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I. Pulla Reddy & Others v. I. Seshi Reddy & Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Jun 15, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal is by two unsuccessful plaintiffs (the son and daughter of the first defendant) whose suit for partition was dismissed by the trial court. The property in dispute ('a' schedule) consists of immovable properties measuring approximately 33 - 71 cents, and 'b' schedule consists of movables and cash valued at Rs. 35,300. The undisputed family relationships are: the second defendant is the father of the first and third defendants; the appellants are the children of the first defendant. The second defendant died pending the appeal and his widow and two daughters were impleaded as his legal representatives (defendants 4, 5 and 6).

The plaintiffs pleaded that all the properties are coparcenary and that the first plaintiff (son) is entitled by birth to a coparcenary share while the second plaintiff (daughter) claimed maintenance and marriage expenses (and, in the context of the amendment law, entitlement to a coparcenary share). The defendants relied on an alleged prior partition dated March 31, 1974 (partition lists, exhibits B-1 to B-3) and other documents, including an agreement of sale (ex. B-16 dated April 25, 1974) concerning item no. 13, and claimed that certain items (1 and 9) were purchased by the fourth defendant and therefore separate property.

The trial court disbelieved the prior partition and certain documents and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that partition would not be in the interest of minors' estate. The plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court reviewed the evidence, the documentary record (including exhibits noted above), the statutory framework (including the Hindu Succession Act and the Andhra Pradesh amendment), and the trial court's reasoning, and has entered the judgment summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged prior partition dated March 31, 1974 (and the partition lists exs. B-1 to B-3) and the alleged allotments based on it are proved and can defeat the plaintiffs' claim for partition.
  2. Whether item no. 13 (claimed to have been purchased by defendants 2 and 3 under ex. B-16) is part of the joint family property and therefore available for partition.
  3. Whether item nos. 1 and 9, alleged to have been purchased by the fourth defendant and claimed to be benami, can be treated as joint family property without impleading and giving the fourth defendant an opportunity to defend title.
  4. Whether item no. 12, allegedly allotted to the mother of the second defendant under the said oral partition for maintenance, is available for partition given findings on the prior partition.
  5. Whether the second plaintiff (an unmarried daughter) is entitled to a share in coparcenary property, particularly in light of the Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1986 (section 29-A) and its non-obstante effect overruling section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as applied in Andhra Pradesh.
  6. If partition is decreed, what are the proportions in which the parties are entitled to shares and what consequential orders (commissioner, mesne profits, maintenance credits) should follow?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Case

  • All properties (both 'a' schedule immovable and 'b' schedule movables/cash) are coparcenary property.
  • The first plaintiff (son) is entitled by birth to a share in the coparcenary.
  • The second plaintiff (daughter) claimed maintenance and marriage expenses; additionally, the appellate argument (in light of subsequent law) supported entitlement to an equal share as a coparcenar.

Respondents' (Defendants') Case

  • Defendants pleaded a prior partition dated March 31, 1974 (supported by partition lists, exs. B-1 to B-3) to non-suit the plaintiffs.
  • Defendants asserted that item no. 13 was purchased by the second and third defendants under an agreement of sale (ex. B-16 dated April 25, 1974).
  • Defendants stated that item nos. 1 and 9 were purchased by the fourth defendant and are her separate property; they also alleged those items to be benami.
  • It was alleged that item no. 12 had been given in the partition dated March 31, 1974 to the mother of the second defendant for her maintenance.
  • At trial, the court below accepted none of these as proved sufficiently to defeat the plaintiffs' claims (though it still dismissed the suit on the ground of the minors' interest regarding partition).

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion cites statutory provisions and legal texts but does not cite judicial precedents (case law).

