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Gudla Satyanarayana v. The State And Two Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Aug 13, 1957
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Factual and Procedural Background

This Full Bench reference arose from a writ petition challenging administrative orders suspending a stage carriage permit. The petitioner was the owner of a bus running between Prayathipur and Elwinpet in Srikakulam District. A police/inspector's report alleged overloading (54 passengers against capacity of 33) and dangerous driving (speed 35–40 mph against an authorised limit of 25 mph). The Regional Transport Officer (RTO) called for an explanation under S.60 of the Motor Vehicles Act and, after rejecting the explanation, suspended the permit for one and a half months. On appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board the suspension was reduced to one month; the State Government in revision refused to interfere. The petitioner challenged these orders in a writ petition as illegal and unconstitutional.

The case raised a substantial point of law about whether a permit granted by a Regional Transport Authority (RTA) can validly be suspended/cancelled by a subordinate (the Secretary / Regional Transport Officer) under Rule 134-A(xi) framed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court noted conflicting judicial authorities — most prominently a Division Bench decision of this Court (Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. v. State of Andhra, 1956 Andh LT 285 : AIR 1956 Andhra 232) holding that the Secretary's suspension was illegal, and an (unreported in authorised journals) Madras High Court decision (Star Transport Ltd. Kurnool v. RTA, Kurnool, W.P. No.87/1951) holding the suspension power validly delegated. Because of these conflicting bench views the matter was referred to a Full Bench for final determination after discussion of the appropriate referral procedure under the Appellate Side Rules.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, by reason of Rule 134-A(xi) of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules (delegating functions to the Secretary), the Secretary or Regional Transport Officer to whom the power is delegated can validly cancel or suspend a permit that was originally issued by the Transport Authority which granted the permit.
  2. Closely related: whether Rule 134-A(xi), insofar as it delegates power under S.60 of the Motor Vehicles Act to an authority that did not grant the permit, is intra vires or ultra vires the Act (i.e., whether the rule-making power and S.44(5) permit such a delegation that effectively severs the statutory link in S.60 between grant and suspension).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner / Owner

  • The petitioner's factual defence (as recorded) denied the alleged offences and contended that, if any offence occurred, liability lay on the driver and conductor and not on the owner.
  • Legally, the petitioner's case (and the learned Judge on initial hearing) advanced the submission that the Regional Transport Officer lacked jurisdiction to suspend a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority and that proceedings taken by the RTO were void and of no avail.

Respondent / Government

  • The Government (through the learned Government Pleader) relied on the validity of Rule 134-A(xi) and on the Madras High Court authority (and later Madras decisions) which upheld delegation of the suspension power to the Secretary/RTO. The contention was that S.44(5) and the rule-making power under S.68 authorized delegation, and that S.60 is not to be read as precluding such delegation.
  • It was further argued (as reflected in the judgment) that the qualifying phrase in S.60, "which granted a permit," was descriptive — i.e., intended only to identify which among several transport authorities actually granted the permit — and not intended to make the power of suspension a personal, non-delegable right of the particular authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. v. State of Andhra, 1956 Andh LT 285 : AIR 1956 Andhra 232 (A) Held that an order of the Secretary suspending a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal; S.60 (special provision) overrides a general delegation. Adopted by the majority in this Full Bench as a persuasive Division Bench authority and as support for the view that S.60 links suspension to the authority which granted the permit and that delegation cannot sever that link.
Star Transport Ltd. Kurnool v. Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool, W.P. No.87/1951 (Madras) (B) (unreported in authorised journals) Madras High Court (Rajamannar C.J. & Venkatarama Ayyar J.) held that suspension by the Regional Transport Officer (Secretary) was valid under R.134-A. Presented to this Court as a conflicting authority; its existence and contrary conclusion precipitated reference to a Full Bench.
Subba Rayudu v. The State, 1955 Andh LT Cr 53 : AIR 1955 Andhra 87 (Full Bench) (C) Principle that decisions of the Madras High Court pronounced prior to 5-7-1954 are binding on this Court (Full Bench); procedural authority. Cited in the procedural discussion about binding effect and the need to follow or refer conflicting Madras decisions to a Full Bench.
Seshamma v. Venkata Narasimharao, ILR 1940 Mad 454 : AIR 1940 Mad 356 (Full Bench) (D) Division Bench should regard itself bound by another Division Bench on a question of law; if it disagrees, it should refer the matter to a Full Bench. Quoted to support the view that conflicting Division Bench decisions require Full Bench consideration to give guidance to subordinate courts.
Veerraju v. Narayanamma, 1952-2 Mad LJ 734 : AIR 1953 Mad 159 (Full Bench) (E) Describes practice in Madras High Court of single judge placing papers before Chief Justice for Full Bench reference when conflicting Bench decisions exist. Referred to in the judgment's procedural analysis about how conflicting bench decisions should be forwarded to a Full Bench.
In re Venkata Subrahamanyam, 1955 Andh LT (Civ) 69 : AIR 1955 Andhra 74 (F) Procedural authority concerning references to Full Bench. Used in the procedural discussion about practice of referring matters to a Bench for possible Full Bench consideration.
Dr. K. C. Nambiar v. State of Madras, 1953-1 Mad LJ 49 : AIR 1953 Mad 351 (G) Procedure: if there is a conflict of Bench decisions, a single Judge should refer the case to a Bench of two Judges who may refer it to a Full Bench. Quoted and relied upon in determining the proper internal procedure for referral in this Court.
Eswaramma v. Seethamma, 1955 Andh LT (Civ) 444 : AIR 1955 Andhra 221 (Full Bench) (H) Discusses practice (following Madras) and confirms that a matter may appropriately be placed before a Bench in the first instance. Cited in the procedural analysis and to justify posting the matter to a Bench which could then refer to Full Bench.
Dhanmull Sowcar v. Secretary R.T.A., 1957-1 Mad LJ 314 : AIR 1957 Mad 387 (I) Madras High Court authority upholding delegation under S.44(5) and R.134-A and validating suspension by the Secretary/RTO. Relied upon by the Government Pleader and discussed by the dissenting judge (Jaganmohan Reddy J.) as supporting the validity of R.134-A(xi).
Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 Howell St. Tri. 1030 (J) Classic principle (Lord Camden) on non-delegation where a right is personal to the grantee. Referred to in argumentation (by a judge) concerning the nature of the qualifying phrase "which granted the permit" and whether it makes the suspension power personal to the grantee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded in two phases: (1) a procedural determination that the conflict between prior Division Bench decisions required reference to a Full Bench; and (2) the substantive legal analysis of whether delegation under S.44(5) and Rule 134-A(xi) can empower a Secretary / Regional Transport Officer to suspend a permit which was originally granted by the Regional Transport Authority.

