvaraya naidu had assigned for consideration all his interests in the chittoor express service to me, and i was its sole proprietor. N. P. Chengalvaraya naidu was by then elected president of chittoor district board and was an ex - officio member of the regional transport authority, chittoor in his official capacity. But he had no interest in the chittoor express service by 5th april, 1951 and the allegations in para. 9 that the grant made on that date is in favour of n. P. Chengalvaraya naidu by the regional transport authority of which he was a member is not correct in view of what is stated above."

(7) So, what appears from the counter affidavit is that neerajhakshmi naidu became the proprietor and that the grant was made to him and not to chengalvaraya naidu but not that ghengalvaraya naidu did not participate in the meeting as a member of the regional transport authority. Therefore, i have no doubt that he was one of the members of the regional transport authority which granted the permit to ghittoor express service of which he was the proprietor and on whose behalf he made the application. When i called upon the government to state who were the members of the regional transport authority on 5th april, 1951, they produced a letter stating that n. P. Chengalvaraya naidu was one of the four members who were present at the meeting of the regional transport authority, chittoor, on 5th april, 1951.

(8) Therefore, the first question that arises for determination is whether chengalvaraya naidu, sitting as a member of the regional transport authority, was entitled to issue a permit in his own favour. The question is concluded by a direct decision of the madras high court reported in visakkapatnam motor transport v. Bangaru raju, ('953) 1 m. L. J. 533 : 1. L. R. (1954) mad. 36.

(9) In that case, the collector was the president of a co - operative society, which applied for a permit. The collector was also the chairman of the regional transport authority. He took part in the proceedings of the regional transport authority and granted a permit to the co - operative society. It was contended that the order of the regional transport authority was contrary to the principles of natural justice because the collector, who was a member of the regional transport authority, was also the president of the go - operative society. In dealing with this argument, rajamannar, chief justice, observed ' that one of the great principles of civilised jurisprudence which is a part of law in britain and which has been adopted in this country is that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. ' reference was made to halsbury's 'laws of england' volume 9, page 883. It was therefore, held that the order granting a permit to the co - operative society was liable to be quashed. I follow this decision and hold that it was not open to chengalvaraya naidu to participate in the meeting and to grant a permit in his own favour. As pointed out by the learned chief justice, there is also another principle which is of equal importance ' that justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. ' as pointed out by lord hewart, chief justice in rex v. Sussex justices ex parte mecarthy. (1924) 1 k. B. D. 256 at 259.

"that nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice."

(10) Lord hardwick also stated that 'in a matter of so tender a nature even the appearance of evil is to be avoided. ' so, i hold that the permit granted on the application of chengalvaraya naidu by the regional transport authority of which he was a member is absolutely illegal and void. Even assuming that the case of the fourth respondent is true that he had transferred his interest in favour of his brother - in - law neerajhakshmi naidu, still, the grant of a permit to the transferee, viz. , his brother - in - law is eaually open to attack. It was suggested during the course of the argument that there was nothing improper in chengalvaraya naidu participating in the meeting and granting a permit to his brother - in - law. But no authority was cited in support of such a proposition. I am inclined to hold that even assuming he had no pecuniary interest in the concern as alleged by him, his interest in the transferee, i. E. , his brother - in - law was substantial and of such a character as is likely to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of bias. He ought not to have therefore, participated in the meeting and granted the permit to his close relation. Even in that view, i am inclined to hold that the grant of the permit to neerajhakshmi naidu as the proprietor of chittoor express service is illegal and void.

(11) As i have already pointed out, there was no fresh application by neerajhakshmi naidu. If it was to be regarded as an application made by him, he was also as much a new entrant as the petitioner herein. The entire reasoning of the regional transport authority proceeded only on the footing that chengalvaraya naidu was the proprietor and that he owned three buses. There is no reference made in the order that neerajhakshmi naidu became the owner and that he had any preferential rights over the petitioner. The orders passed by the regional transport authority and confirmed by the central road traffic board and the government are liable to be quashed.

(12) The state government also had not given any reasons whatsoever for declining to interfere with the order passed by the central road traffic board. As pointed out by me in writ petition no. 814 of 1951, it is necessary that, when judicial orders are passed, they must disclose on their face that the mind of the authority was directed to the facts and law bearing on the case and was properly applied. It was contended by the learned advocate for the respondent that it is only if the order is reversed, it is necessary to give any reasons. The decision of subba rao, j. , (as he then was) in a. Vedachala mudaliar v. The state of madras, (1951) 2 m. L. J. 411. Was referred to in this connection. In the particular case, the learned judge no doubt held that when the order is reversed, it is necessary to give reasons and stated as follows at page 417 ; -

"from the standpoint of fair name of the tribunals and also in the interest of the public they should be expected to give reasons when they set aside an order of an inferior tribunal. If tribunals could set aside the considered orders of subordinate tribunals without any reasons such a power may, in the hands of unscrupulous and dishonest persons - i do not say that there are any such people in the tribunals we are now concerned with - turn out to be a potent weapon for corruption, mamputation and jobbery. Further if reasons for an order are given there will be less scope for arbitrary or partial exercise of powers and the order ex facie will indicate whether extraneous circumstances were taken into consideration by the tribunal in passing the order. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard unless the legislature expressed otherwise. I would therefore hold that the order of a tribunal exercising judicial functions should ex facie show reasons in a succinct form for setting aside the orders of the subordinate tribunals."

