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Guntupalli Venkatasu... v. Guntupalli Tirapatha...
Structured Summary of the Opinion: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal (O.P. No. 1 of 1949)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges an order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Narasaraopet, dismissing O. P. No. 1 of 1949, which was an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis against respondents 32 to 36 on the ground that the petitioner allegedly had no cause of action against them.
The O.P. sought to set aside certain alienations made by the petitioner's father of joint family properties and for partition of the scheduled properties. The petition alleged that some alienations were unsupported by consideration and were made for purposes not binding on the family.
Specific factual particulars in the petition included: items 7, 8, 11–14, 16–18, 21 and 26 were alienated after the petitioner’s birth; items 22–25 were sold on 4-6-1928 and 3-7-1928 (i.e., before the petitioner's birth). The petition also alleged that the father had another son born in October 1928 who died in March 1930, and the petition relied on that fact to challenge the binding nature of those alienations.
The Subordinate Judge conducted an inquiry and concluded that it was not established that the father had such a son born and dead between October 1928 and March 1930. Accordingly, the Subordinate Judge held the petitioner lacked a cause of action in respect of items 22–25, although he found the petitioner to be a pauper and that the petitioner had a cause of action in respect of other items. The present appeal is against that portion of the order dismissing the petition as regards respondents 32–36 claiming items 22–25.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether under Order 33, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code (as amended by the Madras High Court), the Court has power to undertake an elaborate enquiry on evidence and decide, as it would in a full suit, whether the petitioner has a subsisting cause of action.
- Whether Madras Order 33, Rules 5(d) and 5(d-1) read with Madras R.6 permit the Court to receive evidence and decide on questions such as whether a suit is barred by law (e.g., limitation or res judicata) or whether allegations disclose a cause of action, beyond the face of the petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- The learned counsel for the respondents argued that clauses (d) and (d-1) of Madras R.5 read together with Madras R.6 require the Court, if evidence is adduced, to decide whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and whether the suit is barred by any law (for example, limitation or res judicata), i.e., that the Court may determine such issues on evidence at the R.6 inquiry stage.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the petitioner's specific legal arguments in adversarial form beyond the allegations in the petition and the procedural posture described.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vijendra Tirhta Swami v. Sudhindra, 19 Mad 197 | Interpreting the old S.405 CPC wording ("allegations do not show a right to sue") as wide enough to allow Courts to decide whether the application showed a subsisting cause of action enforceable in Court. | Used to show historical interpretation of the older provision was broad enough to consider cause-of-action questions; cited in the context of explaining how R.5(d) replaced the old clause and adopted that interpretation. |
| Amirtham v. Alwar Manikam, 27 Mad 37 | Similarly supports the view that the old provision permitted Courts to decide whether an application disclosed a subsisting cause of action not barred by limitation or other law. | Quoted to demonstrate earlier case law recognizing that the clause in the old code gave power to inquire into cause-of-action questions arising on the face of the petition. |
| Kamani Devi v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1946 Pat 316 | Authority for the proposition that Courts should not embark on an elaborate enquiry and decide complicated questions of law and fact at the pauper-permission stage. | Relied on to support the narrower construction of Madras R.6 — that Courts must not conduct full trial-level inquiries at the leave-to-sue-as-pauper stage. |
| U Ba Dwe v. Mg. Lu Pan, AIR 1932 Rang 107 (FB) | Held that Courts should avoid detailed factual and legal enquiries when deciding whether a pauper application discloses a cause of action. | Invoked alongside Kamani Devi to establish judicial reluctance to allow full-scale enquiries under the pauper rules. |
| Mythili Ammal v. Mahadeva Ayyar, AIR 1948 Mad 433 | Held that the Madras-amended rule gave a right to parties to adduce evidence to establish whether the suit was barred by res judicata or limitation, i.e., supported a broader hearing under R.6. | The present Court expressly disagreed with and rejected the view expressed in this decision, stating an inability to accept its view. |
| Ponnuswamy Goundan v. Alamel Ammal, AIR 1949 Mad 591 | Applied by the same learned judge (in Mythili Ammal context) to support admission of evidence showing a suit was barred by limitation. | Noted as part of the line of authority the Court declined to follow; the present Court refused to accept that these cases justified a full evidence-based trial at the R.6 stage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the central procedural provisions at issue: Madras Order 33, Rule 5 (which lists grounds on which an application for permission to sue as a pauper shall be rejected) and Madras R.6 (which prescribes that where the Court does not see reason to reject an application under R.5 it shall fix a day for receiving evidence to prove the application is not subject to any of the prohibitions in R.5 and hear any evidence to the contrary).