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a series of factual and legal findings anchored to the record and to statutory law:

  1. On the prior partition (March 31, 1974 and partition lists exs. B-1 to B-3): the appellate court affirmed the trial court's disbelief of the alleged prior partition. The court relied on the sequence of documentary events: when the suit notice (ex. B-12) was served, defendants 1 to 3 replied by exs. A-1 and A-2 without any mention of a prior partition; the partition lists were not filed with the written statement (so they could not have existed earlier); oral evidence did not support the partition. For these reasons the court described the prior partition as a fabricated device to deprive plaintiffs of their coparcenary share.
  2. On ex. B-16 (agreement of sale dated April 25, 1974) and item no. 13: the trial court had disbelieved this document and the appellate court examined and accepted that reasoning. Accordingly, item no. 13 was held to be available for partition.
  3. On item nos. 1 and 9: the court accepted that these were admittedly purchased by the fourth defendant, who had not been made a party to the suit and thus had been deprived of an opportunity to defend title. The court held that in the absence of impleading and giving her an opportunity, these items could not be treated as joint family property and were to be excluded from partition.
  4. On item no. 12 (alleged allotment to the mother of the second defendant under the oral partition): because the oral partition was held to be a nullity, the supposed allotment lacked a valid basis. The mother pre-deceased the second defendant; during her lifetime she may have been entitled to maintenance, but the court found that the alleged allotment under the oral partition was false, and therefore item no. 12 was available for partition.
  5. On the plaintiffs' right to seek partition and disruption of coparcenary status: the court applied the principle that once notice claiming partition is given, joint status is disrupted and members become entitled to partition. The court noted that the plaintiffs had attained majority and elected to prosecute the appeal (as per a separate order, C.M.P. No. 8317/87), and therefore partition should be ordered.
  6. On the daughter's coparcenary rights and statutory change: the court reviewed the traditional sastraic/authoritative writings cited in the opinion (expositions from Mayne, Manu commentary excerpts, Mulla, Raghavachariar) to set out historical doctrinal background about daughters' rights, maintenance and partition. The court then described the statutory position under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (section 6 and section 23) and explained how the Andhra Pradesh legislature enacted the Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1986—introducing section 29-A—which by a non-obstante clause gave daughters born in a Mitakshara joint family the status and rights of a son (making the daughter a coparcenar by birth, with rights of survivorship and entitlement to equal shares at partition). The amendment operated in Andhra Pradesh from September 5, 1985 by section 1(3).
  7. Applying the amendment to the facts, the court held that the second plaintiff (an unmarried daughter) was entitled to an equal share with the son as a coparcenar. The court therefore granted the relief of equal share to the second plaintiff and set aside the trial court's dismissal.
  8. Consequential orders: the court framed a preliminary decree for partition excluding item nos. 1 and 9 (because of the fourth defendant's separate title), and included item nos. 2 to 8, 10, 11 and 13 of 'a' schedule and 'b' schedule movables as liable for partition. The court specified shares in the preliminary decree and left open procedures for appointment of a commissioner, final decree, credit for maintenance payments, and applications to ascertain mesne profits from the date of the suit.

Holding and Implications

Core holding: The appeal is allowed; the decree of the trial court is set aside and the suit is decreed with a preliminary decree for partition as specified by the court.

The direct consequences and orders given in the opinion are:

  • The court confirmed that the alleged prior partition (March 31, 1974) and certain challenged documents were not proved and could not defeat the plaintiffs' entitlement to partition.
  • Item nos. 2 to 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the 'a' schedule and the 'b' schedule movables are held liable for partition; item nos. 1 and 9 are excluded (on account of separate purchase by the fourth defendant who was not impleaded).
  • The second plaintiff (unmarried daughter) is declared entitled to an equal coparcenary share with the first plaintiff by operation of the Andhra Pradesh amendment (section 29-A) to the Hindu Succession Act; the court therefore granted equal share relief to her.
  • The court directed a preliminary decree for partition with the following specified shares: plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the first defendant — 2/15th share each; defendant no. 3 — 2/5th share; defendants 4, 5 and 6 — 1/15th share each.
  • The appellants may apply for appointment of a commissioner to prepare a partition report, after which a final decree will be passed. Amounts paid as maintenance may be given credit in the final decree. Parties may apply to ascertain mesne profits for their share from the date of the suit.
  • The appeal was allowed subject to the direction that each party shall bear their own costs.

