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Chandravati Bai (Die... v. Chaganlal Deceased B...
Judgment Summary — MANOHAR PERSHAD, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs Chaganlal, Prahlad Rai and Nanu Ram sued for specific performance against Chandravati Bai and obtained a decree dated 1-7-1952 directing the defendant to execute a sale deed within two months on the plaintiffs paying the balance of the price (Rs.15,500) and presenting a draft of the sale deed; failing execution by the defendant the Court would execute and register the deed. Before the decree was passed Chaganlal died and his son Mangilal was brought on record. The decree-holders deposited the balance amount into Court on 2 September 1952 (the 31st August and 1st September having been holidays) and sought execution. The judgment-debtor objected to execution on grounds that (1) the amount was not tendered to the defendant within two months as ordered and (2) no draft of the sale deed was filed with the money. The executing Court rejected these objections and the judgment-debtor (Chandravati Bai) appealed. During the appeal the appellant died and her husband was brought on record as her legal representative. The appeal includes a preliminary objection relating to abatement because of the death of one of the respondents (Nanu Ram) and a delayed application for bringing his legal representative on record.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rule 12 of Order 22 (providing that Rules 3, 4 and 8 do not apply to execution proceedings) applies to appeals against orders made in execution proceedings (i.e., whether such appeals are "proceedings in execution" for the purpose of abatement rules).
- Whether the delay in filing the petition to bring the legal representative of a deceased respondent on record should be condoned (application filed after 387 days; applicant claimed seven months' serious illness).
- On the merits, whether deposit of the decretal amount into Court on 2 September 1952 (when the Court had been closed on the prescribed date) constituted sufficient compliance with the decree.
- Whether failure to file a draft of the sale deed at the time of depositing the money amounted to non-compliance with the decree when a draft was already on record.
- Whether the decree for specific performance could be enforced against the legal representative (the appellant's husband) in the absence of proof on record that he was in possession of the property.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Rule 12 of Order 22 makes Rules 3, 4 and 8 inapplicable to execution proceedings; therefore those rules (which deal with abatement and bringing legal representatives on record within prescribed time) do not apply to appeals arising from execution orders — so the appeal should not abate for delay in bringing the legal representative on record.
- The delay in filing the legal-representation application should be condoned because the appellant was seriously ill and bedridden for seven months.
- On merit: the respondents did not comply with the decree because (a) the decretal amount was not paid within the two-month period ordered and (b) a draft of the sale deed was not presented with the money.
- The decree for specific performance could not be enforced against the appellant's husband because there was no proof he was in possession of the property (relying on Hamidgani v. Ammasahib).
Respondents' Arguments
- Because respondent Nanu Ram has died and no legal-representation petition was filed within the prescribed period, the appeal should abate (respondents raised a preliminary objection based on abatement).
- The fact of Nanu Ram's death was brought to the appellant's notice on 10-12-1958 and the appellant filed a counter — no sufficient explanation has been provided for not taking steps earlier to bring the legal representative on record, so delay should not be condoned.
- On the merits the respondents maintained that deposit into Court on 2 September 1952 was valid performance of the decree (as the draft sale deed had already been produced during trial and was on record), so there was sufficient compliance with the decree.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Trimbak v. Gopal, AIR 1947 Bom 480 | Authority holding that an appeal against an order made in execution proceedings is not itself a proceeding in execution and Rule 12, O.22 does not apply to such appeals. | Placed among authorities supporting the Court's conclusion that Rule 12, O.22 does not apply to appeals arising from execution orders. |
| Rajah of Kalahasti v. Jagannadha Rayanimgar, AIR 1932 Mad 574 | High Court view aligned with the proposition that Rule 12, O.22 does not apply to appeals against execution orders. | Used as part of the weight of authority rejecting the appellant's contention on Rule 12's applicability to appeals. |
| Chaganmal v. Chaubey Ramdulare Lal, AIR 1933 All 388 | Similar proposition that appeals against orders in execution are not proceedings in execution for Rule 12 purposes. | Cited among the High Court decisions supporting the non-applicability of Rule 12 to appeals. |