The Court traced the history of the rule back to Section 405 of the old Civil Procedure Code (in which the language referenced whether "allegations do not show a right to sue in such Court") and noted earlier decisions that interpreted the old language broadly to allow consideration of whether an application showed a subsisting cause of action enforceable in Court.
However, the Court emphasised that the Madras High Court amendments to O.33 R.5 and R.6 were intended to cure defects and to make clear the scope of the inquiry. The Court read R.5(d) (that the allegations do not show a cause of action) and the newly added R.5(d-1) (where the suit appears to be barred by any law) in light of the amended R.6 and concluded:
- Madras R.6 expressly gives the petitioner the right to be heard before the petition is rejected under R.5 and allows the petitioner to adduce evidence to show the petition is not vitiated by any of the prohibitions in R.5.
- That right to adduce evidence (and the respondent's right to adduce rebutting evidence) is to be confined to matters in respect of which evidence is necessary to establish whether a particular prohibition in R.5 applies (for example, whether the applicant is a pauper, whether property was disposed fraudulently within two months before the application, or whether there was an agreement affecting the subject-matter).
- Where R.5(d) speaks of whether the "allegations do not show a cause of action," the Court explained that this is a question of the sufficiency of the allegations on their face. If the allegations as pleaded disclose a cause of action, no further evidence is required or admissible at the R.6 stage to establish the existence of that cause of action — the inquiry is limited to the petition's averments.
- Similarly, R.5(d-1)’s reference to a suit that "appears" to be barred by any law confines the inquiry to whether, on the face of the petition, the suit appears to be barred — i.e., an outward, manifest view from the pleadings. The Court analysed the dictionary meaning of "appear" to underline that the inquiry is into outward look of the allegations, not a full evidentiary determination on the merits.
The Court rejected the construction urged by respondent counsel (and adopted in decisions such as Mythili Ammal and Ponnuswamy Goundan) that Madras R.6 authorises a full evidence-based trial on substantive questions like limitation or res judicata at the leave-to-sue-as-pauper stage. The Court reasoned that such a construction would collapse the distinction between a pauper petition and a suit, produce duplicative trials (one at the pauper stage and another if the suit is later numbered), enable a trial without payment of court-fees, and waste Court time — outcomes inconsistent with the purpose of Order 33.
Applying this construction to the facts of the present appeal, the Court held that the petition's allegations did disclose a cause of action in respect of items 22–25. The petition stated that the alienations of those items were made by the father during the lifetime of the first son and gave necessary particulars in support of the contention that the alienations were for purposes not binding on the petitioner. Because the lower Court had already found the petitioner to be a pauper and had held generally that the allegations disclosed a cause of action, the appellate Court concluded the petitioner was entitled to leave to sue in forma pauperis.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed and the petitioner is entitled to leave to sue in forma pauperis; the appeal is allowed with costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner is granted leave to sue in forma pauperis; the portion of the Subordinate Judge's order denying leave in respect of items 22–25 (on the ground of absence of cause of action) was set aside.
- Interpretative consequence: The Court clarified that Madras Order 33 Rule 6 only affords an opportunity to adduce evidence in relation to the specific prohibitions set out in R.5 for which evidence is necessary (e.g., pauperism, fraudulent disposition within two months, agreement affecting subject-matter). It does not permit the Court to undertake a full trial-like, evidence-based inquiry into whether the allegations of the petition themselves disclose a subsisting cause of action or whether the suit is barred in fact by limitation or other law beyond what "appears" on the face of the petition.
- No procedural or substantive change beyond this interpretation was made by the Court; the ruling confines the R.6 inquiry to the outward sufficiency of the petition's allegations and evidentiary questions necessary to test the specific prohibitions in R.5.
End of summary — all information above is extracted from and limited to the contents of the provided opinion.
(1) This is Civil Miscellaneous Appeal against the order of the learned subordinate Judge, Narasaraopet, dismissing O. P. No. 1 of 1949, a petitiion filed for leave to sue in forma pauperis against respondents 32 to 36 on the ground that the petitioner has no cause of action against them.
(2) The said O. P. was filed for leave to sue in froma pauperis for setting aside certain alienations made by the petitioner's father, of the joint family properties and for partition of the scheudle properties. In the petition, it is alleged that the alienations were not supported by consideration and were also made for purposes not binding on the family. The petition discloses that item 7, 8, 11 to 14, 16 to 18, 21 and 26 were alienated after the petitioner's birth, but items 22 to 25 were sold on 4-6-1928 and 3-7-1928 i.e., prior to the petitioner's birth. It is alleged in the petition that the father had another son, who was born in October 1928 and died in March 1930 and, therefore, the said alienations also were not binding on the family.
