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Kovi Pitchaiah v. Pemulapati Chinna Subba Naidu And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Nov 17, 1959
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The material facts as recorded in the opinion are: the only son of the 1st defendant died unmarried two years prior to institution of the suit. Thereafter the 1st defendant and her daughter (the 2nd defendant) executed a sale-deed dated 24 March 1954 in favour of the plaintiff. The 5th defendant was the husband of the 2nd defendant and an undivided son of the 3rd defendant.

The plaintiff (appellant in the present appeal) filed a suit for a declaration of title to the suit lands and for a permanent injunction restraining defendants 3 to 9 from interfering with his cultivation. Defendants 1 and 2 did not contest; defendants 3 to 9 resisted inter alia on the ground that the sale-deed did not create rights in favour of the plaintiff.

The trial court (district munsif) framed issues (copied in the record) including title, maintainability of a declaration suit, possession within 12 years, adverse possession by defendants 3 to 9, and bar under section 15 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. The trial court found for the plaintiff on all issues and decreed the suit.

Defendants 3 to 9 appealed to the district court, Cuddapah. At the hearing of that appeal, counsel for the appellants and the 1st respondent filed a joint memorandum agreeing that the appeal should be remanded to the lower court for fresh disposal on three specified questions. On that basis the district judge allowed the appeal and remanded the suit to the trial court. The plaintiff then filed the present appeal against the order of remand.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a case may be remanded by an appellate court with the consent of the parties (i.e., whether an order of remand based solely on the consent of parties is permissible under Order 41, Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
  2. Whether an order of remand made by an appellate court contrary to the express provisions of the Code (as existed under earlier enactments) can be validated by the consent or waiver of the parties.
  3. More specifically, whether the remand effected in this case (pursuant to a joint memorandum identifying three questions for fresh disposal) was within the appellate court's jurisdiction and powers under section 107 and Order 41, Rule 23 CPC (Madras amendment applicable to Andhra Pradesh).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the appellant contended that an order of remand solely based on the consent of the parties is not warranted by the provisions of Order 41, Rule 23, Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The appellant relied on the statutory language (section 107 and Order 41, Rule 23 as amended) and older precedents to argue that remand powers are circumscribed and a remand based purely on consent is illegal.

Position of Parties Who Sought Remand (Joint Memorandum)

