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Pisupati Venkata Rama Rao v. Tadepalli Papayya

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Sep 22, 1954
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Judgment Summary — Second Appeal on Legality of Partnership

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs and defendants formed a partnership trading as "Tadepalli Papayya and Co." to operate a rice ration shop from 3-9-1944 at Bezwada. The business was conducted on the basis of a ration shop licence issued in the name of the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that the firm had been dissolved on 1-9-1945, for settlement of accounts, and for a direction that the 1st defendant pay any amount found due to the plaintiffs. Both Courts below held that the alleged partnership was illegal and unenforceable and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court by way of a Second Appeal; the sole question before this Court was whether the partnership was illegal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the partnership, which operated a rice ration shop on the basis of a licence issued in the name of the 1st defendant, was illegal under the Defence of India Rules and the Madras Rationing Order, 1943.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant sought to distinguish the Rationing Order from statutes such as the Opium Act and the Abkari Act, arguing that no principle of public policy underlay the provisions of the Madras Rationing Order of 1943.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of other parties' arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nalan Padmanabhan v. Badrinath, 35 Mad 582 (A) Held that partnerships entered into in contravention of the Opium Act and Abkari Act provisions were void; the prohibitions in those Acts rest on public policy and extend to transfers of licence privileges. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that statutory prohibitions preventing transfer or shared use of a licence rest on public policy and render partnerships structured to avoid such prohibitions illegal and unenforceable.
Gathercole v. Smith, (1881) 17 Ch D 1 Interpreted the word "transfer" broadly — "one of the widest terms" and includes every means by which property may be passed from one person to another (as cited by James L.J. and Lush L.J.). The Court used this principle to construe the statutory prohibition on transfer of a licence/ration document: admitting another into partnership that makes stock and capital joint is effectively a transfer.
Velu Padayachi v. Sivasooriam Pillai, AIR 1950 Mad 444 (Full Bench) Held that a partnership formed to conduct arrack/toddy vending on a licence granted to only one person is void ab initio whether entered into before or after grant of licence; it either involves a prohibited transfer or results in unlicensed vending. The Court relied on the Full Bench's reasoning to conclude that analogous principles apply to partnerships formed to use a ration licence held by one person: such partnerships are void for contravening statutory prohibitions and public policy.
Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangaswamy, 24 Mad 401 (D) Part of a "long and consistent body of opinion" that partnerships entered to conduct liquor-related businesses on a licence to one person are void ab initio (as cited in Velu Padayachi). The Court treated this case as part of established local authority supporting the rule that partnerships designed to subvert single-person licence restrictions are void; it formed part of the chain of authorities applied by the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in sequential legal steps based solely on the provisions and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court examined Rule 81(2) and Rule 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules and the Madras Rationing Order, 1943 — in particular, Section 2(9) (definition of "rationing document"), Section 13 (a ration document shall not be issued for obtaining rationed articles except by or on behalf of the person to whom such document was issued) and Section 16 (no person shall transfer to any other person a ration document issued to himself).
  2. Object and purpose: The Court observed that the Rationing Order was enacted to maintain supplies essential to the community and to ensure equitable distribution of rice at controlled rates; to achieve that objective the authorities needed to control who could buy and sell rice by issuing authorisations subject to statutory conditions.
  3. Legal consequence of contravention: Because the Defence of India Rules made contravention of orders under Rule 81 an offence (punishable under Rule 81(4)), any contract involving the transfer or use of a ration document by someone other than the authorised person not only contravenes Section 13 and Section 16 of the Rationing Order but also concerns an act made punishable under the Defence rules.
  4. Contractual validity: Applying Section 23 of the Contract Act (as cited in the opinion), the Court concluded that a contract whose object is illegal or contrary to public policy is void; therefore a contract that involves transferring or improperly using a ration document is void.
  5. Precedential support and analogy: The Court considered analogous authorities under other regulatory statutes (Opium Act, Abkari Act). It relied on Nalan Padmanabhan and the Full Bench decision in Velu Padayachi (and the underlying line of cases including Marudamuthu Pillai) to show that partnerships formed to circumvent statutory licence restrictions are void ab initio, because they either effect a prohibited transfer or amount to unlicensed vending and offend public policy. The Gathercole v. Smith authority was used to construe the concept of "transfer" broadly so that admitting another partner who uses stock and capital jointly is a transfer of the licence privilege.
  6. Application to the facts: The partnership in question traded using a ration licence issued to the 1st defendant but permitted the plaintiff and other partners, who had no ration card, to buy and sell rice. The Court held that this amounted to use of the ration document by persons other than the holder (contravening S.13) and involved a transfer of a ration document (contravening S.16), and therefore the partnership contravened statutory prohibitions and related offences under the Defence rules.
  7. Response to appellant's contention: The Court rejected the appellant's attempt to distinguish the Rationing Order from the Opium/Abkari statutes on the ground that the Rationing Order was enacted for the public interest (equitable distribution of scarce rice) and that prohibitions in the Order were likewise based on public policy rather than purely on revenue protection.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the partnership was illegal and unenforceable. The Court affirmed the view of the Courts below and dismissed the appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the suit partnership is declared illegal and unenforceable and the appeal by the plaintiffs fails; the lower courts' dismissal is affirmed.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs and the Court refused leave (as recorded in the opinion).
  • The opinion applies established precedent and principles to the statutory scheme of the Rationing Order; the decision enforces that contracts and partnerships which involve the prohibited use or transfer of ration documents are void on grounds of illegality and public policy. The opinion does not state that it is creating any new legal principle distinct from those it applies.