Procedural reasoning

  • The Court reviewed practice and prior Full Bench authority on how to handle conflicting Division Bench decisions, citing Seshamma, Subba Rayudu and other authorities. Because there were conflicting Division Bench views (this Court's Amaravathi decision and the Madras High Court decision), the matter was referred to a Full Bench for final adjudication.
  • There was discussion about the proper internal procedure for single judges to place conflicting matters before an appropriate Bench; the Court followed the practice of posting the matter before a Bench which would refer to a Full Bench if necessary.

Substantive majority reasoning (Ansari J. and Subba Rao C.J.)

  • Statutory Framework. The Court examined the statutory scheme in Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act: S.44 (constitution and delegation), S.45 (application for permit), Ss.59–61 (conditions, transfer, duration, counter-signatures), S.60 (power to cancel or suspend a permit by "the Transport Authority which granted a permit"), S.63 (counter-signatures), and S.68 (rule-making power).
  • Textual link between grant and suspension. The majority read the qualifying words in S.60 ("the Transport Authority which granted a permit") as intentionally linking the power of suspension/cancellation to the authority that actually granted the permit. That link, in their view, restricts who may exercise S.60 powers to the authority that satisfied the statutory description (i.e., the authority which granted the permit).
  • Limits on delegation. Although S.44(5) permits delegation "if authorised by rules" and S.68(1)/(2) authorises rule-making, the majority emphasized that the Act circumscribes delegation: any delegation must be consistent with and not in conflict with the statutory provisions. A rule could not be framed or construed so as to separate the power to suspend from the statutory link with the granting authority.
  • R.134-A(xi) ultra vires to the extent of severing the statutory link. The majority held that an express rule conferring power of suspension on an authority that had not earlier granted the permit would be ultra vires the statute. Accordingly, Rule 134-A(xi) could not validly be used to empower the Secretary/RTO to suspend a permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority where the Secretary had not granted the permit.
  • Application to facts and precedent. Relying on the Division Bench decision in Amaravathi (which had held that the Secretary's suspension was illegal), the majority concluded that the Secretary/RTO could not validly cancel or suspend the permit issued by the Transport Authority in question. The Court therefore answered the referred question in the negative.

Dissenting reasoning (Jaganmohan Reddy J.)

  • Descriptive reading of "which granted the permit." The dissent interpreted the qualifying phrase as descriptive, identifying which of several transport authorities actually granted the permit, rather than as creating a non-delegable, personal right limited absolutely to the original grantee.
  • Scope of S.44(5) and rule-making power. The dissent emphasised that S.44(5) expressly permits delegation "if authorised in this behalf by rules made under S.68" and that R.134-A(xi) fell within the scope of the rule-making power. The rule, so construed, did not impose any limitation that the Secretary could exercise the power only in respect of permits which he personally had granted.
  • Validity of delegation and practice. The dissent relied on Madras decisions (including Dhanmull Sowcar) that upheld the validity of the delegation under S.44(5) and R.134-A, and concluded that, once validly delegated, the Secretary/RTO legitimately possessed the power to suspend a permit granted by the Transport Authority.
  • Conclusion. For these reasons the dissent answered the question in the affirmative (i.e., the Secretary/RTO can suspend/cancel such permits under R.134-A(xi)).

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: Reference answered in the negative. By majority (Ansari J. and Subba Rao C.J.), the Full Bench held that the Secretary / Regional Transport Officer, to whom power is delegated under Rule 134-A(xi), cannot validly cancel or suspend a permit that was originally granted by the Transport Authority (i.e., the delegation cannot be construed so as to sever the statutory link created by S.60).

Direct consequences for the parties and immediate effect

  • The legal effect of the majority holding is that an order of the Secretary suspending a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is without jurisdiction and is illegal to the extent that the Secretary had not granted the permit or otherwise lawfully acquired the power to grant the permit in the first place.
  • There was a recorded dissent (Jaganmohan Reddy J.) reaching the contrary conclusion; the judgment therefore contains a considered majority ruling resolving the conflict of Division Bench decisions in favour of the view that S.60's linkage cannot be overridden by a broadly worded delegation rule.

