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Nellimerla Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court, Guntur
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The second respondent, a watchman employed by the appellant company, was dismissed in 1975 on a charge of theft after a domestic enquiry. The watchman raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court, Guntur. The Labour Court framed a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry was fair and proper and answered that issue in the negative for three reasons: (1) copies of statements recorded by management from witnesses examined at the domestic enquiry were not furnished to the claimant, thereby preventing cross-examination; (2) a workman who assisted the employee in the domestic enquiry proceedings was alleged to have been won over by management; and (3) although a panchanama was made when the stolen article was recovered, one of the mediators to that panchanama, Routhu Naidu, was not examined at the domestic enquiry. The Labour Court gave the management an opportunity to adduce evidence before it.
The appellant (the company) challenged the Labour Court's finding in Writ Petition No. 2418 of 1977. The High Court (Jayachandra Reddy, J.) declined to interfere with the Labour Court's discretion, agreeing with the Labour Court that the failure to examine Routhu Naidu (an independent mediator) justified the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was defective, and dismissed the writ petition with costs. The appellant appealed from that judgment in a writ appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the appellant was fair and proper (i.e., whether it was vitiated or defective).
- Whether the employer's failure to examine a particular witness (specifically, the independent mediator Routhu Naidu) vitiates a domestic enquiry.
- Whether the management can be compelled to examine any particular witness, or whether it is free to decide which witnesses to examine.
- Whether the High Court should intervene in a challenge to a Labour Court's finding on a preliminary issue in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution (i.e., whether the High Court may or should entertain interference at the preliminary stage).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (company)
- The mere fact that the management did not choose to examine a particular witness (the mediator Routhu Naidu) cannot render the domestic enquiry defective.
- So long as the domestic enquiry was conducted according to the standing orders or rules of the company and was not opposed to principles of natural justice, the Labour Court was not justified in holding the enquiry defective.
- The management has the managerial discretion to examine such witnesses as it chooses and cannot be compelled to examine any particular witness; therefore, the preliminary finding that the enquiry was defective should not stand.
Employee's Arguments (second respondent / workman)
- The management did not furnish copies of statements recorded from witnesses, which prevented the claimant from effectively cross-examining those witnesses.
- One of the workmen who assisted the employee in the domestic enquiry proceedings was alleged to have been won over by the management.
- Because an independent mediator (Routhu Naidu), who was a mediator in the panchanama made when the stolen article was recovered, was not examined, the enquiry was defective and would have revealed the truth if he had been examined.
Additional Procedural/Preliminary Objection
- It was argued (by Sri James) that the High Court should not ordinarily interfere at the stage when only a preliminary issue has been decided by the Labour Court, relying on Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhra (the Supreme Court observation that it may be legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene to prevent stalling of final adjudication).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. The Management (Supreme Court) | Summarised principles regarding domestic enquiries and tribunal review, including: (1) managerial function to take disciplinary action but tribunal can examine justification; (2) employer expected to conduct proper enquiry per standing orders and natural justice; (3) tribunal should not interfere if enquiry is proper and findings plausible except when findings are perverse or management guilty of malafide; (4) where enquiry absent or defective, tribunal must give opportunity to adduce evidence; (5) defective enquiry stands on same footing as no enquiry; (6) tribunal may consider fresh evidence when enquiry absent or defective; (9) once misconduct is proved, punishment will stand unless grossly harsh or showing victimisation. The text also notes the effect of section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act in enlarging tribunal powers. | The Court invoked these principles as the controlling legal framework for assessing whether the Labour Court was justified in treating a domestic enquiry as defective and in directing the tribunal to receive evidence and examine the merits (both misconduct and quantum of punishment). |
| E. C. of India v. V. Kedia | The principle that the mere fact that the enquiry officer did not of his own accord examine a particular company witness does not vitiate the enquiry; parties could summon the evidence they considered necessary and omission by a party to summon a witness does not render the enquiry defective. | The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that not examining a witness who would have supported the management (Routhu Naidu here was a management- or incident-related witness) does not vitiate the enquiry. |
| Tata Oil Mills v. Workmen (Supreme Court) | The enquiry officer in a domestic enquiry cannot effectively compel attendance of any witness; management produced its witnesses and the employee should have taken steps to produce his witnesses. Refusing an adjournment at the instance of a workman could be infirm if it deprived him of reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence. | The Court used this precedent to explain that failure to compel or examine witnesses does not automatically invalidate an enquiry and to distinguish cases where the enquiry officer actively prevented presentation of defence evidence. |
