Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Ramichetti Ramayya Chetti v. Putta Krishnayya Chetti And Another

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Sep 27, 1956
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Order 21, rule 89)

Factual and Procedural Background

A decree-holder (purchaser) bought immovable properties of his judgment-debtor at a court sale held in execution of a decree in O.S. No. 56 of 1949. The judgment-debtor deposited in court the full amount required under Order 21, rule 89, Civil Procedure Code, within the prescribed period, and in the accompanying application to set aside the sale stated that the deposit was made "without prejudice to the suit of the petitioner in O.S. No. 616 of 1949" — a pending suit to set aside the decree in O.S. No. 56 of 1949. By the time the petition under Order 21, rule 89 was heard, the suit (O.S. No. 616 of 1949) had been withdrawn. The decree-holder objected to the validity of the deposit as being conditional; in response the judgment-debtor withdrew the statement that the deposit was made without prejudice to O.S. No. 616 of 1949. The trial court held the deposit to be conditional and therefore improper, and found the application under Order 21, rule 89 unsustainable. The lower appellate court disagreed and held that, because the condition had been withdrawn before the decree-holder had attempted to withdraw the deposit, Order 21, rule 89 should be applied and the sale could be set aside.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a second appeal lies against an appellate order setting aside (or refusing to set aside) a sale under Order 21, rule 89 (i.e., the procedural question of second-appealability given the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provisions relied upon).
  2. Whether the judgment-debtor's deposit under Order 21, rule 89 was conditional (and therefore invalid) because the application accompanying it referred to pending collateral proceedings (a suit to set aside the decree), and whether withdrawal of that reference after the time prescribed rendered the deposit ineffective.
  3. Whether an appellate court's order setting aside the sale was without jurisdiction on the ground that the deposit made by the judgment-debtor was not an unconditional deposit as required by Order 21, rule 89.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (decree-holder / purchaser)

  • The appellant relied on the decision in Srinivasa v. Ayyathwrai (1897) and on provisions of the earlier Civil Procedure Code (1882) to contend that the order of the appellate court should not stand.
  • Under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the appellant pointed to section 104(2) and to Order 43, rule 1(j) (appeal against an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under Order 21, rule 92, which includes orders under Order 21, rule 89), and also referred to section 2(2) — arguing that, in view of these provisions, no second appeal lies from an order passed on appeal under those rules.
  • In practical terms, the appellant objected to the validity of the deposit on the ground that it was conditional, and relied on authorities that describe payments under protest or subject to conditions as incompatible with Order 21, rule 89.

Respondents' Arguments (judgment-debtor and/or supporters of the order)

