Koyilerian Janaki And Others v. Rent Controller (Munsiff), Cannanore And Others

Order

1. The tenant is in appeal before us. The respondent who is the landlady of the premises in dispute filed a petition before the Rent Control Court for eviction of the appellant herein on the grounds that she bona fide needs the building for the occupation of her married daughter and son-in-law who are medical practitioners and also for demolition of the premises and its reconstruction. The Rent Control Court found that there is no relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties. Therefore, the petition filed by the landlady was dismissed. Aggrieved, the landlady filed an appeal against the order of the Rent Control Court. The appellate court found that the need of the landlady is bona fide and the building required demolition for reconstruction. Aggrieved, the tenant preferred a revision petition under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The learned District Judge found that the landlady has neither pleaded the material ingredients of Section 11(3) of the Act in her petition for eviction nor led any evidence in that respect. Therefore, she was not entitled to succeed. Consequently, the revision petition was allowed and the order of the appellate court was set aside. The landlady thereafter preferred a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court challenging the order passed by the learned District Judge in his revisional jurisdiction. The High Court was of the view that the revisional court acted in excess of its jurisdiction conferred upon it and thus set aside the said order and the writ petition was allowed.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that in the absence of any pleading in the petition and evidence to the effect that the married daughter and son-in law are dependent on the landlady, the petition filed by the landlady for eviction of the appellant was liable to be rejected and the revisional court acted within its jurisdiction when it set aside the order of the appellate court. On the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the landlady was required under law to plead and substantiate that her married daughter and the son-in-law for whose occupation the building was required were dependent on her. The relevant portion of Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is extracted below:

“11. (3) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him.”

(emphasis supplied)

Language of Section 11(3) of the Act is plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. A perusal of Section 11(3) shows that if the landlord is in bona fide need of the building for occupation by any members of the family dependent on him he may apply to the Rent Control Court for eviction of the tenant. Thus where eviction of a tenant is sought by a landlord for occupation of any member of his family, the landlord is required to plead and substantiate three ingredients. Firstly, a person for whose need the premises is required is a member of the landlord's family. Secondly, such member of the family is dependent on the landlord and thirdly, there is a bona fide need. In the absence of any one of the three ingredients, the petition by a landlord under Section 11(3) would fail. In the present case, what we find is that, there was pleading to the effect that the building is needed for the married daughter and son-in-law. However, there is no pleading as regards the fact that the married daughter and the son-in-law are dependent on the landlady. The word “family” has not been defined in the Act. However, for the sake of argument we may assume that the married daughter and son-in-law are members of the landlady's family. In that case the landlady has to further plead and substantiate that they are dependent on her. Unless it is pleaded that the married daughter and the son-in-law are dependent on the landlady, a petition under Section 11(3) of the Act cannot succeed on the mere allegation that the building is needed for the occupation of the married daughter and the son-in-law. We are, therefore, of the view that in the absence of any pleading that the married daughter and the son-in-law are dependent on the landlady the appellate court was not justified in allowing the petition of the landlady on the ground that the landlady bona fide required the building for occupation of her married daughter and son-in-law.

3. Once we are of the view that in the absence of any pleading as regarding one of the ingredients that the married daughter and the son-in-law are dependent on the landlady, the landlady cannot succeed in her petition for eviction of the tenant, the next question that arises is as to whether the learned District Judge in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction could interfere with the order of the appellate court. Section 20 of the Act confers revisional jurisdiction on the District Judge. Section 20 of the Act reads as follows:

“20. (1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court and in other cases the High Court, may at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion.”

The aforesaid section empowers the District Judge in its revisional jurisdiction to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity and propriety of such order or proceedings and pass such order in reference thereto, as it thinks fit. On the wording of Section 20, we cannot hold that the revisional power with the District Judge is limited to the mere question of jurisdiction only. The said power is not akin to the jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. In our view, the District Judge in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction could go into the legality, regularity or propriety of any order passed by the appellate court. In fact, the revisional power on the District Judge is of greater amplitude than the power of revision exercised by a court under Section 115 CPC. The order of the appellate court, as we find, suffered from legal infirmity and, therefore, the District Judge was justified in setting aside that order. The High Court fell in error in holding that the District Judge has exceeded in his jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the appellate court. Consequently, the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside.

4. Further we are in agreement with the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that it was not appropriate for the High Court to have interfered with the order passed by the District Judge in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. The proceedings in the present case arose under a special Act governing the landlord and tenant relationship and disputes. The Act does not provide any second appeal or revision to the High Court. The purpose behind for not providing such remedy is to give finality to the order passed under the Act. The power under Article 227 is exercisable where it is found by the High Court that due to a certain grave error an injustice has been caused to a party. For this reason also, the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside.

5. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment under challenge in this appeal is set aside. The order passed by the revisional court is restored.

6. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.