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A. Narayana, Property Guardian, Brahmam Bus Service v. State Of Madras

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Aug 8, 1955

Judgment

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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the State of Madras in G.O. Ms. No. 2224, Home Department, dated 9th July, 1953, and to quash the order passed by the Government.

The petitioner originally owned vehicle MDQ. 509 (now replaced by MDQ. 587). The 2nd respondent is the owner of MDQ. 531. Both applied for permits to run stage carriages on the route Kurnool to Anantapur and were granted permits.

Chronology of relevant administrative acts as stated in the opinion:

30 May 1949: Regional Transport Officer (Cuddapah) fixed timings tentatively and directed that the operators (petitioner and 2nd respondent) run vehicles MDQ. 531 and 509 on the Kurnool–Anantapur route on a system of daily rotation. A notification stated daily rotation would be effective from 1 June 1949, starting with MDQ. 531.
28 April 1950: Regional Transport Authority revised the timings but did not alter the prior order fixing daily rotation.
28 May 1952: The Regional Transport Authority passed an order purporting to go back on its 30 May 1949 order, directing fixed timings for the buses (described in the opinion as an order that conflicted with the earlier rotation system).
19 June 1952 (as recorded in the opinion): An order was passed informing operators to ply in fixed timings issued on 28 April 1950, which superseded the 30 May 1949 order.
Petitioner appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board; the Board held that no appeal lay.
23 March 1953: On being drawn attention to G.O. Ms. No. 2921 (Home, dated 15 July 1949), the Regional Transport Authority passed an order granting rotation of timings for MDQ. 587 and MDQ. 531 with MDQ. 531 to take the first timing on 25 March 1953 and follow rotation thereafter.
2nd respondent preferred a revision petition to the Government against the RTA order dated 23 March 1953.
9 July 1953: The Government, by G.O. Ms. No. 2224 (Home), set aside the RTA order dated 23 March 1953 and restored the order dated 28 May 1952.
Thereafter the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking certiorari to quash the Government order dated 9 July 1953.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Government order dated 9 July 1953 (G.O. Ms. No. 2224) setting aside the Regional Transport Authority's order of 23 March 1953 and restoring the 28 May 1952 order was vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and therefore liable to be quashed by certiorari.
Whether the actions of the Regional Transport Authority and the Government in fixing or altering timings and rotation for stage carriage permits are administrative acts or judicial/quasi-judicial acts amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Position

The petitioner contended that the valid and final order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 30 May 1949 fixed a system of daily rotation between the competing operators and that this order had become final.
The petitioner asserted that the Government order dated 9 July 1953 ignored the prior valid 30 May 1949 order and that no valid reasons were given by the Government for altering the system of daily rotation to the petitioner's prejudice.
Consequently, the petitioner sought issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the Government order of 9 July 1953.

