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R. Anand Kumar v. The Co-Operative Tri...
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petition challenges an order of the Co-operative Tribunal (vice Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad) in C.T.A. No. 3/88 which allowed an appeal by the fourth respondent and set aside an order of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Housing), Hyderabad (the "arbitrator") in ARC No. 41/87-G dated 30-3-1988.
Facts as stated in the opinion: the petitioner succeeded to membership of the third respondent (Jubli Hills Co-operative House Building Society Ltd.) on the death of his father and paid sums for allotment of a plot provisionally allotted to his father (plot no. 57). Due to an administrative oversight the same plot was included in a later draw and allotted to the fourth respondent. The society realized the mistake and informed the fourth respondent by letter dated 8-8-83 that plot no. 57 had already been allotted and offered an alternative plot (no. 468). The fourth respondent disputed the society's action and sought cancellation of the letter; subsequent correspondence between the fourth respondent and the society continued.
On 6-10-87 the fourth respondent filed a petition under Section 61(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act before the Deputy Registrar (arbitrator) in ARC No. 41/87-G seeking declaration for allotment of plot no. 57 in her favour. The society's counter alleged the petition was barred by limitation and that the petition lacked the petitioner's signature. The arbitrator framed two preliminary issues — limitation and absence of signature — and answered both in favour of the respondents before him (i.e., against the fourth respondent). The Co-operative Tribunal allowed an appeal by the fourth respondent, held that the arbitrator should have considered the matter on merits and remanded for fresh enquiry. This writ petition challenges that tribunal order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the arbitrator (Deputy Registrar) has power to dispose of a dispute at the threshold on the ground of limitation, or whether he is obliged to decide all aspects of the dispute on merits before dismissing it.
- Whether a petition filed without the signature of the petitioner can be entertained (i.e., whether absence of signature renders the petition non-entertainable).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments
- Learned counsel Shri Tulasi Reddy contended that the view taken by the tribunal was wrong and that the arbitrator has undoubted power to decide the question of limitation as a preliminary issue.
- It was argued that there was no obligation on the arbitrator to decide all issues including the issue of limitation; the arbitrator could determine limitation at the threshold.
Fourth Respondent's Arguments
- Learned counsel Shri C. P. Saradhy argued that sub-rule (4) of Rule 49 of the Co-operative Societies Rules mandates the registrar/arbitrator to dispose of the matter in its entirety on merits and that the arbitrator has no power to dismiss any petition solely on the ground of limitation.
- It was also argued that the fourth respondent did not have a fair opportunity before the arbitrator to adduce all available evidence on the question of limitation and therefore the matter should be remitted for fresh enquiry.
Society's Arguments (as recorded before the arbitrator)
- The society contended in its counter that the petition was barred by limitation.
- The society also contended that the main petition was not signed by the petitioner and therefore should be thrown out.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sri Ramarao v. Suryanarayana Murthi | Holds that authorities under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act are courts and that registrar/arbitrators function as courts for disputes under the statute. | The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the registrar functions as a special court and performs functions akin to civil courts in relation to disputes entrusted to it, while also distinguishing that this does not mean the registrar is governed by all provisions of the Civil Procedure Code for every purpose. |
| Nilamoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukherjee (speech of Lord Hobhouse cited) | Describes "rent courts" as constituted for deciding purely civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights. | Quoted to explain the nature of special courts and to illustrate that special courts perform functions which civil courts would otherwise perform in relation to the class of suits entrusted to them. |
| Ramabhadra Raju Bahadur v. Maharaja of Jeypore | Supports the proposition that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply only to courts governed by it. | Used to reinforce that CPC applies to courts specifically governed by it and that the registrar's powers must be understood in light of the statute and rules, not by wholesale application of CPC. |
| Amin Sahib v. Tiruvannamalai Co-operative Society | Division bench view that the registrar could be deemed a civil court for some purposes; registrar is civil court for certain statutory purposes but not necessarily for others (e.g., sec. 39 CPC). | Cited to show that a registrar may be treated as a civil court for certain specified purposes, supporting the nuanced view that the registrar is a civil court only to the extent the special law so provides. |
| Subramania v. The Official Liquidator | Authority indicating that the registrar may be deemed a civil court for purposes of court-fee. | Referred to in the discussion about the limited contexts in which the registrar may be treated as a civil court. |
| Lakshmunaidu v. Sitaramaswamy | Holds that powers conferred on registrar (under sec. 62(4)) to pass interlocutory orders must be construed independently and not read in conjunction with CPC; registrar can issue interlocutory orders such as injunctions. | The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the registrar/arbitrator has independent powers to make interlocutory orders under the statute and rules and that such powers need not be derived from CPC. |
| Anand Prakash v. Asst. Registrar, Co-operative Societies | Decision that the arbitrator under the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act had no power to grant injunctions or interim stay during arbitration proceedings because that Act did not confer such power. | The court distinguished that decision as not applicable to the present case because the U.P. Act lacked provision for interlocutory orders, whereas the Co-operative Societies Act and rules in the present case do provide such powers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in several linked steps, grounded in the statute, rules and the Limitation Act:
- Statutory framework: The court examined Section 61 of the Co-operative Societies Act (reference of disputes to the registrar), Section 62 (powers of the registrar/arbitrator, including power to decide or transfer disputes and to make interlocutory orders), and Rule 49 of the Co-operative Societies Rules (procedure for arbitration and settlement of disputes). Rule 49(2) makes the Limitation Act applicable "as if the dispute were a suit and the registrar, a civil court." Sub-rule (4) of Rule 49 requires the registrar/arbitrator to record a brief note of evidence and pass a decision in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience.
