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Kurella Rangayya Naidu v. Kurella Venkataswamy Naidu .

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Mar 4, 1982
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Factual and Procedural Background

This revision was filed by the 4th defendant challenging an order of the Subordinate Judge, Narsapur, passed in I.A. No. 2084 of 1978 in O.S. No. 11 of 1972 dated 24th June, 1981.

The original suit was instituted by two plaintiffs for partition of the plaint schedule properties into 30 equal shares, for allotment and separate possession of one share to each plaintiff, and for rendition of accounts by the 1st defendant until delivery of possession.

The plaintiffs, their father (late Kurella Venkata Raju), the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant were members of a Hindu joint coparcenary family owning the properties. The plaintiffs' father died on 29th May, 1957. He had remarried and fathered the 4th and 5th defendants by his second wife. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants refused to give them their shares, prompting the partition suit.

The 1st defendant (adopted by the 2nd defendant) and the 4th defendant pleaded that a partition was effected on 12th July, 1969 with partition lists signed by defendants 1 and 2 and by the 3rd defendant on behalf of the 4th defendant; they asserted separate possession and that certain debts had been discharged as per the arrangement. The 4th defendant also pleaded that the plaintiffs had relinquished their rights as per mediators' arrangement.

The Subordinate Judge, on evidence, held there was a partition on 12th July, 1969 but that it was not binding on the plaintiffs (who had not participated) and that the plaintiffs had not relinquished their shares. The trial court found no binding debts to be discharged and decreed partition of the properties into 30 equal shares with allotment and separate possession of one share to each plaintiff; other reliefs were dismissed without costs. No appeal was taken against that decree and it became final.

The plaintiffs moved I.A. No. 1029/1974 for passing of a final decree and to ascertain profits; Sri J. Jagannadha Sastri was appointed commissioner and submitted a report, but no final decree was drawn on that report.

Later, defendants 1 and 2 filed I.A. Nos. 2084 and 2085/1975 seeking appointment of a commissioner to partition the properties by metes and bounds and to allot 10 shares as per the preliminary decree and to grant past and future profits as against defendants 3 and 5. The 4th defendant contested, arguing that the preliminary decree only directed allotment to the plaintiffs and that, in any event, the 1969 partition had already created separate possessions.

The Subordinate Judge allowed the two applications and appointed Sri J. Jagannadha Sastri as commissioner to affect partition and file a plan. The 4th defendant filed the present revision challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether defendants 1 and 2 could, without first obtaining modification of the preliminary decree, file applications for appointment of a commissioner to partition and obtain separate possession of their alleged shares.
  2. Whether the Subordinate Judge erred in appointing a commissioner to partition the properties so as to allot the shares of defendants 1 and 2 when the preliminary decree declared allotment and separate possession only for the plaintiffs.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (4th Defendant) Arguments

  • The lower court failed to consider the objections raised by the 4th defendant in the correct perspective.
  • The preliminary decree entitled only the plaintiffs to allotment and separate possession of their shares; it did not direct allotment or separate possession of the shares of defendants 1 and 2.
  • Defendants 1 and 2, in their written statement, never sought allotment of their shares in the partition; rather they pleaded that a partition already occurred in 1969 and that they were in separate possession of their allotted properties.
  • Therefore, without seeking modification of the preliminary decree, defendants 1 and 2 could not maintain the present petitions for appointment of a commissioner.