(13) With great respect to the learned judge, i would add to his observations that even in the case of confirming orders, the same safeguard should be adopted. The judicial order must ex facie show that the judicial body applied its mind to the facts and law bearing on the question and confirmed the decision of the subordinate authority. Sri bhujanga rao, learned advocate for the respondent, strenuously and forcibly contended that the writ ought not to be entertained as the petitioner had filed the application more than 11 months after the order was passed by the government. He stated that the petitioner had conceived the idea of filing the writ only after sri subba rao, j. , (as he then was) dismissed the writ petition no. 85 of 1952 on 15th july, 1952. The main question that arises is whether i should dismiss the writ application on the ground of delay or laches or acquiescence. It is conceded by the learned advocate for the petitioner that there is no period of limitation fixed by the limitation act for filing writs. In england, the period fixed for filing a writ of certiorari is six months. But under order 64, rule (7) r. S. C. There is a power vested in the court to extend the time and excuse the delay in filing a writ of certiorari.

(14) That is set out in halsbury's 'laws of england' volume 9 (2nd edition) paragraph 1515. It is contended on the strength of the decision in rao bahadur a. Nathamooni chetti v. M. R. Viswanatha sastri, (1950) 2 m. L. J. 448. That i should dismiss this writ application on the sole ground of delay, even though the order passed by the regional transport authority granting the permit to chengalvaraya naidu leads to a grave miscarriage of justice and flagrant violation of law calling for the intervention of this court. What is stated in nathamooni chetti v. Viswanatha sastri, is that the courts ought not to generally exercise the extraordinary power conferred by article 226 and issue prerogative writs when there has been a long delay since the passing of the order sought to be quashed. There is no rigid or inflexible rule holding that a writ should not be entertained after a period of 11 months. As a matter of fact, in o. A. O. A. M. Muthiah chettiar v. The commissioner of income - tax, madras, (1951) 1 m. L. J. 417. And in y. Venhateswarlu v. The state of madras, (1954) 1 m. L. J, 244. The writs were entertained even though there was a long delay. In those cases, there was no doubt an adequate explanation given that the petitioner was seeking his remedy in another forum. But i am referrring to those decisions only for the purpose of showing that there is no rigid rule fettering my descretion to interfere in a gross case of this description. The learned advocate for the petititoner referred me to the decisions of other high courts in chamba valley transport ltd. V. State of himachal predesh, a. I. R. 1953 h. P. 8. S. Mahadeva iyer v. State, a. I. R. 1954 t. C. 469. And in lala raja kishore v. District board of seharanpur, a. I. R. 1954 all. 675. Where writ applications were entertained in spite of long delay. As stated supra, having regard to the fact that the grant of the permit to chittoor express service violates in the language of chief justice rajamannar ' one of the great principles of civilized jurisprudence that no man shall be a judge in his own cause', i feel that the case is an eminently fit one to interfere and quash the permit granted to the fourth respondent. Sri bhujanga rao sought to raise a new contention for the first time in this court that no fresh applications ought to have been called for by the regional transport authority after the notification dated 29th november, 1950 and that the petitioner had no right to apply for a permit and that he was not a party aggrieved by the issue of the permit to the fourth respondent and that consequently the appeal to the central road traffic board and the revis;on petition to the government of madras were incompetent. This point was not raised before the regional transport authority or the central road traffic board or the government of madras. It was not even raised in the counter - affidavit before this court. I, therefore, refuse to permit the respondent to raise this question for the first time before this court and sustain the grant of the permit to his client.

(15) Even assuming that it is not open to me to issue a writ of certiorari under article 226 of the constitution by reason of the delay, i think it is eminently a fit case for the exercise of my jurisdiction under article 227 of the constitution. I heard elaborate arguments on the question as to the scope of articles 226 and 227 of the constitution. Sri bhujanga rao contended that the high court has no right of superintendence over the government of madras acting under section 64 - a of the motor vehicles act inasmuch as it is neither a court nor a tribunal. So, the question to be determined is, as to what exactly a 'tribunal' means in article 227. The government pleader referred me to the definition in the oxford dictionary wherein it is defined as 'judgment seat' and 'judicial authority'. In haripada dutta v. Ananta mandal, a. I. R. 1952 cal. 526. Chakravartti, j. , gave the following definition of a tribunal:

"in my view, the word ' tribunal' in article 227 means, as mr. Gupta suggested, a person or a body, other than a court, set up by the state for deciding rights between contending parties in accordance with rules having the force of law, and i would add, doing so, not by way of taking executive action but of determining a question."