(3) The learned Subordinate Judge made an elaborateenquiry and held that it has not been established that the petitioner's father had another sonwho was born and who died between October 1928 and March 1930 and therefore the petitioner hadno cause of action in respect of items 22 to 25. though he held that the petitioner was a pauer and that he has a caquse of action in respect of other items, he dismissed the petition in so far as respondents 32 to 36 were claiming items 22 to 25. The present appeal is filed against the said order.
(4) The main question in this appeal is whether the Court has power to make an elaborate enquiry under O. 33, R. 6, Civil P. C., and decide the question whether the petitioner has a cause of action as it would do in the suuit. To give a satisfactory answer to this question, it is necessary to trace the history of the rule. The lastest rules as amended by the Madras High Court, which also gover this Court, read as follows:
"R. 5: The Court shall reject an applicatioin for permission to sue as a pauper.
a. Where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rr. 2 and 3, or b. Where the applicant is not a pauper, or c. Where he has, within two months next before the presentation of the application disposed of any property fradulently or in order to be able to apply for permission to sue as a pauper, or d. Where the allegations do not show a cause of action, or (d-1) Where the suit apears to be barred by any law, or e. Where he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject-matter of the proposed suit under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subject-matter.
R. 6. Where the Court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the grounds stated in R. 5, it shall nevertheless fix a day (of which at least ten days' clear notice shall be given to the opposite party and to the Government Pleader) for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce to prove that the applicatioin is not subject to any of the prohibitions in R. 5 and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced to the contrary".
(5) The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that cls. (d) and (d-1) of R. 5 read along with R. 6 as amended by the Madras High Court, make it incumbent upon the Court if evidence is adduced, to decide whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and whether the suit is barred by any law. Section 405, Civil P. C., 1882, corresponds to O.33, R. 5. In S. 405 of the old Act, the words used were "that his allegations do not show a right to sue in such Court". When it was contended that the words referred only to the question of jurisdiction, Courts haveheld that the words were wide enought to enable Courts to decide whether an application showed a subsisting cause of action capable of enforcement in Court and calling for an answer and not barred by the law of limitation of any other law. See -- 'Vijendra Tirhta Swami v. Sudhindra', 19 Mad 197 (A) and 'Amirtham v. Alwar Manikam', 27 Mad 37 (B).
Order 33, R. 5 (d) was substituted for the old clause adopting the interpretation put upon the corresponding words in the old Code. The amendeed clause again came under Judicial Scrutiny and Courts have invariably held that Courts should not embark on an elaborate enquiry and decide complicated questions of law and fact to ascertain whether the petition disclose a cause of action or not, See -- 'Kamani Devi v. Kameshwar Singh', AIR 1946 Pat 316 (C), and 'U Ba Dwe v. Mg. Lu Pan', AIR 1932 Rang 107 (FB) (D). If the Court did not reject the application for permission to sue as a pauper for any one of the prohibitions mentioned in R. 5, under R. 6 a duty is cast on the Court to fix a day for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof.
A combined reading of R. 5 and 6 indicates that the Court is not bound to give any opportunity to the petitioner to establish that the petition is not vitiated by any of the prohibitions mentioned in R. 5 and that his right is confined only to adduce evidence in proof of his pauperism. So too, if the Court does not see any ground for rejecting an application under R. 5, the respondent has no right under R. 6, to establish that the petition is liable to be dismissed for any one of the reasons mentioned in R. 5.
(6) The Madras High court amended R. 5 and framed a new rule in substitution of R. 6 to cure two defects. To R. 5 (d) the following caluse (d-1) is added where the suit appears tobe barred by any law". Even before the amendment, Courts have held that under R. 5 (d), the petition should disclose a cause of action capable of enforcement in a Court of justice. Clause (d-1) is only a recognition of the pre-existing case law on the subject. Clauses (d) and (d-1) only indicate what has been the law all along viz., that a Court shall decide whether the petition discloses a subsisting cause of action. Madras R. 6, in express terms, casts a duty on a Court to give an opportunity to the petitioner to establish that the petition is not vitiated by any of the prohibitions mentioned in R. 5. It also gives an opportunity to the respondent to adduce rebutting evidence.
This rule, therefore, in terms gives a right to the petitioner to be heard before his petition is rejected under R. 5. But the enquiry contemplated by the amended rule is only in respect of the prohibitions in R. 5. It does not enlarge of add to the said probibitions. The right to adduce and give rebutting evidence must, therefore, be confined to the prohibitions in R. 5. To illustrate, where it is stated that a petitioner is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rr. 2 and 3, it is open to the petitioner to prove that the petition is so framed and for the respondent to establish that it has not been framed in compliance with those rules. Where a question arises whether the petitioin disposed of property fradulently two months next before the presentation of the application, evidence can be adduced by both parties on the said question.