Respondents' (Defendants 1 and 2 / 2nd Defendant's Counsel) Arguments

  • Defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to allotment of their respective shares in terms of the preliminary decree, and hence the order appointing a commissioner is valid.
  • The trial court had held that the 1969 partition was a nullity, so it was not binding even on defendants 1 and 2; consequently they could seek partition and separate possession of their respective shares.
  • Reliance was placed on Order 20 Rule 18 CPC to support the proposition that the court may pass a preliminary decree declaring rights and make further directions when partition cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bittan Devi v. Rudra Sen (AIR 1966 Allahabad 601) Principle that where a preliminary decree does not declare the defendants' rights, those defendants cannot maintain an application for partition or separation of their share until the preliminary decree is suitably modified; if defendants desire declaration of their rights, the preliminary decree should contain such a declaration, otherwise they may challenge by appeal or review. The court relied on this authority to hold that defendants 1 and 2 could not apply for appointment of a commissioner to partition and allot their shares until the preliminary decree is modified to declare their rights.
Lachmi Narayan Marwary v. Balmakund Marwary (AIR 1924 PC 198) Observed that after decree it is open to any party to initiate supplementary proceedings, but only if his rights and interest have been declared under the decree; ordinarily the plaintiff moves for supplementary proceedings but there is no legal bar to any party whose rights are declared. The court cited this passage to support the proposition that any party can move for further proceedings post-decree only when the decree declares his rights; used to reinforce the need for a declaration of defendants' rights before they could seek partition.
Sarbeswar v. Bibhbasu (AIR 1977 Calcutta 288) Under Order 20 Rule 18(2) CPC, while a court may pass a preliminary decree declaring rights, generally it declares the rights of the plaintiffs and of those defendants who contest and desire declaration; where defendants' rights are not declared, a commissioner is not competent to partition for them unless the preliminary decree is modified by appeal or review. The court approved and followed this view, treating it as supporting authority that a commissioner cannot effect partition in favour of petitioning defendants unless the preliminary decree declares their share or is modified.
Muthu v. Veerammal (1981 1 MLJ 502 & 506) A single judge held that if the preliminary decree does not declare the defendants' rights, their application for partition or separation is not maintainable until the decree is suitably modified; if the decree declares the defendants' share, they may proceed after the preliminary decree. The court followed this decision in affirming the requirement that the preliminary decree must declare the defendants' rights before they can seek partition and separation of their shares.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a step-by-step analysis grounded on the text of the preliminary decree, the trial findings, and relevant authorities:

  1. The court observed the content of the preliminary decree: it directed partition of the plaint schedule properties into 30 equal shares and specifically directed allotment and separate possession of one share to each of the plaintiffs. There was no direction in that decree that the shares of defendants 1 and 2 were to be allotted or that their separate possession be given.
  2. The court recognized Order 20 Rule 18 CPC permits a court to pass a preliminary decree declaring rights and to give further directions where partition cannot conveniently be made without further inquiry; however, the court emphasized that the preliminary decree passed in this case did not declare the defendants' shares or direct allotment for defendants 1 and 2.
  3. The court examined precedents (Bittan Devi v. Rudra Sen; Lachmi Narayan Marwary; Sarbeswar v. Bibhbasu; Muthu v. Veerammal) which establish the principle that if defendants' rights are not declared in the preliminary decree, they cannot maintain an application for partition or separation of their share until the decree is suitably modified (by appeal or review or other appropriate process).
  4. Although initially inclined to accept the respondents' position, the court, after consideration of the cited authorities, concluded that defendants 1 and 2 could not file an application for appointment of a commissioner to partition and allot their shares without first obtaining modification of the preliminary decree to declare their rights.
  5. On that basis the court found the Subordinate Judge's order appointing a commissioner to divide the properties so as to allot the shares of defendants 1 and 2 was incorrect and could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision is allowed and the order of the Subordinate Judge appointing a commissioner to partition the properties so as to allot the shares of defendants 1 and 2 is set aside.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that defendants 1 and 2 cannot proceed by I.A. Nos. 2084 and 2085/1975 to obtain appointment of a commissioner for partition and allotment of their shares unless and until the preliminary decree is suitably modified to declare their rights.
  • The court applied existing case law to require modification of the preliminary decree before defendants may seek partition of their own shares; it did not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond the precedents cited.
  • The revision was allowed without costs, as recorded by the court.

This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

(1) This revision is filed by the 4th defendant questioning the order of the subordinate judge, narsapur, passed in i. A,no,2084 of 1978 in o. S no,11 of 1972 dated 24th june, 1981.

(2) That suit was filed by the two plaintiffs for partition of the plaint schedule properties into 30 equal shares and for allotment and separate possession of one share to each of them and for rendition of accounts by the 1st defendant till the date of delivery of possession of she properties.

(3) The plaintiffs' father, late kurella venkata raju, his brother the 2nd defendant and their father, the 1st defendant constituted members of a hindu joint co - parcenary family owning plaint schedule properties. The plaintiff's father late venkata raju died on 29th may, 1957. His first wife has pre - deceased him, leaving behind the plaintiffs as her only daughters. He took the 3rd defendant as his second wife and bore (he 4th defendant, a son, and the 5th defendant, a daughter. On the ground that the defendants refused to give them their share, the plaintiffs filed the suit for partition.