- Scope of civil procedure: The court rejected the proposition that because the registrar/arbitrator functions as a court in certain respects, the entire Code of Civil Procedure applies to arbitration under Section 61. The registrar is a "special court" for disputes under Section 61 and is a civil court only to the extent the Act and Rules so permit. The CPC applies to courts governed by it and to designated forums under a special law only to the extent that special law enjoins its application.
- Preliminary determination of limitation: The court held there is no provision in the Act or Rules requiring the registrar to try all issues before him or to refrain from deciding the question of limitation as a preliminary issue. The obligation under Rule 49(4) to decide the dispute on the evidence arises only after the registrar is satisfied that the petition is not barred by limitation. If a dispute is not entertainable at the threshold because it is time-barred, the registrar need not proceed to a full merits enquiry.
- On the facts: Article 54 of the Limitation Act (specific performance) was held applicable. The court accepted the arbitrator's computation that the three-year period began with the society's letter of 8-8-83 (acknowledged by the fourth respondent on 1-9-83) and therefore the petition filed on 6-10-87 was barred by limitation. The subsequent correspondence did not enlarge the period. Only exhibits X-1 and X-2 had been placed before the arbitrator; the arbitrator tried limitation as a preliminary issue and both parties proceeded on that issue.
- Remittance and fairness: The court rejected the fourth respondent's contention that she lacked a fair opportunity to adduce evidence on limitation and therefore required a remand. The court found the limitation issue had been tried and saw no necessity to remit the case for fresh disposal on limitation.
- Signature issue: The court declined to decide the second preliminary issue (absence of the petitioner's signature) because neither party argued it before the court and because the conclusion on limitation rendered it unnecessary to decide that question.
- Conclusion on tribunal's order: The court concluded that the Co-operative Tribunal's direction that the arbitrator frame issues, examine witnesses and decide all aspects was contrary to principle and precedent; the tribunal erred in remanding the matter for a full merits hearing rather than upholding the arbitrator's preliminary decision on limitation.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): The writ petition is allowed; the order of the Co-operative Tribunal in C.T.A. 3/88 dated 17-1-89 is set aside and the order of the Arbitrator/Deputy Registrar in ARC No. 41/87-G dated 30-3-1988 is restored.
Implications and consequences:
- The arbitrator's decision that the petition filed by the fourth respondent was barred by limitation is upheld and the tribunal's remand for a full merits enquiry is reversed.
- The court held that the registrar/arbitrator may decide limitation as a preliminary issue and is not obliged to conduct a full merits hearing on every aspect before dismissing a petition as time-barred; Rule 49(4)'s procedural obligations arise only once the registrar is satisfied the petition is not time-barred.
- No broader or novel precedent beyond application of the statute, rules and existing authorities was announced; the decision limits the scope of mandatory application of the CPC to the registrar to those situations specifically provided by the Act and rules. The opinion does not purport to set a general new rule beyond the statutory interpretation applied.
- Costs: There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate's fee: Rs. 250/-. (As recorded in the opinion.)
(1) This writ petition is directed against the order of the co - operativetribunal - v assistant judge, city civil court, hyderabad in c. T. A. No. 3/88 allowing the appeal preferred by the fourth respondent setting aside the order of the deputy registrar of co - operative societies (housing) , hyderabad (herein after called as the arbitrator) in arc no. 41/87 - g dated 30 - 3 - 1988.
(2) The petitioner's father was a member of the third respondent - society - jublihills co - operative house building society limited, hyderabad. After the death of his father the petitioner was admitted as a member; the managing committee of the society approved the membership of the petitioner on 14 - 12 - 82 a letter was received from the third respondent - society on 30 - 5 - 82 informing that lots would be drawn for purpose of allotting plots cf he use sites to the members of the society on 20 - 6 - 82. A sum of rs. 3050/ - which was required to be paid, according to the petitioner was paid and a receipt was obtained from the society. By a letter dated 6 - 7 - 82 the society informed the petitioner that plot no. 57 was provisionally allotted in the name of the pesitioner's father in the draw held on 20 - 6 - 82. The entire balance of the amount of rs. 7,911. 15 (inclusive of registration charges and stamp duty) was paid by the petitioner to the society on 28 - 11 - 82 and he has submitted an application with the necessary affidavits :
"to transfer the membership accouunt of my late father".
