Judgement

BHASKARAN C.J. :- The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short, the Corporation) established under S.3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (Central Act 64 of 1950) is a State Transport Undertaking within the meaning of S.68A(b)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) (for short, the Act). The Corporation had, in terms of S.68C of the Act prepared as many as 291 draft schemes dt. Aug., 14, 1986 proposing to nationalise bus service on routes covered by them in the districts of Nellore and Prakasam, and got them published in the Official Gazette dt. Aug. 22, 1986. These writ petitions, by persons providing passenger transport service in the concerned districts, are for the issue of writs of certiorari quashing the Government Orders dt. Feb. 13, 1987, published in the Official Gazette dt. Feb. 17, 1987, according approval to those drafts schemes.

2. We would now narrate the sequence of events leading to the institution of these writ petitions to the extent relevant. The Corporation had earlier, between the dates May 20 1977 and Aug. 4, 1978, prepared and got published 213 draft schemes in relation to bus service on routes covered by them in the abovesaid districts to be run and operated by the corporation to the complete exclusion of others except to the extent mentioned in the note thereto. The persons providing passenger transport facilities along the routes covered by the said schemes, and others, filed their objections to them before the State Government within the time permitted under S.68D of the Act. All the draft schemes, however, remained without being approved, modified or rejected for a long period of more than eight years; and thereafter the Government issued the notification G.O. Rt. No. 751 dt. Aug. 19, 1985, inviting fresh objections within a stipulated period from persons who had already filed their objections to them and others interested in the matter. In response to this notice, government received fresh objections. At that stage, writ petitions Nos. 12324, 12551-54 and 12366 of 1985 were filed by certain stage carriage operators in the Supreme Court under Art.32 of the Constitution to quash the draft schemes of 1977. On 11-10-1985 the Supreme Court passed an interim order staying "all further proceedings in all matters pending notice. Another writ petition (W.P. No. 12711/85) for the quashing of the draft schemes was also filed under Art.32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court by the 18 operators. In CMP No. 43302/85 filed in that writ petition the Supreme Court passed an interim order on 18-2-1986 which reads as follows :-

"Further steps in relation to the draft schemes Nos. 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 394, 397, 419, 421, 430, 43, 443, 462, 463, 466 and 468 of 1977 published on 20th May, 1977 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary (pursuant to the notification dated 19th August, 1985) be and are hereby stayed."

When matters stood thus, on Aug. 4, 1986 the Corporation decided to withdraw all the said 213 draft schemes prepared and published earlier; and a notification giving effect to that decision was got published in the Gazette dt. Aug. 7, 1986. This was followed in quick succession, by the draft schemes dated August 14, 1986 prepared by the corporation published in the Gazette dt. Aug. 22, 1986. Passenger transport operators, who were granted temporary permits under S.68F(1-C) of the Act pending approval of the earlier draft schemes, filed a batch of writ petitions (WP No. 10852/86 etc.) in this Court for a declaration that the withdrawal notification published on 7-8-1986 was without jurisdiction: and for restraining the Government and the Corporation from taking any action pursuant thereto. A learned single Judge of this Court on Aug. 21, 1986 disposed of the writ petitions without adjudicating the points raised therein on merits, however, with a direction that it would be open to the Corporation to prepare and publish fresh draft schemes; and with an observation that all the petitioners who were plying their vehicles under temporary permits granted under S.68F(1-C) in pursuance of the draft schemes of the years 1977 and 1978 withdrawn under the impugned notification published in the Gazette dated 7-8-1986 would be permitted to ply their vehicles on the routes in question till temporary permits were granted either under S.68F(1-A) or S.68F(1-C) as the case might be, on the routes for which fresh schemes were prepared and published under S.68-C of the Act. Thereafter, another series of writ petitions (W.P. No. 12465/86 and batch) were filed by the permit-holders for the issue of writs of certiorari quashing the withdrawal notifications published on 7-8-1986 and the new draft schemes published on Aug. 22, 1986. These writ petitions were dismissed by the learned single Judge of this Court by the common judgement dt. Oct. 28, 1986. Writ Appeals. Nos. 156, 196 and 212 of 1987 filed against the judgement of the learned single Judge dt. Oct. 28, 1986 were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by the judgement dt. Mar. 5, 1987. In the meanwhile Civil Appeals Nos. 4230 and 4231 of 1985 were disposed of by the Supreme Court by the common order dt. Sept. 20, 1985. The challenge in those Civil Appeals was directed against the validity of Schemes Nos. 401/77 and 402/77 concerning the Nellore district. The relevant portion in the order relating to the disposal of Scheme No. 402/77, with which alone we are at present concerned, reads as follows :

"As regards Scheme No. 402 of 1977, we are of the view that it has got to be quashed in view of the decisions of this Court in Yogeshwar Jaiswal v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1985 SC 516; Sri Shri Chand v. Government of U.P. Lucknow WP (Civil) No. 11744 of 1985 decided on 23rd August, 1985 : (AIR 1986 SC 242) and Phool Chand Gupta v. Regional Transport Authority, Ujjain, WP (Civil) No. 8085 of 1985 decided on 23rd August, 1985 : ( AIR 1986 SC 119). We accordingly quash the draft scheme No. 402 of 1977. We, however, reserve liberty to the State Transport Undertaking of the State of Andhra Pradesh to publish if it is so advised, a fresh draft scheme under S.68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939."

This was followed by the order of the Supreme Court dt. Sept. 29, 1986 disposing of W. P. 12324/85 which was for the quashing of draft Schemes Nos. 405, 406 and 407 of 1977 dt. 20-5-1977 in the following terms;

"Sri T.V.S. Chari, learned Counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh and Sri B. Parthasarathi, learned Counsel for the A. P. State Road Transport Corporation, state that Schemes Nos. 405, 406 and 407 of May, 1977 published in A. P. Gazette dt. 20-5-1977 under S.68-C of the M. V. Act, 1939 have been withdrawn by the State Transport Undertaking. In view of the above statement, there is no need to pass any order in this writ petition. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly."

