A. Kodanda Rao v. Government Of A.P.

Madhava Reddy, J.:-

(1) The writ appeal directed against writ petition no: 2766/77 and writ petition 1000/78 raise one common question of law, viz. , whether the suo motu revisional powers vested in the director of settlements under section 5 (2) of the andhra pradesh (andhra area) estates (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act, hereinafter referred to as estates abolition act, could be exercised even after a lapse of twelve to thirteen years or have to be exercised within a reasonable time.

(2) In the writ appeal, a further question arises as to whether the suo motu revisional powers could be exercised notwithstanding the dismissal of a revision petition filed earlier as time - barred.

(3) The appellants in the writ appeal are the writ petitioners. It it their case that they were granted ryotwari patta by the settlement officer, visakhapatnam under section 11 of the estates abolition act in the year 1960 in respect of certain lands in marripalem village in the estate of talagam. Long after the patta was granted, the district collector, srikakulam filed a revision petition before the director of settlements in the year 1971. That revision petition was filed along with ft petition for condonation of delay. By an order dated 2 - 1 - 1971, the director of settlements dismissed the petition as baired by limitation and on the ground that the order of the settlement officer had become final, in his d. Dis no: 27125/a3/71. That order became final. The director of settlements hoswever, issued a notice dated 5 - 2 - 1974 stating that under the powers conferred upon him under section 5 (2) of the act, he has taken up suo motu revisional enquiry regarding the lands in respect of which patta was granted to the appellants. The appellants entered appeurance and raised a preliminary objection that in view of the fact that the earlier revision petition filed by the collector wag dismissed, he had no jurisdiction to take up suo motu enquiry under section 5 (2) of the act. The director of settlements by his order dated 13 - 6 - 1974 in r. P. No: 84/73 negatived the appellant's contenstion and proposed to proceed further in exercise of his suo motu revisional powers. Against the said order, the appellants preferred a further revision to the commissioner of survey and settlements and land records, andbra pradesh. The commissioner dismissed the petition in c. P, mis. No; 150/77 dated 1 - 6 - 1977 holding that the director of settlements could exercise the suo motu powers of revision and that there was nothing to exclude the case in question. The board of revenue by its order dated 1 - 6 - 1977 dismissed the revision and the writ petition was directed against the said proceedings of the board of revenue and the director of settlements.

(4) Though the claim as to patta is disputed, the facts referred to above as to the circumstances in which the revision filed by the collector was dismissed earlier on 2 - 1 - 1971 and the suo motu revisional power under section 5 (2) which is sought to be invoked by the director of settlements are not disputed. Out learned brother jeevan reddy, j. Dismissed the writ petition holding that the director was fully competent to invoke his suo motu power of revision under section 5 (2) for which no period of limitation was prescribed. He, however, observed:

"it is no doubt true that even the power of revision. For which no period of limitation is prescribed - has to be exercited within a ressonablc time. This aspect was not urged before the director of settlesments. It is for the director to take into consideration the said aspect at the time of passing final orders in the matter."

The writ appeal is directed against the said judgment.

(5) In writ petition no; 1000/78, the writ petitioners were granted patta of ac. 00 - 21 cents of land in survey no: 126/2 of anumasamudram village, an inam village in atmakur taluk in nellore district. The patta was granted under the provisions of the estates abolition act in the year 1959 after enquiry, by the settlement officers. The revenue records were also amended accordingly. On an application made by certain persons in the year 1976 before the director of settlements to cancel the pattas granted in favour of the petitioners, the director of settlements proposed to take up suo motu enquiry under section 5 (2) of the estates abolition act and issued a notice r. P. No: a1/66/78 dated 31 - 1 - 1978 informing the petitioners that for the reasons mentioned therein, he proposed to cancel the patta granted to the petitioners. The petitioners call in question the action of the director of settlements as without jurisdiction and that in any event, the said suo motu enquiry under section 5 (2) cannot be teken up after an unreasonable delay of over nineteen years.

(6) It may be noticed that in the writ appeal the appellants were granted pattas in the year 1960 by the settlement officer after an enquiry under the provisions of the estates abolition act. The grant of patta which stood unchallenged till the year 1971, was sought to be questioned by the collector by filing a revision petition. That revision petition was dismissed on the ground that it was time - barred and also on the ground that the order of the settlement officer made in the year 1961 had become final. That matter was not taken up in further revision to the board of revenue. The order of settlement officer is now sought to be disturbed in exercise of the suo motu revisional powers conferred on the director of settlements under section 5 (2) of the act.