  • Counsel for the appellants (defendants 3 to 9 on the original suit) and the 1st respondent filed a joint memorandum agreeing that the appeal should be remanded for fresh disposal on three specific questions: (1) whether a sale dated 7 September 1936 in favour of Kovi Narasaya was for necessity and binding on defendants 4 to 9; (2) whether the plaintiff was in possession on the date of suit and if not whether the suit was maintainable; (3) whether the suit was barred by section 15 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act.
  • The district judge acted on that joint memorandum and remanded the case; the plaintiff appealed from that order of remand.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manager of the Court of Wards v. Ramaswami Reddi, (1905) 15 M.L.J. 236 : I.L.R. 28 Mad. 437 Held that an order of remand contrary to the provisions of the Code is illegal; Subramania Ayyar, J. held such an illegal remand might nevertheless be cured by consent; Moore, J. dissented, holding consent would not validate an illegal remand. The court reviewed this decision as part of older authority showing a split view; it noted Subramania Ayyar's view that consent can cure such defects and Moore's contrary view, and it considered this split in arriving at its conclusion that remand by consent is permissible under the amended rule.
Palani Chetty v. Rangiadoss Naidu, (1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad. 83 Held that an order of remand contrary to section 562 (old Code) was illegal and could not be validated by the corresponding validating provision; omission to appeal did not amount to consent or waiver. The court treated this as authority that under the old code an illegal remand could not be validated by mere acquiescence; it distinguished this earlier position from the effect of the revised/amended provisions under the new Code and later decisions.
Natesa Gramani v. Venkatarama Reddi, (1907) 17 M.L.J. 518 : I.L.R. 30 Mad. 510 Division bench held that the effect of an appeal was to reopen the decree and that it was competent for the appellate court, on the agreement of parties, to remand the case for trial on issues not raised in the memorandum of appeal. The court noted this case as one of the authorities under the unamended code supporting remand by agreement of parties and used it in the survey of earlier conflicting decisions.
Muthusami Odayan v. Kolandavelu Odayan, A.I.R. 1914 Mad. 15 Held that the power of remand under the new Code (1908) was wider than under the old Code and that an order of remand on the basis of the consent of parties was neither illegal nor improper. The court relied on this decision as authoritative for the proposition that under the new Code an appellate court's remand power is wide and remand by consent is permissible; this case supported the conclusion reached by the court in the present opinion.
Srimannarayanacharyulu v. Bhavanacharyulu, (1948) 1 M.L.J. 336 : A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 348 Observed that if a judge remanded because of parties' consent he should confine the trial after remand to the conditions specified in the consent memorandum; implied that remand by consent could occur. The court read this decision as indicating that remand by consent is possible and remarked that the judgment implied such a possibility, though the judge in that case did not have to decide the point expressly.
Thirumalaiswami Mudali v. Periasami Mudali, (1951) 2 M.L.J. 532 Discussed whether the consent of an advocate for the appellant could validly support an order of remand; the appellate court in that case did not purport to act solely on consent, so the question was not decided. The court cited the case to show that some later decisions did not find it necessary to decide the express question but treated the matter consistently with the view that remand by consent falls within appellate power.
Baikuntha Nath Dey v. Nawab Salimulla Bahadur, (1907) 12 C.W.N. 590 Calcutta High Court held an order of remand made with consent, though contrary to the old Code's provisions, would bind the parties; error of law in remand may be cured by consent. The court cited this decision as supportive of the proposition that an appellate court, vested with power over the subject-matter, may make a remand which, even if erroneous in form, can be cured by consent of parties; it used this reasoning in its survey of authorities favouring consent-remand.
Subba Sastri v. Balachandra Sastri, (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 421 Authority for the proposition that failure to appeal under a particular provision could not be treated as consent or waiver. The court cited this case in the context of earlier decisions (not as determinative of the present point) to show that passive conduct (failure to appeal) is not necessarily consent to an illegal remand under the old Code; it used this to distinguish earlier holdings regarding waiver.
Allahabad High Court decision reported in 1951 All. W.R. 199 Held that where the appellate court reversed findings of fact and remanded for trial de novo by consent of parties, it did not act illegally or with material irregularity even though it could have disposed of the appeal itself. The court relied on this as an example of a high court decision outside Madras that supported the validity of remand by consent under the revised procedural regime and used it to bolster the conclusion that consent-remand is within appellate power.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory framework: section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure (defining appellate powers including the power to remand) and Order 41, Rule 23 (as amended in Madras and applicable to Andhra Pradesh) which prescribes the circumstances and procedure for remand by an appellate court.

The opinion traces the historical evolution of the remand power from earlier legislation (section 351 of the 1859 Code and section 562 of the 1882 Code) through amendments and the enactment of the 1908 Code. The court noted that under the earlier law remand was more narrowly circumscribed and that certain decisions under the unamended Code treated remands made contrary to the provisions as illegal.

The court undertook a careful survey of authorities. It identified a split of judicial opinion:

  • Certain older decisions under the unamended Code (e.g., Palani Chetty) held that an illegal remand could not be validated by consent and was not merely irregular.
  • Other decisions under the unamended Code (e.g., Natesa Gramani and the Subramania Ayyar view in Manager of Court of Wards) permitted or suggested that consent could cure an otherwise irregular remand.
  • Decisions under the 1908 Code and its amendments (e.g., Muthusami Odayan) recognized a broader remand power and expressly held that remand on the basis of parties' consent was neither illegal nor improper.

The court emphasized that the amended Order 41, Rule 23 contains wider language—specifically permitting remand "where the appellate court in reversing or setting aside the decree under appeal considers it necessary in the interests of justice to remand the case"—and that this enlargement of power was deliberate and significant.