| State Bank of India v. R. K. Jain | Where a workman had brought important witnesses to a prior enquiry and in the subsequent enquiry the request to have those witnesses summoned was not forwarded to management and no arrangements made, principles of natural justice were violated because the workman was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to place his defence. | The Court distinguished the present facts from that case: in the present matter, the management chose not to examine a witness on its own behalf, whereas in R.K. Jain the failure related to the management/enquiry officer failing to assist or facilitate the employee's witnesses, thereby violating natural justice. |
| Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Mundhra (Supreme Court) | The Supreme Court observed that the High Court may legitimately refuse to intervene at the preliminary-issue stage to prevent stalling of final adjudication by the Labour Court; such intervention is not normally justified solely to challenge a preliminary issue. | The Court treated this decision as permissive (not a prohibition). It held that while the Supreme Court had said it would be legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene, the High Court still retains power to interfere where a preliminary finding (e.g., that an enquiry was defective) is based on an incorrect appreciation of the law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by first setting out the legal framework derived from the Firestone decision: tribunals can examine the legality and propriety of employer disciplinary action; a proper domestic enquiry must conform to standing orders (if applicable) and the principles of natural justice; where an enquiry is defective or absent the tribunal may allow fresh evidence and determine for itself whether the misconduct is proved; and even when misconduct is proved, the tribunal may, after the insertion of section 11-A, consider the appropriateness of the punishment.
Applying those principles, the Court addressed the Labour Court's three stated reasons for finding the domestic enquiry defective. The Court focused on the contention that the management's failure to examine the mediator Routhu Naidu rendered the enquiry improper. It concluded that:
- The management is free to select which witnesses to examine in a domestic enquiry; there was no standing order identified in the record that compelled the management to examine every witness connected with an incident.
- The mere omission by an employer to examine a particular witness does not, by itself, vitiate the domestic enquiry. If management chooses not to call a witness, it must accept the risk that the case may not be proved, but it cannot be compelled to call any specific witness.
- Failure to examine a witness who would have supported the management cannot be equated to failure to permit the employee to adduce evidence; thus it does not, on the facts, amount to a breach of natural justice.
The Court substantiated these conclusions by reference to prior authorities (E.C. of India v. V. Kedia and Tata Oil Mills v. Workmen) which held that an enquiry is not rendered defective simply because a particular company witness was not examined or because the enquiry officer did not or could not compel attendance. The Court distinguished State Bank of India v. R. K. Jain on the ground that in R.K. Jain the system failed the employee by not arranging for the employee's witnesses to be produced or by failing to forward the request, thereby denying a reasonable opportunity; that distinguishing fact was absent here.
On the procedural point about intervening at the stage of a preliminary issue, the Court explained that Cooper Engineering's observation that the High Court may legitimately refuse to entertain such challenges is not an absolute bar to intervention under Article 226. If the High Court finds that the Labour Court's conclusion on the preliminary issue is based on an incorrect appreciation of law, it may interfere.
Finally, the Court directed the Tribunal (Labour Court) to reconsider the matter: it must examine the report of the enquiry officer, determine whether the Labour Court's finding was perverse or based on no evidence, consider the employee's objection about the composition of evidence (i.e., that management evidence consisted predominantly of management employees and an independent mediator was not examined), and also examine whether the punishment awarded is commensurate with the misconduct.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court set aside the Labour Court's finding that the domestic enquiry was not proper or was defective.
Direct consequences and directions:
- The Labour Court is directed to reconsider the validity of the finding as to misconduct and the quantum of punishment in the light of the principles laid down in the judgment (i.e., applying the standards outlined from Firestone and the accompanying authorities).
- The writ appeal and the writ petition are allowed to the extent of setting aside the preliminary finding that the domestic enquiry was defective; there will be no order as to costs in this matter.
- Because the employee was removed from service in 1975 and six years have elapsed, the Court directed that the Labour Court should conclude the matter quickly and dispose of it within one month from receipt of the records.
Broader implications: The opinion clarifies that a management's selective choice of witnesses does not automatically vitiate a domestic enquiry and emphasizes the tribunal's role (and the Labour Court's duty on remand) to examine whether findings are perverse or based on no evidence and whether the punishment is appropriate. The judgment does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities.
