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State Of Uttaranchal And Others v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent joined the service of the Collector, Uttar Kashi as a Class IV employee in 1964. His service-book, prepared in 1965, recorded his date of birth as 10 April 1936. On 30 January 1996 the respondent was informed that he would attain the age of superannuation (60 years) on 30 April 1996. Only after receiving this notice did he contend that the recorded date of birth was incorrect and relied on a school certificate showing 6 July 1942 as his actual birth date.
Having failed to convince the Collector, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed by a Single Judge. A Division Bench allowed his appeal. The present matter reached the Supreme Court by way of the appellant’s special-leave petition, which has now been granted and decided.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rule 2 of the U.P. Recruitment to Services (Determination of the Date of Birth) Rules, 1974 bars any application or representation for correction of a government servant’s date of birth once it is recorded in the service-book.
- Whether, independent of the statutory bar, the respondent’s request—made almost thirty years after the service-book entry—was too belated to warrant judicial interference.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- Rule 2 conclusively deems the date of birth recorded at entry into service to be correct and expressly prohibits any subsequent correction.
- The respondent had acknowledged the service-book entry on at least three occasions and raised the issue only after three decades, rendering the claim hopelessly delayed.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The date of birth in the service-book was erroneously recorded; his school certificate demonstrates that he was actually born on 6 July 1942.
- On the basis of the corrected date, he should not be treated as having reached the age of superannuation in April 1996.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by quoting Rule 2 of the 1974 Rules, noting that its validity had not been challenged. The Rule unequivocally states that the date of birth recorded at the time of entry into government service “shall be deemed” correct and that “no application or representation shall be entertained” for its alteration. Relying on this mandatory language, the Court held that any attempt to modify the recorded date was legally prohibited.
Even assuming the Rule were inapplicable, the Court found the respondent’s plea to be “highly belated.” The service-book was prepared in 1965, and the respondent had signed it multiple times. Raising the issue nearly thirty years later, only upon receiving the superannuation notice, undermined the credibility and timeliness of the claim. Consequently, the Division Bench erred in ignoring both the statutory bar and the unexplained delay.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; the order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside.
As a direct consequence, the respondent’s date of birth remains 10 April 1936, and his retirement effective 30 April 1996 stands confirmed. The decision turns exclusively on statutory interpretation and delay, setting no new precedent beyond reaffirming the mandatory nature of Rule 2.
Order
1. Special leave granted.
2. In the instant case, the respondent was employed as a Class IV employee by the Collector, Uttar Kashi in the year 1964. In the service-book which was prepared, the date of birth recorded was 10-4-1936.
3. On 30-1-1996 notice was given to him to the effect that he will complete 60 years of age on 30-4-1996 and he would superannuate on that date. It is only thereafter that a representation was made by the respondent to the effect that his date of birth had been wrongly mentioned in the service-book and as per the certificate issued by the school his date of birth was 6-7-1942.
4. Having been unsuccessful before the Collector the respondent filed a writ petition which was dismissed. Later, an appeal filed against the said decision was allowed. Hence this appeal.
5. Rule 2 of the U.P Recruitment to Services (Determination of the Date of Birth) Rules, 1974 reads as follows:
“2. Determination of correct date of birth or age.—The date of birth of a government servant as recorded in the certificate of his having passed High School or equivalent examination at the time of his entry into the government service or where a government servant has not passed any such examination as aforesaid or has passed any such examination after joining the service, the date of birth or the age recorded in his service-book at the time of his entry into the government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth of age, as the case may be, for all purposes in relation to his service including eligibility for promotion, superannuation, premature retirement or retirement benefits and no application or representation shall be entertained for correction of such date or age in any circumstances whatsoever.”
6. These Rules, the validity of which have not been challenged, clearly stipulate that no application or representation shall be entertained for correcting any date or age record and the entry made in the service-book shall be deemed to be the correct date of birth. Be that as it may, even dehors the said rule, we are of the opinion that the plea of the respondent that the date of birth was wrongly recorded was highly belated. He joined service in 1964, the service-book was prepared in 1965 and according to the appellant he has signed the said service-book at least on three occasions. In any case, the plea of the wrong recording of the age in the service-book has been taken nearly thirty years after the service-book was prepared. In our opinion, the Division Bench was in error in ignoring the provisions of the said Rule 2 and even otherwise, in the facts of this case, there was no occasion for the High Court to have interfered with the decision of the appellant.
7. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Division Bench of the High Court.
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