Having reviewed the Madras High Court authorities (both those critical of remand-by-consent and those supportive), decisions from other High Courts (Calcutta and Allahabad) and principles concerning consent orders and estoppel, the court concluded that:

  • The appellate court possesses statutory power under section 107 and the amended Order 41, Rule 23 to remand a case;
  • Under the revised procedural regime and the Madras amendment, an order of remand based on the consent of parties falls within the scope of that power and is not rendered illegal merely because it departs from procedural forms that governed the old Code;
  • Consent orders, once validly formed, raise estoppel and bind the parties much like consent judgments generally do (the court referred to established authority on the binding effect of consent judgments and orders).

The court therefore analyzed prior conflicting authorities, treated earlier restrictive rulings as arising under the unamended law, and aligned itself with authorities holding that the amended rule and the broader power vested by the 1908 Code allow remand by consent.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that an order of remand based on the consent of the parties is within the scope of the powers of an appellate court under Order 41, Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended in Madras and applicable to Andhra Pradesh).

The direct consequence in the case at hand was that the present appeal (challenging the district judge's remand order) failed: the appeal was dismissed with costs and leave to appeal was refused (the opinion records "Leave refused. Appeal dismissed : no leave.").

Implications identified within the opinion:

  • The decision affirms that, under the amended procedural provisions, appellate courts may remand by consent and such consent-based remand orders will bind the parties;
  • The opinion treats consent orders as giving rise to estoppel and being binding in substance like other consent judgments/orders, subject only to the usual contractual or equitable grounds for setting aside consent;
  • If a remand is made pursuant to a memorandum of consent specifying conditions, the court indicates that those conditions should be observed on remand (as discussed in the cited authorities).

The opinion expressly grounds its conclusion in the statutory language of section 107 and Order 41, Rule 23 (Madras amendment), the evolution of the law from prior Codes, and a considered review of precedents; no broader or different consequences were asserted beyond these points and the immediate dismissal of the appeal.

Show all summary ...

(1) This is an appeal against a judgment of the court of the district judge, cuddapah, and raises the question as to whether a case may be remanded with the consent of parties.

(2) The material facts are these : the only son of the 1st defendant died unmarried two years prior to suit whereafter the 1st defendant and her daughter, the and defendant, executed a sale - deed, dated 24th march, 1954, in favour of the plaintiff. The 5th defendant is the husband of the 2nd defendant and is an undivided son of the 3rd defendant. The appellant filed the suit for a declaration that he was entitled to the suit lands and for a permanent injunction restraining defendants 3 to 9 from interfering with his cultivation of the lands. There was no contest by defendants 1 and 2 but the other defendants resisted the suit inter alia on the ground that the said sale - deed did not create any rights in favour of the plaintiff. The trial court framed the following issues : -

" (1) whether the plaintiff has title to the suit property ? (2) whether the suit for mere declaration is maintainable ? (3) whether the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land at any time within 12 years ? (4) whether the defendants 3 to 9 have prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession ? (5) whether the suit is barred by the provisions of section 15 of madras estates (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act ?"

(3) After a consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the district munsif found on all the above issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit as prayed for. Against the said decree, defendants 3 to 9 preferred an appeal to the district court, cuddapah. When the appeal came on for hearing, counsel for the appellants and the 1st respondent filed the following joint memorandum : -

" both parties agree that on the three questions mentioned below, the appeal has to be remanded to the lower court for fresh disposal according to law : (1) whether the sale in favour of kovi narasaya, dated 7th september, 1936, is for necessity and binding on debfendants 4 to 9 ? (2) whether the plaintiff was in possession on the date of suit and if not, is the suit maintainable ? (3) whether the suit is barred by section 15 of madras estates (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act ?"

On the basis of the above memorandum, the learned district judge allowed the appeal and remanded the suit to the trial court for fresh disposal. Thereupon, the plaintiff has filed this appeal against the order of remand.

(4) It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that an order of remand solely based on the consent of parties is not warranted by the provisions of Order 41, rule 23, code of civil procedure. Now, section 107, which defines the powers of an appellate court, reads : -

" (1) subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an appellate court shall have power - (a) to determine a case finally ; (b) to remand a case (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial ; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) subject as aforesaid, the appellate court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this code on courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein."