Respondents' / Government's Position

It was contended on behalf of the Government (Sri Gangadhara Rao on behalf of the Government; Mr. Sankara Rao is also named) that the system of daily rotation fixed by the RTA on 30 May 1949 was only tentative, and that only the timings had been fixed tentatively.
The respondents contended that the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority in 1952 and by the Government were administrative orders and therefore not subject to judicial review by certiorari under Article 226.
The respondents (relying on later authorities) contended that the decision in Vedachala Mudliar (1951-2 Mad LJ 411 / AIR 1952 Mad 276) had been reversed by a Bench in Kali v. Vedachala (1952-1 Mad LJ 152 / AIR 1952 Mad 545), and thus that Subba Rao, J.'s conclusion that the RTA is quasi-judicial ought not to be followed.
Advocate-General and Sri Bashyam Iyengar earlier argued (in the Vedachala proceedings) that the authority, in fixing or modifying timings, was performing an administrative act rather than a judicial or quasi-judicial one; these arguments were repeated before the court in this opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (AIR 1950 SC 222)	Definition of a "judicial" act (May, C.J.'s definition) and articulation of tests for when certiorari may issue; approving and adopting the distinction between judicial/quasi-judicial and administrative acts.	The court relied on this decision to adopt the definition of a judicial act (an act by competent authority upon consideration of facts imposing liability or affecting rights) and the four conditions (Atkin, L.J.'s formulation) under which certiorari may issue.
Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices (1926 AC 586)	Authoritative articulation (Lord Atkinson) supporting the definition of a judicial act and the distinction from administrative acts.	The opinion notes that May, C.J.'s definition was approved by Lord Atkinson in this case; the court cites it as supporting authority for the definition of judicial acts.
Vedachala Mudliar v. State of Madras (1951-2 Mad LJ 411; AIR 1952 Mad 276)	Held that the Regional Transport Authority has legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and is a quasi-judicial body when exercising powers under the Motor Vehicles Act; rejected the argument that fixing or modifying timings was merely administrative.	The court accepted the reasoning of Subba Rao, J. in this case and relied on it to hold that the Regional Transport Authority, acting under sections 47 and 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, performs judicial or quasi-judicial functions and cannot arbitrarily prejudice parties by altering timings or rotation.
Motilal v. Uttar Pradesh Govt. (AIR 1951 All 257)	Full Bench decision referred to in Vedachala Mudliar concerning the nature of authority and/or powers under transport legislation (as cited in Vedachala).	Referenced as part of the authority relied upon in Vedachala Mudliar to support the conclusion that the Regional Transport Authority is a quasi-judicial body.
Kali v. Vedachala (1952-1 Mad LJ 152; AIR 1952 Mad 545)	Bench judgment addressing whether fixing timings formed a condition of the permit and whether appeals to the Central Road Traffic Board were maintainable; the Bench left open the correctness of Subba Rao, J.'s conclusions on the administrative vs. quasi-judicial nature of RTA orders.	The respondents relied on this decision to argue that Vedachala Mudliar had been reversed. The court carefully read the Bench judgment and concluded that the Bench did not reverse Subba Rao, J.'s conclusion on the nature of the order; the court therefore found no force in the respondents' reliance on Kali v. Vedachala to displace Vedachala Mudliar.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in the following steps (stated only from the material contained in the opinion):

Examination of the documentary record and orders: The court reviewed the sequence of orders (30 May 1949; 28 April 1950; 28 May 1952; 23 March 1953; and the Government order of 9 July 1953) and the content of those orders, particularly the 30 May 1949 order which introduced a system of daily rotation.
Identification of an error apparent on the face of the record: The court found that the Government ignored the prior valid and final order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 30 May 1949, which fixed a system of daily rotation. The Government order made no reference to that 1949 order and offered no reasons for altering a system that had become final.
Legal characterization of the nature of the orders: The court considered whether the RTA and Government orders were administrative or quasi-judicial. It applied the definition of a judicial act quoted from the Province of Bombay decision (an act by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, imposing liability or affecting rights) and the four conditions for certiorari stated by Atkin, L.J.
Reliance on precedent: The court accepted the reasoning of Vedachala Mudliar (Subba Rao, J.) that the Regional Transport Authority has legal authority to determine questions affecting rights and is quasi-judicial when exercising powers under sections 47 and 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The court rejected the respondents' contention that Vedachala had been reversed by Kali v. Vedachala, finding that the Bench in Kali had not decided the question of the RTA's nature and had left the point open.
Application of legal test to facts: Applying the tests for judicial/quasi-judicial action and the requirement that where rights are affected the authority must act judicially, the court concluded that the RTA and Government orders in question were quasi-judicial and therefore amenable to judicial review. Because the Government's order exhibited an error apparent on the face of the record (ignoring the final 1949 order and supplying no reasons for prejudicial alteration), certiorari was appropriate.
Conclusion and remedial action: On the basis that the Government's order was procedurally and substantively defective for the reasons stated, the court quashed the Government order dated 9 July 1953 and allowed the writ petition, awarding costs and fixing advocate's fees.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court quashed the Government order dated 9 July 1953 and allowed the writ petition.

Immediate consequences as set out in the opinion:

The Government order (G.O. Ms. No. 2224 dated 9 July 1953) is quashed.
The writ petition is allowed with costs; the advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 100, with Respondents 1 and 2 to pay Rs. 50 each (as ordered in the opinion).

Broader implications addressed by the court:

The court reaffirmed the principle (as applied in Vedachala Mudliar) that the Regional Transport Authority, when exercising powers under sections 47 and 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity and therefore cannot alter timings or rotation in a manner that arbitrarily prejudices parties. The opinion does not state that it is laying down a new precedent; it relies on existing authorities and accepts prior reasoning.