(7) So also in writ petition 1000/78, the order of the settlement officer granting patta after enquiry in the year 1959: is sought to be disturbed after a period of nineteen years in purported exercise of the powers conferred under section 5 (2) of the act on the director of settlements. Section 5 of the estates abolition act reads as follows:

"5. Appointment and function of settlement officers: - (1) as soon as may be after the passing of this act, the government shall appoint one or more settlement officers to carry out the functions and duties assigned to them under this act. (2) every settlement officer shall ba subordinate to the director and shall be guided by such lawful instructions as he may issue from time to time; and the director shall also have power to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the settlement officer, other than these in respsct of which an appeal lies to the tribunal"

.

(8) For the exercise of revisional powers under section 5 (2) no period of limitation as such is prescribed under the act or the rules made thereunder. Therefore it is contended on behalf of the respondents that that power can be exercised at any time and that no period of limitation can be prescribed by analogy or otherwise. However, it is argued by mr. Poornaiah, learned counsel for the appellants and mr. Krishna reddy, learned counsel for the writ petitioners that even though no period of limitation is prescribed under the statute that power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. Before considering the case law, we may notice that under g o,ms. No: 96 revenue dated 21st november 1956, for filing revision petitions against the order of a settlement officer under section 11, period of limitation is prescribed. A period of thirty days is prescribed for filing revisions before the director of settlements against the orders of the settlement officers. No specific period of limitation is prescribed. For the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the director of settlements suo moto under lection 5 (2) of the act.

(9) A division bench of this court in k. Ventata reddy and others vs. The director of settlements, survey and land record: hyderabad and others \ has considered the contention that the revisional powers conferred on the director of settlements can be exercised only within a reasonable time and that the said power exercised after a lapse of seven years from the date of the grant of pattas to the appellants cannot be said to have been exercised within a reasonable period and observed that

"nowhere doe the act fix the period within which the director of settlements have to exercise his suo motu revisional jurisdiction"

. After referring some of the decisions of the supreme court, the division bench observed :

"the only limitations to which the power is subject are that the revisional authority should not trench upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the act, or rules to other authorities and hould not ignore the limitations inherent in the exercise of those powers."

There can be no doubt thet where no period of limitation is pres - sctibcd by the act or the rules made thereunder for the exercise of the suo raotu power of revision, the exercise of the power cannot be impusgned on the ground thet it is barred by limitation. No period of limistation can be imposed other wise then by statute or the rules made there under. But nonetheless, merely because power is vested in an authority to revise the orders of the subordinate authorities suo motu, as observed by our learned brother jeevan reedy, j. , in the order under appeal, "the power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. " in our view in cases where no period of limitation is prescribed under the statute or the rules made thereunder for exercise of revisional powers suo motu, the question for consideration is not whether the exercise of the power is barred by limitation for in the absence of a period of limitation prescribed under the act, the question of bar of limitation cannot arise - - if is a question of the reasonable period of limitation within which thet power should be exercised where the question is one exercising thet power within a reasonable time and what is reasonable period would undosubtedly be dependant upon the facts and circumstances of each case

(10) In state of gujarat vs. Patel raghav nathe and others to which a reference was made by the learned single judge, speaking for a bench of three judges of the supreme court, sikri, j. Considered the question whether the commissioner can revise the order made under section 65 of the bombay land revenue code at any time and answered thus:

"it is true thet there is no period of limitation prescribed under section 211, but it seems to us plain thet this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasosnable time must be determined by the facts of tbc case and the nature of the order which is being revised."

Then the supreme court proceeded to consider whether in the circumsstances of thet case, the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction after a period of more then one year could be deemed to be reasonbale and obsserved thus :

"12. It seems to us thet section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time under section 211. Under sec - 65. Of the code if the collector does not inform the appliscant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows thet a period of three months is considered ample for the collector to make up his mind and beyond thet the legislature thinks thet the matter it so urgent thet permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Readsing sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us thet the comsmissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few monthi of the order of the collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operastions at least within a few mouths from the date of the permisssion. In this case the commissioner set aside the order of the collector on october 12, 1961, i. C. , more then a year after the order, and it seems to us thet this order was passed too late."