This summary is confined to the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Judgement

The question in this Second Appeal is whether the suit partnership is illegal.

2. The facts found by the Courts below may be stated. The plaintiffs and defendants formed a partnership in the name and style of Tadepalli Papayya and Co. for running rice ration shop business from 3-9-1944 at Bezwada. The said business was conducted on the basis of a ration shop licence issued in the name of the 1st defendant. The suit was filed for a declaration that the firm, Tadepalli Papayya and Co., had been dissolved on 1-9-1945, for settlement of accounts and for directing the 1st defendant to pay such amount as may be found due to the plaintiff. Both the Courts held that the alleged partnership was illegal and unenforceable and, on that finding dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred the above Second Appeal.

3. The only question in the Second Appeal is whether the said partnership is illegal. The answer to the question depends upon the provisions of the Defence of India Rules and that of the Madras Rationing order 1943. It will be convenient to read the relevant provisions at this stage :

"Rule 81(2) :- The Central Government or the Provincial Government so far as appears to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India or the efficient prosecution of the war or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community may by order provide (a) for regulating or prohibiting production, treatment, beeping, storage, movement, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of articles or things of any description whatsoever and in particular for prohibiting the withholding from sale, either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons, of articles or things kept for sale and for requiring articles or things kept for sale to be sold either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances; (b) for controlling the prices or rates at which articles or things of any description whatsoever may be sold or hired and for relaxing any maximum or minimum limits otherwise imposed on such prices or rates.

Rule 81(4) :- If any person contravenes any order made under this rule, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both."

4. Under Section 2(9) of the Madras Rationing Order of 1943, a "rationing document" includes a rationing book, a ration card or any part of any ration book or ration card or any coupon or any declaration, authority, permit or other document issued or made by or under the provisions of this Order.

Section 13 :-

"A ration document shall not be issued for obtaining any rationed article, except by or on behalf of the person to whom ouch document was issued."

Section 16 :- "No person shall transfer, to any other person a ration document issued to himself."

5. It is seen from the aforesaid provisions that the Ration Order was passed for maintaining the supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It was intended to ensure an equitable distribution of rice to the members of the public at controlled rates. To achieve that object, it was necessary that the person who buys and sells rice, should be under the control of the authorities concerned and subject to the regulations made to prevent abuse. The Order, therefore, enabled the authorities concerned to issue an authorisation to a retail dealer to buy and sell rice subject to the conditions laid down in the said Order. Under S. 13, the authorisation cannot be used by any person other than the person to whom it was issued. Under S. 16, such a person is prohibited from transferring a ration document to any other person.

Under the Defence of India Rules, any contravention of an order made in exercise of the powers conferred under that rule was made an offence punishable as such. It is, therefore, obvious that any contract involving the transfer of a ration document not only contravenes the express prohibition contained in S. 13 of the Order, but also relates to an act which is made an offence punishable under the Defence of India Rules. Such a contract would be void under S. 23, Contract Act, as the object of that contract involves something illegal or contrary to public policy.

6. There are innumerable cases on the analogous provisions in different statutes such as the Opium Act, the Abkari Act, etc. It would be enough if two of the relevant cases laying down the principles are noticed.