The opinion does not assert the creation of a novel precedent; it applies statutory changes (the Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1986) to the facts and grants partition and consequential relief accordingly.

Show all summary ...

(1) The two unsuccessful plaintiffs are the appellants. They are theson and daughter respectively of the first defendant. The parties as arrayed in the lower court are described in the appeal as well. Their suit for partition was dismissed. Thus they filed this appeal.

(2) The undisputed facts are that the second defendant is the fatherof the first and third defendants. The appellants are the children of the first defendant. The second defendant died pending appeal. His widow, the fourth respondent, and his two daughters, the fifth and the sixth respondents, are impleaded as legal represntatives. They are also termed as defendants nos. 4, 5 and 6 for the purpose of continuity. 'a' schedule property consists of immovable properties of an extent of ac. 33 - 71 cents. 'b schedule property consists of movables and cash and their total value is rs. 35,300/ -. The extents of these lands and their existence have not been disputed.

(3) The case of the plaintiffs is that all these properties are coparcenaryproperties; and that by birth the first plaintiff is entitled to his share in the coparcenary. The 2nd plaintiff is entitled to maintenance and marriage expenses. The defendants pleaded a prior partition on march 31, 1974 as evidenced by the partition lists, exs. B - l to b - 3, so as to non - suit the plaintiffs. They have also stated that item no. 13 is alleged to have been purchased by the second and the third defendants under ex. B - 16, the agreement of sate, dated april 25, 1974 and this item was disbelieved by the court below; that item nos. 1 and 9 were purchased by the fourth defendant and they are, therefore, her separate property: and that item no. 12 was stated to have been given in the partition, dated march 31, 1974, to the mother of the second defendant towards her maintenance and this is also not available for partition.

(4) The trial court disbelieved the partition, dated march 31, 1974and the partition lists, exs. B - 1 to b - 3, for varied reasons. I find that the reasons are cogent. When the suit notice, ex. B - 12 was given to defendants nos. 1 to 3 claiming partition, a reply was given under exs. A - 1 and a - 2 by defendants nos. 2 and 3. In the reply no whisper had been made regarding the prior partition. As on that date there is obviously no partition at all. In the written statement they pleaded prior partition. But the partition lists, exs. B - 1 to b - 3, were not filed along with the written statement. Therefore, even by that date they have not fabricated exs. B - 1 to b - 3. Apart from these stark facts, oral evidence was adduced. The trial court has given cogent reasons to believe their evidence. Accordingly, i hold and confirm for the same reasons that the prior partition is a myth proposed up to denude the plaintiffs of their share in the coparcenary. The lower court has given cogent reasons to disbelieve the agreement of sale, ex. B - 16, dated april 25, 1974, under which the second and third defendants claimed to have purchased item no. 13 of the plaint schedule property. I have carefully examined the evidence and i accept the same. So, item no. 13 is available for partition. With regard to items 1 and 9, the properties were admittedly purchased by the fourth defendant. She was not made a party to the suit. She has been deprived of her right to defend. They have claimed that the property was benami. In the absence of the fourth defendant being impleaded and given her an opportunity to defend her title acquired for item nos. 1 and 9, they cannot be considered to be part of the joint family property. They are accordingly liable to be excluded.

(5) Sri parvatha rao, learned counsel for the appellants stated thatthe mother ofthe second defendant pre - deceased him. Though she was entitled to maintenance during her life time, in view of the fact that the very basis that she was allotted item no. 12 under oral partition, dt. March 31, 1974, has been knocked off its bottom, that item is also available for partition. I find force in the contention. During the life time of the mother of the second defendant, she was entitled to maintenance. The very basis on which the allotment was made is the oral partition, dated march 31, 1974. It was pot accepted and i have confirmed. In that view, the alleged allotment is a false one. Therefore, item no. 12 is also available for partition. Accordingly, the property, namely, item nos. 2 to 8, 10, 11 and 13 of'a' schedule and 'b' schedule moveables are liable for partition. The court below, though held that prior partition is not proved, dismissed the suit on the ground that it is not in the interest of the estate of the minors effecting partition.