| Madhao Rao Ghatate v. Baliram Narayan, AIR 1938 Nag 502 | Held appeals against execution orders are not proceedings in execution; Rule 12 does not apply. | Referenced to support the Court's conclusion on Rule 12. |
| Ajudhia Pershad v. Sham Sunder, AIR 1947 Lah 13 | Same view: Rule 12 not applicable to appeals against execution orders. | Counted among the decisions that the Court relied on in resolving the Rule 12 issue. |
| Baksh Ali v. Sarat Chandra, AIR 1919 Cal 1053 | Calcutta High Court took view that Rule 12 does not apply to appeals against execution orders. | Included with the other High Court authorities supporting non-applicability of Rule 12 to appeals. |
| Hakeem Syed v. Fateh Bahadur Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 565 | Contrasting authority: Patna High Court took a different view on the applicability issue. | Noted by the Court as part of the conflict of opinion on Rule 12's scope. |
| Kadial Marappa v. Jai Narayan, 24 DLR 644 (Hyderabad) | Hyderabad High Court earlier took a view similar to the other High Courts (non-applicability). | Cited as a supporting local decision for the non-applicability position. |
| Venkatachalam Chetti v. Ramaswamy Servai, AIR 1932 Mad 73 (Full Bench) | Full Bench decision relied upon by appellant; contained an observation quoted by counsel. | The Court held the Full Bench did not decide that Rule 12 applies to appeals and any such observation was obiter; thus it did not support the appellant's contention. |
| Wana Ravji v. Natu Murha, ILR 35 Bom 35 | Held that payment into Court is valid compliance with a decree even if the decree directed payment to the decree-holder (Order 21, R.1). | Applied by the Court to hold that deposit of the decretal amount into Court on 2 Sept 1952 was a valid performance of the decree. |
| Sankaran Unni v. Raman, AIR 1925 Mad 743 | Held that payment made on the next reopening day after holidays (with intent and readiness to pay) is a valid payment; payment into Court is acceptable. | Relied upon as supporting the view that payment into Court on reopening day was valid compliance. |
| Chinna Nadar v. V. Arumugham Chetty, AIR 1927 Mad 1196 | Bench decision following AIR 1925 Mad 743: payment on reopening day is good payment; no distinction between compromise and other decrees for this point. | The Court stated it is bound by this Bench decision and relied on it in upholding the validity of the respondents' deposit into Court. |
| Kunj Behari Singh v. Bindeshri Prasad Singh, AIR 1929 All 207 | Held in its facts that payment into Court was not valid (in a compromise decree context involving instalments and default); cited as a direct authority adverse to payment-into-Court argument. | Noted as a direct authority on the point against payment into Court, but the Court expressed doubt about its correctness in light of Order 21, R.1 and observed it was bound by the Madras Bench decision instead. |
| Balakrishna Ayyar v. Parvathammal, AIR 1928 Mad 154; Bhagwat Narain Singh v. Srinivas, AIR 1937 Pat 113; Ram Kinkar Singh v. Kamal Basini Devi, AIR 1938 Pat 451; Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1935 PC 85 | Cited by appellant for the proposition that non-compliance (late payment/no draft) defeats execution. | The Court observed these were not directly on point (and thus did not change its conclusion that deposit into Court and reliance on an existing draft were sufficient). |
| Hamidgani v. Ammasahib, AIR 1941 Mad 898 | Held that a legal representative who comes into Court in execution proceedings cannot question the decree; if he claims an interest in the decree property his rights may be unaffected if he was not a party. | The Court held that this case did not assist the appellant; Section 50 CPC governs liability of legal representatives and permits execution against them to the extent property of the deceased has come to their hands. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a structured fashion addressing (A) the preliminary Rule 12 / abatement issue, (B) condonation of delay for bringing a legal representative on record, and (C) the merits of compliance with the decree and enforceability against a legal representative.
A. Applicability of Rule 12, Order 22 to Appeals
The Court began by noting the text of Order 22, Rule 12: "nothing in rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order." It observed that if proceedings are in execution, the abatement provisions (Rules 3, 4 and 8) would not apply. However, there is a conflict of opinion among High Courts whether an appeal against an order in execution is itself a "proceeding in execution" so as to attract Rule 12. After surveying several High Court decisions taking the view that Rule 12 does not apply to appeals (Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, Nagpur, Lahore, Calcutta) and a few contrary authorities (Patna, earlier Hyderabad view), the Court considered a Full Bench decision cited by the appellant (Venkatachalam Chetti v. Ramaswamy Servai) and concluded that it did not hold that Rule 12 applies to appeals; any language to that effect would be obiter. The Court therefore resolved that Rule 12 of Order 22 does not apply to appeals arising against orders made in execution proceedings. The appellant's contention on this point was therefore rejected.