(5) Sub - section (1) specifies the powers conferred on an appellate court in order to enable it to dispose of a case completely and effectively. The powers themselves are mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) and the conditions and limitations subject to which such powers are to be exercised are prescribed in the first schedule. Order 41, rule 23, defines the scope of the power of a court under clause (b) to remand a case. The rule, as amended by the madras high court, which is also the provision applicable to the state of andhra pradesh, reads : -

"where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal, or where the appellate court in reversing or setting aside the decree under appeal considers it necessary in the interests of justice to remand the case, the appellate court may, by order, remand the case and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded, and shall send a copy of its judgment and order to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, with directions to re - admit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit ; and the evidence (if any) recorded during the original trial shall, subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand."

(6) The present provision corresponds to section 351 in the code of civil procedure, 1859, and section 562 of the code of 1882. Section 562 ran thus : -

"if the court against whose decree the appeal is made has disposed of the suit upon a preliminiary point, and the decree upon such preliminary point is reversed in appeal, the appellate court may, if it thinks fit, by order remand the case, together with a copy of the order in appeal, to the court against whose decree the appeal is made, with directions to re - admit the suit under its original number in the register and proceed to determine the suit on the merits. The appellate court may, if it thinks fit, direct what issue or issues shall be tried in any case so remanded."

(7) Before this section was amended by act vii of 1888, where a case had been decided on a preliminary point, and essential evidence had thereby been excluded, and the decree reversed in appeal, then the appellate court had the discretionary power to remand the case. The code of 1908, as appears from a comparison of the language employed in section 562, which preceded the enactment of Order 41, rule 23, enlarged the power of the court in the matter of remand. The madras amendment inserted the words : "where the appellate court in reversing or setting aside the decree under appeal considers it necessary in the interests of justice to remand the case ", and deleted the words " if it thinks fit ", occuiring in the original rule. Sri venkatarama sastri, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended thac the power of an appellate court to direct a remand is circumscribed bv the provisions of order 41, rule 23 and a remand based on the consent of parties is illegal. In support of this contention he has relied upon two decisions of the madras high court. The first of them, which is earlier in point of time, is the decision of a division bench consisting of subramania ayyar and moore, jj. , in the manager of the court of wards v. Ramaswami reddi, (1905) 15 m. L. J. 236 : i. L. R. 28 mad. 437. There the court of first instance had framed all the necessary issues and decided all those issues and the lower appellate court, reversing the decision of the court of first instance on one of the issues, remanded the case for re - trial under section 564, civil procedure code. Both the learned judges concurred in holding that an order of remand contrary to the provisions of the code was not merely irregular but illegal. Subramania ayyar, j. , however, held that an order of remand

"in contravention of section 564 is a violation of a mandatory provision of the law which makes the order of remand illegal, and one that ought to be set aside at the instance of a party entitled to object to such a procedure, but which nevertheless is of such a character that the defect can be cured by consent."

(8) The learned judge observed :

"the doctrine that consent does not give jurisdiction of course applies where the court has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject - matter': ledgard v. Bull, l. R. 13 i. A. 134 at 135. It would not, however, apply to violations of rules of procedure though they are more than irregularities. For the doctrine of waiver has been applied even where there has been what may be correctly described as jurisdictional defects in a general sense."

Moore, j. , while reaching the conclusion that there was nothing on the record to show that the remand orders was passed by consent, held that even if it were proved that both the appellants and respondents consented to the suit being remanded, that would be immaterial. He was of the view that the order of remand being illegal, consent of parties - would not make it legal.