Note: The Court's opinion contains extensive procedural discussion about how conflicting bench decisions should be handled and cites a number of authorities on that procedure. The substantive majority holding rests on a textual and purposive reading of S.60 in relation to S.44(5) and the rule-making power, and on the conclusion that rules cannot validly be framed so as to contravene or nullify the statutory limitation linking suspension/cancellation to the authority which granted the permit.

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Judgement

UMAMAHESWARAM, J. :- The simple question that arises for decision in this Writ petition is whether a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority can be suspended by the Regional Transport Officer. A Bench of this Court in Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. Amaravathi v. State of Andhra, 1956 Andh LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A), held that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal. The learned Government Pleader invited my attention to an unreported decision of the Madras High Court, D/-11-08-1952 in Star Transport Ltd. Kurnool v. Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool, W. P. No. 87 of 1951 (B), taking a contrary view and holding that the suspension by the Regional Transport Officer is valid.

The decision of the Madras High Court was not referred to in the judgment of this Court it is surprising that such an important decision was not reported in either of the authorised or the unauthorised reports. In Subba Rayudu v. The State, 1955 Andh LT Cr 53 : ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87) (FB) (C), it had been held by a Full Bench of this Court that the decisions of the Madras High Court pronounced prior to 5-7-1954 are binding upon this Court. In Seshamma v. Venkata Narasimharao, ILR 1940 Mad 454 : (AIR 1940 Mad 356) (FB) (D), Leach, C. J., observed at p. 474 (of ILR Mad) : (at p. 360 of AIR) in the following terms :

"The Division Bench is the final Court of appeal in an Indian High Court, unless the case is referred to a Full Bench, and one Division Bench should regard itself bound by the decision of another Division Bench on a question of law... .... If a Division Bench, does not accept as correct the decision on a question of law of another Division Bench the only right and proper course to adopt is to refer the matter to a Full Bench, for which the rules of this Court provide."
If the Bench decision had been referred to the Bench of this Court, it would have either followed it or if it felt that it required reconsideration, it would have referred the matter to a Full Bench. But, unfortunately, it was not placed before the Bench of this Court which took a different view. As there are two conflicting judgments on the point, it is necessary that the question should be finally decided by a Full Bench. The principle laid down by Leach, C. J., that if this course is not adopted, the Courts subordinate to the High Court would be left without guidance, will apply equally to this case.

2. The next question that has to be decided is whether I should refer the matter to a Bench for referring the matter to a Full Bench or whether I should place the papers before the learned Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench. Rule 2 of the Appellate Side Rules provides that if both Judges constituting the Bench agree that the determination involves a question of law, they may order that the matter, or the question of law should be referred to a Full Bench. Rule 6 enacts that notwithstanding anything in the foregoing rules to the contrary, the Chief Justice may direct that any application, petition, suit, appeal or reference shall be heard by a Full Bench as defined in these rules.

There is no provision in the Appellate Side Rules enabling a single Judge to refer the matter direct to a Full Bench. The practice obtaining in the Madras High Court is for a single Judge to place the papers before the Chief Justice for a reference to a Full Bench, if there are conflicting Bench decisions on the same point. Vide Veerraju v. Narayanamma, 1952-2 Mad LJ 734 : (AIR 1953 Mad 159) (FB) (E) and In re, Venkata Subrahamanyam, 1955 Andh LT (Civ) 69 : ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 74) (F). But in Dr. K. C. Nambiar v. State of Madras, 1953-1 Mad LJ 49 : (AIR 1953 Mad 351) (G), Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) held at p. 53 (of Mad LJ) : (at p. 354 of A R) that the following procedure should be followed :

"If there is a conflict of Bench Decisions, he (i.e., a single Judge) should refer the case to a Bench of two Judges who may refer it to a Full Bench."

In 1955 And LT (Cri) 53 : ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87) (C) the learned Chief Justice quoted with approval his own observations in 1953-1 Mad LJ 49 : (AIR 1953 Mal 351) (G) and stated that the practice obtaining in the Madras High Court should be followed in this Court. Following his observations, I referred a Court-fee matter to a Bench in order that the matter might be placed before a Full Bench. The matter was heard by the Learned Chief Justice and Satyanarayana Raju, J., and they referred the question to a Full Bench. That decision is reported in Eswaramma v. Seethamma, 1955 Andh LT (Civ) 444: ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 221) (FB) (H). At p. 447 (of Andh LT) : (at p. 222 of AIR), Bhimasankaram, J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, made the following observations :

"In accordance therefore with the practice that obtained in the Madras High Court and which is to obtain in this High Court also as laid down by the Full Bench decision in 1955 Andh LT (Cri) 53 : (( S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87) (FB) (C), the learned Judge directed that this matter should go before a Bench to the first instance, though strictly speaking in accordance with the observations of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in 1953-1 Mad LJ 49 : ( AIR 1953 Mad 351) (G), he might have referred it to a Full Bench himself."