So too, when the questions is whether the applicant is a pauper or not, R. 6 allows that question to be decided on evidence. When the question is whether there was an agreement with reference to the subject-matter of the proposed suit, the rule enables the parties to establish that fact one way or other. But where the question is whether the allegations in the petition do not show a cause of action, obviously under Madras r. 6, no evidence can be adduced, for the prohibition in R. 5 is not that the petitioner has no cause of actioin, but whether the allegations do not show a cause of action. If the allegations disclose a cause of action no further evidence, would be admissible.
(7) So too, in the case of r. 5 (d-1) the evidence would be confined only to the question whether the suit appears to be barred by any law and not to the question whether the suit is barred by any law. The word 'appears' therefore has been designedly used to confine the scope of the enquiry only to the allegations in the petition. The Dictionary meaning of the word 'appear' is 'manifest' or 'seen'. The meaning of the word 'appearance' is 'outward look'. If it appears on the allegatioins in the petition that the suit is barred by any law, it will be rejected. The enquiry under R 6 must, therefore, be confined to the question whether on the allegations in the petition, the suit is barred by any law.
This interpretation is not inconsistent with the express provisions of Madras R. 6. If the evidence contemplated under R. 6 is intended to prove that the application is not subject to any of the prohibitions in r. 5, it can only only mean those prohibitions in respect of which evidence is necessary to establish that a partifular prohibition does not affect the petition. So read, Madras R. 6 gives full effect to the intention of the framers, for, as aforesaid, the prupose of the rule is only to give an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence only on the prohibitions mentioned in R. 5.
(8) If, on the other hand, the construction now sought to be put upon Madras R. 6 by thelearned Counsel for the respondents is accepted, the distinction between a pauper petition and a suit disappears. Order 33 has been enacted to serve a treble purpose (1) to protect the bonafide claims of a pauper (2) to safeguard the interests of remove and (3) to protect the defendant's right not to be harassed. By enabling the Court to prevent persons with property from suing as paupers or third parties who acquire an interest in the calims of paupers from using the names of paupers and to dismiss petitions which do not 'ex facie' disclose a subsisting cause of action, the interests of bona fide paupers are safeguarded and defendants are protected from unnecessary harassment.
The procedure prescribed also protects revenue, for on eqnuiry if it is found that the petitioner is not a pauper, he will have to pay court-fees. On the other hand, if a Court shouldmake an enquiry and decide on the evidence, even before the suit is numbered, whether the petitioner has a subsisting cause of action, the entire suit should be heard before leave is granted. The words 'subsisting causes of action" will comprehend the entire dispute between the parties; the questions whether the plaintiff has a right to the relief claimed, whether the defendant has infringed that right and whether the suit claim is barred by limitation by 'res judicata' or any other statutory law would have to be decided on the evidence.
If the petition was dismissed on such an enquiry the petitioner would have got a trial without payment of court-fee. If the petition was allowed on such an enquiry the same questions should be decided again if the suit was numbered. There would be two trials on the same evidence and perhaps two conflicting decisions and the Court's time would unnecessarily be watned. This could not have been the intention of the framers of Madras R. 6 and we cannot attribute that intention to them.
(9) The learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of Satyanarayana Rao J., in -- 'Mythili ammal v. Mahadeva Ayyar', AIR1948 Mad 433 (E), in support of his contention. There, the Subordinate judge of Cuddalore, refused to allow evidence on the question whether the suit was barred by limitation. The learned Judge held that the rule as amended by the Madras High Court gave a right to the parties to adduce evidence to establish whether the suit was barred by 'res judicata' or by limitation. The same learned Judge followed the earlier decision in -- 'Ponnuswamy goundan v. Alamel Ammal', AIR 1949 Mad 591 (F), and held that the Court was not justified in shutting out evidence by the opposite party to show that the suit was barred by limitation. We regret our liability to accept the view expressed by the learned judge.
We therefore, hold that Madras R. 6 was intended only to give an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence before the petition is rejected on the ground of one or other of the prohibitions contained in R.5 and it does not enlarge the consent or scope of those prohibitions. In the present case, the allegations in the petition disclose a cause of action. It is clearly stated in the petition that the alienations of items 22 to 25 were made by the father during the lifetime of the first son. Necessary particulars also were given in support of the petitioner's plea that the alienations were made for purposes not binding on the petitioner. As the lower Court held that the petitioner is a pauper and that the allegations in the petition disclose a cause of action, the petitioner is entilted to have leave to sue in forma pauperis.
(10) In the result, the appealis allowed with costs.
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