Due to over sight, according to the petitioner, the plot was included in the next draw held on 20 - 12 - 82 and it was allotted to the fourth respondent. The mistake was realised in august, 1983. By a letter dated 8 - 8 - 83 the society informed the fourth respondent :
"we wish to bring to your kind attention that in the draw for allotment of plots held oa 26 - 12 - 82 due to an administrative error smt. Rekha bothara was inadvertently allotted a plot no. 57 which had already been allotted earlier to another member. This matter was considered by the managing committee at its meeting held on 22 - 7 - 88 and they have decided to allot you an alternative plot no. 468 in block iii area."
A reply was sent on 1 - 9 - 83 by the fourth respondent to the co - operative society informing that she paid the entire amount in respect of plot no. 57 and the letter of the society dated 8 - 8 - 83 deciding to allot an alternative plot to her :
"is highly illegal, unjust and contrary to the bye - laws of the society apart from violation of the principles of natural justice."
She, therefore, requested the society to cancel the letter dated 8 - 8 - 83. Acknowledging the letter of the fourth respondent dated 1 - 9 - 83 the society informed her in writing on 11 - 11 - 83 :
"that in the draw for allotment of plots held on 26 - 12 - 82 due to an administrative error you are inadvertently allotted plot no. 57 which has already been allotted earlier to another member. Hence you are allotted plot no. 468 afterwards. The option is given to you either to retain the plot no. 468 or whether your name should be considered for next draw for allotment of plots in block iii subject to availability of plots".
The fourth respondent replied on 7 - 2 - 84 stating that
". There are 13 plots vacant and unallotment till this day. Oa my request a list of unallotted plots in block iii was furnished to me. As per the said list plot nos. 144, 150, 239 and 435 are still not allotted to anybody. I humbly submit that plot no. 150 is similar to plot no. 57 which was earlier allotted to me in all resnects. I, therefore, request you sir, to kindly allot me the plot no. 150 in exchange for plot no. 57 in block no. Iii of jubli hills co - operative house building society limited."
As no reply was received, the fourth respondent once again addressed a letter to the society on 26 - 12 - 85 re - iterating her request and stating that she was :
"subjected to torture and victimisation. Baing a house wife of an employed person, i cannot challenge me said cancallation of my allotted plot before the registrar of co - operative societies fearing torture and making my self present before the registrar."
On 6 - 10 - 87 she filed a petition under sec. 61 (1) of the co - operative societies act before the arbitrator (deputy registrar of co - operative societies) the second respondent herein in arc no. 41/87 - g seeking a declaration for allotment of plot no. 57 in her favour. Under sec. 61 of the act the registrar acts as an arbitrator. The co - operative society and the writ petitioner herein are respondents 1 and 2 respectively in arc 41/87 - g before the arbitrator. The society in its counter inter alia stated that the petition was barred by limitation and that as the main petition was not signed by the petitioner (r 4) it should be thrown out. The arbitrator, therefore, framed the following two preliminary issues :
1. Whether the suit filed is barred by limitation ? 2. Whether the pelition filed without affixing the signature by the petitioner can be entertained?
After considering the arguments advanced by both sides the arbitrator answered both points in favour of the respondents before him (the petitioner and r - 3 herein).
(3) The limitation in respect of the applications filed under sec. 61 isgoverned by sub - rule (2) of rule 49 which lays down that the limitation :
"shall be regulated by the provisions of the limitation act 1963 as if the dispute were a suit and the registrar a civil court."article 54 of the limitation act lays down that for specific performance of a contract the period of three years limitation runs from, the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. The arbitrator expressed the view that the period of limitation of three years starts from 1 - 9 - 83, the date on which the fourth respondent herein had acknowledged the receipt of the letter dated 8 - 8 - 83 marked as ex. No. 1 and as the petition under sec. 61 (1) was filed on 6 - 10 - 87 the same was barred by limitation. The petition filed before the arbitrator was not in accordance with the procedure incorporated in the civil rules of practice in that the petition did not contain the signature of the party. An application was filed for permission to comply with the defect. The arbitrator declined to grant the permission and held that the petition was not in conformity with rule 26 of the civil rules of practice.