  • The respondents raised a preliminary objection that no second appeal lies (i.e., challenged the appellant's locus to maintain the second appeal under the post-1908 provisions).
  • Factually, the respondents relied on the withdrawal by the judgment-debtor of the conditional statement before the decree-holder had attempted to withdraw the deposited money — arguing the deposit thereby became unencumbered and valid for the purposes of Order 21, rule 89.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srinivasa v. Ayyathwrai, (1897) 8 M.L.J. 54 : I.L.R. 21 Mad. 416 Authority under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 concerning appealability in execution-related matters (section 310-a of 1882 Code). Cited by appellant; the court contrasted this earlier position under the 1882 Code with changes introduced by the 1908 Code, observing that the law has changed as to second appeals.
Kumukutty v. Neelakantan, (1930) 59 M.L.J. 893 : I.L.R. 53 Mad. 943 Stated that Order 21, rule 89 is intended to "put an end to every kind of contention and dispute" and that payment under protest or coupled with conditions would frustrate the rule. The court observed these statements were too broadly expressed and should not be read as substituting for the text of Order 21, rule 89; the judgment's observations were held to be qualified by context (existence of a subsisting decree).
Krishna Iyer v. Arunachalam Chettiar, (1935) 69 M.L.J. 349 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 972 (Full Bench) Held that a deposit under Order 21, rule 89 must be voluntary and unconditional; suggested reservation to impeach validity in other proceedings might not vitiate the deposit. The court relied on this authority but noted the Full Bench's view that reservation to impeach might not automatically vitiate a deposit; it treated the Full Bench's approach as supportive of a narrower reading of "conditional" deposits.
Raghuram v. Deokala Pande, (1927) I.L.R. 7 Patna 30 The person making payment under Order 21, rule 89 must accept the validity of the court sale; once payment is made, one cannot later assert sale invalidity to deny payment consequences. Cited as representative of the view that unconditionality of payment denotes acceptance of the sale; the court acknowledged the authority but reconciling it with rule text and later decisions.
Maduri Saran v. Bishambar Nath, (1927) I.L.R. 49 All. 839 Statement that an applicant's assertion that deposit may be returned if sale is not set aside is not a condition but states an inevitable legal consequence. Used to support the proposition that reference to a right of restitution or collateral proceedings does not convert a deposit into a conditional one.
Krishnam Chettlar v. Nachimuthu, (1942) 1 M.L.J. 500 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 453 Where a decree is reversed or set aside after sale/execution, the decree-holder must restitute amounts deposited under Order 21, rule 89. Cited to confirm that restitution follows if the underlying decree ceases to exist; used to show that a depositor's reference to possible restitution does not make the deposit conditional.
Mohomed Taqi Khan v. Raja Ram, A.I.R. 1943 All. 267 Where execution was held to be barred by limitation on appeal, a judgment-debtor who deposited would be entitled to restitution of the deposit. Supported the court's point that restitution follows where the decree loses effect (e.g., barred by limitation) and that this legal consequence does not render the deposit conditional.
Papu Reddiar v. Pichu Iyer, (1938) 1 M.L.J. 829 Quoted distinction that Order 21, rule 89 assumes existence of a subsisting decree and a real "decree-holder"; if the very foundation (subsisting decree) is gone, the unconditional-payment observations may not apply. Cited to show limits to the broad statements in earlier cases and to qualify when unconditional-payment doctrines apply.
Edward Mathuram v. Abdul Latiff, (1949) 1 M.L.J. 447 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 764 Held that a deposit filed "without prejudice" to appeal and reserving right to recover on success in appeal was a conditional deposit and invalid under Order 21, rule 89. The court respectfully disagreed with that decision on its facts and reasoning, distinguishing it because the reservation to seek restitution on successful appeal is a legal consequence rather than a condition preventing immediate withdrawal by the decree-holder.
Sham Sundar Singh v. Munshi Mushaheb Lal, (1923) I.L.R. 2 Pat. 534; Ram Shwendra v. Awadh Behari, A.I.R. 1923 Patna 159; Dulhin Mathura Koer v. Bansldhar Singh, (1911) 15 C.L.J. 83 Authority for the proposition that withdrawal of a condition attached to a deposit before the decree-holder has attempted to withdraw the money cures the defect and validates the deposit. Applied directly to the facts: because the judgment-debtor withdrew the reference to collateral proceedings before the decree-holder attempted to withdraw funds, the deposit was not invalidated.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two analytical strands: (A) procedural/appealability questions arising under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and (B) the substantive question whether the deposit was conditional and therefore invalid.

A. Procedural / Appealability Analysis

The court examined the appellant's contention, based on earlier authority and the 1882 Code, that a second appeal should be maintainable. It noted the 1908 Code changed the law: section 104(2) bars appeals from orders passed on appeal under rules that themselves provide for appeal; Order 43, rule 1(j) expressly provides an appeal from orders setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under Order 21, rule 92 (which encompasses orders under Order 21, rule 89). Section 2(2) excludes from the definition of "decree" any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order. In the court's view, read together, these provisions mean that an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under Order 21, rule 89 or 90 is not open to second appeal even if the decree-holder is the purchaser at the execution sale. The court acknowledged submissions that conversion to a civil revision petition had been requested, and that courts have sometimes intervened under section 115 in appellate orders setting aside sales; it accepted that such interventions have occurred.

