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S. Narayana v. V. Paidiraju .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This civil revision petition arises under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. The landlord (referred to in the opinion as the landlady) filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner (tenant) in respect of the petition schedule building bearing No. 7-4-7 situated on the eastern side road of Ramgaraju Street, Vizianagaram. The landlady acquired the property by a registered settlement deed executed in her favour on 2-11-73 by her father.
The eviction petition was founded on the ground of bona fide requirement: the landlady alleged she required the premises to carry on a business with the assistance of her husband. It was also alleged that the tenant was subletting portions of the building (specifically to one Janab Shaik Nanna Saheb). The tenant resisted the petition, asserting regular payment of rent, denying subletting, and pointing out that the petitioner (landlady) had 3 or 4 other houses in Vizianagaram suitable for the husband's business.
The Rent Controller passed an order of eviction holding that the premises were required bona fide for the personal use and occupation of the landlady and that the respondent (tenant) had sublet the suit premises. On appeal, the appellate authority disagreed with the Rent Controller's finding on subletting but, on the ground of bona fide requirement, confirmed the finding of eviction and held that the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted.
The present civil revision petition is confined to two principal grounds: (a) the question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsists, and (b) whether the bona fide requirement was established.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsists in light of the registered settlement deed and attornment.
- Whether the landlady established a bona fide requirement for possession of the premises to carry on business.
- Whether the eviction petition and notice contained adequate particulars (i.e., whether the pleading specified the nature and particulars of the proposed business), and whether lack of such particulars is fatal to the petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments
- There was no pleading at all regarding bona fide requirement; the pleading lacked particulars about the proposed business.
- On merits, the bona fide requirement was not established; the findings below were devoid of evidence.
- The tenant denied subletting and alleged continuous payment of rent; the tenant also pointed out the landlady had other houses suitable for the husband's business.
Respondent's (Landlady's) Arguments
- All necessary particulars had been furnished in the pleadings; reasons for self-occupation were fully indicated in the eviction petition and notice.
- Even if pleadings were sparse, in conjunction with evidence no prejudice was caused to the tenant.
- The bona fide requirement had been established beyond doubt and the concurrent findings of the authorities below should not be interfered with.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| tiruveedhi ramanjaneyulu vs. Araveti venkata subbamma (1980 (ii) a l t'315) | Held that where the nature of the business proposed was not indicated in notice or petition, authorities erred in granting eviction. | The court reviewed this decision as part of a line of authority stressing that omission of particulars can be fatal where it results in absence of indication of proposed business. |
| naganath vs abdul waheed (1881 (1) a p l j 62) | Held that absence of specific pleading of the nature of the business in eviction petition precludes eviction. | The opinion cites this decision as one taking a strict view that lack of particulars is fatal; it is used in the survey of conflicting authorities on particulars. |
| vishnu prasad bhatt vs. K narayana rao (1982 (i) a p l j 223) | Held that lack of particulars or non-mention of nature of business in pleadings cannot by itself be a foundation for dismissing eviction petition. | The court noted this decision as representing a differing view that particulars are not necessarily fatal; the opinion treats it as part of the spectrum of authorities to be weighed. |
| k. L setty vs. m l k setty (1982 (1) a p l j 345) | Held each case must be decided on its facts; if tenant cannot show prejudice, eviction should not be denied merely because business was not specified. | The opinion relies on this principle in concluding that absence of particulars is not automatically fatal and that prejudice to the tenant is the relevant test. |
| c r p 2242 and c r p 2243/81 dated 8-6-1982 (seetharam reddy, j) | Adverting to the conflicting cases, held that particulars of proposed business and reasons must be brought out in the petition; lack thereof is fatal. | The opinion records this decision and notes that Seetharam Reddy J. followed the majority view requiring particularisation; the court contrasted this strict approach with the more flexible view it favours. |
| daulat ram vs. giridhari lal (AIR 1980 P & H 131) | Held that if parties lead evidence on the assumption that matters were pleaded, the tenant cannot claim surprise; lack of specification is not automatically fatal. | The opinion cites this as supporting the proposition that absence of particulars may be cured by evidence and that surprise/prejudice is the relevant consideration. |
| pyari bai vs. tadeka gowrarnma (AIR 1971 A P 411) | Held the court need not probe landlord's reasons or prudence of the proposed business; bona fide requirement must be established and no proof of preliminary steps is necessary. | The opinion relied on this authority to state that overt preparatory acts are not required to establish bona fide requirement. |