(6) It is now well settled that once notice is given claiming partition,the joint status is disrupted and they are, therefore, entitled to partition. Since the plaintiffs attained majority and elected to prosecute the appeal as per the orders passed by this court today in c. M. P. No. 8317/87, the properties are liable to partition and the plaintiffs are entitled to partition and allotment in proportion to their respective shares.

(7) Undoubtedly the first plaintiff being a coparcenary is entitled bybirth to his share in the coparcenary. The second plaintiff, lakshmi, is the daughter of the first defendant; the hindu woman, as mother, wife and daughter occupied pride of pedastal in society. Yet her position in matters of succession is portrayed in sastraic law, as culled out in para 521 of mayne's hindu law and usage (12th edition) at page 749, that in smritis, while in some respects the position of women, particularly that of the daughter, the wife and the mother was high, passages derogatory to women scattered in the earliest literatures have been generally taken to spell the inferior status of women. At page 750, it is stated thus :

"what is clear, however, is that notwithstanding the vedic text, when a partition took place, we find from the earlier writings, that shares were allotted to the wife, mother and grandmother. The daughter, the mother and the grandmother were evidently first recognised as heirs to one who died with male issue. The status of the appointed daughter even from vedic times was undoubtedly very high. As early as kautilya's arthasastra, in the absence of sons, the daughters born to a man of approved marriage took his estate."

(8) In para 530, at page 755, it is stated regarding daughter's heirshipthus:

"the daughter was from the earliest times recognised as an heir, probably at the first as an appointed daughter and later whether appointed or not. By the time of kautitya, daughters were clearly heirs. A text of manu states her right of inheritance: "a son is even as one's own self, and the daughter is equal to the property. " some of the commentators of manu read the text as referring only to an appointed daughter. But the word used is 'duhita' (daughter) and not putrika (appointed daughter). The appointed daughter was already dealt with by him in the two previous verses 127 and 128. Brihaspati who closely follows manu clearly understood it to refer to an unappointed daughter, for he himself says, "a daughter, like a son, springs from each member of man; how then should any other mortal inherit the father's property while she lives. Vishnu, yajnavalkya and katyayana also recognise the right of a daughter. The mitakshara, citing the texts of katyayana and brihaspati, declares that "the daughters inherit in the absence of the wife. " aparaka holds that "in the case of daughters, ownership in the father's wealth arises by birth itself as in the case of sons. " the smritichandrika and following it, the viramitrodaya, as well as vivadachintamani understand the text of manu as referring to the unappointed daughter and reject the contrary view of the other commentators. "

(9) In the chapter on partition, in para 361, at page 701, it is statedthus :

"rights of daughters :where a partition takes place during the life of the father, the daughter has no right to any special apportionment. She continues under his protection till her marriage; he is bound to maintain her and to pay her marriage expenses, and the expenditure he is to incur is wholly in his discretion. But where the division takes place after the death of the father, the same texts which direct that the mother should receive a share equal to that of a son, direct that the mother should receive a fourth share. Rights of unmarried sisters :manu directs : "to the maiden sisters, the brothers shall severally give portions out of their shares, each out of his share, one - fourth part. Yajnavalkya requires that brothers should have their unmarried sisters married at their expense giving them a quarter of their own share. The provision of a quarter share was confined to unmarried sisters only, married sisters not being entitled to any share along with their brothers. Obviously, the provision was meant for the expenses of marriage as well as for a gift or dowry in connection with marriage. This is evident from the artha - sarstra of kautilya and narada. The latter says: "they shall maintain her upto the time of marriage; afterwards let her husband keep her. "

(10) On the chapter maintenance, in para 724, it is stated thus:

"a daughter is entitled to maintenance until her marriage and to have her marriage expenses defrayed. An unmarried daughter of a hindu coparcener can sue the manager of the joint family for her maintenance. She is not bound to sue her father and proceed against his share only in the joint family properties."