On the same day, similar orders were passed in W.P. Nos. 584, 12351, 12352, 12366, 12353 and 12354 of 1985. The total number of petitioners whose case was thus disposed of came to 90. By judgement dt. 8-2-1985 in Ch. Vijayanarasimha Reddys case AIR 1985 Andh Pra 361, Division Bench of this Court had directed the Government to dispose of the draft schemes of the years 1977 and 1978 within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the said order. Within the stipulated time or even thereafter the Government did not, however, dispose them of.

3. The leading argument on behalf of the Writ Petitioners was advanced by Advocate Sri G. Suryanarayana. We have also heard Sri R. Manga Chary, Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy, Sri Venkata Chary and Shri Kesava Pillai, the other learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners. The Corporation was represented by the learned Additional Solicitor General, Sri G. Ramaswamy; and the State of Andhra Pradesh by the learned Advocate General, Sri E. Manohar.

4. The matter was hotly contested The points raised were manifold; but they are found to be nothing but different aspects of the same issue, so that they could, in our opinion, conveniently be compressed into two.

(1) Whether the impugned Government Orders dt. 13-2-1987 (Published in the Official Gazette dt. 17-2-1987) under Sub-Ss. (2) and (3) of S.68-D of the Act, approving the draft schemes dt. 14-8-1986 prepared by the Corporation, published in the Official Gazette on 22-8-1986, are invalid and inoperative in law because of the earlier draft schemes of the Corporation published between 20-5-1977 and 4-8-1978, which, according to the Writ Petitioners, could not have been withdrawn at all; and, if at all, their withdrawal could not have been done in the manner in which it was done; and, therefore, those schemes should be deemed to be alive, awaiting disposal at the hands of the Government under S.68 D(2) of the Act ? and

(2) Whether the impugned Government Orders are vitiated by the non-application of mind on the part of the Government, resulting in the failure to ascertain whether the opinion stated to have been formed by the Corporation that there was need, in public interest, and for providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated passenger transport service in the area and on the routes covered by the schemes to be run and operated by the State Transport Undertaking to the exclusion of others, was really supported by any material in that behalf ?

5. The above two points in focus could not, however, be answered in isolation of certain basic principles guiding exercise of power under Art.226 of our Constitution, and also of the antecedental facts forming the backdrop of the case. It is the well recognised principle that those who invoke the writ jurisdiction should come to the Court with clean hands. It is equally well settled that the Court would be slow in issuing a Writ of Certiorari quashing certain proceedings, the result of which would be the revival of some invalid proceedings (vide the observation of the Supreme Court in para 17 of p.837 in Gadde Venkateswar Raos case AIR 1966 SC 828. These two principles and the surrounding facts of the case, which we propose to refer to briefly; have in our opinion, a good deal of relevance so far as the challenge to the impugned order based on the ground that the Corporations action in withdrawing the earlier draft scheme was illegal and improper.

6. We have already noticed, from the facts stated, that the writ petitioners were totally opposed to the earlier draft schemes of 1977 and 1978. Those draft schemes were not to their liking and they never wanted them to be approved or implemented. They had filed their objections to the draft schemes not once; but twice; one immediately after their publication; and the other within the time stipulated by G.O. Rt. No. 751 dt/- 19-8-1985 by which the Government invited objections afresh. They filed writ petitions in this Court and the Supreme Court contending, inter alia that those draft schemes were liable to be quashed; that they were not intended to subserve the interests of the travelling public by providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinate passenger transport service; and that by the long lapse of time they had become outmoded and irrelevant, and were liable to be declared invalid in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Yogeswar Jaiswals case AIR 1985 SC 516. Sri Srichands case AIR 1986 SC 242; Phool Chand Guptas, AIR 1986 SC 119, and Rajeswaris case, (Civil Appeal Nos. 4230-4231 of 1985 decided on 20-9-1985). They were also aware of the fact that draft scheme No. 402/77 relating to Nellore district was quashed by the Supreme Court by the judgement dt/- 20-9-1985 in Civil Appeals Nos. 4230 and 4231/85 on the ground that there had been unjustifiable and unexplained delay after the publication of the draft scheme under S.68-C of the Act. The delay being about 8 years. According to their own pleadings and understanding, the said draft schemes were dead and gone; and no attempt should be made to bring them back to life. All that the Corporation did by the withdrawal notification was to give a quite burial to the dead scheme without any ostentation. Should this court in exercise of the power under the extraordinary jurisdiction, pass an order, the result of which would be the restoration of a draft scheme which has, by the long lapse of time, forfeited the right to remain in existence, only to be given a ritualistic burial later ? We are sure, and we presume that the petitioners also are aware, that the writ jurisdiction of this Court is not meant for such futile exercise. By the judgement dt/- 21-8-1986 a learned single Judge of this Court had declined to interfere with the withdrawal notification; the writ petitions challenging the draft schemes published on 22-8-1986 contending, inter alia, that the withdrawal notification was bad in law was dismissed by a learned single Judge by the judgement dt/-28-12-1986 which was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of this Court by the judgement dt/- 5-3-1987. Even in W.P. No. 80/87 filed in the Supreme Court under Art.32 of the Constitution, which was allowed to be withdrawn by the order dt/- 3-2-1987, the petitioners therein had seriously taken the stand that the draft schemes of the years 1977 and 1978 had become outmoded because of changed circumstances as a result of the long lapse of time. It is a matter of great significance that this writ petition in the Supreme Court was filed after this Court upheld the withdrawal notification dt/- 7-8-1986 by the judgement dt/- 28-10-1986. For reasons best known to them, they did not pursue the point relating to the validity of the withdrawal notification before the Supreme Court, but chose to withdraw the writ petition without inviting a decision thereon. In the order dt/- 3-2-1987 the Supreme Court stated "We express no opinion on the merits of the case."