B. Condonation of Delay to Bring Legal Representative on Record
The legal-representation petition (S.R.16590 of 1959) alleged the appellant had been seriously ill and confined to bed for seven months. The petition was filed on 15 April 1959, whereas Respondent No.3 died on 24 March 1958 — a delay of 387 days. The Court refused the appellant's request for an opportunity to produce evidence of illness, noting that the death of the respondent had been brought to the appellant's notice in the executing Court (10-12-1958) and a counter was filed then; no sufficient explanation was offered for not moving earlier to file the legal-representation petition after that date. On that basis the Court dismissed the application to bring the legal representative on record.
C. Merits — Compliance with the Decree
The appellant's core merits contention was that the decretal amount was not paid within two months and no draft of the sale deed was presented, so there was non-compliance. The Court analysed the terms of the decree and Order 21, Rule 1 CPC which provides the modes of paying money under a decree (including payment into Court). The Court held that payment into Court is a valid method of performance even where the decree directs payment to the decree-holder. Given the holidays, the respondents deposited the balance into Court on 2 September 1952 and the Court held that this was a valid payment and sufficient compliance with the decree. The Court relied on ILR 35 Bom 35 (Wana Ravji v. Natu Murha) and Madras decisions (Sankaran Unni v. Raman; Chinna Nadar v. V. Arumugham Chetty) to support the proposition that payment into Court on reopening after holidays is valid. The Court acknowledged an adverse authority (AIR 1929 All 207) that held payment into Court was not valid in its particular compromise-decree facts, but expressed doubt about that ruling's compatibility with Order 21, R.1 and said it was bound by the Madras Bench decision.
As to the absence of a fresh draft when the money was deposited, the Court noted that a draft sale deed (Exhibit 7) was already on record as produced during trial; consequently it was unnecessary for the respondents to file another draft and reliance on the draft already on record constituted sufficient compliance with the decree's requirement.
D. Enforcement Against Legal Representative and Possession
The appellant argued enforcement could not proceed against her husband because there was no proof he was in possession. The Court referred to Section 50 CPC which permits execution of a decree against the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor and limits the representative's liability to the property of the deceased which came to his hands and was not duly disposed of. On that basis the Court rejected the appellant's contention and held that Section 50 CPC governs liability and execution against legal representatives.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Direct effects of the decision on the parties:
- The appeal by the judgment-debtor (Chandravati Bai) was dismissed with costs.
- The legal-representation petition to bring the representative of the deceased respondent on record was dismissed for want of sufficient explanation for the delay.
- The Court held that (a) payment of the decretal amount into Court on 2 September 1952 was a valid payment and sufficient compliance with the decree under Order 21, Rule 1 CPC and (b) reliance on an existing draft sale deed on record (Ex.7) was sufficient compliance with the decree's requirement to present a draft.
- The Court confirmed that a decree may be executed against the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor under Section 50 CPC, subject to the limitations stated in that provision.
Broader legal determinations expressed by the Court (as articulated in the opinion):
- The Court concluded that Rule 12 of Order 22 does not apply to appeals arising against orders made in execution proceedings (i.e., such appeals are not "proceedings in execution" for the purpose of making Rules 3, 4 and 8 inapplicable).
- The Court reaffirmed the principle (following Bench and High Court authorities) that payment into Court, including on the reopening day after holidays, can constitute valid performance of a decree where Order 21, Rule 1 CPC allows payment into Court as a mode of payment.
Judgement
MANOHAR PERSHAD, J.: -
This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal on behalf of the judgment-duebtor arises out of execution proceedings started by the decree-holders herein.
2. The facts which give rise to this appeal are: Chaganlal, Prahlad Rai and Nanu Ram as plaintiffs brought a suit for specific performance against Chandravati Bai, the appellant in the Original Side of the High Court of Hyderabad and obtained a decree, which is in the following terms:
"The defendant execute the sale deed within two months of the date of this judgment on the plaintiffs paying the balance of the price i.e., Rs.15,500/-. If the plaintiffs were to fail in presenting the sale deed to the defendant for execution and registration with the balance only of the price money, this suit shall stand dismissed. On the other hand, if the defendant were to fail to execute and register the sale deed on its presentation together with the balance of the price money, this Court will execute and register the sale deed and arrange for delivery of its possession to the plaintiff."