(4) The 1st defendant filed a written statement and it was adopted by his son the 2nd defendant. They admitted the relationship, but they pleaded that in 196a the 3rd defendant raised disputes on behalf of the 4th defendant to effect partition, and accordingly, the 1st defendant effected partition of the properties and partition lists were prepared on 12th july, 1969, which were signed by defendants 1 and 2 end the 3rd defendant, on behalf of the 4th defendant. In addition it is stated that bigger shares were allotted to the father of the plaintiffs and to the 2nd defendant as the debts binding on the family were agreed to be discharged by defandants 2 and 4. Since then they have been in separate possession and enjoyment of the respective propeities that have fallen to their share.

(5) The 4th defendant filed a separate witten statement which was adoptad by defendants 3 and 5. He alto stated that there was a partition in the family in 1969 and he had discharged the joint family debts. In addition he stated that the plaintiffs have relinquished their rights in the family properties as per the arrangement made by the mediators.

(6) On a consideration of the evidence the learned subordinate judge held that there was partition of the family properties on 12th july 1969, as pleaded by the defendants. He found that the plaintiffs did not relinquish their shares in the joint family properties as pleaded by the 4th defendant - he held the partition effected in the absence of the plaintiffs without giving then any share is a nullity and not binding upon the plaintiffs. He held that there were no binding debts to be discharged. Finally he decreed the suit directing partition of the plaint schedule proparties into 30 equal shares and allotment and separate possession of one such share to each of the plaintiffs. The future mesne profits were directed to be determined on a separate application. The rest of the suit claim was dismissed, but without costs.

(7) No appeal was filed against that decree. Therefore it has become final,

(8) Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed i. A. No. 1029/1974 for passing of a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree, and to ascertain the profits. Sri. J. Jagannadha sastri, vakil, was appointed as commissione to partition the properties and ascertainment of the profits. He submitted a report. Evidently he craved out the shares of the plaintiffs out of the share that fell to venkata raju in 1969. Thereafter no further steps were taken for passing a final decree in terms of that report.

(9) Subsequently, defendants 1 and 2 filed i. A nos 2084 and 2085/ 1975 to appoint a commissioner to partition the properties by metes and bounds and allotment of 10 shares as per the preliminary decree and also to grant past and future profits as against defendants 3 and 5. The 4th defendant contested that petition by stating that the preliminary decree directed partition of the family properties into 30 equal shares and allotment of two such shares to the plaintiffs and the present petition for allotment of separate shares to them was not maintainable healsj submmitttd that in view of the partition that took place in 1969 the three shares have been separate possession and enjoyment of their properties that fell to their share and that he and the 2nd defendant had also discharged the family debts as agreed to at the time of the partition.

(10) The learned subordinate judge allowed the two applications holding that under the decree the defendants are equally entitled to the shares in the properties, and on what basis the said allotment has to be made is a point that has to be seen after the commissioner goes to the place and shows the feasibility of the division of the properties by filing necessary plans showing the proposed division. Therefore, he held that defendants 1 and 2 - can ask for appointrrfrt of a commissioner accordingly, he appointed sri. J. Jagannadha sastry as commissioner for affecting the proposed partition and also to file his report and a plan. Thereafter, i am given to understand, that the 1st defendant died and the 2nd defendant is in possession of his properties and he is his legal representative. Questioning the order in i a. Imo. 2084/1978 the 4th defendant has filed this revision.

(11) It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the lower court did not consider the objections raised by the defendant in the correct perspective. It is stated that under the preliminary decree only he plaintiffs were entitled for allotment of their shares and defendants 1 and 2 are not entitled for allotment of their shares it is urged that the defendants 1 and 2 in their written statement did not claim that their shares also should be alloted to them in the partition. On the other hand they contended that there was already a partition on 12th july, 1979 and they were in separate possession and enjoyment of the properties that fell to their share. It was finally submitted that without asking for modification of the preliminary decree, the defendants 1 and 2 could not maintain the present petitions.

(12) On the other hand it was submitted by the learned counsel for the 2nd defendant that defendants 1 and 2 are entitled fcr allotment of their respective shares, in terms of the preliminary decree, and therefoie, the order passed by the learned judge is valid. It was also submitted that the learned subordinate judge held that the partition effected in 1969 was a nullity; if so it is not binding even on defendants 1 and 2 and consequently they could ask for partition and separate possession of their respective shares. In this connection my attention was also invited to the provisions of order 20 rule 18 cpc.