7. We will now proceed to consider the validity of the Government orders dt/- 13-2-1987 (published on 17-2-1987) in the light of the contention that there was no proper withdrawal of the earlier draft schemes; and, therefore, the draft schemes published later were null and void. The validity of the withdrawal notification was earlier canvassed, as already noticed, before the learned single Judge who disposed of W.P. No. 12465/86 and batch by judgement dt/- October 28, 1986, and before the Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 155, 196 and 212 of 1987 upheld that decision by judgement dt/- March 5, 1987. It is true that the learned single Judge and the Division Bench had expressed the view that the power of the Corporation to withdraw the draft schemes could be traced to S.21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act X of 1897), even though there was no specific provision under Chap. IV-A of the Act empowering the Corporation to withdraw a draft scheme which had already been published. When the present writ petition came up before a Division Bench, which consisted of two of us (the Chief Justice and Anjaneyulu, J.), the counsel for the petitioners cited the decisions, of the Supreme Court in Kamla Prasad Kheton v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 676 and in K.M. Chikkaputaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 956 of this High Court in Ramachandra Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 40, of the Punjab High Court in Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd. v. State, AIR 1966 Punj 214, and the Gauhati High Court in Gauhati Transport Assn. v. State, AIR 1978 Gauhati 33 (FB). The counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the light of the decisions referred to above, there was an arguable case in support of the contention that the view taken by the Division Bench in the judgement dt/- 5 March 1987 that the power of the Corporation to withdraw the draft scheme published under S.68-C of the Act could be traced to S.21 of the General Clauses Act deserves to be reconsidered. It was for that reason, the matter was referred to the Full Bench by the Division Bench.

8. We would examine the question whether there was a proper withdrawal of the earlier draft schemes a little later. Let us, for the time being, assume for the sake of argument, that there was no valid withdrawal; and, therefore, those draft schemes were pending consideration at the hands of the Government under S.68-D of the Act at the time when the new draft schemes were prepared and published. In the context of the challenge against the approval order based on the ground that the withdrawal notification of the earlier draft schemes was not valid, the position of the Corporation could not be worse than that which arises from this assumption. Could the Government order approving the new draft schemes be considered null and void in the eye of law because the earlier draft schemes had not been finally disposed of under S.68-D of the Act ? To our mind, it appears that the fact that the draft schemes, prepared and got published by the Corporation earlier, remained without being disposed of by the Government, would not by itself make the later draft scheme approved by the Government invalid, provided the procedure laid down in Ss.68-C and 68-D of the Act had been adhered to. We are not without authority to support this opinion in Varkey v. State of Kerala, ILR (1968) 2 Ker 96. The Kerala State Road Transport Corporation had prepared and got published a draft scheme for nationalisation of certain routes under Chap. IV-A of the Act; and the private operators on some of the routes excluded by the scheme had filed their objections thereto under S.68-D. The Government of Kerala considered the objections and approved, the scheme. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court which upheld the dismissal by the learned single Judge of the writ petition for quashing the scheme, as approved by the Government, held that Chap. IV-A of the Act did not indicate anywhere that without modifying or cancelling an existing scheme under S.68-E no new scheme could be proposed or approved: what S.68-E laid down was that when a cancellation or a modification of an existing scheme was to be effected, the procedure laid down in Ss.68-C and 68-D so far as it could be made applicable, should be followed, in other words, if a new scheme was proposed and approved following the procedure laid down in Ss.68-C and 68-D the existing scheme would yield or give place to the fresh schemes and therefore the existence of some schemes was no bar to the promulgation of fresh scheme. This decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Varkeys case (supra) was approved by the Supreme Court in M/s. Standard Motor Union Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 273. Towards the end of para 6 at p. 275 the Supreme Court said :

"In so far as the new scheme modifies the earlier schemes, the modifications could be made under S.68-E. As the procedure laid down in Ss.68-C and 68-D were followed the conditions of S.68-E were satisfied. Section 68E does not require that the new schemes should expressly say that the new scheme modifies the earlier schemes. On the promulgation of the new scheme the earlier schemes stand modified by implication pro tanto"

.

(Underlining ours).

This decision of the Supreme Court was referred to in the judgement of a Division Bench of this High Court in para 87 at page 150 in M. Gangappa v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975 Andh Pra 138. Therein it has been stated as follows :

"A further contention was raised that in some cases old schemes which were published were not rejected. Yet the new schemes regarding the same routes were approved while the old schemes were still pending. It is seen from para 21 of the Home Secretarys affidavit that earlier scheme was not in the proper form. So the R.T.C, has come up with a fresh scheme in the proper form and the same is approved now. The earlier defective scheme was rejected by the Government by a G.O. dt/- 30th July, 1973 and the same was not pending when the present scheme was approved. Even otherwise when the new scheme is approved even when the old scheme was pending it would mean that the old scheme stood rejected. It was not necessary to say in the new scheme that the old scheme is cancelled. vide Standard Motor v. Kerala State, AIR 1969 SC 273"

.

(Underlining ours).