| manohar vs. shair ali (AIR 1977 A P 239) | Held that proposed experience or applying for municipal licence are not relevant at pleading stage; licence application does not arise until possession is given. | The court referenced this to reinforce that preliminary administrative steps are not necessary to prove bona fides. |
| mangilal rathi vs. kishen rao (1972 (2) a p l j 8) | Explained that landlord cannot prepare for business unless premises are available; tenant can demolish bona fide claim by showing contrary positive acts. | The opinion used this to explain the evidential landscape: absence of preparatory acts is not fatal, but tenant may rebut bona fides by positive acts. |
| Jn naoappa v krishna (3) 1s71 (2) an w r 141 (ramachandra raju, j) | Held bona fide requirement is a reasonable requirement; a landlord's reasonable and bona fide need for occupation should generally prevail subject to absence of oblique motive. | The court relied on this statement of principle to frame the legal standard for bona fide requirement: reasonableness and absence of oblique motive. |
| bega begam v abdul ahad khan (AIR 1979 S C 272) | Held that "need" implies an element of necessity as opposed to mere desire, but genuine need should not be rendered impossible by over-technical interpretation. | The opinion invoked this Supreme Court principle to caution against artificially narrowing the concept of need while requiring a real element of necessity. |
| fitter peera saheb v. balachandhra rao (AIR 1972 Mysore 14) | Held that court should begin with presumption that the owner's claim of requirement is true; tenant's mere assertion is not sufficient to rebut presumption. | The opinion cited this authority for the presumption in favour of the landlord's claim of requirement. |
| smt. kamala son' vs. rup lal mehra (1970 All India Rent Control Journal 34) | Held that court must determine truth and bona fides of claim and consider reasonableness in all circumstances. | The opinion quoted this decision to emphasize the court's duty to assess bona fides and reasonableness. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a two-part analysis corresponding to the two central grounds of the revision petition.
First, on the question whether the landlord-tenant relationship subsisted, the court noted that the settlement deed was executed in the landlady's favour and that necessary attornment had been effected; accordingly, the petitioner (tenant) could not challenge that relationship. Thus, the remaining live issue for consideration was whether the landlady had established a bona fide requirement for possession.
The court examined the pleadings and evidence on bona fide requirement. The eviction petition's pleaded averment (para III(e)) stated, in essence, that "the petitioner wishes bona fide to do business with the assistance of her husband and therefore she bona fide requires the building in the tenancy of the respondent for her personal use and occupation." The pre-petition notice repeated the same manner of statement. The landlady did not give evidence herself; her husband testified in chief that they wanted to open a shop dealing in towels and that they asked the respondent to vacate the building to do their business there. In cross-examination the husband described himself as having a cloth shop and reiterated that the purpose was personal occupation, denying that the petition was filed to harass the respondent.
Turning to the legal standards, the court surveyed competing authorities about whether an eviction petition must specify particulars of the proposed business. The court summarized the lines of authority:
- Some authorities (e.g., decisions cited as by Jeevan Reddy J. and Punnayya J., and followed by Seetharam Reddy J. in certain cases) held that particulars of the proposed business, and reasons for choosing that business, must be set out in the petition and that failure to do so may be fatal.
- Other authorities (notably Choudary J., Ramachandra Raju J.) took a more pragmatic approach, holding that lack of particulars does not automatically doom the petition and that the decisive criterion is whether the tenant is prejudiced or taken by surprise by the omission; each case must be decided on its facts.
The court adopted the pragmatic, cumulative approach expressed by Ramachandra Raju J., emphasizing that:
- Pleading should broadly apprise the other side of the case, but technical insistence on classical particularisation should not be allowed to defeat substantial justice.
- The critical test is whether inadequacy of particulars caused prejudice to the tenant or prevented him from meeting the landlord's case, not mere formal omission.
- Overt acts of commencement or preparations for business are not necessary to establish bona fides; the absence of such acts is not determinative.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that although a broad assertion of requirement for a towels business was pleaded and briefly supported by the husband's oral testimony, there was "absolutely no semblance of endeavour to show bona fide requirement." The court concluded that the eviction petition together with the evidence "should breathe bona fides," and in the instant case the pleading and evidence did not. There was only a bare statement of requirement for a towels business and no direct or circumstantial evidence to support bona fides.
The court therefore held that the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on the question of bona fides were "devoid of evidence or material" and that the conclusions reached were "not rationally possible in the circumstances."
Holding and Implications
Holding: The orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority were set aside and the civil revision petition was allowed. The court ordered "No costs."