Note: This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information not contained in that opinion has been added.

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Judgement

This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari, to call for the records of the State of Madras in G. O. Ms. No. 2224, Home Department, dated 9th July, 1953, and to quash the order passed by the Government.

2. The petitioner originally owned MDQ. 509 and has replaced it now by MDQ. 587. The 2nd respondent herein is the owner of MDQ. 531. Both the petitioner and the 2nd respondent applied for the issue of permits to run stage carriages along the route Kurnool to Anantapur, and they were granted permits accordingly. On 30th May, 1949, the Regional Transport Officer, Cuddapah fixed the timings tentatively. He also directed that the operators viz., the 2nd respondent and the petitioner should run their vehicles MDQ. 531 and 509 on the route Kurnool-Anantapur on a system of daily rotation. On 1st June, 1949, a notification was issued accordingly. It states that the buses should run on a system of daily rotation and that the rotation timings would be given effect from 1st June, 1949, starting with MDQ. 531. On 28th April, 1950, the Regional Transport Authority revised the timings. But he did not in any way alter the prior order fixing the system of daily rotation. On 28th May, 1932, the Regional Transport Authority went back upon his order dated 30th May, 1949. He passed the order in the following terms :

"In this office proceedings first cited, the buses MDQ. 531 and 587 on the route Kurnool-Anantapur were ordered to run in fixed timings starting at Kurnool by 6-30 A. M., and 9-00 A. M., respectively.

But it is brought to my notice that both are being run in daily rotation in the above timings.". The expression "respectively" is opposed to the terms of the order passed on 30th May, 1949. The operators were running the buses on a system of daily rotation according to the order passed on 30th May, 1949. I am unable to understand how the Regional Transport Authority felt any doubt as to why they were being run in daily rotation. On 19th June, 1952, he passed the following order :

"The operators of buses MDQ. 587 and 531 on the route Kurnool to Anantapur are hereby informed that they should ply in fixed timings issued in this office Proceedings No. 1810-B of 1950, dated 28th April, 1950, which supersede the orders issued in this office R. No. 5683-E of 1949, dated 30th May, 1949"

. No reasons are given by the Regional Transport Authority as to why he went back upon the order fixed on 30th May, 1949. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner herein went up on appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board. The Central Road Traffic Board held that no appeal lay. When the attention of the Regional Transport Authority, Cuddapah was drawn to G. O. Ms. No. 2921, Home, dated 15th July, 1949, he passed the following order on 23rd March, 1953 :

"The rotation of timings in respect of the bus MDQ. 587 of Sri. K. Babanna and the bus MDQ. 531 of M/s. the Kurnool Co-operative Motor Transport, Kurnool, running on the route Kurnool to Anantapur via Dhone and Gooty are hereby granted and MDQ. 531 shall take the first timings on 25th March, 1953 and follow the rotation thereafter with effect from 25th March, 1953"

. The 2nd respondent preferred a revision petition to the Government against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, dated 23rd March, 1953. The Government by its order dated 9th July, 1953 set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 23rd March, 1953 and restored the order dated 28th May, 1952. The petitioner has consequently preferred this application for the issue of a writ of certiorari.

3. I have carefully gone through the several orders, and I am clearly of opinion that there is an error apparent on the face of the order passed by the Government. They ignored the valid order passed by the Regional Transport Authority on 30th May, 1949, fixing the system of daily rotation. No reference whatsoever is made by the Government to this order which had become final. I do not agree with the contention addressed by Sri Gangadhara Rao on behalf of the Government or of Mr. Sankara Rao that the system of daily rotation was fixed tentatively. The order dated 30th May, 1949, is quite clear that what was fixed tentatively was only the timings. The rights inter se between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were duly fixed on 30th May, 1949, by introducing the system of daily rotation. No valid reasons are stated in the Government Order as to why that system should be altered to the prejudice of the petitioner. In the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority on 28th May, 1952, and in the order passed by the Government, no reference whatsoever is made to the order passed in 1949. The order is therefore liable to be quashed.