B. Substantive Analysis — Validity of the Deposit under Order 21, rule 89

The court stated the legal requirement clearly: a deposit under Order 21, rule 89 must be unconditional, i.e., the money should be available to the decree-holder to be drawn out forthwith and unconditionally. Payments "under protest" or payments coupled with obligations or undertakings to be performed before the decree-holder can draw out the amount would not be valid.

The court analyzed a range of precedents: some earlier decisions had language suggesting that any reservation or protest would fatally undermine a deposit (e.g., observations attributed to Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Kumukutty). The court held those observations were too broadly expressed. It emphasized that a petition under Order 21, rule 89 that merely refers to collateral proceedings (for example, a suit or an appeal impugning the decree) does not, by that reference alone, impose a condition preventing the decree-holder from drawing the deposit. A statement that the deposit might be returned if the sale is not set aside is not a condition but a plain statement of a legal consequence — restitution would follow if the decree is later reversed or set aside. The court reinforced that Order 21, rule 89 presupposes the existence of an executable decree and of a genuine decree-holder; if the underlying decree ceases to exist (reversal, setting aside, limitation, or scaling down), restitution must be made.

The court noted authority holding that where a deposit is in fact conditional, the defect is cured if the applicant withdraws the condition and the money becomes available for payment to the decree-holder before the decree-holder has made any attempt to withdraw it. Applying that principle to the facts, the court found that the judgment-debtor had withdrawn the reference to the pendency of O.S. No. 616 of 1949 before the decree-holder had attempted to withdraw the deposit; accordingly the deposit was not invalidated by the earlier reference.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court confirmed the order of the lower appellate court and dismissed the second appeal with costs.

Implications (direct effect on the parties, drawn from the opinion):

  • The appellate court's order setting aside the sale is upheld — the sale is set aside as previously ordered by the lower appellate court.
  • The judgment-debtor's deposit under Order 21, rule 89 was not rendered invalid merely because the application initially referred to collateral proceedings; the reference to possible restitution (if the decree were later set aside) does not make the deposit conditional.
  • Because the judgment-debtor withdrew the reference to the pendency of the suit before the decree-holder attempted to withdraw the deposit, the deposit was available for withdrawal by the decree-holder free of the earlier stated reference; withdrawal of the condition before any attempt by the decree-holder to draw the money validated the deposit.
  • The court reiterated that if subsequently the underlying decree is reversed, set aside or otherwise ceases to be operative (for example by limitation), the decree-holder is obliged to make restitution of the deposit as a matter of law or equity.
  • The opinion clarifies and qualifies earlier authorities: some earlier broad statements that deposits "under protest" are always invalid were held to be too wide; the court reconciled authorities and emphasized the primacy of the rule text and the factual foundation (existence of a subsisting, executable decree) for applying the unconditionality principle.

Note: The court also analyzed and described the effect of the Civil Procedure Code (1908) provisions on appealability (section 104(2), Order 43, rule 1(j), section 2(2)), concluding that orders under Order 21, rule 89/90 are not ordinarily open to second appeal; however, on the merits the appellate order setting aside the sale was upheld in this case.

End of summary — based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

(1) The decree - holder in o. S. No. 56 of 1949 purchased the immovable properties of his judgment - debtor at a court sale held in execution of the decree. The judgment - debtor deposited into court the full amount required under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, within the prescribed period. In his application to set aside the sale, there was a statement that the deposit was made "without prejudice to the suit of the petitioner in o. S. No. 616 of 1949". Now o. S. No. 616 of 1949 was a suit to set aside the decree in o. S. No. 56 of 1949 which was then pending. By the time the petition under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, was heard, the suit had been withdrawn. On an objection raised by the decree - holder to the validity of the deposit, the judgment - debtor withdrew the statement that the deposit had been made without prejudice to o. S. No. 616 of 1949. Nevertheless the trial court held that the deposit was a conditional one and therefore improper, that the withdrawal of the condition after the expiry of the time prescribed for the deposit and application was ineffective and that the application under Order 21, rule 89, was unsustainable. The lower appellate court differed and reached the following conclusion :

"in the present case, the judgment - debtors withdrew the condition on the date after the first arguments were heard and thereafter the case was re - opened and reheard. Upto that time, the decree - holder has not made any attempt to withdraw the money. So before the proceedings were closed and before orders were pronounced and after the objections of the decree - holder were heard the condition had been withdrawn. At the time when the order was passed, there was no impediment for the decree - holder withdrawing the amount in deposit. I am of opinion that in this case Order 21, rule 89, should have been applied"
.

