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Alapati Sivaramakrishnayya v. Alapati Kasiviswanatham And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Mar 13, 1956
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a judgment by Satyanarayana Rao, J., of the Madras High Court, which confirmed a decree by the Subordinate Judge of Tenali in favour of the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 42 of 1947. The appellant, who was the 1st defendant in the original suit, challenges this decision. The dispute concerns ownership and possession of certain land. The 1st plaintiff claimed to have purchased the land from the 1st defendant under a sale deed dated 13-7-1939 pursuant to an agreement dated 10-2-1939. The plaintiffs 2 and 3 were alleged tenants of the 1st plaintiff and had leased the land from him for five years starting in 1946. Disputes arose when the defendants, related to the 1st plaintiff’s wife, allegedly tried to forcibly extract more than Rs. 15,000 from the 1st plaintiff and obstructed the plaintiffs’ possession and cultivation of the land. Petitions under sections 144 and 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code were filed, and the Deputy Magistrate decided possession in favour of the 1st defendant. The crop on the land was auctioned, and proceeds were deposited with the magistrate. The plaintiffs filed suit to set aside the Deputy Magistrate’s order, recover possession, and claim the auction proceeds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the contract of sale and the sale deed of the suit property by the 1st defendant in favour of the 1st plaintiff were sham and nominal and not intended to be given effect to.
  2. Whether the 1st plaintiff and his brother executed the letter dated 15-7-1939 in favour of the 1st defendant.
  3. To what profits prior to the suit are the plaintiffs entitled.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The 1st defendant asserted that the contract of sale and sale deed were executed as a façade to protect his ownership from claims by his brother, with the documents intended merely as evidence of his title.
  • He denied receiving the sums recited as paid under the contract and sale deed and claimed to have remained in possession and paid the land revenue himself.
  • He relied on a letter dated 15-7-1939, allegedly executed by the 1st plaintiff and his brother, acknowledging his title and possession, asserting the plaintiffs 2 to 5 were not necessary parties as they were never in possession.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The 1st plaintiff challenged the authenticity of the letter dated 15-7-1939 as a forgery.
  • He explained that he and his brother had signed a blank paper at the defendant’s request in connection with prior litigation, suspecting that the defendant used this to fabricate the letter.
  • The 1st plaintiff and his brother gave conflicting evidence about the genuineness of the signatures on the letter, with the 1st plaintiff denying and his brother admitting the signatures.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Devidas v. Mamooji (A.I.R. 1924 Nag. 103) Proof of signature is prima facie proof of execution unless circumstances show otherwise; admission of signature on a blank paper is not admission of execution. The court used this precedent to analyze the burden of proof regarding the letter dated 15-7-1939, concluding that mere proof of signature raises an inference of authorship and binding effect unless disproved.
Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi Discussed the conflict in opinions on burden of proof regarding execution and signature; supported that proof of signature can discharge burden of execution. The court respectfully agreed with this view to hold that the burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove the letter was signed on a blank paper and thus not binding.
J.K. Shaka v. Dulah Meah (Rangoon High Court) Where a defendant admits signature on a promissory note but claims it was signed in an incomplete condition, burden is on defendant to prove the note is not what it appears. The court cited this to support that once signature is admitted, the burden shifts to the party denying the document’s validity.
Lakshmamma v. M. Jayearam (Mysore High Court) Where a party alleges signature was affixed on a blank paper to be filled later, that party must prove this fact; otherwise presumption is against him. The court applied this principle to hold the plaintiffs bore the burden to prove the letter was fraudulently created after signing a blank paper.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused primarily on the authenticity and effect of the letter dated 15-7-1939 (ex. B-8), which was pivotal to the case. The 1st plaintiff denied the genuineness of the signatures, while his brother admitted them, creating conflicting evidence. The court noted the improper conduct of the plaintiffs in filing a disingenuous reply statement that neither admitted nor denied the signatures clearly, causing an unusual burden of proof on the defendant.

The court clarified the legal concept of "execution" of a document, distinguishing letters from deeds or wills which require formal execution. It held that proof of a signature on a letter is prima facie proof that the letter’s contents are attributable to the signatory, unless disproved by evidence that the signature was obtained fraudulently or on a blank paper.

Relying on precedents, the court emphasized that the burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove that the signatures on the letter were obtained on a blank sheet and that the letter was fabricated. The court found the plaintiffs failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily.

Consequently, the court accepted the lower courts’ findings that the letter was not proven to be forged and that the plaintiffs’ case was undermined by their own conduct and failure to establish the circumstances of the signatures.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed and the suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed with costs throughout.

