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K. Seshachalam v. District Collector
Factual and Procedural Background
The petition is an application for a writ of mandamus directing the Collector (1st respondent) to make a reference under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners' land was acquired by the Government and the petitioner filed an objection on 27 April 1947. An award under S. 11 was passed on 14 June 1947. Under S. 12(2) of the Act, the Collector should give immediate notice of the award to persons interested who were not present or represented when the award was made.
A notice appears to have been despatched on 11 July 1947, but the counter-affidavit admits the notice was returned unserved. The petitioner had no knowledge of the award until he received the Collector's communication dated 31 March 1951 (L. Dis. No. 5321 of 1951). The petitioner then requested the Collector to make a reference under S. 18, but the Collector refused on the ground that the application was barred by limitation. The petitioner consequently filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner's claim for a reference under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is barred by limitation, having regard to the proviso to S. 18(2) which prescribes different periods depending on presence/representation and receipt of notice.
- How the phrase in clause (b) of the proviso — "within six months from the date of the Collector's award" — is to be construed when the statutory notice under S. 12(2) was not served on the affected person (i.e., whether it means six months from the award date or six months from the date of knowledge of the award).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Position
- The petitioner had no knowledge of the passing of the Collector's award until receipt of the Collector's communication dated 31 March 1951.
- The petitioner requested the Collector to make a reference under S. 18 upon receiving that communication; the Collector refused on limitation grounds, which prompted the writ petition seeking mandamus to direct a reference.
Respondent's Arguments
- Respondents' counsel (Sri D. V. Reddi Pantulu) contended that the petitioner ought to have made enquiries and that it was unlikely the petitioner had no knowledge of the award for nearly four years.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Unreported decision of Krishnaswami Nayudu J. (published in Indian Express, 5 Aug 1951) | Court construed language meaning six months from date of knowledge of the passing of the Collector's award. | The court referred to this construction as one of two Madras High Court judges' views supporting a knowledge-based reckoning of the six-month period. |
| Rajagopala Ayyangar J., Lakshmana Rao v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Ranipet | Elaborately discussed the construction that the six-month period runs from the date of knowledge of the award where notice was not received. | The court followed Rajagopala Ayyangar J.'s decision as a persuasive authority for construing clause (b) as six months from knowledge. |
| Venkatasubba Rao J., Swaminathan v. Latchmanan, ILR 53 Mad 491 at p. 496 (AIR 1930 Mad 490 at p. 491) | Expressed the principle that "the very word order by necessary implication means, in law, that the party affected has had reasonable notice of it." | The court quoted this passage to support the proposition that the statute should be construed so that the limitation period operates from the date of knowledge (reasonable notice) rather than mechanically from the award date where notice was not served. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first found on the facts (as disclosed in the affidavit and admitted in the counter-affidavit) that the statutory notice under S. 12(2) was not served on the petitioner and that the petitioner did not know of the passing of the award until 31 March 1951.
The court identified the sole legal issue as whether the petitioner was barred because he did not make the application within six months from the date of the Collector's award under the proviso to S. 18(2). It parsed the proviso: clause (a) was inapplicable (since the petitioner was not present or represented), and the first part of clause (b) (six weeks from receipt of notice) was also inapplicable because notice under S. 12(2) was not served.
The court observed that a literal reading of the second part of clause (b) — prescribing six months from the date of the Collector's award — "no doubt creates difficulty" where a petitioner had no knowledge by reason of non-service of notice. To resolve that difficulty the court relied upon prior Madras High Court decisions (including those of Krishnaswami Nayudu J. and Rajagopala Ayyangar J.) and quoted Venkatasubba Rao J.'s observation in Swaminathan v. Latchmanan that the term "order" implies reasonable notice to the affected party.
Applying those authorities, the court concluded that the reasonable construction of the statutory language is to treat the six-month period as running from the date of knowledge of the passing of the award (i.e., from when the affected person received notice or otherwise knew of the award), rather than mechanically from the date of the Collector's award when the statutory notice was not served.
The court considered the respondents' contention that the petitioner should have made enquiries and that it was improbable he had no knowledge for nearly four years, but found no record evidence to support that contention and therefore did not accept it.