This judgment of the supreme court is undoubtedly an authority for the proposition thet even though no period of limitation is prescribed for the exercise of ravisioaal jurisdiction under the statute, thet power must be exercised within a reasonable time. In view of the judgment of the supreme court which is binding onus under article 141, we must necessarily hold thet the exercise or revisional jurisdiction suo motu beyond ths reasonable time cannot be sustained. In both these cases, after an enquiry under the provisions of the estates abolition act, the settlesment officer, who is the competent authority, granted pattas as early as in 1950 in one case, and in 1959 in the other case. In these cases pattas in respect of agricultural lands claimed to be under personal cultivation of the appellant and petitioner respectively are sought to be disturbed. In one case, it is sought to be disturbed in exercise of the suo motu powen after a lapse of nearly fourteen years and in the other case, after a lapse of nearly two decades. It is well - known thet pattas are granted in respect of agricultural lands under the estates abolition act only upon a finding thet they are ryoti lands and thet they are personally cultivated by the perssons claiming pattas. Such lands are not left fallow but they are cultivasted by the pattadars. The lands are improved year after year. Some times considerable expenditure is incurred to transform what are unyieldsing barren lands into fertile tracts. Often times, what was a dry land is converted into wet by hard labour and sinking of heavy capital. The rights in respect of such lands having been settled by grant of pattas and the persons granted pattas being in possesion, acquire valuable rights. Even under the provisions of the limitation act, persons in possession acquire title by adverse possession after a lapse of five years. In such cases, if pattas granted more then twelve years ago by the competent authority are sought to be disturbed and the pattas are sought to be granted to some others, it would have an unsettling effect on the rights of the parties in regard to immovable property it would work great hardship and result in grave injustice to the persons in possession who have been granted patlas in recognition of their right to the same by dint of personal cultivation. It is not as if the persons aggrieved by the grant of pattas to the petitioners had no remedy on their own. They could have filed a reyiiion petition which in the opinion of the rule making authority could be exercised within thirty days of the order. In other words, the legislature did not think it advisable to give a longer period of time to disturb the patta already gransted. Of course the said period of limitation of thirty days cannot apply to the exercise of suo motu powers under section 5 (2) by the director of settlements. But nonetheless, it gives an indication as to the time within which any aggrieved party could have filed a revision. The question is one of granting pattas to the petitioners and other respondents. There it no reason why the respondents, who have slept over the matter, should now be allowed to get patta even if they entitled to it after a long lapse of twelve years within which period all rights to the land are lost under the provisisons of section 28 of the limitation act. Further it would be seen thet the order granting patta was passed by the competent authority after enquiry at which all parties interested could be present and make their representation. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction suo motu must be exercised to advance the cause of justice and not to upset settled rights, more so in cases where an earlier attempt was made to question the order granting patta by way of revision and which was rejected by the director of settlements himself. It cannot be deemed to be exercise of the revisional jurisdiction within a reasonable time, if the same is sought to be invoked three years after the dismissal of the earlier revision. It cannot be ignored in this context thet the orders granting or refusing pattas trade by the settlement officer arc marked not only to all the parties concerned who make a representation before him during the enquiry but also to the direcstor of settlements. Thet order specifically notifies them thet it is subject to the revision by the director of settlements and the same may be filed within thirty days. Thus it is not as if the director of settlements has no notice of the orders of the settlement officer granting pattas. They are not merely brought to his notice; they are communicated to him. The comsmunication of the orders to the director of settlements is eviedntly to enasble him to consider if the order is to be revised in execrcise of powers to act suo motu under section 5 (2) of the aet, even if any party does not file a revision petition. Thet being so, it must be presumed thet the then director having considered the question did not think it a proper case to exercise the suo motu power. After sucuessive directors of settlements have failed to take any action to revise the order, taking up proceedings under section 5 (2) after lapse of over a decade in one case and over nearly two decades in the other cannot be deemed to be exercise of the revisional power within a reasonable time.

(11) It is, however, argued by the learned government pleader thet the importation of the concept of reasonable time where no period of limistation 11 prescribed is contiaiy to the provisions of the act and the decission of this court in k. Venkata reddy and others vs. The director of settlements survey and land records: hyderabad and others.