The observations of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) and approved by the Full Bench in Subbarayudus case (C), were, as already set out, as follows :

"If there is a conflict of Bench decisions, he (i.e., a Single Judge) should refer the case to a Bench of two Judges who may refer it to a Full Bench......"

and not that single Judge should refer the matter to a Full Bench. It is not clear whether the later Full Bench decision in 1955 Andh LT (Civ.) 444) : ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 221) (H), is to be understood as overruling the observations in Subbarayudus case (C) and enabling a single Judge to refer the matter direct to the Full Bench. Though the practice obtaining in the Madras High Court is to direct the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice for a reference to a Full Bench, having regard to the fact that there is no rule enabling a single Judge to refer the matter to a Full Bench direct and the observations of Subbarao, J., (as he then was) approved by the Full Bench in Subbarayudus case (C) are that I should refer the matter to a Bench in order to enable the Bench to post it before a Full Bench, I am directing this matter to be posted before a Bench under R. 1 of the Appellate Side Rules.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

(Subba Rao, C.J. and Umamaheswaram, J.)

SUBBA RAO, C.J. :-

3. Umamaheswaram, J., directed this matter to be posted before a Bench to enable the Bench, if necessary, to refer it to a Full Bench.

4. Before we state the facts, the rule of procedure pointed out by our learned brother Umamaheswaram, J., may be noticed. Umamaheswaram, J., criticised the statement of Bhimasankaram, J., in 1955 Andh LT (Civ.) 444 : ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 221) (FB) (H), that a single Judge might refer the case to a Full Bench and observed that it was not supported by the Full Bench Decision in ILR 1955 Andhra 1 : 1955 Andh LT (Cri) 53 : ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87) (FB) (C). It is true that according to the Full Bench, a single Judge cannot directly refer a matter to a Full Bench. We understand that Bhimasankaram, J., made that observation on the basis of the practice obtaining in Madras High Court. Whatever may be the practice in Madras, we should strictly follow the rules of procedure laid down by the Full Bench of this Court.

5. The question raised is whether by reason of R. 134-A of the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Regional Transport Authority which issued the permit can delegate its power to cancel or suspend it to a subordinate body, and if it did so whether the order made by the Subordinate authority cancelling the permit would contravene the provisions of S. 60 (1) of the Act. A Division Bench of this Court in 1956 Andh LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A), held that S. 60, being a special provision governing suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general rule empowering the authority to cancel an order made by a Superior Officer.

In that view, the Division Bench held that an order of the Secretary suspending a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal. The same question was raised before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C. J., and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in Writ Petn. No. 87 of 1951 (B), and though this particular point was not raised in terms, the learned Judges held that the order made by the Regional Transport Officer cancelling the permit issued by a superior officer was valid and under R. 134-A that power was validly delegated to him by the Transport Authority.

This judgment, though delivered in August, 1952, was not reported either in authorised or unauthorised journals. We do not know whether the Judges who delivered the Judgment did not give permission for its being reported. Ordinarily, we should think that unreported judgements of other High Courts should not be a basis for referring points finally decided by a Division Bench of this Court to a Full Bench. But this Judgment has been brought to our notice and was already considered by one of our learned brothers we think it would be in the interests of the public that the question is finally decided by a Full Bench of this Court. We accordingly refer the following question to a Full Bench :

"Whether, by reason of R. 134-A (xi) of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Secretary, to whom the power to cancel or suspend a permit is delegated, can validly cancel or suspend the permit issued by the Transport Authority?"

ORDER OF THE FULL BENCH

SUBBA RAO, C.J. :-

6. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments prepared by Ansari, J., and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., expressing conflicting views on the question referred to the Full Bench. The judgments disclose that two views can reasonably be taken on the question.

7. In 1956 Andh LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A), a Division Bench of this High Court of which I was a member, expressed an opinion consistent with the view taken by Ansari, J., After hearing the arguments of the Government Pleader more elaborately advanced than on the first occasion and after giving respectful attention to the reasons given by Jaganmohan Reddy, J., in his judgement. I do not feel any justification for changing my view already expressed in the earlier judgement. I, therefore, agree with Ansari, J., and answer the question in the negative.

M.A. ANSARI, J. :-

8. The question referred to this Full Bench, is :

"Whether, by reason of R. 134-A (xi) of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Secretary, to whom the power to cancel or suspend a permit is delegated, can validly cancel or suspend the permit issued by the Transport Authority."

9. The aforesaid reference has arisen in a Writ Petition that seeks cancellation of three orders passed against the petitioner. He is the owner of the bus with a route permit between Prayathipur and Elwinpet in Srikakulam District. The Sub-Inspector of Parvathipur had made a complaint that on March 30, 1953, the stage carriage M D V 1959 was carrying 54 passengers as against its capacity of 33 passengers and was also being dangerously driven at a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour while the authorised limit was only 25 miles.

The Regional Transport Officer, Srikakulam thereafter, called upon the petitioner to show cause why action should not be taken against him under S. 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV of 1939, and his permit suspended. The explanation offered denied any offence having been committed, stating that if an offence was committed the driver as well as the conductor would alone be responsible; and the owner could not be penalised.

The Officer rejected the explanation and suspended the permit for a month and a half. On appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board, its Secretary reduced the permit of suspension for one month. The Government in exercise of its revisionary powers has refused to interfere. These orders are challenged in the Writ Petition as being illegal and unconstitutional. By an amendment two further grounds have been taken for vacating the orders.