This decree was passed on 1-7-1952; but before the passing of the decree, Chaganlal, having died, his son Mangilal was brought on record as his legal representative. As per the decree, the balance amount was deposited by Mangilal, Prahlad Rai and Nanu Ram in Court on 2nd September, 1952, as 3lst August and 1st September 1952 happened to be holidays, and the decree-holder prayed for the execution of the decree. The judgment-debtor objected to the execution of the decree on two grounds. The first was that as the amount ordered under the decree was not tendered to the defendant within the period of two months, that cannot be deemed to be sufficient compliance with the order passed and therefore the suit was liable to be dismissed and the plaintiffs shall have no decree in their favour to stand upon.
The second ground urged was that inasmuch as a draft of the sale deed was not filed along with the money, there was not sufficient compliance with the order of the Court and that being a condition precedent, the suit would be liable to be dismissed on this account also. Both these contentions were rejected by the executing Court. Aggrieved by the order of the executing Court, Chandravati Bai had come up in appeal. During the course of the appeal, she died. Her husband has been brought on record as her legal representative.
3 A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the respondents that in as much as Nanu Ram has died and the legal representation petition filed by the appellant not having been filed within the prescribed period, the appeal will not abate against him alone but in toto, having regard to the nature of the decree. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that as Rules 3, 4 and 8 of Order 22 do not apply to proceedings in execution of the decree or order as provided in Rule 12 of Order 22, the question of bringing the legal representative on record within the prescribed period and the appeal having abated does not arise.
It is further urged that even if it is held that Rule 12 of Order 22 is not applicable to appeals, the delay in filing the application to bring the legal representative on record be condoned, as the appellant was seriously ill for seven months and was confined to bed. On behalf of the respondents it is contended that in the execution proceedings, the fact of the death of Nanu Ram was brought to the notice of the appellant on 10-12-1958 and the appellant had filed a counter and as no explanation has been given why after 10-12-1958 at least steps were not taken to file the legal representation petition here in this Court, the delay could not be condoned.
4. In so far as the first contention is concerned, it may be pointed out that it is an appeal before us arising out of execution proceedings and not an execution petition. What is provided under Order 22, Rule 12 is "nothing in rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order." It follows therefore that if the proceedings are in execution, the provisions relating to abatement contained in rules 3, 4 and 8 would not apply.
There is conflict of opinion as to the applicability of this rule to appeals against orders in execution. The Bombay High Court in Trimbak v. Gopal, AIR 1947 Bom 480, the Madras High Court in Rajah of Kalahasti v. Jagannadha Rayanimgar, AIR 1932 Mad 574, the Allahabad High Court in Chaganmal v. Chaubey Ramdulare Lal, AIR 1933 All 388, the Nagpur High Court in Madhao Rao Ghatate v. Baliram Narayan, AIR 1938 Nag 502 and the Lahore High Court in Ajudhia Pershad v. Sham Sunder, AIR 1947 Lah 13 have held that an appeal against an order made in execution proceedings is not itself a proceeding in execution of a decree or order and Rule 12, Order 22 does not apply to appeals against orders made in execution proceedings and such appeals are subject to the same rules in regard to abatement as any other appeals and in such an appeal, therefore, if no application is made for bringing the legal representative of a deceased party on record within the period prescribed, the appeal would abate like other appeals. The Calcutta High Court also in the case of Baksh Ali v. Sarat Chandra, AIR 1919 Cal 1053 has taken a similar view. The High Court of Patna on the other hand has in the case of Hakeem Syed v. Fateh Bahadur Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 565 taken a different view. The then Hyderabad High Court in Kadial Marappa v. Jai Narayan 24 DLR 644 had also taken a view similar to the other High Courts. The learned counsel for the appellant relying on a Full Bench decision in Venkatachalam Chetti v. Ramaswamy Servai, AIR 1932 Mad 73 contended that the Full Bench has held that Rule 12 of Order 22 applies also to appeals. We cannot agree with the contention of the learned Counsel. It is nowhere held in this decision that Rule 12 of Order 22 applies to appeals against orders made in execution proceedings.
5. The learned counsel drew our attention to the following observation by their Lordships:
"It follows from these decisions that in appeals also the same view of R.12, O.22 was accepted, as in the case of execution petitions."and contended that their Lordships have held that Rule 12, Order 22 was applicable to appeals also. No doubt, there is this observation but it is not the finding of the Full Bench and as a matter of fact, the Full Bench could not give that finding because the matter was not in appeal before them and even if this observation is taken as a finding, it would, in our opinion amount to obiter. We are, therefore, definite that Rule 12 of Order 22 does not apply to appeals arising against orders made in execution. This contention therefore fails.