(1) The second respondent herein, a watchman in the appellant - company was dismissed from service on a charge of theft after tte holding of the domestic enquiry. The second respondent raised an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication to the labour court, guniur. The labour court framed a preliminary issue as to whether the domestic enquiry was fair and proper and held that the domestic enquiry was not fair and proper. For coming to that conclusion, the labour court gave thtee reasons: firstly, copies of the statements recorded by the management from the witnesses who were examined by it at the domestic enquiry were not furnished to the claimant so as to enable him to cross - examine the witnesses. Secondly, the labour court held that the workman who was assisting the employee in the proceedings before the domestic enquiry was won over by the management. Lastly, it held ihat when the stolen article was recovered, there was a panchanama and one of the mediatois of the panchauama routhu naidu was not examined at the domestic enquiry. For all the above reasons, it held that the domestic enquiiy was not fair and proper and gave an oppsrtunity to the management to adduce evidence before the labour court regarding the charges levelkd against the employee.
(2) Callenging the finding that the domestic enquiry was not proper, the appellant herein filed a writ petition no. 2418 of 1977. Our learned brother, jayacbandra reddy, j. Observed that the question whether refusal to furnish a copy of the statements made by the witnesses during the preliminary investigation caused any prejudice has to be gone into at a later stage. He did not express any opinion on the question whether the workman who was assisting the employee was won over or not. He, however, agreed with the labour court that as the management did not examine routhu naidu an independent mediator, the labour court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was defective. As the labour court bad applied its mind and come to the conclusion that the dorcesic enquiry was not proper, he held that the high court could not interfere with that discretion in a proceeding under art. 226 of the constitution. In the result, he dismissed the writ petition with costs. The appellant has preferred this writ appeal as against the said judgment.
(3) Sri v. Jagannsdha rao, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the mere fact ihat the appellant, did not choose to examine a particular witness, namely, the mediator routhu naidu cannot make the domestic enquiry defective in any sense of the term. He submitted that as long as the domestic enquiiy is held according to the standing orders or rules of the company governing the domestic enquiries as long as the enquiry was not opposed to the principles of natural justice, the labour court was not justified in holding that the enquiry was defective or not proper. Is was open to the management to examine such witnesses as it chose and the management cannot be compelled to examine any particular witness. The finding therefore on the preliminary issue that the domestic enquiry was defective or not proper cannot be allowed to stand.
(4) In order to appreciate the contentions, it is necessary to bear in mind the legal principles which are to be followed by the labour court in dealing with punishments imposed after the conduct of the domestic enquiry. There have been a number of decisions of the supreme court dealing with this question, but it is sufficient to refer to the decision of the supreme court in workmen of firestone tyre and rubber co. V. The management where the principles are summarised as follows :
"1. The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if a dispute is referred to a tribunal, the latter has power to see if action of the employer is justified.
2. Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the standing orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be an empty formality.
3. When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is plausible conclusion folowing from the evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to bit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or malafide.
4. Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the employer and the employee to adduce evidence before it, it is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra,
5. The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a petmo facie case. On the other band, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the tribunal and the latter on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does net arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry.
6. The tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justification of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or afier the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective.
7. .
8.
9. Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a tribunal for the fir t time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered wish by the tribunal sxctpt ic cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation.
10. .
This was the law applicable to all industrial adjudications. After the introduction of section11 a to the industrial disputes act, 1947, the positon is that even in case, where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finiding of misconduct arrived at, the tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved. Further, under section 11 - a, though the tribunal holds that the misconduct is proved, nevertheless, it may be of the opinion tbat the order of discharge or dismissal for the said rancor - duct is not just'fied. In other wcrds, proved misconduct does not automatically merit punishment by way of discharge or dismissal. The labour court can under certain circumstances award to the workman a lesser punishment,
(5) In the light of the principles laid down, we have to see whether the finding that the domestic enquiry conducted by the appellant was defective or was not proper is justified. The only ground that was argued before us in support of that conclusion is that one of the mediators in the panchanama held at the time when the stolen property was recovered was not examined. It was contended on behalf of the employee that all the other witnesses were emploees of the appellant ant! they were made to support the case of the appellant. If the independent mediator had been examined, truth would have come out. Inasmuch as he was not examined, the domestic enquiry was not proper. We are unable to agree with this contention. It is open to the management to examine such witnesses as it chooses in the domestic enquiry. If it does not examine any witness, it takes the risk of the case facing held to be not proved. It cannot ba compelled to examine any particulu witness. The mere fact that it does not examine any witness cannot vitiate the enquiry. No sanding orders have been pointed which cornf el the management to examine all the witnesses to a particular incident. Hence, it cannot be said that any standing order is violated.