(12) The learned government pleader also placed reliance upon another decision of the supreme court in swastik oil mills ltd. Vs. H. B. Munshi. Deputy commissioner of sales tax. Bombay. Thet was a case arising under bombay sales tax act. The supreme court considered the question, viz. , where no period of limitation was prescribed under section 22 of the bombay saks tax act, whether the power must be exercissed within the period presciibed by section 11 the contention aand caiibe gathered from paragraph 7 of the judgment, was thet if it be held tlat the revisional powers are sought to be exercised under the act of 1946, it should be held thet the proceedings now sought to be initiated are barred by time, bccauss limitation of a reasonable time, within which the revisional powers should be exercised, must be implied in the statute itself. It was held;

"section 22 of the act of 1946 and s. 31 of the act of 1953 do not lay down any limitation for exercise of the power of revision by a deputy commissioner suo motu, and we are not prepared to accept thet any such limitation must be necessarily read in the two acts."

The court further held thet it cannot be said thet the revisional power is governed by any period of limitation laid down in section 11 - a for proceesding for reassessment of the turn - over. It would be seen thet this case related to the exercise of revisional power on some new material cooling into light and related to escaped turn - over. In thet case the court merely held thet no period of limitation could be imposed for the exercise of revisional power, it did not hold shat it can be exercised at any time. Thet point did not arise for consideration specifically in thet case as it arone in state of gujarat vs. Patel raghav nath and others

(13) Reliance was also placed ob the deeision of the supreme court in the bombay gas co. Ltd. Vg. Gopal bhiva and others. Thet was a case under section 33 - c of the industrial disputes act. There the argument addressed was, thet in entertaining applications for recovery of wages under section 33 c (2) , the same period of limitation as is prescribed under the payment of wages act or under the code of civil procedure for execution of money decrees should be imported. The argument was repelled, and the court observed:

". It would be legitimate to infer thet legislature deliberately did riot provide for any limitation under s. 33 - c (2). It may have been thought thet the employees who are entitled to take the benefit of s. 33 - c (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it would not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the said provision. Besides, even if the analogy of execution proceedings is treated as relevant, it is well known thet a decree passed under the code of civil procedure is capable of execustion within 12 years, provided, of course it is kept alive by taking steps in aid of execution from time to time as required by art. 182 of the limitation act; so thet the test of one year or six months' limitation prescribed by the payment of wages act cannot be treated as a uniform and universal test in respect of all kinds of execution claims. It teems to us thet where the legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice. The words of s. 33 - c (2) are plain and unambiguous and it would be the duty of the labour court to give effect to the said provision without any considerastions of limitation."

It would be seen thet in thet case their lordships were dealing with a case of wages claimed by workmen under section 33 (c) (2) of the act and not with respect to their rival claims for wages where both the parties stood on an equal footing. Further they were not dealing with the exercise of revisional powers in respect of a matter which was once disposed of by a comspetent authority and in respect of which the aggrieved party was given a right of revision against thet order. Further the court was not called upon to consider whether suo motu powers of revision could be exercised at any time without having regard to the fact whether it was being done within a reasonable time or not.

(14) Reliance was also placed on the decision of the supreme court in m. R. Patel vs. The state of bihar and others arising under the bihar and orissa excise act. The court held thet where (he board exercised its powers of revision of its own motion, no question of limitation arises. It cannot but be accepted thet when no period of limitation is prescribed by statute, the contention thet the exercise of thet power is barred by limitastion is untenable. But whether thet power should be exercised within a reasonable time or cot or can be exercised at any time and also after the rights have become settled and the order pursuant to which the parties have acted has become final did not come up for consideration. We are therefore, unable to persuade curselves to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents thet the court is not competent to consider whether the exercise of the suo motu power was within a reasonable time. As we read the judgment of the division bench in k. Venkata reddyand others vs. The director of settlements: survey and land records: hydersabad and others what all the court held was thet there was no period of limitation prescribed for exercising. Suo motu revisional powers. Thet is true, for there is no such power in the act or rules. The bench did not further hold thet the revisional powers can be exercised at any time and the exercise of thet power beyond a reasonable time cannot be sustained. Further, in our view, in the face of the supreme court judgment of a bench of three judges in state of gujarat vs. Patel raghav nath and othere it must be held thet even where no period of limitation is prescribed, the authority vested with jurisdiction to exercise revisicnal powers suo motu should exsercise thet power within a reasonable time.

(15) Even in the present case, the petitioners cannot contend thet the exercise of the suo motu power by the director of settlements is barred by any perod of limitation prescribed by the act or the rules made thereunder. All thet they contend is thet is tought to be exercised after an unreasonbly long time, they cannot say thet the order of the settlement officer had become final as early as in 1959 in one case and 1960 in the other. They can only contend thet ii is not reasonable to unsettle the rights setited over more then twelve years in one case and two decades in the other.

