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Mohd. Abdul Muqtedar (Dead) By Lrs. And Another v. Shaikh Fakruddin And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant filed a suit seeking a declaration that an open space of land situated to the west of his house was government land available for the common use of himself and Respondents 1 and 2. The trial court, relying mainly on records of the Evacuee Department, held that the land was indeed government property and not part of the evacuee house purchased by Respondent 1; it further issued a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the appellant’s use of the land.
The first appellate court affirmed the finding that the land was government property but modified the injunction by deleting relief concerning fixtures on the appellant’s wall. Dissatisfied, the respondents filed a second appeal before the High Court.
The High Court framed three purported “substantial questions of law,” reassessed the evidence, and concluded that the open space was of use only to Respondents 1 and 2 and must go with their houses, effectively reversing the concurrent factual findings below.
The appellant obtained special-leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) by re-appreciating facts and that its conclusion was erroneous even on merits.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was correct in holding that Defendant 1 acquired title to the open space by virtue of the original or amended sale deed, despite earlier government descriptions treating the land as separate government property.
- Whether the dismissal of a previous suit barred the present suit under Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC.
- Whether the suit was barred by Section 33 of the Evacuee Property (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act.
- More fundamentally, whether any “substantial question of law” actually arose so as to justify interference by the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had exceeded its Section 100 CPC jurisdiction by overturning concurrent findings of fact without any genuine substantial question of law. The Court scrutinised the documentary trail:
- The auction notice and bid sheet (7-5-1970) described the northern boundary of the evacuee property purchased by Respondent 1 as “open space of Government and public road,” showing the open land was never auctioned.
- Respondent 1’s own letter (7-7-1970) and the original sale certificate (21-9-1970) repeated the same boundary description, confirming exclusion of the open space from the sale.
- An amended sale certificate (28-6-1972) introduced a new sentence stating that the open space was “common between evacuee property and Sawkar Nadeem Saheb.” The Court considered this amendment inconsistent with all earlier documents and inferred it had been procured to defeat the appellant’s use of the land.
- Even the amended certificate did not assert ownership of the open space in either respondent; it merely labelled the land “common,” leaving ownership unresolved.
Concluding that the High Court’s factual inference lacked foundation and that no substantial question of law existed, the Supreme Court reinstated the concurrent findings of the lower courts.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; decree of the first appellate court restored with costs to the appellant.
The immediate consequence is that the appellant retains the right to use the open space, and the respondents are restrained from interference as per the restored decree. The decision reiterates the limited scope of second appeals under Section 100 CPC, underscoring that High Courts cannot re-evaluate facts absent a real substantial question of law; however, it sets no new precedent beyond this reaffirmation.
Order
1. The issue which arises for consideration in this appeal by special leave pertains to an open space of land adjoining the house of the appellant.
2. The appellant had filed a suit for declaration to the effect that an open space of land to the west of his house was for common use of the appellant as well as Respondents 1 and 2 herein. According to the appellant, Respondent 2 was the owner of House No. 3-1-50 and Respondent 1 had purchased a house which was previously an evacuee property at the time when the property was sold by public auction. There was an open space of land which was surrounded by a road in the north, by the house of the appellant in the east, the house of Respondent 1 in the south and the house of Respondent 2 in the west. Evidence was led before the trial court which, inter alia, came to the conclusion that the said open space was government land and had not been sold to Respondent 1 and nor was it a common property of Respondents 1 and 2. This conclusion was arrived at notwithstanding the fact that the Government had in the said suit contended that the said open land did not belong to it.
3. The documentary evidence on the basis of which the trial court came to the conclusion that the open space was government land and not the land of Respondent 1 was essentially that of the Evacuee Department. The trial court while giving the declaration that the land in question was government land issued a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, who are respondents in this appeal, from preventing the appellant from use of the said open space.
4. In appeal, the lower appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court. It, however, modified the trial court's judgment to the extent that it set aside the last relief which had been granted by the trial court to the effect that a perpetual injunction had been granted restraining the Municipal Council from removing doors, windows, water spouts, etc. on the western wall of the appellant's land. The appellant herein had no complaint with regard to the modification to that extent of the trial court's decree but the respondents herein filed a second appeal before the High Court.