(9) In the second of the cases, palani chetty v. Rangiadoss naidu, (1909) i. L. R. 32 mad. 83, the facts were these : - the court of first instance passed a decree in favour of plaintiff on the strength of a plan which was not disputed by the defendants. On appeal, the appellate court held that the plan was unsatisfactory and that a proper plan was necessary for a right decision of the suit and remanded the suit for re - trial under section 562, civil procedure code. No appeal was preferred by the plaintiff under section 588, civil procedure code, against the order of remand and the lower court again passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff which was reversed on appeal. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal to the high court. Munro and abdur rahim, jj. , held that the original order of remand was contrary to the provisions of section 562, civil procedure code, as the court of first instance had not decided the suit on a preliminary point within the meaning of the section ; and that such an order was not merely irregular but illegal and could not be validated by section 578, civil procedure code, which corresponds to section 99 of the code of 1908. The learned judges further held that even if such illegal order might be validated by consent or waiver, neither the omission of the plaintiff to appeal under section 588 nor his acquiescing in the trial on remand amounted to such consent or waiver.

(10) It was there observed : - "the illegal remand in the present case cannot therefore be treated as a mere irregularity and section 578, civil procedure code, has no application. It was held, however, by subramania ayyar, j. , in the manager of the court of wards, kalahasti estate v. Ramasami reddi, (1905) 15 m. Lj. 236 : i. L. R. 28 mad. 437, moore, j. , dissenting, that an illegal order of remand might be validated by consent or waiver, and it is therefore argued 'that we should not interfere because the plaintiff did not appeal against the order of remand or object to the district munsif going on with the suit. As to the first of these reasons, the plaintiff had the right either to appeal under section 588 (28) , civil procedure code, against the order of remand, or to take the objection in second appeal. This is not disputed, and there is authority for it in subba sastri v. Balachandra sastri, (1894) i. L. R. 18 mad. 421. Failure to appeal under section 588 (28) cannot therefore be treated as consent or waiver. As to the second reason the plaintiff could not prevent the trial from going on. Thus, even if the view taken by subramania ayyar, j. , be followed, the argument fails. From the above observations it is clear that the learned judges did not expressly dissent from the view taken by subramania ayyar, j. , in the manager of the court of wards v. Ramasami reddi.

(11) In between the two decisions referred to above, a division bench of the same high court consisting of benson and wallis, jj. , held in natesa gramani v. Venkatarama reddi, (1907) 17 m. Lj. 518 : i. L. R. 30 mad. 510, that the effect of an appeal was to reopen the decree of the lower court and it was competent to the appellate court on the agreement of parties to remand the case for trial on issues not raised in the memorandum of appeal. This decision had not been brought to the notice of the learned judges who disposed of the case in palani chetty v. Rangiadoss naidu, (1909) i. L. R. 32 mad. 83. All these cases arose under the unamended code.

(12) After the code of civil procedure, 1908, was enacted a division bench of the madras high court, consisting of sadasiva aiyar and spencer, jj. , held in muthusami odayan v. Kolandavelu odayan, a. I. R. 1914 mad. 15 (1) , that the power of remand possessed by the appellate court under the new civil procedure code was wider than the power under ae old code and that an order of remand on the basis of the consent of parties was neither illegal nor improper. The learned judges followed the view of subramania ayyar, j. , in the manager of court of wards v. Ramasami reddi, (1905) 15 m. L. J. 236 : i. L. R. 28 mad. 437.

(13) In srimannarayanacharyulu v. Bhavanacharyulu, (1948) 1 m. L. J. 336 : a. I. R. 1948 mad. 348, satyanarayana rao, j. , observed as follows : -

"there is nothing in the judgment to show that the learned judge remanded the suit because the parties consented to such a course. If the learned judge intended to remand the case because the parties consented to such a course then he should have confined the trial after remand to the conditions specified in the memo, signed by the advocate for the respondents and the advocate for the appellant."

The learned judge, no doubt, held that as the judgment and decree of the lower court did not contain an indication that the terms of the consent memo, were intended to be followed, it was unnecessary to go into the question. Though the learned judge did not specifically consider the question, it is implied in the above observation that there could be an order of remand by the consent of parties.

(14) It was argued before mr. Justice chandra reddy (as he then was) in thirumalaiswami mudali v. Periasami mudali, (1951) 2 m. L. J. 532, that the consent of the advocate for the appellant could validly support an order of remand passed by the appellate court but the learned judge rightly pointed out that it was not necessary to go into that question by reason of the fact that the appellate court did not purport to act on the consent of the parties. The position which emerges from a consideration of the decisions of the madras high court is this. The power of remand under the new code of civil procedure is much wider than under the old code and an appellate court has undoubted jurisdiction to remand a suit with the consent of parties.