Nalan Padmanabhan v. Badrinath, 35 Mad 582 (A) deals with a question arising under the Opium Act. There two persons were farmers of opium revenue under Government. They obtained a licence from the Collector for the sale of opium subject to the condition among others that they should not sell, transfer or sub-rent their privileges without the permission of the Collector. They, without the sanction of the Collector entered into an agreement with C, by which they admitted him as a partner in the opium business. The third party admitted as partner drought a suit for dissolution and winding up of the business. Benson and Sundara Ayyar, JJ. held that the agreement was void and the suit was not maintainable. At page 586, the learned Judges observed :

It is well established that the provisions of the Abkari and Opium Acts are not intended merely to protect the public revenue and that the prohibitions contained therein are based on public policy."

The learned Judges proceeded to state :

"We are also of opinion that the partnership in this case was illegal for another reason, as it contravened the provisions of Cl. 26 of the licence which prohibits the transfer of the right of sale granted to the defendants."

As regards the meaning to be attributed to the word "transfer" the learned Judges observed :

"But if one person carrying on a trade and possessing stock and capital, admits another into partnership with himself, making the stock and capital, the joint property of both, it is impossible to contend that there is not a transfer in such a case. The word "transfer" says James L.J. in the - Gathercole v. Smith, (1881) 17 Ch D 1 (B) is one of the widest terms, that can be used and according to Lush L.J. in the same case, the word "transferable" is a word of the widest import and includes every means by which the property may be passed from one person to another. We are not concerned in construing a statute like the Opium Act with the mere form of the transaction, but with the substance of it."

7. It will be seen from the aforesaid decision that the learned Judges held that the partnership was illegal for two reasons (i) that it offended the rule of public policy and (ii) that it contravened an express statutory prohibition. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court elaborately considered the question arising from the madras abkari act in - Velu Padayachi v. Sivasooriam Pillai, AIR 1950 Mad 444 (C). The facts there are : The parties to the partnership agreement sold arrack themselves or through the other partners as their agents on a licence granted to the defendant alone in which there was a term prohibiting him from transferring his rights. The partnership agreement was entered into prior to the issue of the licence to the defendant. The suit was filed by one of the partners for recovery of the amounts due to him under a settlement of account in respect of the said partnership. The defence was that the suit partnership was illegal and, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. At pp. 446-447, Horwill, J. who delivered the judgment observed :

"When a licence, which is a personal privilege to vend, is acquired by one partner, it is certainly his licence and not the licence of the partnership. Since it was granted to him on the express understanding that it was to be used by him and by him alone, its use by the partnership would involve a transfer in precisely the same way as it would if the partnership were entered into after the licence was issued. On the question of public policy, it is difficult to see any difference between the object of the partnership entered into before the licence was granted and one entered into after it was granted. In either case, the partnership would be entered into for the purpose of bringing about a result prohibited by law, i.e., the vending of arrack by a person who had no licence to do so."

At page 449, the learned Judge concluded his discussion in the following words :

"From the above discussion, it is evident that, there is a long and consistent body of opinion of this High Court from - Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangaswamy, 24 Mad 401 (D) onwards with which we agree, that a partnership entered into for the purpose of conducting a business in arrack or toddy on a licence granted or to be granted to only one of them is void ab initio whether the contract was entered into before the licence was granted or afterwards, in that it either involves a transfer of the licence, which is prohibited under Rule 27 and punishable under S. 56 or a breach of S. 15, Akbari Act, punishable under S. 55, because the unlicensed partner by himself or through his agent, the other partner, sells without a licence."

8. In my view, the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions equally apply to the facts of the instant case. The partnership business of buying rice and selling same in the retail shop was carried on with the aid of the licence, in favour of the 1st defendant. When the licence was issued to the 1st defendant, it was intended that he should, and none else, use that for doing business. Instead the plaintiff and other partners, who had no ration card along with the 1st defendant bought and sold rice. It certainly was a user of the ration card by persons other than the one to whom it was issued in contravention of Section 13 of the Rationing Order. It also involved the transfer of a ration document prohibited by S. 16 of the Rationing Order.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to make a distinction between the Opium and Abkari Acts and the Rationing Order and argued that no principle of public policy underlay the provisions of the Rationing Order. I cannot agree. As I have already stated, the Rationing Order was introduced in the interests of the public for the equitable distribution of rice during those days of scarcity. If there was a question of public policy in enacting the Abkari and Opium Acts, I do not see how the Rationing Order of 1943 could be put in a different category. It was not issued in the interests of public revenue. It was essentially intended to protect the public interests and to effectuate that purpose, certain acts deleterious to the public interests were prohibited and the breach thereof was made punishable. The suit partnership entered into between the plaintiff and his partners in direct contravention of the statutory prohibitions is illegal and unenforceable. The judgment of the lower Court is correct.

10. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave.

Appeal dismissed.