The first of these is that the Regional Transport Officer has no jurisdiction under law to take action against the permit and that his proceedings are void, and of no avail. The learned Judge hearing the Writ Petition referred it to a Division Bench, because of conflict of judicial views on the Secretarys jurisdiction to suspend permits by Regional Transport Authority. As the Decisions are of Division Benches, the question already mentioned has been referred to this Full Bench.

10. It would facilitate a better appreciation of the two views if the relevant statutory provisions and the Rules framed thereunder are given at the very beginning. They are contained in Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 42 requires owners to use in public places their transport vehicles in accordance with the conditions of permits granted or countersigned by the Regional or State Transport Authority. The State Government is empowered by S. 44 (1) to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities for exercising and discharging the powers and functions conferred on them by the Chapter. Section 44 (5) is important and reads as follows :

"The Provincial Transport Authority or any Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made under S. 68, may delegate such of its powers and functions to such authority or person and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said rules."

Under S. 45, every application for permit is to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region or to one of the regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle. Section 58 (1) : provides the duration of a permit, other than one which is temporary, to be not less than three and not more than five years and the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. Section 59 contains what conditions should attach to the permits.

It forbids transfer except with the permission of the Transport Authority which granted the permit. Sub-section (2) further enacts that, the holder may with the permission of the Authoritv by which the permit was granted, replace his vehicle by another of the same nature, and capacity. The powers of cancellation and suspension of permit are given by S. 60, which runs as follows :

"60. (1) The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit -

(a) on the breach of any condition specified in sub-s. (3) of S. 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or

(b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit, or

(c) if the holder of the permit ceases to possess the vehicle or vehicles covered by the permit, or (d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation ;

Provided that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation.

* * * *

11. Reference may also be made to S. 61 which relates to transfer of permit on death of the holder and enables the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicle to use for three months subject to such a person within thirty days of the death informing the transport authority which granted the permit. There remains only S. 68 which confers rule-making power on the State Government. Its relevant parts are as follows :-

"68. (1) A Provincial Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely :-

XX XX XX

(za) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed."

12. Only Rule 134-A need be mentioned out of the Rules framed in exercise of the power conferred by the Section. Its part important for purposes of this reference is the following :-

"The Board may for prompt and convenient despatch of business by general or special resolution delegate to the Secretary the following functions :-

XX XX XX

(xi) power under Section 60 of the Act to suspend a permit and the power under S. 63 (3) read with S. 60 of the Act to suspend counter-signatures of permits."

13. Now, there are two authorities of the Madras High Court that the Rule is not ultra vires. The first of these is the judgement of the Learned Chief Justice and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in (Writ Petn. No. 87 of 1951 (Mad) (B)). The petitioner in the case was the Managing Director of a Company owning a bus running on the route Nandyal - Jammalamadugu under a stage carriage permit by the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Officer, as the Secretary of the granting authority passed an order suspending the permit for two weeks on the ground of the bus having been overloaded. An appeal was preferred which was dismissed. In the Writ Petition one of the grounds taken was that the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority could not be suspended by the Secretary.

It was argued that the power of delegation conferred by S. 44 (5) should be construed as subject to the qualification that only powers and functions which were not judicial or quasi-judicial could be delegated and as suspension of a permit was a judicial function it could not be delegated. The contention was not accepted on the ground that there was nothing in the subsection which restricted the power of delegation. The learned Judges observed :

"Once a function is among those prescribed by the rules, the delegation cannot be challenged."

The case in which a different view is taken is 1956 Andhra LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A). There were three writ petitions. In one the Regional Transport Officer, Guntur, had suspended the bus permit for six weeks on account of an unauthorised extra trip. In the second Writ Petition the same officer having found the bus to have taken 36 passengers as against the seating capacity of 33, had suspended the renewed permit for a month. In the third petition the permit was suspended also for overloading. It was held therein that the Secretary had no power to cancel the permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority, and his orders were without jurisdiction. His Lordship the Chief Justice delivering the judgment had observed at pp. 290 and 291 (of Andhra LT) : (at P. 234 of AIR) :

"......it is clear that R. 134-A (xi) is a general provision, and S. 60 (1) is a special provision, overlapping each other to some extent in respect of the same subject-matter. Both provide for suspending a permit already issued. While R. 134-A (xi) says that the Secretary can suspend a permit under certain circumstances, S. 60 enacts that the Secretary can suspend a permit only if he has granted it. Section 60 being a special provision governing suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general rule empowering the authority to cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer. By so construing, we must hold that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal."

14. This authority has not been followed in the decision of the Madras High Court in Dhanmull Sowcar v. Secretary R.T. A., 1957-1 Mad LJ 314 : ( (S) AIR 1957 Mad 387) (I). In that case, the petitioner held a permit by the Regional Transport Authority. North Arcot District, and on a report by the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector that the bus was overloaded the Regional Transport Officer, who was also the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, directed suspension of the permit for three months. The appeal was dismissed, but the period was reduced by the Government in exercise of revisional powers.