(6) The only other question is whether the employee was given a reasonable opportunity to meet the case of the management and whether the principles of natural justice have been violated. We are unable to see how it can be said that the principles of natural justice are violated by the employer not examining a particular witness. If an employee requires a particular witness to be examined and it is within the power of the employer to produce such witness for examination and it does not do so, it may reasonably be argued that the principles of natural justice are violated as the employee has not b;en given a reasonable opportunity to examine a wifness to depose in his favour, but that is not the case here. In these circumstances, it is impossible to hold thit the domestic enquiry was not proper or was defective. In g. E. C. Of india vs v. Kedia it was contended that the domestic enquiry was vitiated as a particular witness employed by the company was not examined. It was held that the mere fact that the enquiry officer did not of his own accord examine the said witness does not vitiate the enquiry. It was open to the parties to summon such evidence oral or documentary which they considered necesiary and if one or the other party omitted to summon a witness or a document, the enquiry officer cannot ba blamed for it, nor is the enquiry rendered defective or unfair on that account. Reference may also be made to the decision of the supreme court in tata oil mills vs. Workmen in that case, the employee contended that the enquiry officer should have taken steps to get the two witnesses brought before him for giving evidence. The supreme court observed that in a domestic enquiry, the officer holding the enquiry can take no valid or effective steps to compel the attendance of any witness and that just as the management produced its witnesses, the employee should have taken steps to produce his witnesses. It was further observed that if on refusing'to adjourn the hearing at the instance of workman, the enquiry officer failed to give the workman a reasonable opportunity to it ad evidence, that may in a proper case be considered to introduce an element of infirmity in the enquiry, but it cannot be held that the enquiry suffered from infirmity merely because the enquiry officer did not compel the witnesses whom the employee wanted to come and give evidence. In our view, the present case is a fortiori one. If" the fact that the enquiry officer does noj compel a witness whom the employee wants to give evidence does not vitiate the enquiry, it would follow that the fact that the enquiry officer did not examine a witness who would support the management would net vitiate the enquiry. It cannot be said that by not examining the witness, any injustice was caused to the employee. Reliance was placed on the decision in state bank of india vs. R. K. Jain in that case, the workman brought two witnesses of considerable importance at a prior enquiry conducted by another enquiry officer which was abandoned for no fault of the workman. In the subsequent enquiry, he made a request to have the two witnesses summoned for givirg evidence on his side, but his request was not forwarded to the management and no arrangements for production of the two witnesses were made. In those circumstances, it was held that the principles of natural justice had been violated and the workman was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to place his defence before the enquiry officer and that the order passed on such a domestic erquiry could not be sustained. The situation in the present case is entirely different as this is not a case where the management has not taken any steps to examine the witnesses who were required to be produced by the workman, but it is a case where the management did not choose to examine one witness on its own behalf. We are therefore of he view that the tribunal was not justified in holding that the domestic enquiry was not proper.
(7) Sri james raised a preliminary objection that this court ought not to interfere at this stage when only a finding has been given on a preliminary issue in proceedings under article 226 of the constitution and relied upon a decision in cooper engineering ltd, vs. P. P. Mundhra the supreme court observed as follows -
"we should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour court questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the high court to refuse to intervene at this stage."we do not understand this decision as saying that the high court has no jurisdiction to interfere against a finding on a preliminary issue that the domestic enquiry was not proper or was detective. All that the supreme court said was that it would be legitimate for the high court to refuse to interfere. If the court feels that fhe finding on the domestic enquiry is not proper and is based upon an incorrect appreciation of the law, we are of the view that it is open to the high court to interfere against such finding in a proceeding under art. 226 of the constitution.
(8) Having regard to the principles enunciated by the supreme court, it would be open to the tribunal to consider the report of the enquiry officer and decide whether the finding is perverse or whether it is based on no evidence and in coming to that conclusion it will naturally consider the abjection of the employee that a finding arrived at by relying on the evidence produced by the management consiitirg as it is, of only theemployees of the management in the absence of the examination of the independent mediator, amounts to a finding based on no evidence. It is also the duty of the tribunal to consider whether the punishment awraded is commensurate with the misconduct.
(9) The finding that the domestic enquiry was not proper or was defective is set aside and the tribunal is directed to consider the validity of the finding as to misconduct and the quantum of punishment in the light of the principles laid down in this judgment. The writ appeal and the writ petition are allowed to this extent. There will be no order as to costs.
(10) As the employee was removed from service as early as in 1975 and six years have elapsed, it is but right that the decision should be given by the labour court very early. We direct that the labour court should dispose of the matter within one month from the date of receipt of the records. Gvkr
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