The direct effect of this decision is to affirm the defendant’s claim to the disputed land and reject the plaintiffs’ claims based on the purported sale and letter. The opinion does not establish any new precedent but reinforces existing principles on burden of proof regarding signatures and execution of documents in property disputes.

Show all summary ...

Bhimasankaram, J.:-

(1) This is an appeal against the judgment of our learned brother satyanarayana rao, j. , which was pronounced by him as a judge of the madras high court. The appeal has been transferred to this court under section 38 of the andhra state act. By his judgment, the learned judge confirmed the decree of the learned subordinate judge of tenali in favour of the plaintiffs in o. S. No. 42 of 1947 on the file of the latter. The 1st defendant in that suit was the appellant before the learned judge and he is also the appellant before us. There were three plaintiffs in the suit, plaintiffs 2 and 3 being alleged to be the tenants of the 1st plaintiff in respect of the land which is the subject - matter of the dispute between the parties. The 1st plaintiff claimed to have purchased the land from the 1st defendant under a sale deed dated 13 - 7 - 1939 in pursuance of an agreement dated 10th of february that year. The sale deed and the agreement have been marked in the suit as exs. A - 1 and a - 2 respectively. The 1st plaintiff alleged in the plaint that he was put in possession of the land and that till 1946, it "was being cultivated with the help of the cattle and farm - servants belonging to the joint family of himself and his elder brother. " it was further stated therein that "as 1st plaintiff's brother was of late mostly staying at tenali, the plaintiff was obliged to lease out the suit land to plaintiffs 2 and 3 for 5 years" under a registered lease deed dated 10 - 5 - 1946 registered on 9 - 8 - 1946 and marked as ex. A - 10. The plaintiffs 2 and 3 cultivated the suit land, the plaint proceeded to say, that year; but as there were disputes between the 1st plaintiff and his wife and as the 1st defendant who was related to her along with other relations of hers wanted "to extract by force" something more than the sum of rs. 15,000/ - which the 1st plaintiff had settled to pay her by way of maintenance, the defendants invaded the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs, and with a view to carry away the. Crops raised by the plaintiffs 2 and 3 in the suit land, obstructed them in their field operations. Then there was a petition filed by the plaintiffs under section 144 of the criminal procedure code followed by a petition under section 145 of the same code. The deputy magistrate, tenali decided the question of possession in favour of the 1st defendant. The crop on the land, pending those proceedings, was auctioned under orders of the deputy magistrate and the sale proceeds amounting to rs. 1,310/ - were deposited with the magistrate. The suit was, therefore, filed for setting aside the order of the deputy magistrate dated 31 - 5 - 1947 and for recovery of possession of the land as well as the sum of rs, 1,310/ - the profits of the year 1946 so deposited. The defendants 2 to 5 are said to be close relations of the 1st plaintiff's wife. The 1st defendant was the only contesting defendant and his case is best set out in his qwn words as stated in his written statement:

" this defendant owns land adjoining that which previously belonged to his sister - in - law one pavuluri bullamrna. She offered to sell her land to this defendant at a time when the disputes between him and his brother were still left undecided. This defendant feeling apprehensive that in case he were to buy the said property in his name without anything more, his brother might lay claim to a share therein, treating it as a purchase from the joint family funds, took counsel with the 1st plaintiff and his brother, who though not closely related to this defendant, were on the most cordial and intimate terms with one another. This defendant was advised that if he should make it appear as though he raised funds for buying land from the said bullamma by selling his own land, any possible attack by his brother could be easily and effectively met or averted. It was under these circumstances that the contract of sale dated 10 - 2 - 1939 and the sale deed dated 13 - 7 - 1939 came to be executed in favour of the 1st plaintiff. The said documents were merely meant to supply evidence incase of need, of the fact that the property bought from bullamma is this defendant's own not liable to any claim on the part of his borther."