(15) A division bench of the calcutta high court, consisting of stephen and mookerjee, jj. , held in baikuntha nath dey v. Nawab salimulla bahadur, (1907) 12 c. W. N. 590, that an order of remand made with consent, though made contrary to the provisions of section 562 of the old code, would bind the parties. Mr. Justice mookerjee there observed as follows : -

"an appellate court does not act without jurisdiction when it makes an erroneous order of remand, but merely commits an error of law, in making an order of a particular description in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction over the subject - matter of the litigation. Such error may be cured by consent."

(16) The learned judge drew a distinction between cases where the court had no inherent jurisdiction over the subject - matter of the suit and where there was no question of want of inherent competency of the court. In the former class of cases, such jurisdiction could not be conferred by consent ; but in the case of remand, the question was not one of jurisdiction but rather of the power of the court. Clearly, the appellate court is vested with power to dispose of an appeal in one of the modes specified in section 107. The power of the court to make an order of remand in exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction over the subject - matter of the litigation being statutorily recognized, the fact that in the exercise of such power it might commit an error of law, does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court. That being so, the questions arises as to whether the defect is curable by consent. As mr. Justice mookerjee pointed out :

"it is not necessary to discuss whether the error is rightly regarded as an irregularity or may more fittingly be described as an illegality as it is due to a contravention of an express provision of the law ; it is sufficient to hold that the error does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, and consequently may be cured by consent."

(17) The learned judge fortified his conclusion thus : -

"it may also be pointed out that the provisions in sections 562 and 564 are introduced for the benefit of litigants so as to guard against a fresh trial of the whole cause by the court of first instance and to protect them from the delay, trouble and expense of a fresh appeal ; if, therefore, litigants find it the more advantageous course that the whole case should be retried and consent to such a procedure, an order of remand contrary to the provisions of section 564 is not null and void."
the decision of subramania ayyar, j. , in the manager of the court of wards v. Ramasami reddi, (1905) 15 m. L. J. 236 : i. L. R. 28 mad. 437, was relied on by the learned judge as supporting the view taken by him. The allahabad high court also took the same view in a decision reported in 1951 all. W. R. 199. Where the appellate court reversed the findings of fact of the trial court and remanded the case for trial de novo by consent of parties, it was held that it did not act either illegally or with material irregularity even though it could have disposed of the appeal itself.

(18) That a consent order raises an estoppel as much as a decree passed in invitum has been settled by a long course of decisions. So long, therefore, as a consent order stands, it is not open to either party thereto to give it the go - by even if it contains clauses that are bad in law. It is, no doubt, true that a consent order is a mere creature of the agreement on which it is founded, and it may be set aside on any ground which would invalidate an agreement between the parties. The principle is thus stated by vaughan williams, j. , in south american and mexican company, ex parte bank of england, in re. , l. R. (1895) 1 ch. 37 at 45.

"under these circumstances i have only to consider, with reference to the second question, mr. Moulton's suggestion, that a judgment by consent, upon which the court has not exercised its mind, does not and cannot raise an estoppel inter partes. I can only say this is the first time i have ever heard such a proposition suggested. It has always been the law that a judgment by consent or by default raises an estoppel just in the same way as a judgment after the court has exercised a judicial discretion in the matter. The basis of the estoppel is that, when parties have once litigated a matter it is in the interest of the estate that litigation should come to an end; and if they agree upon a result or upon a verdict, or upon a judgment, or upon a verdict and judgment, as the case may be, an estoppel is raised as to all the matters in respect of which an estoppel would have been raised by the judgment if the case had been fought out to the bitter end."

(19) It only remains to add that the powers conferred on an appellate court by the provisions of Order 41, rule 23, as amended in this state, are even more extensive. As a result of the above discussion, the conclusion must be that an order of remand based on the consent of parties is within the scope of the power of the appellate court und'er Order 41, rule 23, code of civil procedure. That being so, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Leave refused. Appeal dismissed : no leave.