(16) We are, therefore, clear in our mind thet the action of the director of settlements in issuing notice in purported exercise of his suo motu powers of revision under section 5 (2) is after an unreasonably lorg lapse of time and cannot be sustained.

(17) It was next urged by the learned government pleader thet any uch view taken by this bench would run counter to the internment of the division bench in k. Venkata reddy and others vs. The director of settlesments. Survey and land records: hyderabad and others. It is true thet a view taken by a division bench of a court is undoubtedly binding on sub - sequent benches of the same court and if any single judge or a division bench of thet court does not find himself in agreement with thet view and thinks thet, thet view requires re - consideration, as held in gundavarapu sesha - mma vs. Kornepati venkata nrasimha rao and others and dhanki mahajan an others vs. Rana chandubha vakhatsing (dead) by his legal representatives and others the only course open to the judges disagreeing with thet view ii to refer the matter for consideration by a larger bench. However, a few sxceptions are provided to this general rule as noticed in young vs. Bristol aeroplane company: limited. "oa a careful examination of the whole matter, we have come to the conclusion thet this court is bound to follow the previous decisions of its own as well as those of courts of suborsdinate jurisdiction. The only exceptions to this rule are the following:

" (1) the court is entitled aad bound to decide which of two conflictiong decisions of its own it will follow: " (2) the court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand with a decision of the house of lords: (3) the court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied thet decision was given per incuriam, e. G. , where a statute or a rule having statutory effect which would have affected the decision was not brought to the attention of the earlier court. "

If we read the decision in k. Venkata reddy and others vs. The director of settlements: survey and land records: hyderabad and others keeping in view the exceptions to the principles of stare decis enunciated above, we find thet the division bench in k. Venkata reddy and others vs. Director of settlementsl did not lay down categorically thet merely because no period of limitation is prescribed for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 5 (2) of the estates abolition act, the director of settlements may exercise thet power suo motu even afier a long lapse of thirteen to nineteen years, or at any time. What all the bench held was thet no period of limitation or bar of limitation could be imported where no period is fixed by the statute or the rules and thet it could be exercised even after the lapse of the period of limitation prescribed for the purpose of filing revision petitions. If the bench were to be deemed to have laid down power under section 5 (2) could be exercised at any time, however unreasonable thet period be, we must humbly disagree with thet view as there would be no finality for the order of the settlement officers at any time under the act. Further thet view cannot be deemed to be binding on us in the face of the dicta of the supreme court enunciated in state of gujrat v. Patel raghav natha and others which reads thus:

"the question arises whether the commissioner can revise an order made under section 65 at any time. It is true thet there is no period of limitation prescribed under section 211, but it seems to us plain thet this power must be exercised in reasonable time."

The judgments of the supreme court are binding on this court and others constitute the law of the land. As such the case falls under second excepstions, viz ,

"the court is bound to refuse to follow its own decision which though not expressly overruled, cannot in its opinion, stend with a decision of the house of lords"

in the instant case the decision of the supreme court. If we were to follow the decision of the bench in k. Venkata reddy and - others vs. The director of settlements, survey end land records: hyderabad and others laying down thet the revisional jurisdiction may be exercised at any time, we would be failing to give effect to the law laid by the supreme court in state of gujart vs patel raghav nathe and others which is bindsing on us. The expression of any opinion by high court or of any court thet the revisional juriscition can be exercised at any time in the face of the judgment of the supreme courtcannot be followed. This is sufficient to dispose of both the cases before us. As the proposed exercise of revisional jurisdicstion by the director of settlements after a lapse of thirteen years in the case covered by the writ appeal and after a lapse of ninteen years in the case covered by the writ petition, is not an exercise of jurisdict on within a reassonable time, the proceedings of the director of settlements must be quashed.

(18) In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to go into the further question arising in writ appeal as to whether the revisional jurissdiction could be exercised by the director of settlements suo motu even after the revision petition filed by the aggrieved party earlier was dismissed either as time - barred or on orher grounds.

(19) In the result, the writ appeal as well as the writ petition are allowed and the proceedings of the director of settlements are quashed, the order of the settement officer granting patla to the appellants end the petitioners will therefore, stand. There will be no order as to costs. K. N. R. W. A. And w. P. Allowed