On the basis of the factual finding (non-service and lack of knowledge until March 1951) and the construction of the proviso as running from date of knowledge, the court held the petition was fit for relief under Article 226 and issued the writ directing the Collector to make a reference under S. 18.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court allowed the petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Collector to make a reference to the proper court under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The petition was allowed with costs; advocates' fee awarded was Rs. 100.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the Collector is ordered to make the statutory reference under S. 18 in respect of the petitioner's claim.
- The court construed the proviso to S. 18(2) so that, where the statutory notice under S. 12(2) is not served and the affected person lacks knowledge, the six-month period in clause (b) is to be treated as running from the date of knowledge of the award rather than mechanically from the award date.
- The court followed earlier Madras High Court decisions in reaching this construction and observed that it would be appropriate for the legislature to clarify the section in the light of these decisions.
- The decision does not purport to create a novel legal principle but applies and follows existing judicial constructions of the provision; its immediate consequence is relief to the petitioner rather than declaration of a new precedent.
Judgement
This is an application for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the 1st respendent to make a reference under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners land was acquired by the Government and the petitioner filed his objection on 27th April, 1947. An award under S. 11 was passed on 14th June, 1947. According to the terms of S. 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector should give immediate notice of the award to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made.
A notice appears to have been despatched on 11th July, 1947. In paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit, it is admitted that the notice was returned unserved. The petitioner who had no knowledge of the award wrote to the Collector for information. He received intimation about the passing of the award by the communication of the Collector dated 31st March, 1951, in L. Dis. No. 5321 of 1951. He requested the Collector to make a reference under S. 18 of the Act but the Collector refused to make a reference on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The petitioner has consequently filed this writ for the issue of a mandamus.
2. The facts as disclosed in the affidavit clearly establish that the statutory notice required under S. 12 (2) of the Act was not served on the petitioner. It also appears that he had no knowledge till the receipt of the Collectors communication dated 31st March, 1951. So, the only question that has to be determined is, whether his claim for a reference under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is barred by limitation. The proviso to S. 18 (2) of the Act runs in the following terms :
"Provided that every such application shall be made :
(a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under S. 12, sub-s. (2) or within six months from the date of the Collectors award whichever period shall first expire."
Clause (a) to the proviso does not apply to the facts of the case. The first part of Cl. (b) is also inapplicable as the notice under S. 12 (2) was not served on the petitioner. The only point to be decided is, whether the petitioner is barred as he did not file the application within six months from the date of the Collectors award. A literal reading of the second part of Cl. (b) no doubt creates difficulty. It states that the application should be filed within six months from the date of the Collectors award.
This clause has been construed by two learned Judges of the Madras High Court i.e., Krishnaswami Nayudu J., and Rajagopala Ayyangar J., as meaning within six months from the date of the knowledge of the passing of the Collectors award. The decision of Krishnaswami Nayudu J., on this point does not appear to have been reported, though it was published in the issue of the Indian Express, dated 5th August, 1951. Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar has elaborately discussed this question in Lakshmana Rao v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Ranipet.
He followed three bench decisions of the Madras High Court dealing with three different Acts employing similar language. It was pointed out by Venkatasubba Rao J., in Swaminathan v. Latchmanan, ILR 53 Mad 491 at p 496 : (AIR 1930 Mad 490 at p. 491, (B), that
"the very word order by necessary implication means, in law, that the party affected has had reasonable notice of it."
Following those decisions, I hold that the reasonable construction to be put on the language of the section is to construe it as six months from the date of knowledge of the passing of the award. It is appropriate that the legislature makes the section clear in the light of these decisions.
3. Sri D. V. Reddi Pantulu, on behalf of the respondents contended that the petitioner must have made enquiries as to the passing of the award and that it is unlikely that he had no knowledge of the passing of the award for nearly four years. As there is nothing on record to show that he had any knowledge, I am not willing to accept his contention. The writ was filed after correspondence passed between the petitioner and the Collector. It seems to be an eminently a fit case for the issue of a writ of mandamus under Art. 226 of the Constitution. I therefore issue a writ directing the Collector to make a reference to the proper Court under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The writ is therefore allowed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 100.
Petition allowed.
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