(2) The correctness of this view is challenged on behalf of the decree - holder purchaser, the appellant in this second appeal. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that no second appeal lies. The appellant relied on the decision in srinivasa v. Ayyathwrai, (1897) 8 m. L. J. 54 : i. L. R. 21 mad. 416. That was a decision under the civil procedure code of 1882. Section 310 - a of the civil procedure code of 1882 corresponded to Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code. There was. No provision in the civil procedure code of 1882 for an appeal against the order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under section 310 - a. A decision under section 310 - a being one on a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree was held to be appealable under sections 2 and 244 of the old code, if the decree - holder was himself the purchaser inasmuch as the question was one between the parties to the suit. The civil procedure code of 1908 has changed the law. Under section 104 (2) , no appeal lies from an order passed on appeal under the rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by the rules. Order 43, rule 1 (j) , provides for an appeal from an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under order 21, rule 92, civil procedure code, which comprises orders made under order 21, rule 89. No second appeal would lie from an order passed on appeal from an order under, 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, by reason of the prohibition, in section 104 (2). This is so even if the matter is one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and it arises between the parties to the suit and therefore falls within section 47. Section 2 (2) of the civil procedure code expressly excludes from the definition of a decree any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order. Therefore, in view of the provisions of order 43, rule 1 (j) , read with sections 2 (2) and 104 (2) , civil procedure code, it must beheld that an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under order 21, rule 89 or 90, civil procedure code, is not open to second appeal even though the decree - holder is the purchaser at the execution sale. I was asked to convert the second appeal into a civil revision petition. It was pointed out that courts had interfered under section 115, civil procedure code, with appellate orders setting aside sales under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code. This is no doubt the case.

(3) The question is whether the order of the appellate court setting aside the sale under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, is without jurisdiction because the deposit made by the judgment - debtor was not unconditional but was hedged in with a condition not warranted by law. For a deposit under Order 21, rule 89, to be valid or effective, it must be unconditional, that is to say, the money should be available to the decree - holder to be drawn out by him forthwith and unconditionally. A payment into court under protest or a payment subject to the purchaser giving security or undertaking any other onerous obligation before drawing out the amount, would not be valid. Reliance was placed on the decision of venkatasubba rao, j. , in kumukutty v. Neelakantan, (1930) 59 m. L. J. 893 : i. L. R. 53 mad 943, where the learned judge observed that the object of Order 21, rule 89, is to " put an end to every kind of contention and dispute" ; that the rule would be "frustrated if the person paying money under it is permitted to do so under protest" ; that "if the debtor wants to keep a dispute open, he cannot claim the benefit" of rule 89 ; and that the rule "is inconsistent with the notion that payment can be made either under protest or coupled with conditions. " in krishna iyer v. Arunachalam chettiar, (1935) 69 m. L. J. 349 : i. L. R. 58 mad. 972 (f. B.) , it was held that a deposit made under Order 21, rule 89, must be taken to have been made for payment to the decree - holder voluntarily and unconditionally. In raghuram v. Deokala pande, (1927) i. L. R. 7 patna 30 the court held that the person making a payment under Order 21, rule 89, must accept the validity of the court sale. Kulwant sahay, j. , observed : - "once a payment is made under Order 21, rule 89, it is clear that the person making the payment cannot be heard to say that the sale was not a valid sale and that the money deposited should not be paid to the decree - holder". Stray sentences from these judgments' were relied upon as complete and comprehensive statements of the law. Needless to say that they cannot be substituted for the provisions of order 21, rule 89. A petition filed under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, referring to the existence of collateral proceedings in which the validity of the decree is impugned could not be regarded as imposing a condition on the decree - holder or auction - purchaser before the former could draw out his decree amount and the latter, his solatium of 5 per cent, from the deposit 'in court. If an applicant under Order 21, rule 89, states that if the sale is not set aside the deposit might be returned to him, it is not a condition but only a statement of one of the inevitable legal consequences of the sale not being set aside. The right to a refund of the deposit in that event would be there, whether expressed or not in the petition under Order 21, rule 89, and a reference to it would not make the deposit conditional. Maduri saran v. Bishambar nath, (1927) i. L. R. 49 all. 839. Again a judgment - debtor, who has appealed from a decree in execution of which his property has been sold and who makes a deposit under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, to set aside the sale pending the appeal, will have a right to restitution of the money paid by him and drawn by the decree - holder, if the decree is reversed on appeal and the suit is dismissed. The same would be the position if the decree is set aside in a suit filed by the judgment - debtor or if the decree is an ex parte one and is set aside at the instance of the judgment debtor after the sale was held in execution of the decree. See krishnam chettlar v. Nachimuthu, (1942) 1 m. L. J. 500 : a. I. R. 1942 mad. 453. Again if the court overrules the objection of the judgment - debtor to the execution of the decree on the ground that it is barred by limitation and sells the property in execution and on an appeal by the judgment - debtor, it is held that execution of the decree was barred by limitation, the judgment - debtor making the deposit under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, would, in law, be entitled to a restitution of the deposit made by him. See mohomed taqi khan v. Raja ram, a. I. R. 1943 all. 267. Hi in the cases referred to above, the judgment - debtor in his application under Order 21, rule 89, refers to the proceedings pending or intended to be taken for getting rid of the decree and makes a deposit, it does not become a conditional one. It is merely a statement of a fact and of the legal consequences flowing from it. The decree - holder is not thereby prevented from withdrawing the money deposited. Only he is reminded, quite needlessly perhaps, of the existence of possibility of proceedings by way of a suit, appeal or application to set aside the decree and of the legal consequences that might result therefrom, if they prove successful.