The learned Judges held that the provision in S. 44 (5) of the Motor Vehicles Act for the delegation of powers of the Regional Transport Authority, does not offend the well-recognised concept of jurisdiction that a Judicial Officer cannot delegate his functions to another. rule 134-a of the rules was also held as not ultra vires of the rule-making authority. Rajagopalan, J., at p. 317 (of Mad LJ) : (at pp. 389-390 of AIR) made the following observations concerning S. 60 :

"Section 60 of the Act conferred the power to cancel or suspend a permit on the Transport Authority which granted that permit. That was obviously to specify with precision which among the Regional Transport Authorities that were constituted by the State Government under S. 44 (1) of the Act, should exercise the power, for which S. 60 (1) of the Act made provision...... The learned Advocate-General was well-founded in his contention, that the qualifying phrase in S. 60 (1) "which granted a permit" was not intended to make the power conferred by S. 69 (1) of the Act one to be exercised by virtue officio that is, a right "personal" to the grantee the Regional Transport Authority, within the meaning of the principle laid down by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington. (1765) 19 Howell St. Tri. 1030 (J), "a trust that that grantee cannot delegate to another." We have already pointed out that the Act itself made express provision for delegation in S. 44 (5)......... To explain the scope of the qualifying phrase........in S. 60 (1) the learned Advocate-General invited our attention to the provisions of Ss. 59 and 61 of the Act which provided for the transfer of a permit and vested that power in the Regional Transport Authority with a similar qualifying phrase "by which the permit was granted" or "which granted the permit." We have dealt with this aspect only to emphasise that the specific provisions made in S. 44 (5) for the delegation of powers of a Regional Transport Authority, inclusive of the power conferred by S. 60 (1) of the Act, does not offend any well-recognised concept of jurisprudence."

15. The difference between the two views is obvious. One holds that because the power of suspension etc., is vested under S. 60 in the Regional Transport Authority, it can delegate such power under S. 44 (5). The other view is that the statute having linked the power of suspension with the earlier exercise of the power of granting the permit, the State Government in framing the Rules under the Act cannot disregard the link. No rule can, therefore, be framed or construed under which the power of suspension can be delegated to another who had not granted the permit.

With respect to the learned Judges who have taken the former view, I would follow 1956 Andh. LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A). Obviously Ss. 59 and 60 vest certain powers on certain authorities. Such an authority is indicated in the Sections by the phrase "which granted the permit" or "by which the permit was granted." It follows that the power of transference under S. 59 or suspension under S. 60 is exercisable only by the authorities which satisfy the qualifications. The proposition is not challenged. What is urged is that such an authority can under S. 44 (5) delegate the power. The argument, however, overlooks the circumscribed power of delegation conferred by the Act.

Section 44 (5) expressly enacts that the jurisdiction delegated under the Section must be according to the rules framed under the Act and subject to restrictions, limitations and conditions that may be prescribed by these rules. The State Government under S. 68 is directed to make rules for purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter. If the Act insists, and I have come to the conclusion that it does, on linking the power of revocation or suspension with that of having granting the permit, the rule-framing authority cannot disregard the link. No useful purpose will be served in citing authorities in support of the obvious propositions that if rules framed under the statute are in excess of the provisions of the statute they are ultra vires.

It follows that any express rule conferring power of suspension of permit on any authority that has not granted the permit earlier, would be ultra vires. Notwithstanding such an express rule there can be no delegation of power under S. 60 on one that has not earlier granted the permit. If that cannot be done by an express rule a fortiorari it cannot be done by construing a rule, however, widely worded it may be. The result is that S. 44 (5) cannot be invoked in support of the view mentioned earlier in the paragraph. The question is not where there is personal trust conferred on the delegating authority. The point is that no Rule according to which the authority can delegate can be framed or construed so as to enable the authority to separate and confer the cancelling power on one who had not granted the permit.

It is also not clear why the phrase "which granted a permit" in S. 60 should be construed as indicating only Regional Transport Authorities. The State Transport Authority under S. 44 (3) (b) can perform the duties of Regional Transport Authority where there is no such Authority, and obviously S. 60 would cover the case of such an authority where it is discharging the functions. So also S. 60 would cover the case of a person who is exercising the delegated power if the permit which is being suspended, has been granted by such delegation. It is clear that the phrase "which granted a permit" in S. 60 links up the power conferred by the section with the power of having granted the permit, whichever be the authority that has granted the permit. That is the rational reading of the several Sections.

16. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the answer to the questions is in the negative.

JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. :-

17. On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules, I have come to a different conclusion.

18. The following question has been referred to us : (After stating the question, the judgment proceeds as under : -)

A Division Bench of this Court presided over by the Honble Chief Justice had in the case of 1956 Andhra LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232), (A), held that S. 60 being a special provision governing suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general R. 134-A (xi) empowering the authority to cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer in certain, circumstances and consequently the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority was held to be illegal. In (W. P. 87 of 1951 (Mad) (B)), a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C. J., and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in a judgment delivered on the 11th August 1952, considered the question raised before them, namely, that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to suspend the permit in his favour because under S. 60 (1) it is the Transport Authority which granted the permit that can cancel a permit or suspend it.

In that case it was the Regional Authority which granted the petitioner a permit while the Secretary who was the Regional Transport Officer acting in exercise of the powers delegated under S. 44 (5) of the Act, passed orders suspending the permit in favour of the petitioner for two weeks on the ground that the petitioner had overloaded the bus. It was held that the Regional Transport Officer was acting well within the scope of the Act in passing the orders of suspension. The contentions raised either before the Bench in 1956 Andhra LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A), or before us do not appear to have been raised in that case. In order to appreciate the contentions urged before us, it isnecessary to examine the several provisions of the Act and Rules.