The observation of the Supreme Court referred to, according to us, would be sufficient authority to repel the contention of the writ petitioners herein that the impugned approval orders were not valid because of the pendency of the earlier draft schemes. We do not fail to notice the difference on facts between the case decided by the Supreme Court and the case we are now called upon to decide. In the former case, what was deemed to have been impliedly modified on the promulgation of the later scheme was the approved scheme in operation. Whereas in the latter case what is to be deemed to have been impliedly cancelled is the draft scheme which had not been finally disposed of. As the underlying principle remains the same in either case, the observation of the Supreme Court should apply to the facts of the present case. It would be too farfetched an argument that the temporary permits granted to the petitioners under S.68-F(1-C) of the Act would cease to be effective on issue of permits to the State Transport Undertaking; and in view of this distinction, the observation of the Supreme Court would not apply to the case on hand. We would, therefore, hold that assuming that the earlier draft schemes had not been properly withdrawn that would not by itself vitiate the impugned government Orders of 13-2-1987, approving the draft schemes published on 22-8-1986.

9. The burden of arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Chapt. IV-A of the Act is a self-contained Code in itself; there is no express provision in that chapter empowering the Corporation to issue two draft schemes at the same time; and in that view, the preparation and publication of the draft schemes, approved by the impugned Government Orders, had no legal basis whatsoever. This reasoning overlooks the effect of the provisions of S.14 of the General Clauses Act, which provides;

"Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any power is conferred, then unless a different intention appears, the power may be exercised from time to time as occassion requires."

There is no dispute that power is vested in the Corporation by S.68-C of the Act to prepare and cause to be published a draft scheme for nationalisation of the road transport service, if it is of the opinion that there is need, in public interest, and for providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, in any area or on the routes covered by the scheme, for the State Transport Undertaking to run or operate the service in the area on the routes to the exclusion of others. By virtue of S.14 of the General Clauses Act, this power could be exercised from time to time as occasion demands. The exercise of that power by the Corporation should be in conformity with the provisions contained in S.68-C of the Act; there is no other condition precedent to the exercise of that power from time to time as occasion requires. In the whole of S.68-C of the Act, we find no intention contrary to this general principle. There is no bar, express or by necessary implication, against the Corporation preparing a scheme and causing it to be published when a scheme prepared and got published earlier remained without being disposed of. This appears to be the basis of the decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Varkeys case ILR (1968) 2 Ker 96 (supra) approved by the Supreme Court in M/s. Standard Motor Union Private Ltd., AIR 1969 SC 273 (supra). We also find support for the view we have expressed on this point in the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in para 9 at pp. 9-10 of Vasanlal Maganbhai Sanjanwalas case, AIR 1961 SC 4.

10. We are not at all impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the General Clauses Act had no application to matters covered by the Act, much less to those covered by Chap. IV-A of the Act. The stand of the petitioners is that by virtue of the provisions contained in S.68 B of the Act, which lays down;

"The provisions of this Chapter and the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chap. IV of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law."

Chap. IV-A of the Act should be deemed to be a separate and complete Code in itself, and, therefore, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would have no application to matters covered by S.68-C of the Act. The interpretation sought to be placed on S.68-B of the Act by the petitioners, we are afraid, is grossly incorrect and untenable. Chapter IV A of the Act contains special provisions relating to State Transport Undertaking, as the heading itself indicates. The object of S.68 B is to ensure that the monopoly created in favour of the State Transport Undertaking in public interest by the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act works smoothly and that the provisions inconsistent thereto contained in Chap. IV of the Act or in any other law for the time being in force should not be allowed, to come in the way of the objective being achieved. It would, however, be presumptuous on the part of anyone to consider that the provisions of Chap. IV-A of the Act stand by themselves and that no other law would be applicable to them. On the other hand, the correct position appears to be that S.68-B keeps intact other provisions including those of Chap. IV except to the extent of inconsistency between them. The provisions of Chap. IV-A of the Act evidently are meant for advancing the cause of nationalisation, to be in tune with spirit of socialism enshrined enshrined in our Constitution, not at all for protecting the vested interests of persons who are opposed to, or affected by such a progressive measure. If the General Clauses Act is not to be applicable to Chap. IV-A it should be an Act containing provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of Chap. IV-A. We have not been shown any provision in the General Clauses Act which is inconsistent with the provisions of Chap. IV-A of the Act. We have no hesitation in rejecting the contention that because of S.68-B of the Act the provisions of the General Clauses Act could not apply to matters dealt with in Chap. IV-A of the Act.

11. There is also little substance in the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioners that Sub-Sec. (4) of S.135 of the Act clearly indicates that one and the only Section of the General Clauses Act made applicable in relation to the provisions contained in the Act is S.6 of that Act. Section 135 of the Act dealt with repeal and savings; and what Sub-Sec. (4) thereof provides is :

"The mention of particular matters in this Section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals."

It is rather surprising that the petitioners thought that this Sub-Section is capable of yielding an interpretation that S.6 of the General Clauses Act alone applies to the provisions of the Act; and that impliedly, therefore, it excludes the application of all other provisions of the said Act to the provisions of the Act (Motor Vehicles Act). A little careful reading of this Sub-Section would reveal beyond doubt that what is stated therein is by way of clarification that nothing said in that Section should be held to prejudice or affect the general application of that Section (S.6) with regard to the effect of repeals.

12. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act embodies a rule of construction, it being not meant to confer any substantive right. Its applicability to the provisions of a particular statute would depend upon the subject matter, the context and relevance of the provisions of that statute. The subject matter in each of the two decisions of the Supreme Court and the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh, Punjab and Gauhati High Courts, cited and relied on by the petitioners before us, to which reference has already been made by us in para 7 of this judgement, it is totally different from that of the present case. The Supreme Court cases dealt with the power of amendment under S.18-A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; and the withdrawal of exemption from tax, granted earlier by a notification, without issuing a rescinding notification in that behalf. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was one concerning the variation of the area of a Panchayat duly constituted by a notification under S.2(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads act (35 of 1959), against the spirit of the statutory provisions. The Punjab decision was in relation to the variation of the reference under S.10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act; and the Gauhati decision is in relation to a notification under S.43 of the Act (M.V. Act) Inasmuch as we have already found that in the light of the provisions of S.14 of the General Clauses Act and the observations of the Supreme Court in Standard Motor Union Private Ltd., (AIR 1969 SC 273) (supra), the power of the Corporation to prepare and get published a draft scheme under S.68-C of the Act without waiting for the disposal by the Government of a draft scheme published earlier could not be assailed in law, we do not consider it necessary to go into the correctness of the reasoning with respect to the scope and ambit of S.21 of the General Clauses Act found in the judgement dated 28-10-1986 in W.P. No. 12465 p. 86 : (Reported in AIR 1988 Andh Pra 124) and batch, and of the Division Bench in the judgement dt/- 5-3-1987 in W.A. Nos. 155, 196 and 212 of 1987 of this Court.

13. Before we part with the discussion on the effect, if any, of the withdrawal notification published on 7-8-1986 on the impugned approval orders published on 17-2-1986, we have to dispose of one more contention based on the implication of the stay orders of the Supreme Court dt/- 11-10-1985 and 14-2-1986. Almost identical to this are two other contentions urged before us, though the facts are of a different nature. (1) A Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Ch. Vijayanarsimha Reddy, AIR 1985 Andh Pra 361 (W.P. No. 8597/84 and Batch dt/- 8-2-1987) had directed the Government to dispose of the earlier draft schemes within six months from the date of receipts of the order; but the Government had not disposed of those schemes when the new draft schemes were published on 22-8-1986; and (2) when the Government had seizin of the matter, the Corporation was bereft of the power to deal with the draft scheme in any manner, as during the interregnum between the publication of a draft scheme and publication of the order approving it the Corporation was in a functus officio state.

14. The plea based on the stay orders being extremely technical in character, the learned Additional Solicitor General sought to meet it by an equally technical stand: According to him, the use of the expression "further" in the orders of the Supreme Court is pregnant with meaning in the sense that the stay operated against further proceedings; and that it had no application to anything else. He would contend that the withdrawal of the draft schemes not being a further action pursuant to the draft schemes, there was no violation of the stay order. We would look at the matter from a different angle, endeavouring to gather the true spirit and purpose of the orders passed by the Supreme Court. In that context, a few questions spring up in our minds. What were the writ petitions in the Supreme Court for ? What was the prayer in the stay petitions ? What was the mischief the petitioners were anxious to prevent ? and what was that, in all probability, the Supreme Court had in mind when the stay orders were passed ? The immediate provocation for filing the writ petitions in the Supreme Court was the issue of notification G.O. Rt. No. 751 of 19-8-1985 calling for fresh objections to the draft schemes of 1977-78. The Government appears to have resorted to this unusual step of calling for objections to the draft scheme afresh, apprehensive of the fallouts of the Supreme Court decision in Yogeswar Jaiswals case, AIR 1985 SC 516 (supra) as by that time more than a period of 8 years had lapsed since the publication of the draft schemes on 20-5-1977. While the petitioners wanted the draft schemes themselves to be quashed, as they had become obsolete in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the stay orders sought were for stopping immediately the Government from proceeding with the hearing of the objections to the draft schemes filed pursuant to G. O. Rt. No. 751 of 19-8-1985. For the sake of precision, we would extract portions of the relevant averments and prayer in the for ad interim ex parte stay in those writ petitions. The averments in para 3 of the petition filed in W.P. No. 12324/85 read as follows :

"Pursuant to the omnibus Notification issued by the Government dt/- 19-8-1985 to which reference has been made in the main writ petition the Government is preparing to act under the aforesaid Notification and is also proposing to issue Notices of hearing to the various objections. If the notices are issued and further action taken it will not only cause great hardship and loss to the petitioners but also completely frustrate the relief sought for in the present petition besides flouting the law laid down by this Honble Court in the several decisions referred to in the main writ petition."

The prayer in para 4(i) therein is :

"Grant an interim ex parte injunction restraining the respondents from taking any further steps pursuant to their Notification dt/- 19-8-1985 in relation to the Schemes in question (Annexure-A to the main writ petition)"

. (underlining ours). We have to presume that the stay granted by the Supreme Court was in conformity with this prayer and in the light of these averments in the stay petition. We are sure, the question as to whether the Corporation would be entitled to withdraw the draft schemes, or in doing so it would be violating the stay orders, was not at all in the mind of the Supreme Court. There is yet another significant fact. The petitioners at the initial stage appear to have received the withdrawal notification with a sign of relief, as it amounted to acceptance of their contention before the Supreme Court in their writ petitions then pending. They could not have got a better relief from the Supreme Court in those writ petitions as, at best, they could have only hoped for the draft schemes to be quashed as prayed for. It is in this background the Supreme Court on 29-9-1986 recorded the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner that the draft schemes impugned in the writ petitions were withdrawn; and in view of those statements it was considered that there was no need to pass any order in the writ petitions; and disposed them of accordingly. At that time, they did not complain to the Supreme Court that they were aggrieved by the withdrawal notification. In a sense the withdrawal notification was impliedly approved by the Supreme Court when the parties to the proceedings got recorded the fact relating to that, and allowed the matter to be disposed of by that Court without any objection whatsoever. In fact, the Corporation appears to have a case that the withdrawal notification itself was issued on the advice of the Supreme Court. In the minutes of the Routes Committee of the Corporation dt/-24-7-1986, it is seen stated as follows :

"11. That in the light of the above verdict, the Supreme Court advised the Attorney General to advice the State Government that the Government/Corporation may cancel/withdraw all the draft schemes published in the year 1977."