(4) It follows from what i have said that the observations of venkatasubba rao, j. , in kumukutty v. Neelakantan, (1930) 59 m. L. J. 893 : i. L. R. 53 mad. 943, extracted above are too widely and generally expressed. Patanjali sastri, j. , in krishnan chettiar v. Nachimuthu, (1942) 1 m. L. J. 500 : a. I. R. 1942 mad. 453, and raman adiyoli v. Kannan nambiar, (1940) 1 m. L. J. 340, expresed his dissent from them in these terms : "these observations are rather widely expressed and if they were intended to convey the meaning that once a judgment - debtor pays the amount to set aside sale under Order 21, rule 89, he must be deemed to have made the payment voluntarily even though he has preferred an appeal from the decree in question and will be disentitled to a restitution of the amount if the decree is set aside on appeal, i must respectfully dissent from them''. I am in respectful agreement with patanjali sastri, j. , sitting with abdur rahman, j. Venkatasubba rao, j. , himself distinguished his earlier decision in kumukutty v. Neelakantan, in these terms : "in the former [case, it has been held that Order 21, rule 89, is inconsistent with the notion that payment can be made either under protest or coupled with conditions. True, but the whole judgment proceeds upon the footing first that there was a subsisting decree, that is, subsisting in fact and secondly, there was a decree - holder, one who really answered that description. Order 21, rule 89, assumes the existence of a " decree " and of a " decree - holder " and when the very foundation is gone, namely, a subsisting decree, it would be futile to contend that the decision which refer to unconditional payment can apply''. (papu reddiar v. Pichu iyer, (1938) 1 m. L. J. 829). A deposit under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, assumes the existence of an executable decree and if the decree in pursuance of which the property is sold is gone, by being reversed on appeal or set aside in a suit brought for the purpose, by being scaled down to zero under madras act iv of 1938 or by execution being held ' to be barred by limitation, the decree - holder would have no right to retain the amount deposited by the judgment - debtor under order 21, rule 89 and withdrawn by him, but must make restitution to the judgment - debtor as a matter of law or equity. The reference to other proceedings for getting rid of the decree in an application filed under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, does not make the accompanying deposit a conditional one. In krishna iyer, v. Arunachalam, (1935) 69 m. L. J. 349 : i. L. R. 58 mad. 972 (f. B.) , beasley, c. J. , who delivered the judgment of the full bench, was apparently of the view that the reservation of a right to impeach the validity of the execution sale in other proceedings might not vitiate an application and a deposit under order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code. Attention is necessary to order 21, rule 89 (2) which requires an election to be made as to whether the applicant would proceed under order 21, rule 89 or order 21, rule 90, civil procedure code. This provision does not debar an application to set aside the execution sale under section 47, civil procedure code, on grounds other than those specified in order 21, rule 90, civil procedure code. Nor does it debar an appeal from the decree under execution or a suit to set aside that decree merely because an application and a deposit under Order 21, rule 89, have been made by the judgment - debtor.