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the eviction orders confirmed below were quashed, and the tenant's position is preserved by allowance of the revision petition.
- The court applied existing authorities on particulars and bona fide requirement rather than announcing a new legal rule; it emphasized that absence of detailed particularisation in the petition is not automatically fatal unless it causes prejudice or the evidence fails to demonstrate bona fides.
- The opinion reiterates established principles: bona fide requirement must be real and supported by facts or circumstances demonstrating genuineness; overt preparatory acts are not necessary; the landlord's reasonable personal requirement is presumed unless rebutted by evidence of oblique motive or lack of bona fides.
This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or legal propositions beyond those stated in the opinion have been added.
(1) The petitioner is the tenant in this civil revision petition arising under the ap buildings (lease rent and eviction) control act. The landlord filed a petition for eviction of tha petition schedule building bearing no. 7 - 4 - 7 situated on the eastern side road of ramgaraju street in vizianagaram. The landlady got the property by virtue of the registered settlement deed executed in her favour on 2 - 11 - 73 by her father. The eviction petition is filed on the ground of bonafide requirement for carrying on business with the assistance of her husband and it was alleged that the tenant was subletting portions of the building for higher rent and actually sublet to one janab shaik nanna saheb. This petition is resisted by the tenant that he was paying rent regularly and the suit premises was never sublet and the petitioner has 3 or 4 houses in vizianagaram which are suitable for carrying on the business of the husband of the petitioner. The rent controller passed an order of eviction holding that the premises was required bonafide for personal use and occupation of the petitioner and the respondent sublet the suit premises. On appeal, the appellate authority held that the rent controller is not justified in holding that the tenant sub - let the suit premises and on the ground of bonafide requirement confirmed the finding of the rent controller and the order of eviction and also held that the relationship of landlord and tenant subsist. This revision petition is confined to two grounds viz. The relationship of landlord and tenant and the bcnafide requirement.
(2) In so far cs the relationship of the landlord and tenant it cannot be contravened thai the settlement deed was executed in in her favour and pursuant to the same necessary attornment was done and therefore the petitioner cannot have any whisper of grievance regarding the same. Therefore, the issue whether the landlord has established the bonafide requirement survives for consideration. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no pleading at all with regard to the bonafide requirement and even otherwise the pleading lacks particulars and on merits the bcnefide requirement is not established and the findings given by the authorities below are devoid of evidence. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that all the necessary particulars have been furnished in the pleadings and the reasons for self - occupation have been fully indicated in the petition for eviction and in any event the pleading in conjunction with evidence does not cause any prejudice and the bonafide requirement has been established beyond doubt and the concurrent findings arrived at by the authorities should not be interfered with. It is necessary to advert to the particulars given in the petition for eviction regarding the bonafide requirement. In para lll (e) it is stated as follows: -
"the petitioner wishes bcnafide, to do businss with the assistance of her husbsnd and therefore she bonafide requires the building in the tenancy of the respondent for her personal use and occupation."
In the notice given on 27 - 7 - 74 before filing the petition it is stated in the sante manner. The landlady did not examine herself but her husband is examined. In chief examination it is stated by him as follows:
"we wanted to open a shop dealing in business and towels in the petition schedule house. I am at present doing the same trade. We asked the respondent to vacate the building, as we want to do our business in that building."
Jn the cross - examination it is stated as follows: -
"i am having a cloth shop. I cannot tell the door no. The purpose of asking for eviction, is only to have the same for our personal occupation. It is not true to suggest that i have no necessity with the occupation of the said house and the petition was filed with an intention to harass the respondent."