He further alleged that he did not receive the sum of rs. 6,200/ - recited to have been paid under the contract or the other amount recited as having been further paid under the sale deed. He claimed to have himself continued in possession and enjoyment of the property despite ex. A - 1. He further averred that the cist on the land was being paid with his own money though in the name of the 1st plaintiff. He also stated that the 1st plaintiff and his elder brother who is their joint family manager, had passed a letter dated 15 - 7 - 1939 in his favour stating the circumstances under which the sale deed in favour of the 1st plaintiff came to be executed and acknowledging his (the 1st defendant's) title to and possession of the property. He asserted that the defendants 2 to 5 are not necessary parties to tho suit, they not being in possession of the property at any time. The 1st plaintiff filed a reply statement in which he attacked the letter dated 15 - 7 - 1939 stated to have been passed by him and his elder brother as a forgery. He further stated as follows:

" the 1st plaintiff and his brother filed a suit in o. S. No 8 of 1938 on the file of the sub court, tenali against alapati peda venkata krishnayya and others for partition of certain joint properties and outstandings. 1st defendant was a party to that suit, being a co sharer entitled to a share equivalent to that of the 1st plaintiff and his brother. He worked on behalf of the 1st plaintiff and his brother in that litigation. He got three commissioners appointed in the said suit for seizing documents and account books from the residence of the said peda venkata krishnayya and some others."

He then added :

"urgent orders had to be obtained for breaking open the locks of iron safes and a room. This plaintiff and his brother had to remain at the houses of these defendants to prevent the clandestine removal of the documents and books, 1st defendant represented to this plaintiff and his brother that he would get a petition filed, obtain orders from the court if this plaintiff and his brother signed on a blank white paper and gave it to him and that it was necessary for filing the petition. This plaintiff and his brother believed those words and signed on a blank white paper and delivered the paper to the 1st defendant. This plaintiff suspects that the paper might have been used by the 1st defendant to fabricate the letter alleged in paragraph 6 of his written statement. The letter is not therefore valid and binding on the plaintiff."

On these pleadings, the following issues were raised by the trial court: " (1) whether the contract of sale and sale of suit properties by 1st defendant in favour of 1st plaintiff are sham and nominal and were not intended to be given effect to ? (2) whether 1st plaintiff and his brother executed the letter dated 15 - 7 - 1939 in favour of the 1st defendant 1 (3) to what profits prior to suit are plaintiffs entitled ? it will be noticed that as the second issue stands, the onus of proof in the sense of the duty to lead in evidence first, was cast on the 1st defendant. Of course, there is no admission even in the reply statement that the letter dated 15 - 7 - 1939 ex. B - 8 contained the signatures of the 1st plaintiff and his brother. The reply statement was so worded as to enable the 1st plaintiff and his brother later either to deny their signatures therein or to admit them as it suited them. This reluctance to take a definite stand as regards their alleged signatures in ex. B - 8 - and there can be little doubt that the reply statement was filed after an examination of the letter by the 1st plaintiff and his brotherhas not unnaturally, led to a corfflict between the versions in the witness - box of the 1st plaintiff as p. W. 1 and his elder brother as p. W. 2. The 1st plaintiff clearly and definitely denied that the signatures in ex. B - 8 were those of him and his brother while p. W. 2 admitted their genuineness. Both the witnesses, of course, spoke to the entrustment of a blank sheet of paper containing both their signatures to the 1st defendant for ,the purpose of a petition to be filed in connection with o. S. No. 8 of 1938. But, at the time of the arguments, apparently on better thoughts, it was admitted by their counsel that the signatures were those of the 1st plaintiff and p. W. 2 though the learned sub judge states that the admission was made at the time of the trial. It is difficult to appreciate what the learned subordinate judge meant, because, as already stated, p. W. 1 flatly denied the signatures in the witness box. The course of the trial whereby the 1st defendant was first compelled to lead in evidence in regard to ex. B - 8 was determined by the. Frame of the second issue which, of course, was correctly framed in the absence of any definite admission in the reply statement as to the signatures. But, curiously, when the 1st defendant was in the witness box, a suggestion was put to him that he he had taken the signatures of the 1st plaintiff and his brother on a blank paper in connection with a petition in o. S. No. 8 of 1938. It is to be noticed that the 1st plaintiff was examined after the 1st defendant though on the same day. Inspite of the suggestion so put to the 1st defendant in the witness box, the 1st plaintiff as p. W. 1 stated that the signature in ex. B - 8 was not his and that there was also no signature of his brother in it. But, p. W. 2 who was examined the next day, deposed in conformity with the suggestion put to the 1st defendant during his cross - examination that ex. B - 8 was the blank paper in which he and the 1st plaintiff had signed and which they had given to the 1st defendant in order to be used to prepare an affidavit for supporting a petition in o. S. No. 8 of 1938. The above account clearly shows that the 1st plaintiff was uncertain as to the line to be adopted in regard to ex. B - 8 and that he was unwilling to take upon himself the burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the court that ex. B - 8 was a letter prepared over his and his brother's signatures on a blank piece of paper for some purpose connected with a prior litigation in which the 1st defendant and the 1st plaintiff and his brother were jointly interested. This indefiniteness of attitude resulted in the second issue being so framed as to compel the 1st defendant to adduce evidence first as regards ex. B - 8. This dubious course of conduct in the early stages of the trial followed by the admission at a later stagethough, a pointed out earlier, it is difficult to say that there was such an admission at any stage of the trial, having regard to p. W. 1's statement in the witness boxis, we think, utterly to be deprecated. There is no reason why this admission should not have been made at the earliest point of time, that is, when the reply statement was put in. The reply statement is disingenuous and designedly unhelpful and was calculated apparently to forestall the prima facie case that might be established against the plaintiffs in case their signatures were proved to be genuine, as the plaintiffs had good reason to fear they might easily be. Now, it is perfectly clear that ex. B - 8 is the pivot of the case. If the learned subordinate judge and the learned judge in appeal had come to the conclusion that ex. B - 8 were genuine, there is little doubt that they would have held in favour of the defence because the other evidence available, as their judgments show, is not of such a character as to be decisive of the case. We, therefore, propose to address ourselves, in the first instance, to the question as to whether ex. B - 8 is a letter signed by the 1st plaintiff and his brother p. W. 2. The learned subordinate judge held that ex. B - 8 is a forged document. Our learned brother satyanarayana rao, j. , recorded his finding about ex. B - 8 in these words :