(11) In raghavachariar's hindu lawprinciples and precedents, 8thedition (1987) at page 393, section 435 - under the chapter, "the laws of inheritance" states that a daughter takes a restricted interest in the property similar to that taken by the widow. When there are two or more daughters, unmarried daughters take the inheritance to the exclusion of the married daughters. Under the chapter 'maintenance' in section 225, it is stated regarding the right of unmarried daughter thus :

"where a hindu dies leaving a widow and an unmarried daughter the widow for her life and the unmarried daughter till her marriage, will be entited to continue to reside in the family dwelling house in which they have been residing with him during his life time, but this right arises only on his death and is claimable against his heirs, surviving coparcenars or the alienees of such heirs or coparcenars as the case may be."

(12) In mulla's hindu law, 12th edition, in section 43, at page 101,under the chapter daughter's right in mitakshara succession, he states thus:

"daughters do not inherit until all the widows are dead. As between daughters, the inheritance goes, first, to the unmarried daughter (s) , next to daughters who are married and "unprovided for", that is indigent, and lastly, to daughters who are married and are "enriched", that is, possessed of means. A married daughter may be a widow. No member of the second class can inherit while any member of the first class is in existence and no member of the third class can inherit while anv member of the first or the second class is in existence. The rule about one married daughter excluding the other married daughter from inheritance comes into operation only if one daughter is indigent while the other one is possessed of wealthy. "

By survivorship, it is stated thus :

"two or more daughters of a class take the estate jointly as in the case of widows, with rights of survivorship. Any one daughter may alienate her life - interest in the property, but not so as to affect the rights of survivorship of the other daughters."

To a share at partition, in section 128, at page 168, it is stated that as regards the madras school, the practice of allotting a share to females on partition has became obsolete, no question can, therefore, arise in that school as to whether such share is stridhana or not.

(13) Thus, in the sastraic law, from times immemorial the daughterwas recognised as an heir, as one's (male) own half; like son springs from membership of man, she inherits in the absence of son along with wife. During life time of father, at a partition, she has no right to a share except right to protection, maintenance and marriage expenses. On father's death, she, should receive a share equal to that of a son. Brothers also are obligated to bear the burden of maiden sisters. She is entitled to maintenance till date of marriage and her marriage expenses defrayed from joint family. She can sue the manager of the hindu joint family for her maintenance without looking for her father or proceeding against his share. She is entitled to light to residence in family dwelling house until her marriage. This right continues to subsist and is available against father's heirs, surviving coparcenars or even alienees. Among the daughters, unmarried excludes the married : among the married, indigent excludes affluent completely. In madras school of mitakshara law, her right to a share in the joint family has become obsolete.

(14) The sastraic law was given statutory base when codification waseffected. Section 6 of the hindu succession act, 1956 (act 30 of 1956) for short, "the act", prescribes the rule of succession by survivorship, thus : when a male hindu dies after commencement of the act, having at the time of his death an interest in a mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivosrhip upon the surviving members of the coporcenary and not in accordance with the act. (the other provisions and explanation are unnecessary. Hence omitted). Therefore, the right to survivorship is confined to coparcenars, the female members of the family are not considered as coparcenars though their right to devolution of interest by succession is circumscribed to the estate of father/husband/son as class one heir in the schedule. Section 23 of the act gives right to a female heir specified in class i of the schedule, including a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of the family but excludes a female heir to claim partition until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein, but her right to residence therein has been preserved by engrafting a mandatory language thus : "the female heir shall be entitled to a right of residence therein. " in the case of a daughter, the proviso provides that she shall be entitled to a right of residence in the dwelling house only if she is unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow. Section 20 of the hindu adoptions and maintenance act, 1956 obligates a hindu to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children as long as the child is a minor.