(After quoting the relevant provisions of Ss. 44, 45, 59, 60, 61, 63, 68 and R. 134-A. His Lordship continued as follows :-)

19. In 1956 Andhra LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A), it was urged that R. 134-A, particularly sub-r. (xi) is in excess of the rule-making power of the Provincial Government. The argument was that S. 68 (1) does not apply as the rule is not only not inserted to carry into effect the provisions of that Chapter, but is also inconsistent with the provisions of S. 60 (1), that cl. (z-a) of sub-s. (2) of S. 68 has no bearing as no power is conferred on any authority to make rules for delegating its functions.

It was there held that S. 68 (1) authorises the Provincial Government to make rules empowering the Regional Transport Authority to delegate its functions and S. 68 (2) (z-a) enables it to make rules laying down conditions subject to which the said delegation can be made and that R. 134-A (xi) is certainly within the scope of the rule-making power of the Government.

The learned Chief Justice in the case of W. P. 87 of 1951 (Mad) (B) observed that there was nothing in 6. 44 (5) which restricts the power of delegation and that it does not offend the well-recognised principle that a Judicial or non-judicial officer cannot delegate his power to another; that the sub-section expressly indicates that the authority concerned may delegate such of its powers and once a function is among those prescribed by the rules, the delegation cannot be challenged. The question before us is not that the delegation cannot be made or is bad, but is whether the rule empowers the delegated authority to suspend a permit not granted by it.

In other words, has the delegation been circumscribed by preserving the power of revocation or suspension in the authority which granted the permit. His Lordship the Chief Justice in 1956 Andhra LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A), put it on the basis that both the R. 134-A (xi) the general provision and S. 60 (1) the special provision overlap each other to some extent in respect of the same subject-matter. His Lordship observed at pp. 290 and 291 (of Andh LT) : (at p. 234 of AIR) :

"...............Both provide for suspending a permit, already issued. While R. 134-A (xi) says that the Secretary can suspend a permit under certain circumstances, S. 60 enacts that the Secretary can suspend a permit only if he has granted it. Section 60 being a Special Provision governing suspension of permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general rule empowering the authority to cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer. By so constructing, we must hold that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is Illegal."

Learned Government Pleader relies upon the recent decision of the Madras High Court in 1957-1 Mad LJ 314 : ((S) AIR 1957 Mad 387) (I), which takes a contrary view. Rajagopalan, J., at P. 320 (of Mad LJ) : (at pp. 391-92 of AIR) after considering the case of Amaravathi Motor Transport Co., (A), observed :

"............We are unable to discover any real basis for holding that S. 60 is a special provision and that R. 134-A (xi) should be construed as a general provision regulating the jurisdiction to cancel or suspend permits. Section 60 of the Act is the only provision in the Act itself, which provides for the exercise of the power to suspend or cancel a permit. It is that power that can be delegated under S. 44 (51 of the Act. It was that power that was delegated to the Regional Transport Officer under R 134-A (xi).

The validity of that delegation was upheld by the learned Judges and we have already held that R. 134-A including item (xi) thereof is intravires. The delegation under S. 44 (5) is subject to any limitations or conditions that can be imposed by the rule-making power. rule 134-a (xi) did not impose any conditions either expressly or by necessary intendment that the operation of that rule was confined only to a permit granted by the Regional Transport Officer himself.

The authority to grant a permit was given to the Regional Transport Authority by the Act. Delegation of that power was permissible under S. 44 (5) of the Act, and a limited power was delegated to the Regional Transport Officer by R. 134. We have endeavoured to explain the scope of the Qualifying phrase "which granted a permit" in S. 60 (1) of the Act. In our opinion S. 60 (1) is the only statutory provision for the power to punish by suspension. Exercise of that power is further regulated by R. 134-A (xi).

The delegation of the jurisdiction to exercise that power is valid. Still, what has been delegated is only the power conferred by S. 66 (1) of the Act. If the delegation is valid, it is that power, subject to the conditions and limitations imposed by R. 134-A (xi) that vests in the Regional Transport Officer and that vesting is valid".

The arguments Submitted by the learned Government Pleader centres round the interpretation of the qualifying words "which granted the permit" in S. 60 (1) of the Act. The contention simply put is that these qualifying words do not vest the power conferred by S. 60 (1) of the Act in the Regional Transport "Authority to be exercised virtuo officio in order to justify the conclusion that the power of revocation or Suspension has been linked with that of the authority granting the permit. It is necessary therefore, to examine the true meaning and ambit of the qualifying words which granted a permit occurring in S. 60 (1).

Are these words used merely to refer to the particular transport authority granting the permit out of the several transport authorities functioning in different regions as words of description or have they been inserted with the object of confining the power of cancellation or suspension of the permit only to the authority which granted the permit: that is, are the words of limitation? I now propose to examine the relevant provisions of the Act given above in order to ascertain the true import of the qualifying words used in S. 60 (1).

20. Section 44 specifies the transport authorities which the Government by notification in the Official Gazette, shall constitute for the provinces (States) namely. Provincial Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities for each of the areas as may be specified in the notification. The functions of the Provincial Transport Authority are shown in sub-s. (3) cl. (b) which empowers the Provincial Transport Authority to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such authority and if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions. Under S. 45 every application for a permit is to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region or of one of the regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle and if the applicant resides or has his principal place of business in any one of those regions to the Regional Transport Authority of that region.