The learned Additional Solicitor General also had made reference to this letter from the learned Attorney General to the State/Corporation during the course of his submissions. In the earlier proceedings, the petitioners did not succeed in the challenge directed against the withdrawal notification. They appear to have no case that the Corporation was guilty of contempt of Court; at any rate, they did not make any such complaint to the Supreme Court. The attempt now, as an afterthought, is to make use of the alleged breach of the stay order collaterally to challenge the Government Order under S.68-D of the Act approving another set of schemes prepared and got published by the Corporation under S.68-C of the Act. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we find absolutely no merit this contention measure of supervision due to limited ability.

15. The direction in the judgement dt/- 8-2-1985 in Ch. Vijayanarasimha Reddys case AIR 1985 Andh Pra 361 is to the government to dispose of the matter within a stipulated period. That does not in any way destroy or abridge the right of the Corporation to prepare a draft scheme and to have it published. The contention that once a draft scheme is prepared and published it should have a final disposal according to the provisions contained in S.68-D of the Act presupposes the existence of the draft scheme. If the legal position is that on the promulgation of another scheme the earlier draft scheme would automatically stand cancelled, there was no draft scheme to be dealt with by the Government. In that view, the assumption that there is even now a draft scheme pending with the Government is erroneous, and all the arguments based on that assumption have only to be repelled We, therefore, reject the contention of the petitioners that the validity of the draft schemes published on 22-8-1986 depended on the validity of the withdrawal of the earlier draft schemes dt/- 20-5-1977, since, according to them, there could not be two different draft schemes in respect of the same routes.

16. There is also a contention regarding the form in which the withdrawal of the scheme should be published Reference is to made to Rules 315 and 316 of the Motor Vehicles Rules. According to the petitioners, every scheme has to be published in Form STU or STUM in the Gazette, and the withdrawal notification not being in those forms, there was illegality attached to the publication. Along with this is raised a contention that the provisions of Chap. IV-A of the Act are to be construed strictly inasmuch as they affected the fundamental right of the petitioners guaranteed under Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution. So far as the form of publication is concerned according to the petitioners themselves, there is no provision made in Chap. IV-A in regard to withdrawal of a draft scheme published, and no form has been prescribed in that behalf. It is also to be noticed that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art.19(1)(g) are subject to the reasonable restrictions; and particularly subject to the provisions of sub-cl. (ii) of Cl.(6) of that Article. Though in some of the writ petitions, a contention is seen to have been taken that the impugned Government Orders violate Arts.14, 21 and 301 of the Constitution, it was not pursued seriously in the course of arguments.

17. We would now pass on to the consideration of the second limb of the argument of the writ petitioners. The petitioners would contend that the impugned orders are vitiated on account of the non-application of mind by the Government, particularly in the matter of ascertaining the nature of the material, if any, that existed to support the opinion stated to have been formed by the Corporation. Under this head, the petitioners have attempted to magnify the significance of many minor points which did not deserve any serious considerations. The most important point vigorously contested under this head is that the Corporation had no material whatsoever to form the opinion that there existed need, in public interest, to nationalise the passenger service in the area or on the routes concerned for providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated passanger transport service. Elaborating this argument, it was submitted that what were being published as the new draft schemes were nothing more than the substitution of the withdrawn draft schemes themselves with trivial modifications here and there under the guise of a new notification to circumvent the decision of the Supreme Court in Yogeswar Jaiswals case (AIR 1985 SC 516) and the decision dated 20-9-1985 in Civil Appeals Nos. 4230 and 4231/85 quashing draft schemes Nos. 401 and 402/77 relating to Nellore district; the preparation of the new draft schemes was not preceded by a traffic survey; the Corporation was oblivious of the tremendous increase of the passenger traffic in the area and on the routes after the publication of the draft schemes dt/- 20-5-1977; and as many as 31 routes, detailed at p. 175 of Book No. 2 (material papers), in relation to which bus service was available till then, had been left out.

18. We find very little merit in these contentions. In para 7 of the additional counter-affidavit filed by the Corporation on 2-4-1987, it is categorically stated that a traffic survey was conducted before framing the new schemes; for the purpose of satisfying both the Government and the objectors, the survey reports and other materials were made available to the Minister after due notice to the objectors counsel which the Counsel had acknowledged. A feeble attempt was made by the counsel for the petitioners to contend that the servey report produced for our perusal by the counsel for the Corporation was really the one which preceded the 1977-78 schemes, not the one conducted in relation to the 1986 draft schemes. At our suggestion, the counsel for the Corporation had also produced for our perusal the report of the traffic survey conducted before 1977-78 schemes were prepared and published. That is an entirely separate report. This demonstrated the hollowness of the contention advanced by the petitioners in this regard. We have also been shown the records relating to the payments of T.A. and D.A. to the staff and officers employed on the traffic survey in July, 1986. The very fact that the details of the new routes have been furnished as an appendix to the draft schemes and they are substantially in variance with the details furnished along with the earlier draft schemes is sufficient proof that a fresh survey was conducted and a fresh look at it had been made by the Corporation. Assuming that there are few routes in the new set of schemes which retained their earlier identity, it does not affect the validity of the new set of schemes as a whole. It has also to be noticed that as against 213 schemes notified in 1977-78, the number of draft schemes published in 1986 came to 291. The contention that some of the existing routes disappeared from the routes map under the new scheme also does not appear to be correct. The learned Additional Solicitor General has, with the aid of a note prepared for the purpose, submitted before us that none of the 31 routes mentioned in page 175 of the material papers (Book No. 2) had been dropped, but what really happened was that the length of those routes had been extended shifting the terminus to a point beyond the existing one so as to serve more people in a better way.