(16) He approved the decision in sabitri motor service, ltd. V. Asansol bus association, a. I. R. 1951 cal. 255. Wherein it was held that a commissioner of a division, acting as the appellate authority under the motor vehicles act, was a tribunal within the meaning of article 227. In a. Vedachala mudaliar v. State of madras, (1951) 2 m. L. J. 411. Mr. Justice subba rao (as he then was) held that the regional transport authority and the central road traffiic board in issuing permits or refusing them were performing quasi - judicial functions. I followed that decision in writ no. 547 of 1953. The calcutta decisions were followed by mr. Justice ramaswamy in annamalai mudaliar, in re, a. I. R. 1953 mad. 362 the learned judge also exhaustively dealt with the case - jaw bearing on the interpretation of article 227. In a recent case in gangala kurthi pattisam, inre, (1954) 1 m. L. J. 165. Chief justice rajamannar adopted the definition of " tribunal" given by chakravarthi, j. , in haripada dutta v. Ananta mandal, the further question that remains to be considered is whether even assuming that the regional transport authority and the central road traffic board are tribunals within the meaning of article 227, the government of madras exercising functions under section 64 - a of the motor vehicles act, is a " tribunal " under the superintendence of the high court. There is no direct decision on this question. Adopting the definition of a 'tribunal' given in the above decisions i see no reason why the government of madras in exercising judicial powers under section 64 of the motor vehicles act is not a tribunal and why the high court is not entitled to exercise its powers of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. The only decisions that were referred to by the advocate for the respondent and also by the government pleader in this connection are the decisions in dr. M. Krishnamoorthy v. The state of madras, (1951) 1 m. L. J. 709. And in union of workmen of r. S. N. And i. G. N. And railway co. , ltd. V. The river steam navigation co. , ltd. And others, a. I. R. 1951 assam 96

(17) In dr. M. Krishnamoorthy v. The state of madras, the question that arose for consideration was whether the government and the disciplinary proceedings tribunal would fall within article 227. The passage relied on is in the following terms :

"the learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to bring the case under article 227 of the constitution under which this courtis given superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. We have no hesitation whatever in holding that neither the government nor the disciplinary proceedings tribunal would fall within article 227."

No reasons are given by the learned judges in support of their conclusions. Possibly having regard to the particular nature of the proceedings they held that the government and the disciplinary proceedings tribunal do not fall under article 227. As the present case arises under the motor vehicles act and as it is clear, that the powers exercised by the regional transport authority, the central road traffic board and the government are judicial in character, that decision cannot have any application to the facts of this case. The next case that was relied on was the decision in union of workmen of r. S. N. And i. G. N. And railway co. , ltd. V. The river steam navigation co. , ltd. And others. , a. I. R. 1951 assam 96 that decision also has no bearing on the facts of this case. What was held therein was that the provincial government acting under sections 7 and 8 of the industrial disputes act is not a tribunal within the meaning of article 227. That again turns upon the particular language of sections 7 and 8 and the powers conferred on the government thereunder. Sri bhujanga rao tried to found an argument based on the inclusion of the words "any government" in article 226 and the omission thereof in article 227. I do not think that there is any force in that contention. In article 226 the constitution makers wanted to make it clear that the expression " any authority " included in appropriate cases "any government". It would not be necessary to use that expression "any government" in article 227 as the word 'tribunal' is sufficiently w'de enough to cover even the government when it exercises judicial functions. The only point for decision in the case is whether the government exercising powers under section 64 - a acts judicially or not. As i am clearly of the opinion that it exercises judicial powers, it is a tribunal within the meaning of article 227. As stated supra, i would in the peculiar circumstances of the case bs prepared to exercise my powers under article 227 and set aside the order of the regional transport authority granting the permit to chittoor express service, if for any reason it is held that i cannot issue a writ of certiorari under article 226 by reason of the delay of the petitioner.

(18) It transpires that the period for which the permit was applied for by the petitioner has expired long ago. The permit in favour of the 4th respondent was renewed by reason of his having been granted a permit by the regional transport authority on 5th april, 1951. In writ petition no. 893 of 1953 it was held by a divison bench of the madras high court of which i was a member, that the validity of the renewed permit depends on the validity of the original permit and that consequently a court is entitled to decide the question whether the permit was rightly granted or not even after the expiry of the period of the permit. It is in view of that decision, i have decided the question as to the validity of the permit granted by the regional transport authority to the 4th respondent even though it was only for one year.

(19) To the writ application the petitioner impleaded a. Kuppusami naidu as the 5th respondent. No reasons were given in the affidavit as to why the permit granted in his favour should be set aside. No arguments were addressed before me by sri dwarakanath on behalf of the petitioner. So the writ application as against the 5th respondent has to be dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee rs. 100. In the result a writ will be issued quashing the permit given in favour of the 4th respondent. But in the circumstances, i hold that the petitioner as well as the 4th respondent should bear their own costs. There will be no order for costs in favour of the government as they were instructed not to take any part in the dispute between the competing parties. Writ issued.