(13) At the first flush, i was inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents. But, on deeper consideration and after going through the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, i have come to the conclusion that defendants 1 and 2 could not file an application for appointment of a commissioner without, first getting the preliminary decree modified and, therefore, the order of the learned sub - orbinate judge is not correct.

(14) It is true that defendants in their written statement did not ask for partition and separate possession of their shares. On the other hand, they have contended that there was already a partition between the three branches in 1969. The trial court also found, as a fact, that there was a partition among the three branches but it held that it was not binding upon: the plaintiffs, as they were not parties to it.

(15) It is also true order 20 rule 18 cpc. Provides that the court may, if the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the several parties interested in the property and giving such further directions as may be required. But in the present case, the fact remains that a preliminary decree was passed to the effect that the plaint schedule properties should be partitioned into 30 equal shares and allotment and separate possession of one such share to each of the plaintiffs. Thus, there is no direction in that decree that there should be allotment and separate possession of the shares of defendants 1 and 2, it was only a direction for allotment and separate possession of the shares of the plaintiffs. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the fact that the properties have to be divided into 30 equal shares means that the shares of defendants 1 and 2 are also specified. I find it difficult to accept this contention. The preliminary decree does not say that the shares of the defendants 1 and 2 should also be separated and their separate possession should be given to them. If so. Until the preliminary decree is modified fhe defendants 1 and 2 cannot file the present petitions for separation and allotment of their shares.

(16) Now i will refer to the relevant decisions. In bittan devi vs. Rudra sen (1) [air 1966 allahabad 601) it was held:

"it is true that the courts of law generally lay down in the preliminary decree the plaintifts' share or rights in the property, but where the defendants desire that their share or interest be also declared, the preliminary decree should contain such a declaration also. If, for some reason, the defendants' rights have not been declared in the preliminary decree, the agrieved party can challenge the decree in in appeal or can apply for review. One thing is clear that after the passing of the preliminary decree also, the defendants can apply for and have their share partitioned on payment of court - fee etc. , as may be necessary under the law. The courts of law cannot go behind the decree and have to take further steps on the basis of the decree already passed. Consequently if the preliminary decree passed in a partition suit does not contain any declaration as to the rights of the defendants, their application for the partition or separation of their share shall not be maintainable till they have the preliminary decree suitably modified, but once the preliminary decree contains a declaration as to the defendants' share, they can, even after the passing of the preliminary decree take steps for the separation of their share."

(17) In this connection reference was made to lachmi narayan marvary vs. Balmakund marwary (air 1924 pc 198) wherein it was held by the privy council that it was the plaintiff who ordinarily moves the court to initiate the supplementary proceedings after the passing of a decree, but there was no legal bar to any pary to the suit taking such steps provided that his rights and interest had also been declared under the decree. The privy council observed:

"after decree it is open to any party to a suit, to whose interest it is that further proceedings be taken to initiate the suppferrentary proceedings, but in the ordinary case it is the plaintiff who moves."

(18) In sarbeswar vs. Blbhabasu (2) air 1977 calcuatta 288 a division bench of the calcutta high court observed:

"under the provisions of 020 r 18 sub r. (2) the court though may pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the several parties in the suit property in a partition suit but generally the court declares the rights of the plaintiff and of those defendants who contest in the suit and desire their rights to be so declared the rights and share of the defendants being not declared in the preliminary decree the commissioner is not competent to partition and make separate allotment of the share in respect of the property in suif in favour of the petitioners unless she said preliminary decree is modified declaring the right and share of the petitioners either on appeal or on review of the said preliminary decree."

(19) The learned judges appioved blttan devi vs. Rudra sen (1) supra.

(20) In muthu vs. Veerammal (3) 1981 1 mlj 502 and 506 a singla judge of the madras high court observed:

"if the preliminary decree already passed does not contain any declaration as to the rights of the defendants their application for partition or separation of their share shall not be maintainable till they have the preliminary decree suitably modified. But when once the preliminary decree contains a declaration as to the defendant's share they can even after passing of the preliminary decree take steps for the actual separation of their share."

(21) The learned judge followed bittan devi vs. Rudra sen (1) supra in this regard.

(22) In view of these decisions with which i agree, i hold that the defendants 1 and 2 could not file an application for appointment of a commissioner to partition and allot their separate shares, until they get the preliminary decree suitably modified in that regard. Consequently , i set aside the order of the learned subordinare judge in appointing the commissioner to divide the properties so as to allot the shares of defendants 1 and 2. Accordingly, the revision is allowed but in the circumstances of the case, without costs.