19. We also find no merit at all in the contention that the Corporation acted in an irresponsible manner in undue haste in the matter which is of considerable importance to the public. According to the petitioners, the new schemes were conceived in a short period of 7 to 10 days. This argument is based on the assumption that before 4-8-1986, on which date the withdrawal order was passed, the Corporation had no idea of preparing a new draft scheme at all. During the course of the submissions, the counsel for the Corporation has rebutted the correctness of this submission. It would be quite reasonable to infer that ever since the Corporation come to know about the decision of the Supreme Court in Yogeswar Jaiswals case AIR 1985 SC 516 (supra) it was conscious of the futility of pursuing with the 1977-78 schemes, which were virtually, dead and gone, and was keeping itself busy with the collection of materials for preparing a new set of schemes. That the traffic survey was conducted in the month of July, itself falsifies the contention that it was only after 4-8-1986 the idea of having a new set of schemes was entertained by the Corporation.

20. The petitioners had, during the course of arguments, made much ado about the failure on the part of the Corporation to produce before the Minister who heard the objections the material on the basis of which it had formed the opinion in regard to the need for the nationalisation of the routes. Our attention had been drawn to the memo filed on 7-1-1987 on behalf of the objectors in Scheme Nos. 1, 4, 5, etc. of the stating, inter alia, that during the course of arguments those objectors had requested the authority hearing the objections to direct the Corporation to produce all the records on which the opinion was formed by the Corporation; and in spite of the repeated representations and requests on 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Jan. 1987 during the course of hearing, the Minister did not direct the Corporation to produce the records in all those schemes. The hearing by the Minister of Transport under S.68-D of the Act took place from 2-1-1987 to 9-1-1987 and the Corporation has no case that the materials had been produced before the hearing ended. The stand of the Corporation, however, is that it did produce the materials before the Minister disposed of the objections and gave approval to the schemes. We find it difficult to appreciate the statement in the memo filed by the petitioners on 7-1-1987;

"the non-production of records during the course of hearing caused great hardship to the objectors as they were denied the reasonable opportunity."

In fairness to the counsel for the petitioners, it has to be said that they never contended for the position that they were entitled to peruse or scrutinise the material relied on by the Corporation for its opinion, it being a matter of its subjective satisfaction. They conceded that they were not entitled to compel either the Corporation to produce the material before the Government, or the Government to call for such materials from the Corporation. The jurisdiction exercised by the Government acting under S.68-D of the Act is akin to that of a quasi-judicial tribunal. The Government Orders under Sub-Secs. (2) and (3) of S.68-D of the Act are final, inasmuch as no appeal or revision against such orders have been provided for in the Chapter. The finality attached to the orders under S.68-D of the Act is for the reason that the task has been entrusted to a high placed authority. It is evident, therefore, that once the Minister approved the draft schemes, he was satisfied that the schemes were properly prepared, and that they could and should be implemented in public interest. It is open to the objectors to produce evidence to establish that the schemes were not in public interest or to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and well-integrated transport service. In this case, instead of any one of the objectors doing that, what they sought to do was to blame the Corporation and the Government, stating that there was no material for the opinion formed, and they had been prejudiced because of the non-production of the material before or during the time of hearing before the hearing authority as desired by them. Once it is conceded that they were not entitled to peruse or scrutinise the material on the basis of which the opinion was formed by the Corporation, it matters little whether the materials were placed before the Government by the Corporation before or after the hearing concluded, so long as the Government has no case that either it was not satisfied that there was material for the opinion, or that the information called for had not been placed before it by the Corporation.

21. It was strenuously contended that the Corporation did not take the pains to gather the particulars or examine them to ascertain whether there was feasibility in public interest for nationalising the routes. The submission was that the whole responsibility was entrusted to the Routes Committee which was constituted in exercise of the power of the Corporation under S.12 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, not under any of the provisions contained in Chap. IV-A of the Act. The contention is twofold. Firstly, inasmuch as the delegation of the function to the Routes Committee was not authorised by any of the provisions contained in Chap. IV A such entrustment of the task to the Routes Committee itself was bad; and, secondly, that the Corporation had only acted as a rubber-stamp by stating that it confirmed the proposal made by the Routes Committee. There is no basis for this argument, legal or factual. Merely because there is no provision in Chap. IV-A of the Act for constituting a Routes Committee, it does not mean that the Corporation cannot constitute a Committee or take advantage of its expertise or the statistics gathered by it, in the absence of any prohibition in that behalf in that Chapter.

The Corporation naturally may have to gather the information either through its own employees or through an expert body constituted for that purpose. In that view, in perusing the minutes and reports of the Routes Committee for preparing a plan, with due regard having had to the policy of the State Government to provide Village - Link Transport Service, the Corporation could not be accused of having done anything which it ought not to do. In fact, the question of delegation as such does not arise. The Corporation has to gather the information to formulate ideas through some agency in that behalf; that is all what has happened here also.

22. One other contention of the petitioners is that the Corporation did not have the necessary resources to implement the schemes, pointing out that it had not fully implemented several schemes already approved; and that it did not introduce additional buses on the said routes as suggested by the Transport Commissioner and the Regional Transport Authority from time to time. According to a statement filed by some of the petitioners, the maximum number of buses required under the approved schemes is 1,574, the minimum number required being 787. The statement would also show that the actual number of vehicles placed on road is 525 (Prakasam district - 234, Nellore district 291). In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation on 2-4-1987 in W.P. 2138/87, in para 12, it is stated as follows :

"I submit that the Corporation was granted permits under S.68-F(1) on all the approved routes and they are operating 462 vehicles in Nellore district and 418 vehicles in Prakasam district with effect from 20-2-1987."