5. By order dated 11-1-1984, the High Court framed the following questions stated to be substantial questions of law:
“1. Whether the conclusion of the courts below that Defendant 1 does not get any title by virtue of the sale deed even including the amended sale deed, Exhibit-P2, is proper and legal when the Government itself admits that it was an evacuee property. Was it sold to Defendant 1?
2. Whether the dismissal of the previous suit bars the present suit under Order 2 Rule 2?
3. Whether the suit is barred by Section 33 of the Evacuee Property (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act?”
6. The High Court then proceeded to examine the evidence and came to the conclusion that the open space was situated in such a way that it was of no use to any person other than Respondents 1 and 2 and the said open space would go along with the two houses. The High Court did not expressly deal or answer the questions of law which had been formulated at the time of admission of the second appeal.
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that in fact no question of law, leave alone a substantial question of law, arose in the present case. It is not in dispute that the government auction which took place had described the property in question as being, inter alia, bounded on the north side by “open space—public road”. The bid sheet of 7-5-1970 also described the property as being bounded on the north by “open space of Government and public road”. It is Property No. 3/129, Mohalla Berron Killa, Raichur which had been purchased which, as indicated in the bid sheet and in the advertisement, did not include the said open space. Also placed on record is a letter dated 7-7-1970 written by Respondent 1 to the Minister for Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation, asking for the release of sale certificate. In this letter written by Respondent 1, the property purchased by him is stated to have been bounded on the north by “Nadim Saheb's house and open space and adjoining government road”.
8. Respondent 1 received a sale certificate dated 21-9-1970 and there also the property was described as being bounded on the north by “open space of Government and public road”.
9. The trouble for the appellant herein arose when the respondents herein were able to secure an amended certificate of sale dated 28-6-1972. At the foot of the said certificate, the boundary as to the north was described as follows:
“Open space and the house of Shri Sawkar Nadeem Saheb now purchased by Shri Shaik Hussain, H. No. 3-1-53. Beyond the open space one public road is lying. As per the plan of registered sale deed open space is common between evacuee property and Sawkar Nadeem Saheb.”
10. It is the latter certificate of 28-6-1972 which has been relied upon by the High Court in coming to the conclusion that the open space of land was common between Respondents 1 and 2.
11. Apart from the fact that the conclusion which was arrived at by the High Court was essentially one of fact and, therefore, outside its jurisdiction while deciding an appeal under Section 100 CPC, even on facts we find that the decision of the High Court was incorrect. Right from the auction notice till the grant of the certificate of sale in 1970, the open space in question had never been shown as having been auctioned in favour of Respondent 1. This open space has always been regarded as being north of the boundary of the house purchased by Respondent 1. Secondly, even in the amended sale certificate, this land is still shown as open space. It is not indicated in the amended sale certificate that the land in question had been sold as evacuee property in favour of Respondent 1. The last sentence in the description of the boundary toward the north has added the sting in the tail. It is stated therein that as per the plan of registered sale deed open space is common between evacuee property and Sawkar Nadeem Saheb (Respondent 2).
12. What is in question is as to who is the owner of the said open space. The amended certificate of sale does not state that this open space is owned either by Respondent 1 or Respondent 2 or by them jointly. By mentioning that the open space is common between the evacuee property and the property of Respondent 2, it clearly indicates that it is certainly not part of the property of Respondent 1 or of Respondent 2. Admittedly, Respondent 2 at no point of time took part in the auction-sale which had been conducted and, therefore, there should have been no occasion for the certificate of sale to indicate that the open space is common between the evacuee property and Respondent 2. We have little doubt that in coming to the conclusion that the amended certificate of sale was procured solely with a view to oust the user of the open space by the appellant herein. The said amended certificate of sale is not in consonance with the earlier documents regarding the sale of the evacuee property.
13. The High Court, in our opinion, fell in error in reversing the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the trial court and the lower appellate court. We, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the lower appellate court. The appellant will be entitled to costs.
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