" the direct evidence therefore of the execution of this document by the plaintiff and p. W. 2 with knowledge of the contents is unacceptable, and the learned judge, who had an opportunity of seeing the witnesses, was not prepared to rely on their evidence and i am not prepared to differ from him. Ex. B - 8 has not been established to be a document, which was willisgly executed by p. W. 2 and the 1st plaintiff with knowledge of the contents."

This passage indicates that the. Learned judge took the view that the 1st defendant had to establish that the 1st plaintiff and p. W. 2 had "executed the letter willingly with knowledge of its contents. " before we discuss the question of burden of proof in a case of this character, it is necessary to point out that the word 'execution' is hardly apt when used in regard to the drafting of a letter and is only appropriate in regard to a deed or instrument, as in such cases, certain formalities are insisted upon by law and they are to be followed by the executant in order to make the document effective in law. Where, as in the case of a will, the law requires the attestation by two witnesses of the signature of the testator there can be no execution, as such, unless the procedure prescribed by the law in regard to attestation is followed. A piece of paper, though styled a will and though it may contain the alleged testator's signature will not be a will unless it has been executed in the manner prescribed by law. So also is the case with other documents where definite fromal requirements are prescribed. Nobody can 'execute' a will by merely drawing up a document containing directions as to the disposal of his property after his death followed by his signature. Nobody can be said to have executed a mortgage bond merely by signing a document called a mortgage deed. But, in the case of a letter where there can be no possible question of 'execution' in this sense, proof of a man's signature under it is surely prima facie proof that the contents of the letter are attributable to his authorship. If a person denies that he has written a letter which contains his signature, then surely he must prove what he alleges, i. E. , that the letter was got up on a blank piece of paper containing his signature, as also the circumstances in which he happened to put his signature on such a piece of paper. There is no question of proving the "execution" of a letter by the signatory. Even where formal execution as such has got to be proved, cases have held that where a man's signature appears in a document at the place where the executant of such a document would normally sign, then the signature may prima facie be taken as having been put in token of execution and that therefore the proof or admission of a signature in a document requiring the execution in a particular form is prima facie proof that the document was executed by the signatory, because, normally, it has to be presumed under sec. 114 of the evidence act that a person only puts a signature in a document in token of his execution thereof. But the present one, it sesms to us, is an afortiori case because here, there is no question of any execution. We may usefully refer in this connection to a passage from the judgment of a bench of the nagpur high court in dalchand mulchand v. Hasanbi:

" in devidas v. Mamooji (a. I. R. 1924 nag. 103) for instance it was held that an admis. Sion by the defendant that a document bears his signature coupled with an assertion that it had been placed upon a blank piece of paper upon which the rest of the document was fraudulently scribed was not an admission of execution and so the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff. One of us (bose j.) recently came to the opposite conclusion in second appeal no. 208 - b of 1935. In view of this conflict of opinion, we think it desirable to examine the question at length. As an abstract proposition it is beyond doubt that the initial burden of proving execution when it is denied is upon the plaintiff. The real question we have to decide here is not that but whether this onus can be discharged by mere proof of signature; not proof of execution as such but by bare proof of signature. With the utmost respect for the learned a. J. C. Who decided devidas v. Namooji (a. I. R. 1924 nag. 103) , wve think it can."