We do not propose to go into the veracity of the statement filed by the petitioners. We have absolutely no reason to suspect the truth of the averments made in the counter-affidavit sworn to by a responsible officer of the Corporation. We are also not impressed by the argument that the gap between the maximum and minimum buses to be provided under the scheme on many routes is such that it was intended to deceive the public. According to them, the Corporation, which does not have the means to ply on the notified routes sufficient number of vehicles, would be operating only minimum number of services. We are of the opinion that a certain amount of flexibility in these respects is necessary in order to cope with growing needs and unforeseen circumstances. The financial resources of the Corporation is not one of the points that could be raised in the form of objection, which has to be, broadly speaking, confined to the fourfold objectives of efficiency, adequacy, economy and proper co-ordination as stated in S.68-C of the Act. May be that at the most they could go to the extent of saying that the nationalisation was not in public interest and, in any event, the complete exclusion of other operators on the notified routes was not justified. The very fact that the Corporation is a creation of a statute, and it has the backing of the State Government, is sufficient proof of its ability to command resources, and the objector is precluded from raising any question relating to that, vide the decision of the Supreme Court in M.P. Co-operative Societies, Bhopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1815. Moreover, the comparison, if any, between the facilities already in existence and the facilities offered by the Corporation now under the new Schemes, is not so much for deciding as to between the Corporation and the private operators who should be chosen. It is for the Government to satisfy whether it is in public interest to allow the implementation of the draft schemes by granting approval, if in the true spirit of the provisions of S.68C of the Act it would further the interests of the travelling public, nor curtail or take away the facilities already available.

23. It was also contended before us that the objections should have been disposed of giving reasons in a judicial way, and the copy of the orders passed by the Minister who heard the objections should have been furnished to the petitioners, as otherwise it would be violative of judicial procedure and the principles of natural justice. The government hearing the objections and passing orders under S.68D of the Act is only quasi-judicial authority, not a judicial authority. The procedure to be followed is as laid down in Chap. IVA. There is no provision in Chap. IVA in regard to the manner in which the objections are to be disposed of. If a fair hearing has been given to the parties, and the representatives of the Corporation and the objections of the operators and others had been given due consideration, that would be sufficient compliance in terms of S.68D of the Act. In our opinion, the petitioners are not entitled either to insist on a detailed discussion in regard to the reasons which led to the rejection of each of their objections, or to have a copy of such orders. The orders passed by the Government show that the salient features in the representations and the objections had been considered, and it was only after satisfying himself of the feasibility of the schemes that the Minister accorded approval to them.

24. In one of the cases (WP. 2306/87) the prayer is for the quashing of the approved scheme (G.D. Ms. No. 339 of 13-2-1987) so far as it relates to the town services in Chirala town. According to the petitioners, by the note appended to the annexure to the scheme approved by the G.O. of the year 1963 as modified by the G.O. dt. 27-4-1968, it was provided that the scheme would not affect the existing routes including fair weather and town service routes, operated upon by other persons. Their grievance now is that as a legal consequence of the approval of the new set of schemes by the impugned Government order, the maximum length of every town service route which overlaps the notified routes is restricted to 8 KMs. Under S.68F(2) of the Act, the Regional Transport Authority has the power to modify the terms of an existing permits so as to curtail the area or route covered by the permit insofar as such permit relates to the notified area of notified route. Under the impugned permits, what has been excluded from the purview of operation by the State Transport Undertaking is the town service routes not exceeding 8 KMs in length. We fail to see how there is any illegality either in the impugned order, or the action taken by the Regional Transport Authority in terms of his notice dt. 19-2-1987. As held by the Supreme Court in Adarsh Travels Bus Service, AIR 1986 SC 319 followed in Pandiyan Roadways Corporation Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 47 : (AIR 1987 SC 958) if the provisions in the scheme prohibit private operators from plying stage carriages on the whole or part of the notified routes, it is futile to contend that any of the operators could claim to ply their vehicles on the notified routes or part of the notified routes.

25. A submission was made that this Court might be pleased to direct the Regional Transport Authority to grant permits to the petitioners in appropriate cases under the proviso to Sec. 68FF of the Act.

This question does not arise inasmuch as the categorical cases of the corporation is that they had applied for and obtained permits in relation to all the notified routes. Even otherwise, no such directions are called for from this Court, as on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, if they are entitled to apply for and obtain such permits, they would be at liberty to do so in the absence of any direction from this Court.

26. Here we come to the end. That the temporary permits granted to the petitioners under S.68F (1-C) of the Act ceased to be effective on the grant of permits to the Corporation implementation of the approved schemes is the real cause of the heart-burning so far as the petitioners are concerned. Their action in courts has been motivated by the natural human instinct for self-preservation. All said and done, it could not, however, be said that the inevitable occurred too early, or to their surprise that being the very condition of the permit granted to them, they must have been, every moment, prepared for it. In our democratic socialistic set up, vested interest of individuals yields to public interest; that is the will of the people as expressed though their chosen representatives in Parliament. "Wheel for commonweal"; this is the symbol, the motto of the Corporation. Spokes in the wheel blocked its forward movement along the routes now notified for a long period of ten years. Further delay might damage the wheel beyond repair; and the commonweal would be the casualty.

27. The result, therefore, is all the Writ petitions are dismissed; however, without any order as to costs. Advocates fee Rs. 150/- in each case.

28. We should like to place on record our warm appreciation for the enlightening arguments in great detail advanced, and for the assistance rendered in furnishing useful information and copies of relevant documents by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Solicitor General and the learned Advocate General, who appeared on behalf of the respondents.

Immediately after the judgement was pronounced the learned counsel for petitioners made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not find any substantial question of law of general importance or any question of law which requires to be settled by the Supreme Court involved in these Writ petitions. Hence leave declined.

Petition dismissed.

S.14 of the General Clauses Act,