6. The next question is whether sufficient reason has been shown to condone the delay in filing the legal representation petition The reason given in paragraph 1 of the petition S.R.16590 of 1959 is that the appellant was seriously ill for the last seven months and was confined to sick bed. This application was filed on 15th April 1959. Respondent No.3 died on 24th March, 1958. It follows, therefore, that this petition to bring the legal representative of respondent No.3 was filed after 387 days. The appellant argues that he may be given an opportunity to produce evidence, to prove that he was ill for seven months. We are not inclined to accept this request, far from the counter filed by the other side, it appears that the fact of death of the respondent was brought to the notice of the appellant in the executing Court and he had actually filed a counter on 10-12-1958 and no explanation has been given as to why steps were not taken at least after 10-12-1958 to file a legal representation petition.
7. In the result, this legal representation petition would stand dismissed.
8. The next question that arises is what is the effect of the dismissal of the legal representation petition, whether the appeal would abate in toto or to the extent of respondent 3 alone. We do not wish to go into the discussion as to whether the appeal abates in toto or only to the extent of respondent 3 having regard to the view that we have taken as regards the merits of the appeal.
9. On the merits of the appeal, it is urged. that the lower Court has erred in holding that the decree-holder has complied with the provisions of the decree, when as a matter of fact, he urges that the amount ordered to be paid under the decree was not paid in time and draft of the sale deed was not actually presented and that, therefore, it cannot be said that there was sufficient compliance with the terms of the decree. The learned counsel placed his reliance on Balakrishna Ayyar v. Parvathammal, AIR 1928 Mad 154, Kunj Behari Singh v. Bindeshri Prasad Singh, AIR 1929 All 207, Bhagwat Narain Singh v. Srinivas, AIR 1937 Pat 113 Ram Kinkar Singh v. Kamal Basini Devi AIR 1938 Pat 451 and Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1935 PC 85.
This argument is equally devoid of force. The decree, as seated earlier was passed on 1-7-52. The decree provided that the appellant should execute the sale deed within two months of the decree on the respondents paying the balance of Rs.15,500/- and filing a draft of the sale deed. The respondents deposited the amount on 2nd September, 1952 as 31st August 1952 and 1st September 1952 happened to be holidays. No draft of the sale deed was presented, but their contention was that as such a draft had already been produced before the Court during the trial and also exhibited, there was no question of filing any fresh draft.
Question arises whether by the deposit of the amount in Court and by the draft sale deed being already on record, there was sufficient compliance with the terms, of the decree. The lower Court has held that that was sufficient compliance. We agree with the view of the court below. The decree did not provide that the amount he paid to the defendant. Rule 1 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides the modes of paying money under decree reads:
"All moneys payable under a decree shall be paid as fallows: (a) into Court; (b) out of Court to the decree-holder or (c) otherwise as the Court which made the decree directs.
The law envisages payment into Court as a valid compliance with decree, even though the decree directs payment to the decree-holder. The respondents, in our opinion, had the option of paying to the defendant or paying into Court and they chose the latter method and as the Court was closed on 31st August and 1st September, 1952 they paid the amount into Court on the 2nd September. This payment, in our opinion, is a good payment and a valid performance of what the decree requires.
Identical question had arisen in the Bombay High Court in Wana Ravji v. Natu Murha, ILR 35 Bom 35. In that case, the decree provided as follows:
The plaintiff should pay by the 10th day of April, 1909, to the defendant Rs.100/-. If the moneys are not paid by the plaintiffs as agreed upon, the property in dispute will remain with the defendants by right of ownership and the plaintiff will have no right of ownership over the same."
The plaintiff in that case paid the amount on 14th April 1909. A question arose whether the payment so made was within the terms of the decree. It was held by Chandavarkar and Heaton, JJ, that the payment was properly made, for Order 21, R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, intended to enact and did enact that payment into Court was a valid compliance with the decree even though the decree directed payment to the decree-holder. In the instant case also a decree was passed in similar terms as those in the Bombay case referred to above.
Similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in Sankaran Unni v. Raman, AIR 1925 Mad 743. This was a case in which the plaintiff obtained a compromise decree, by which if money was paid within the 30th Meenon 1907 (12th April 1922), the sum of Rs.285/- was to be taken in full satisfaction of the claim. The decree provided that in default of such payment the defendants were to pay the plaintiff the whole of the plaint amount with costs. The defendants put in an application to the lower Court to have satisfaction entered of the decree, on the ground that he tendered the amount to the plaintiff on 12th April, 1922, but as the plaintiff did not receive that amount, he sent it by money order to the plaintiff, which again was refused and he therefore had the money ready with him to be deposited in Court and to give a challan to make that deposit. That was on the reopening day of the Court after the mid-summer holidays, on the 12th June, 1922.
On an objection being taken whether that was valid payment, it was held relying on ILR 35 Bom 35 that it was a valid payment.
Another Bench of the Madras High Court in Chinna Nadar v. V. Arumugham Chetty, AIR 1927 Mad 1196 following the decision reported in AIR 1925 Mad 743 has held that where a judgment-debtor agrees to pay the decretal amount on a certain date but the Court is closed on that date, a payment made on the next reopening day is a good payment and that there is no distinction in this respect between a compromise decree and another decree. This also being a Bench decision this Court is bound by it.
10. AIR 1928 Mad 154 was a case where the question of extension of time under Sec.148 Cr. P.C. was order is passed allowing an application upon certain terms and providing that within the time allowed those terms are not complies with, the application shall automatically and without further interposition by the Court, stand dismissed. No, further order of Court is necessary to effect dismissal of the application. In the instance case, there is no question of any extension of time. This ruling, therefore, in our opinion is not applicable to the facts of the case.
After the Bench decision in AIR 1927 Mad 1196 we do not feel it necessary to go into a detailed discussion of the other authorities cited by the learned counsel. Of the authorities cited, except AIR 1929 All 207 which is a direct authority on this point, the other Cases are not direct to the point in question. In AIR 1929 All 207 Sulaiman and Kendall, JJ. no doubt held that payment into Court was not a valid payment, in that case, under a compromise decree the amount due was to be paid in instalments the whole amount was to become due. On the date of the payment of first instalment the Court was closed and a tender was filed when the Court reopened. It was held that there was a default in the payment of the first instalment as the defendants who had the option to make the payment direct to the decree-holder or to deposit the amount in Court, could not take advantage of circumstance that the Court was closed on the date of payment. We feel a doubt as to whether in the face of the provisions of Order 21, R.1 C.P.C. it could be said that the decree-holder could not exercise his option of paying the amount into Court, but it is not necessary to discuss the case as we have already stated we are bound by the Bench decision reported in AIR 1927 Mad 1196
11. From the above discussion, it would appear that payment into Court by the respondents was a valid payment and that it was sufficient compliance with the provisions of the decree.
12. Now, the other question that remains to be considered is whether failure to present the draft of the sale deed amounted to non-compliance with the terms of the decree. It is no doubt true that the respondents did not file a draft of the sale deed as provided by the decree, but it was contended by them that it was unnecessary as there was already a draft copy, Ex.7 on record. When the draft copy of the sale deed was already on record, we also feel that it was unnecessary for the respondents to have further filed a copy. They could rely on the draft copy and that, in our opinion, was sufficient compliance with the term of the decree.
13. Yet, another argument was advanced before us that inasmuch as the judgment-debtor has died and there is no proof on record to show that her husband who has been brought on record is in possession of the property, the decree passed in favour of the respondents for specific performance could not be enforced against him in this connection, the learned counsel relied on Hamidgani v. Ammasahib, AIR 1941 Mad 898. We do not find any substance in this argument. We may, in this connection, refer to Section 50 C.P.C. which provided:-
"(1) Where a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased.
(2) Whether the decree is executed against such legal representative, he shall be liable only to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to his hands and has not been duly disposed of; and for the purpose of ascertaining such liability; the Court executing the decree may, of its own motion or on the application of the decree-holder, compel such legal representatative to produce such accounts as it thinks fit.
14. In view of the above provision, the contention of the learned Counsel fails. The case of AIR 1941 Mad 898 does not help the contention of the learned Counsel. In that case, it was held that when a person comes into Court in execution proceedings as the legal representative of a deceased party, he cannot question the decree which has been passed. If the decree concerns property in which he claims an interest, the decree will hot be binding upon him unless he was a party to the suit. If he was not a party to the suit or had been dismissed from the suit his rights will be entirely unaffected and he will be in a position to enforce them in a suit instituted by him for that purpose.
15. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed
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