(3) The learned counsel for the petitioner initially contended that the petition for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement lacks particulars and on this score alone the eviction petition is liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that there is substantial requirement with regard to the pleadings and no prejudice is caused to the tenant as there is sufficient evidence already on record and therefore the contention of the petitioner on this ground is untenable. In support of the contention the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in tiruveedhi ramanjaneyulu vs. Araveti venkata subbamma (1980 (ii) a l t'315) ln this case the landlady in the notice as well as in the eviction petition stated that she intends to do business without specifying any particular business but in the cross - examination the landlady stated that the premises is required for purpose of doing mandi which was hitherto done by her son. On these facts, jeevan reedy j. , held that the nature of the business proposed to be commenced has not been indicated either in the notice or in the eviction petition and as such the authorities erred in granting eviction. In naganath vs abdul waheed (1881 (1) a p l j 62) it was held by punnayya j. , that the landlady has not specifically pleaded in the eviction petition the nature of the business which was proposed to be commenced and in view of the same the eviction cannot be acceded to. In the case cited the nature of the business proposed to be started and particulars have not been stated except mentioning that the premises is required for starting business. It is only in the cross - examination it was stated that the premises is required to start crockery and shamiyana business in the premises for the purpose of doing business by her son. In these circumstances punnayya. J, concurring with the view okjeevan reddy, j, in 1980 (ii) alt 315 held that in the absence of indication of the nature of business in the notice, eviction petition and the chief - examination the concurrent finding of the tribunals suffered from the taint of unreasonableness resulting in miscarriage of justice. In vishnu prasad bhatt vs. K narayana rao (3) 1982 (i) a p l j 223 in the eviction petition it was stated that the petitioner belongs to the trading community and the premises was purchased to carry on their business in the entire building and they are not owning any non - residential building for the purpose of business which they have been carrying on. Differing from the view taken by jeevan reddy, and punnayya jj. , it was held by choudary j. , that the lack of particulars or non - mention of nature of business in the pleadings cannot constitute the foundation for dismissing the eviction petition. In k. L setty vs, m l k setty (4) 1982 (1) a p l j 345 it is held by ramachandra raju, j. , that each case has to be decided on its own facts and if the tenant is not able to show any prejudice the denial of relief of eviction is not justified merely on the ground that the business which the landlord proposed to commence was not specified in the petition for eviction. Adverting to the decisions of jeevan reddy, and punnayya jj, it was held by ramachandra raju, j, that in the context of holding that bonafide requirement was not proved the factum of absence of indication of the nature of business in the eviction petition also caused prejudice to the tenant and it should not be understood that as a general rule that an eviction petition can be dismissed for the failure on the part of the landlord to specify particular business which he proposes to commence. In c r p 2242 and c r p 2243/8! dated 8 - 6 - 1982 seetharam reddy, j , held as follows adverting to the above three judgments: -
"since the majority that is three out of five judges have held that particulars of proposed business and also the preference as to why the particular business are required have to be brought out in the petition itself and any contravention will be fatal to the petition, i follow the majority view and reiterate what has already been stated that the particularisation of the business without being vague or equivocal must be stated in the petition itself and it is this ingredient that in essence contributes towards the formation of satisfactory opinion by the controller. Since this ingredient is woefully lacking in this petition, the petition deserves to be dismissed".
In daulat ram vs. Giridhari lal (5) a i r 1980 p and h 131 it was held that even if all the ingredients are not specified in the eviction application but both the parties lead on the assumption as if the same has been pleaded, the tenant cannot be allowed to have been taken by surprise. I agree with the neat exposition made by ramachandra rsju, j,, regarding the amplitude of the decisions of punnayya, jeevan reddy and choudary, jj. Both jeevan reddy and punnayya jj. , adverted to the evidence and ultimately held that bonafide requirement is not satisfied and in that context highlighted the absence of indication of nature of business in the eviction petition. As observed by ramachandra raju, j. The facts in the decision of choudary, j did not warrant the discussion and opinion on this issue. In the decision rendered by choudary j. , it was stated in the eviction petition that it was proposed to carry on the business hither to carried on previously and as such there is sufficient indication in the eviction petition and the provocation for ratiocination is not founded en facts. Sitharam reddy, j agreed with the view taken by jeevan reddy, j and punnayya j and the accent appears to be more on arithmetics. I agree with the view of ramachandra raju, j that the cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances should be taken into consideration and the absence of mention of the nature of business in the eviction petition is not fatal. The criteria should be whether the respondent is not able to project his case effectively or taken by surprise and prejudice is caused. In a situation where evidence is adduced by both sides being fully aware of mutual versions the insistence upon this technicality in the pleading is academic and unrealistic. The object of the pleading is to alert the other side regarding the case sought to be projected and apprise the court or tribunal the broad factures of the stand by either side. The pleading is a facet of fair play and natural justice as the otherside should not be taken by surprise and the object is to define the terms at the earliest opportunity. The religious adherence to technical approach to classic style of pleadings, evidence and other procedure should not be stretched to the point of stumbling block or unduly lengthy process in the course of furnishing the judicial end product or rendering substantial justice. The ultimate aim is to cater to the need of litigent public crying out for accelerated adjudication and the technical pleas should not be permitted to be unduly stretched and render the proceedings abortive. The guideline should be whether any prejudice is caused to either party. 1 he inadequacy of particulars of pleading is not fatal and the pleading or averment in the eviction petition is in the nature of outilne or frame work and the moulding of details can be done by evidence or otherwise. It is sufficient if the eviction petition contains the broad features or grounds for eviction to enable the tenant to withstand the onslaught with necessary ammunition.