Quite apart from all technical considerations, what is the inference that an ordinarily careful person would draw from a letter or document which he knows or is assured bears a man's signature? which is more in accordance with the ordinary course of human affairs? what is the common course of businessto sign a blank piece of paper and hand it over to stranger, or, as here, solemnly to execute deed with no intention of acting on them, or to affix one's signature to a document one has read and understood, or had explained in token of execution with the full intention of giving effect to it? we think it would be a serious thing to hold that execution cannot be proved except by direct evidence. What is to happen when everybody who can speak about the matter is dead and the document is less than 30 years old? how often does any one but the executant see a cheque or a promissory note signed? what can a plaintiff do in such cases but adduce bare proof of signature, and yet according to the view in devidas v. Mamooji (a. I. R. 1994 nag. 103) which was a case of a promissory note, that would not be enough. We have no quarrel with the general proposition that proof of signature is not necessarily proof of execution and that an admission that a document bears a man's signature is not necessarily an admission of execution. The circumstances of the case may negative such an inference. We fully realise that quite apart from fraud cases may arise in which a document is signed without any intention of present execution: for instance, a man might sign a fully drawn up contract and put it in his pocket without having any intention of executing it he may have signed (it) with the intention of delivering it at some later date if a certain event should happen and of tearing it up if it should not. That of course would not amount to execution, not even to conditional execution. It would not create even a contingent interest in the subject - matter of the instrument. But surely, if nothing else is known, then the mere fact that a document is proved to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody, ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed, with the intention of execution. Surely it is evidence by which execution can in conceivable circumstances be proved". Then, discussing the facts of the case in devidas v. Mamooji they proceeded to state as follows :

" in that case, the plaintiff's statement when analysed consisted of three separate assertions of fact: (1) that the thumb impression in question was the defendant's (2) that it had been affixed to the document in question as opposed to the piece of paper on which it appeared, and (3) that it had been so affixed in token of execution. The defendant admitted the first of these three statements and denied the other two. As regards the first there was no qualification whatever. Of course, this was not an admission of liability and not an admission of execution, it was merely admission of the one fact that the thumb - impression on the paper was the defendant's. That being so, as we view the law the plaintiff was not called upon to prove that fact. But if that is accepted then according to our view an inference arises under the law about execution and not because of any admission made by the defendants : an inference that the thumb impression had been affixed in token of execution. The plaintiff would succeed if nothing more is known not because the defendants had admitted execution but because the plainiiff has established a prima facie case."

We are in respectful agreement with the view so expressed. We may also note that in the case of a promissory note, a full bench of the rangoon high court in j. K. Shaka v. Dulah meah overruling a contrary view taken in hoe moh v. Seedat held that where the plaintiff sues on a promissory note, and the defendant admits, (or has had proved against him conclusively) his signature or his thumb impression on the promissory note, but asserts that he did not sign the promissory note in the condition in which it is filed, the burden is on the defendant to prove that the promissory note is not what it appears to be. Our attention has also been drawn to the decision of a single judge of the mysore high court in lakshmamma v. M. Jayearam. It was held in that cast that:

" where a party alleges tha,t he affixed his signature or thumb impression on a blank paper on which the document must have been written later, he has to prove that fact and that if he fails to do so, the presumption is against him."
as already stated, in this case there is no question of any execution at all and therefore, it seems to us that the burden of satisfying the court that the signatures were inserted upon a blank piece of paper squarely rests on the plaintiffs and if they fail to discharge such burden, it must be presumed that the contents of ex. B - 8 having been subscribed to by the 1st plaintiff and his brother are true and binding upon them. (after discussing the entire evidence his lordship concluded:] having regard to the several circumstancss of the case which we have discussed in the earlier part of our judgment, we have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs must fail not necessarily because ex. B - 8 is proved to be true by the 1st defendant but because the plaintiffs have not established to the satisfaction of the court the circumstances in which the signatures of p. Ws. 1 and 2 came to be put upon that document. We must confess that we are not altogether satisfied with the conclusion we have reached. But, we can have little regret if this is the result of the failure on the part of the plaintiffs to be fair with the court and their adoption of what we consider improper tactics in the conduct of their case. In 'the resu. Lt, this appeal succeeds and the suit of the plantiff s will stand dismissed with costs througout. T. R. R.