4. It is contended on behalf of the Respondent that the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority in 1952 or by the Government is only an administrative order, and that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. Various authorities were cited before me for the purpose of drawing the distinction between an administrative order and a judicial or quasi judicial order. It is sufficient to refer to the Supreme Court decision in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani 1950-2 Mad LJ 703 : (AIR 1950 SC 222) (A), on this point. The definition of a judicial order given by May, C. J., was approved by Lord Atkinson in Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices 1926 AC 586 at p. 602 (B). Kania, C. J., accepted that definition as the best definition of a judicial act as distinguished from an administrative act and it is as follows :

"In this connection, the term Judicialdoes not necessarily mean acts of a judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purpose of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others"

. Kania, C. J., then proceeded to consider the four conditions laid down by Atkin, L. J., under which a rule for certiorari may issue. At page 707 the four conditions are laid down in the following terms :

"Wherever any body of persons (1) having legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and, (3) having the duty to act judicially, (4) act in excess of their legal authority - a writ of certiorari may issue"

5. Applying those tests, I have no doubt that the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority and the Government are quasi-judicial orders. This question was considered by Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in Vedachala Mudliar v. State of Madras 1951-2 Mad LJ 411 : (AIR 1952 Mad 276) (C). He discussed the several sections of the Motor Vehicles Act and held at page 415 (of Mad LJ) : (at pp. 278, 279 of AIR) that the Regional Transport Authority has the legal authority to determine the questions affecting the rights of subjects. After referring to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Motilal v. Uttar Pradesh Govt. (AIR 1951 All 257) (D) he took the view that the Regional Transport Authority is a quasi-judicial body. He rejected the argument addressed by the Advocate-General and Sri Bashyam Iyengar that the said authority in fixing the timings or modifying them later is only performing an administrative act. At page 416 (of Mad LJ) : (at p. 279 of AIR) he observed as follows :

"If fixing the time table in the first instance could be made only by adopting judicial procedure, it is unreasonable to hold that under rule 269 the Regional Transport Authority could modify the time table in an administrative capacity, for, if that be so, the safeguards provided by the Legislature would be defeated. Mr. Bashyam made an attempt to make a distinction between the orders under section 48(a), (b) and (c) and the orders under section 48 (d). I cannot appreciate the distinction for those orders under whatever clause they are made are made only after the necessary judicial enquiry provided in section 47"

I accept the entire reasoning of the learned Judge.

6. The learned Advocates for the respondents sought to contend that the decision was wrong. My attention was drawn to the several provisions of the Act. The arguments addressed by the Advocate-General and Sri Bashyam Iyengar before Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) were practically repeated before me. I am not persuaded to take a different view or refer the matter to a Bench. I am inclined to hold that the Regional Transport Authority acting under sections 47 and 48 is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. He can neither alter the timings nor change the system of rotation so as to prejudice the parties arbitrarily or capriciously as contended by Sri Sankara Rao.

7. The next contention urged on behalf of the respondents was that the decision in 1951-2 Mad LJ 411 : (AIR 1952 Mad 276) (C) was reversed by a Bench of the Madras High Court in Kali v. Vedachala 1952-1 Mad LJ 152 : (AIR 1952 Mad 545) (E) and that the decision of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) ought not to be followed. At page 155 (of Mad LJ) : (at p. 548 of AIR) Rajamannar, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Bench leaves open the correctness of the conclusions of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) on the question as to whether the order was an administrative or quasi-judicial order. The observations are as follows :

"In this view it does not become necessary to examine the correctness of the learned Judges conclusion on the other important question argued before him as to the nature of the order of the Regional Transport Authority in fixing or regulating the timings"

A careful reading of the Bench Judgment discloses that the Bench only took the view that the fixing, of the timings was not a condition of the permit and that the appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board was not maintainable. I do not agree with the contention that the conclusion of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) as to the nature of the order had been reversed by the Bench. I therefore hold that there is no force in the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that the order is an administrative one.

8. Having regard to the fact that there is a clear error apparent on the face of the record, I quash the order passed by the State of Madras on 9th July, 1953. The writ petition is allowed with costs. The Advocates fee is fixed at Rs. 100 (Respondents 1 and 2 to pay Rs. 50 each).

Order quashed.