(4) The learned counsel for the respondent has invited my attention to the decision of this court in pyari bai vs. Tadeka gowrarnma (6) air 1971 a p 411 parthasarathi, j. , held that it is not for the court to probe into the landlord's reasons for choosing the business activity or the prudence or soundness of the proposed venture but bonafide requirement only has to be established and the court must be satisfied as to the existence of the bona fids proposal for commencing the business and no proof of preliminary steps having been taken to start the business is necessary. In manohar vs. Shair ali (7) air 1977 a p 239 gangadhara rao, j held that the proposed experience of a person to start the business and the question of applying to the municipality for licence are not relevant and the question of applying for licence does not arise unless the possession of the premises is given. The reasoning adopted by the court below to this effect was not endorsed. In mangilal rathi vs. Kishen rao (8) 1972 (2) a p l j 8 madhava reddy, j held as follows:
"unless the premises itself is available for occupation, the landlord would not be in a position to make any other preparation like obtaining the licence or placing orders for the supply of goods o" in fact ,make any other preparation for commencing the business. The claim of bona fides when asserted by the landlord can be demolished by the tenant by providing some positive acts like letting out the premises in the occupation of the landlord subsequently or pressing the tenant for enhancement of the rent for the premises after he had claimed eviction or the like. "
Jn naoappa v krishna (3) 1s71 (2) an w r 141 ramachandra raju, j held that bona fide requirement is no other than reasonable requirement. The requirement of the tenant may be greater than that of the lard'ord but being the owner, so long as the right of private ownership is recognised by law, the requirement of the landlord, so long as it is reasonable and bona fide and if it is for his own occupation and the requirement is not vitiated by any oblique motive intended to harass the tenant to extract more rent or otherwise to let out to some other tenant and, things like that the requirement of the land lord should be supreme. In bega begam v abdul ahad khan (10) air 1979 s c 272 in the context of considering the connotation of the expression reasonable requirement with reference to the personal necessity of occupying the premises under jammu and kashmir houses and shops rent control act, it was held that there must be an element of need as opposed to mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. The connotation of the term "need" or "requirement" should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the act which effords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In fitter peera saheb v. Balachandhra rao (11) air 1972 mysore 14, it was held that when the owner says that he requires his premises for his own use and occupation, the court must start with a presumption that the landlord's claim is true and the mere statement of the tenant that the case of the landlord is false is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. In srnt. Kamala son' vs. Rup lal mehra (12) 1970 all india rent control journal 34 the supreme court held as follows: -
"the high court decided that having regard to all the circumstances including the status, her age, her desire to live in her own building, her accustomed mode of life and the accomodation available to her on the ground floor of no. 4 original road, it could not be said that the requirement of the appellant is bona - fide. Xxx xxx xx a mere assertion that the landlord requires the premises occupied by a tenant for his personal occupation is not decisive. It is for the court to determine the truth of the claim and also determine whether the claim is bonafide. In determining whether the claim is bona fide, the court is entitled and indeed bound to consider whether it is reasonable."
The decisions cited on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent are concerned with indicia for arriving at the conclusion regarding bona fide requirement. The vital principle that emerges from these decisions is that overt acts of commencement or preparations for commencement of business are not necessary, for establishing bona fide requirement.
(5) In the context of the principles propounded in the decisions it has to be considered whether the concurrent findings in the instant case regarding bona fide requirement are sustainable. In the petition for eviction it is stated that the requirement is for commencing the business and this is sought to be substantiated by oral evidence given by the husband of the landlady. In the chief examination it is merely stated that the shop is necessary for dealing in towels. It must be borne in mind that the requirement alone is not sufficient but it should be accompanied by bonafide. These is absolutely no semblance of endeavour to show bonafide requirement. The eviction petition in conjunction with the evidence should breathe bona fides. It is not feasible to predicate the precise features of the evidence and facts in support of the version of bona fides but it depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The look of the evidence and facts and circumstances should indicate bona fide requirement, in the instant case except the bare statement of requirement for towels business there is absolutely no evidence direct or circumstantial in jn support of the bonafides. The concurrent findings are devoid of evidence or material and the conclusions arrived at are not rationally possible in the circumstances,
(6) The orders of the rent controller and the appellate authority are set asida and the civil revision petition is allowed. No costs.
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