(1) Tenant is the revision - petitioner in this civil revision petition arising under section 22 of the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960. Both the tribunals below have ordered eviction on the ground that the landlady requires the shop premises bona fide for self - occupation. I will state the facts in so far as they are relevant for the present purpose.

(2) The eviction petition was filed in 1976 with the averments that the tenant, who has been occupying the shop in question for the last eight years, did not vacate the same inspite of a demand to that effect : and that she wants this shop and the adjacent shop in occupation of another tenant, for her own occupation for starting a business by her son. When a notice was served upon the tenant calling upon him to vacate the premises, he came forward with false contentions. The tenant denied the bona fide nature of the personal requirement alleged by the landlady. He stated that she does not require the premises for the purpose averred by her and that, it is only a ruse to get him evicted.

(3) The only question that arose for consideration before both the tribunals was, whether the requirement is true. The learned rent controller held that though in the notice issued before the institution of these proceedings, and also in the petition, the particular nature of the business proposed to be started by the landlady's son is not specified, still it cannot be said that her requirement is not bona fide, for the reason that (i) the landlady and her son belong to a business community ; (ii) for the last four months, i. E. , from about march 1977, p. W - 2 (son of the landlady) has been doing 'mandi' business in a rented premises ; and (iii) that, though no actual preparations were made for starting the business by the time of the filing of the petition, still that cannot be a ground for negativing the landlady's plea, inasmuch as they are admittedly possessed of properties and are capable of raising necessary funds for starting a business. The appellate authority generally agreed with the reasoning of the rent controller.

(4) In this civil revision petition, sri r. V. Subba rao, the learned counsel for the tenant - petitioner, contended that in the light of the clear provisions of law and the vague and uncertain allegations made by the landlady and her son, the tribunals below were in error in entertaining the petition or ordering it. He submitted that neither in the notice issued before the institution of the eviction petition, nor in the eviction petition, nor in the chief - examination of the landlady has she specified the particular business which she proposed to commence in this shop premises and that, the very petition filed by the landlady is not in conformity with the provisions of law.

(5) I find sufficient force in the contention of the learned counsel, though both the tribunals below have not acceded to this contention. Section 10 (3) of the act, in so far as it is relevant for the present purpose, reads as follows : "10 (3) (a) : a landlord may, subject to the provisio suof clause (d) , apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building (i) xx xx xx (ii) xx xx xx (iii) xx xx xx (iv) in case it is any other non - residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non - residential building in the city, town, or village concerned, which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled, whether under this act or otherwise (a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or (b) for the purpose of a business which, in the opinion of the controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence" now, in this case, the landlady did not apply for eviction on the ground that she requires the premises for the purpose of a business which she is carrying on, on the date of the application. Therefore, sub - clause (a) in clause (iii) has no application hefein. The only sub - clause relevant, is (b) which provides that a landlord can apply for eviction on the ground that he requires a non - residential building "for the purpose of a business which, in the opinion of the controller the land lord bona fide proposes to commence". It needs no reiteration that this enactment is based upon public policy, and one of it's main objects is to give protection to the tenants against unreasonable eviction. The language of clause (iii) (b) is clear. And one of the cardinal rules of interpretation of the statutes is that no words therein shall be understood as superfluous or redundant. The sub - clause says that the controller must be satisfied that the landlord requires the premises for the purpose of "a business" which he bona fide proposes to commence. Now, how will a rent controller form the requisite opinion? obviously, on the basis of the facts placed before him. A more general and vague allegation that the land - lord proposes to commence some unspecified business hardly enables the controller to form ihe opinion. He must be told what type of business the land - lord or a member of his family, as the case may be, proposes to commence in the premises. The controller will then see whether, having regard to the circumstances of the landlord, the type of proposed business, and the location and type of the premises concerned, the proposal is bona fide, or not. In other words, the opinion has to be formed, in a given case, in the particular facts and circumstances of the case. A general averment that 'i want to do business in the premises, can never be sufficient, and no controller can reasonably say that he was satisfied about the bona fides of the landlord's requirement on the basis of such a general, vague allegation. In the light of the spectific language of the enactment, it must be held that the petition for eviction should itself specify the particular business, which the landlord proposes to commence in the premises concerned. Such a requirement is also necessary so that the other side has an opportunity to meet and rebut it.