The proviso authorises the State Government by notification in the Gazette to direct that applications for such class of permits and in such region as may be specified in the notification shall be made to the Provincial Transport Authority. It may be noticed that a person has been given the option to apply for a permit to one or other of the Regional Transport Authority of the Regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or to one or other of the Regional Transport Authorities where the applicant resides or any one of those regions. Apart from the several regional authorities which are empowered to grant a permit, in the case of an applicant who intends to use his vehicle in one or more regions, the Government can also by a notification direct the applicant to apply for permits to the Provincial Transport Authority.

Further under S. 44(3)(b) if the Regional Transport Authority is not functioning in any region or if so required the Provincial Transport Authority can perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any route common to two or more regions. From the aforesaid provisions it appears to me that where there are more than one authority which are empowered to grant a permit to the applicant, the qualifying words "which granted the permit" are used to identify the authority which actually granted the permit and naturally it can only be that authority which can cancel or suspend the permit and not any other authority which could have granted the permit.

It is significant to note that the words in S. 60 (1) are not Regional Transport Authority, but merely the Transport Authority. The marginal note to S. 44 uses the words Transport Authorities to denote both the Provincial Transport Authority as well as the Regional Transport Authorities. It appears to me, therefore, that when in S. 60 (1) the words transport authority which granted a permit are used, they are only intended to specify out of the several transport authorities empowered to grant a permit, the particular authority which has actually granted the permit.

The authority which has actually granted the permit must necessarily cancel or suspend the permit. No other authority can do so even though the other regional authorities could have granted a permit to the applicant either on account of his residence or place of business etc,. In S. 59 also which restricts transfer of permit from one person to another the permission to be sought for such transfer is the transport authority "which granted the permit." In sub-s. (2) when dealing with the permission to be granted for replacing one vehicle by another of the same nature, the permission is to be of the authority by which the permit was granted.

Section 63 states that a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of one region is not valid in any other region, unless the permit is counter-signed by the transport authority of that region, Subject to such conditions which that regional authority, when counter-signing, may attach in the same way as it would have imposed if it had granted the permit. Sub-section (3) applies the provisions in that Chapter relating to grant, revocation and suspension of the permits to the counter-signatures of permits. The power to grant, revocation and suspension of the counter-signature under this sub-section is not qualified by the words by the Transport Authority which counter-signed the permit.

In my view this was not necessary because the Transport Authority counter-signing the permit has been sufficiently identified as the transport authority of the region where the permit is to be made valid. One other significant matter to which I wish to refer is that in the provisions relating to the making of applications, procedure for considering these applications and the power of restricting the permits and imposing conditions etc., that is in Ss. 47, 48, 50, 51, 53 and 55, the indefinite article A has been pre-fixed to the Regional transport authority generally to denote any of the several regional authorities.

It is only after the stage of the grant of permit has passed that the words of description "which granted a permit or by which the permit was granted or of that other region in Ss. 59 (1) and (2), 60 (1), 61 (1) and 63 (1) have been used to specify the particular transport authority granting the permit or counter-signing the permit. It is true that the power to cancel or suspend the permit is given to the transport authority of the region granting the permit; but that does not further, make that a right personal to the grantee. Under S. 44 (3) (b) it may be seen that the Provincial Transport Authority can perform the duties of a Regional Authority where there is no such authority.

If the argument that the right to cancel or suspend the permit is linked with the authority issuing the permit, is accepted that is, if it is a right personal to the grantee, then even after the regional authority for the area has been appointed, it cannot cancel or suspend the permits given by the Provincial Transport Authority. That could not have been intended to be the result, because after the Regional Transport Authority is appointed the Provincial Transport Authority can have no jurisdiction over the region except to the limited extent provided for under S. 44; if so the Regional Transport Authority which is actually functioning cannot regulate the Motor Transport plying in its region by either cancelling a permit or suspending it.

Once it has been held that a delegation of the power can be validly made, and that is not question before us, the exercise of that power cannot be deemed to be personal to the Regional Authority granting the permit. On the other hand, as I have ventured to show, the various provisions of the Act point to a contrary view. Sub-section (5) of S. 44 authorises the delegation of any of the powers, that is, either the power to cancel or the power to suspend or both and once any or all of the powers are delegated the authority to which it is delegated becomes identified with the transport authority of the region granting the permit.

Further the Secretary under R. 134-A (xi) is only vested with the power to suspend the permit or to suspend the counter-signatures of permits. For exercising that power no limitations have been imposed to restrict it only to cases in which the Secretary has granted the permit or counter-signed it. If a limitation of that nature was intended it would have implied the delegation of the power to the Secretary to grant the permit. Otherwise it would tantamount to saying that the delegation of power of suspension alone would be invalid or at any rate otiose.

But it has been held in 1956 Andh LT 285 : (AIR 1956 Andhra 232) (A), that R. 134-A (xi) is certainly within the scope of the rule-making power of the Government and is therefore valid and as observed by Rajamannar, C. J., once a function is among those prescribed by the rules, the delegation cannot be challenged. With great respect I agree with this view. My answer to the question, therefore, is in the affirmative.

Reference answered in the negative.