(15) Article 14 of the constitution accords equality disregard of sexthe preamble of the constitution assures equality of status and social and economic justice to every citizen with dignity of person. The exclusion of the daughter from participation in coparcenary ownership by reason of her sex is obnoxious to article 14. As a result, pernicious dowry system prevalent in the society has been creating baneful effect not only on the status of the woman but also her continued living with equal dignity of person in the in - law's house. The constitution mandates and ethos of social justice kindled the conscience of the community, surged and charged, the andhra pradesh legislature which stepped in to eradicate this abased and abominable social evil by positive measures simultaneously ameliorating the conditions of the women in the hindu society by bringing about the hindu succession (aadhra pradesh amendment) act 1986 (act 13 of 1986) for short, "the amendment act", introducing chapter ii - a in the act. By operation of section 1 (3) thereof, it came into force from september 5, 1985. Thereby the need to apply section 6 of the act, in its application to andhra pradesh is obviated. Instead, section 29 - a provides equal rights to a daughter in coparcenary property by engrafting non - obstanti clause to section 6 of the act thus:

(i) in a joint hindu family governed by mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcenar shall by birth become a coparcenar in her own right in the same manner as the son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son, inclusive of the right to claim by survivorship and shall be subject to the same liabilities and disabilities in respect thereto as the son ;

(ii) (a) at a partition in such a joint hindu family the coparcenary property shall be so divided as to allot to a daughter the same share as is allotable to a son. (the two provisos are not necessary. Hence omitted).

(iii) any property to which a female hindu becomes entitled by virtue of the provisions of clause (i) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this act or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by will or other testamentary disposition ;

(iv) nothing in clause (ii) shall apply to a daughter married prior to or to a partition which had been effected before the commencement of the hindu succession (andhra pradesh amendment) act, 1986. "

(other sectionssections 29 - b and 29 - c are not necessary for the purpose of this case. Hence omitted).

(16) Thus, the amendment act provides that notwithstanding sec. 6of the act, section 29 - a resurrects the lost place to a daughter declaring that in a joint hindu family governed by mitakshara law, the daughter by birth became a coparcenar in her own right as a son and shall have the same rights in the coparcenary in her own right in the same manner as a son; in the coparcenary property she shall be entitled by survivorship to an equal share along with the son with the same liabilities and disabilities enjoined in that regard on the son; that she is entitled at a partition of coparcenary property to be allotted an equal share with a son and shall in terms of sub - section (iii) thereof, she holds the property obtained at such partition as a full owner. By operation of sub - section (iv) of section 29 - a of the amendment act, an unmarried daughter is entitled as a coparcenar to seek partition. The married daughters are excluded to a share in partition already effected prior to the amendment act came into force nor are they entitled to reopen the partition effected prior to september 5, 1985.

(17) Prof. S. Venkataraman, in his preface to n. R. Raghavachariar'shindu law - principles and precedents (eighth edition) has stated thus :

"the times have however changed. Amid the clash of principles and conflict of claims courts are now treated as the governing agency which maintains the totality of the legal order. They are regarded as the trustees of the law. Judicial process is the only way devised by the wit of man to maintain the rule of law. The judges are regarded as; the repositories of the confidence of the people and tne protector of the rights and liberties of the subject."

Law is a social engineering to subserve the need of the society and to bring about the change in the society without friction. The court shall, therefore, take judicial notice of the subsequent change of law and must mould the relief as per the amendment act prevailing as on the date of the decree. Thus, the second plaintiff being unmarried, is entitled to an equal share with the first plaintiff in the joint family property. The relief of equal share is accordingly granted to her. The decree of the trial court is set aside and the suit is decreed. There shall be a preliminary decree for partition of plaint 'a' scheduled properties except items 1 and 9 and plaint 'b' schedule properties, declaring that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the first defendant are entitled to 2/15th share each; defendant no. 3 is entitled to 2/5th share and defendants 4, 5 and 6 are entitled to 1/15th share each. It is open to the appellants to file an application for appointment of a commissioner to submit report for effecting partition in proportion to their respective shares. A final decree for partition shall be passed thereafter. Tne amounts paid in the meanwhile towards maintenance may be given credit in the final decree. It is also open to the parties to file an application to ascertain mesne profits for their share and payment thereof shall be nude from the date of the suit, as prayed for.

(18) The appeal is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances,each party is directed to bear their own costs.