(6) Now coming to the facts of the present case, it is admitted that in the notice issued prior to the institution of the eviction petition, the landlady did not specify the nature or the type of business which she proposed to commence in the shop. In the eviction petition also it was not specified. Both "in the notice and the eviction petition the only allegation made was that she wants this premises for her own occupation, for starting a business by her son. Admittedly, her son was not doing any business either on the date of the notice, or on the date of ths petition. Even in her chief - examination, the landlady, as p. W - 1, did not specify the particular business which she wanted to commence in the shop. She only stated "i wanted the premises for running a shop by my major son". When cross - examined, she stated "my son never did business previously. He wants to do the business. For the last three years t have been contemplating to start business. Then only i told the respondent to vacate the premises. We were contemplating to start mandi business from the beginning. Ex. B - 1 is the notice issued by us. We have not specifically mentioned the mandi business in it. About one year (back) when i wanted him to vacate, he increased the rent by rs. 10/ - more. At that time my son was studying. ".

(7) The son of the landlady is examined as p. W - 2. He stated "i am now doing business is sundry articles since three months. There are mandies by the side of the shop of the respondent. The petition building is required for running my shop. ". Cross - examined with respect to the business he was doing at the time of his deposition, he stated "i am having my shop in vasam lingaiah's house. I am paying rs. 60/ - rent per month. I took it for four months only. There is no document for the said lease. The four months' period is not over. My shop is at a distance of 40 yards to 1 town police station. There are mandi shops there. I have obtained sales - tax registration certificate". It is thus clear that, in this case, the nature of the business which the landlady proposed to commence in the premises by evicting the tenant, was not specified in the eviction petition, nor was it specified in the chief - examination of the landlady. Only when cross - examined she came forward with an allegation that she wants her son to do 'mandi' business in the shop. The business which p. W - 2 has been doing since about march 1977 is not mandi business. According to p. W - 2 himself, he is doing business in sundry articles. If p. Ws - 1 and 2 really wanted to do mandi business in the shop, then one would expect p. W - 2 to start mandi business in the other shop taken by him on lease. I have already set out the relevant portions of his testimony, wherein he stated that though there are mandi shops near about the shop taken by him on lease, he is not doing mandi business. In this state of evidence, it is difficult to say that the rent controller could have been satisfied that the landlady bona fide proposes to commence "a business" in the said premises. Indeed, neither the rent controller, nor the appellate authority was satisfied on this score. The reasoning of the appellate authority can bast be set out in it's own words. It observed: ". It is no doubt true that it was not specifically stated that she wanted to start mandi business. This ex. B - l is dated 23 - 2 - 1976. The landlady might not have come to a definite conclusion as to the nature of business to be started by her. Such course can be decided even after obtaining the possession of the petition schedule building. Today she may think of starting one business and tomorrow if somebody who has got experience in that business reveals about the practical difficulties, she may change her idea and then she may think of starting some other business. So, under the circumstances simply because she did not specify in ex. B - 1 about the nature of business she intended to start, cannot be understood to be the point against her to prove the lack of bona fides. In my opinion, it is quite probable that in many cases many persons may not come to such a definite conclusion at that point of time about the nature of the business to be started. Apart from that, when the nature of the business was not finally settled by the landlady, we cannot expect her to take any further steps also. ". I am clearly of the opinion that this reasoning runs counter to the express language of the enactment, which says that the authority under the act has to be satisfied that the landlord bona fide proposes to commence a business in the premises. It is not enough for him simply to be satisfied that the landlord proposes to do some or other business in the premises.

(8) The other circumstances which weighed with the authorities below in holding that the landlady's requirement is bona fide, are equally unsustainable in law. That the landlady and her son belong to a 'business community' is neither here nor there. There is no presumption that everybody belonging to a business community should do business. The inter - relation between profession and community has broken down long ago, and particularly in urban areas it is a misleading test. Secondly, the fact that p. W - 2 started doing some business from about march 1977 (the eviction petition was filed in 1976 itself) , does not cure the inherent defect in the eviction - petition. It may be noticed that the business which p. W - 2 has been doing since a few months prior to his deposition, is not 'mandi' business, but business in sundry articles though in that area there are mandi shops as well. On this score, the rent controller has committed a certain inexactitude as well. He observed

"it is admitted by the respondent that p. W. 2 is running a mandi shop business in a rented building for the last four months"

. I have already set out the relevant portions of the testimony of p. W - 2. He himseif says that in the shop taken by him on lease, he is doing business in sundry articles, and not mandi business. If so, the aforesaid observation made by the learned rent controller cannot be correct. Similarly the alleged capacity of the landlady to raise funds for doing mandi business, does not cure the inherent defect in the eviction petition,

(9) I am, therefore, of the opinion that both the tribunals below were in error in ordering eviction, under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (b) of the act.

(10) Civil revision petition is, accordingly, allowed and the eviction petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Mpr crp allowed.