(5) There is, however, a decision of govinda menon, j. , in edward mathuram v. Abdul latiff, (1949) 1 m. L. J. 447 : a. I. R. 1949 mad. 764, where the learned judge held that a deposit accompanied by an application of the judgment - debtor stating inter alia, that it was filed "without prejudice to my contentions in the appeal and my right to recover it from the decree - holder in the event of my success in appeal" was a conditional deposit and therefore invalid under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code. The learned judge relied on the decisions of venkatasubba rao, j. , and beasley, c. J. , already referred to, particularly on the dictum of venkatasubba rao, j. , that "if a debtor wants to keep a dispute open, he cannot claim the benefit" of Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code. The attention of the learned judge, just as in the arguments before me, was not drawn to the later decisions of patanjali sastri, j. , and of venkatasubba rao and abdur rahman, jj. , to which i have referred. Govinda menon, j. , observed : "in the present case, the respondent does not say that the money when drawn out by the decree - holder would remain the decree - holder's property. The respondent reserved to him the right to call back the money and claim it in the event of his success in the appeal that was pending". With all respect to the learned judge, i am unable to see why the deposit in that case was bad. It is not necessary that the judgment - debtor who deposits the money under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, should acknowledge the right of the decree - holder to draw out and retain the money deposited under all circumstances order 21 rule 89, does not require the judgment - debtor to forego his right of. Restitution in case the decree against which he has appealed is reversed after the court sale is set aside under that rule. The money was available to be drawn out by the decree - holder forthwith without any condition or obstacle. The pendency of an appeal from the decree was no bar to the execution of the decree or the sale of the judgment - debtor's property. Nor was it a bar to an application under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code. It was not a condition prescribed by law that an applicant under Order 21, rule 89, civil procedure code, should abandon his appeal from the decree just as he has to abandon an application under order 21, rule 90, civil procedure code. The reference to the pendency of the appeal and of the liability of the decree - holder to make restitution, if the decree was reversed on appeal, was otiose. It was merely a statement of fact known to the decree - holder and of a legal truism. The statement did not impose a condition on the decree - holder, for even without it, the law would have imposed the liability on him to make restitution if the decree is set aside on appeal. Differing from govinda menon, j. , i am of opinion that the deposit under Order 21, rule 89, in the present case was not bad in law by reason of a reference in the application of the judgment - debtor to a pending suit to set aside the decree in execution of which the court sale was held.

(6) There is also authority for the view that if, as soon as an objection to a conditional deposit made under Order 21, rule 89, is taken, the applicant withdraws the condition and the money becomes available for payment to the decree - holder free from any condition before he has made any attempt to withdraw it, the deposit is not invalid. See sham sundar singh v. Munshi mushaheb lal, (1923) i. L. R. 2 pat. 534 ram shwendra v. Awadh behari, a. I. R. 1923 patna 159, and dulhin. Mathura koer v. Bansldhar singh, (1911) 15 c. L. J. 83.

(7) In the present case, the judgment - debtor who applied under Order 21, rule 89, withdrew all reference to the pendency of a suit to set aside the decree before the decree - holder made any attempt to withdraw the money. For these reasons, i confirm the order of the lower appellate court and dismiss the second appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.

Order 21, rule 89,