(4) Aggrieved by that the respondent herein filed an appeal (cta 3/88) under sec. 76 of the co - operative societies act before the co - operative tribunal (v assistant judge, city civil court) the tribunal allowed the appeal expressing the view that the arbitrator is a civil court and, therefore, the civil procedure code as well as the limitation act will apply in respect of disputes referred to the arbitrator under sec. 61. The civil rules of practice made by the high court for the guidance of the subordinate civil courts in the state cannot constitute the basis for dismissing the petition by the arbitrator although be exercises the powers of the civil court and that the arbitrator ought to have considered the additional affidavit filed for rectification of the defect. The tribunal observed that :
". When many irregularities were brought to the notice of the arbitrator it is the duty of the lower cjurt to decide the petition by framing issues and examining the witnesses and by marking documents and giving an order on aid aspects and dismissing the petition on preliminary aspects is illegal and arbitrary and nothing but miscarriage of justice".
On that view the matter was remanded to the arbitrator for fresh enquiry with a direction to dispose of the a. R. C. 41/87 - g on merits in accordance with law. The validity of that order is questioned in this writ petition.
(5) Shri tulasi reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner contends thatthe view taken by the tribunal is clearly wrong; the arbitrator has undoubted power to decide the question of limitation as a preliminary issue and there was no obligation cast upon him to decide all the issues including the issue pertaining to limitation. Countering these contentions shri c. P. Saradhy, learned counsel for the fourth respondent argues that in unambiguous language sub - rule (4) of rule 49 of the co - operative societies rules mandates the arbitrator to dispose of the matter in its entirety on merits and he has no power to dismiss any petition on the ground of limitation.
(6) Omitting the immaterial portion, sec. 61 reads :
"61 dispute which may be referred to the registrar : (1) notwith standing anything in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its commitee against, a paid employee of the society arises (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members ; or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society , or (c) xx xx xx (d) xx xx xx the dispute raised before the arbitrator was between not only two members inter se but also against the society. The dispute, therefore, falls within the ambit of 61 (1) (a) and (b). The registrar on reference of a dispute under sec. 61. Is empowered by sec. 62 to decide the dispute by himself or transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested oy the government with powers in that behalf or refer it to any other arbitrator. Sub - section (4) enjoins that the registrar or the arbitrator shall decide the disoute in accordance with the provisions of the act and the rules and bye - laws and such a decision shall, subject to the provisions of sec. 76, be final. The registrar or arbitrator as the case may be has power to make interlocutory orders pending final decision of the dispute, in the interest of justice. Under sec. 120 the registrar shall have the power of a civil court while trying a suit under the code of civil procedure in respect of (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person, (b) compelling the production of documents, (c) issuing a commission for the examination of any witness; and (d) receiving evidence on an affidavit. Rule 49 so far as it beara question under consideration read : 49. Procedure for arbitration and settlement of disputes : (1) a reference to the registrar of any dispute under sec. 61 of the act shall be in writing. (2) the period of limitation for referring a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society to the registrar under sub - section (1) of sec. 61 of the act shall be regulated by the provisions of the limitation act, 1963 as if the dispute were a suit and the registrar, a civil court : provided xx xx xxx provided further xx xxx (3) xx xx xx xx (4) the registrar, the arbitrator or other person deciding the dispute shall record a brief note of the evidence of the parties and witnesses who attended and upon the evidence so recorded and after consideration of any documentary evidence produced by the parties, shall pass a decision in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience and such decision given shall be in writing. In the absence of any party duly summoned to attend, the dispute may be decided ex - parte."
(7) The question is whether the arbitrator has power to dispose of thedispute at the threshold stage on tthe ground of limitation or is he obliged to consider all the aspects including limitation? rule 52 lays down elaborate procedure for execution of decrees, decisions or orders passed by the registrar/arbitrator. The procedure contained in rule 52 is analogous to the procedure under order xxi of the c. P. C. Rule 49 (6) (c) lays down that the civil court on an application shall enforce the decision of the arbitrator as if it were a final decree of the court. Power is conferred on the registrar/ arbitrator to transmit the decision to the civil court for execution. Sub - rule (9) says that the dispute referred to the registrar under section 61 shall ordinarily be disposed of within,:a period of six months from the date of the reference.
(8) The question whether the registrar - arbitrator under the co - operativesocieties act acts as a special court fell for consideration before the madras high court in sri ramarao vs. Suryanarayana murthi (1). After reviewing the case law venkatarama ayyar, j. Held :
". It must be held that the authorities under the madras cooperative societies act are courts because they derive their authority to decide a dispute only under the provisions of the statute and not by any agreement of parties and they are exercising the judicial powers of the state. The weight of authority is, undoubtedly, in favour of the view that the registrar and the arbitrators functioning under the statute act as courts".
The learned judge after referring to the speech of lord hobhouse in nilamoni singh deo vs. Taranath mukherjee (2) wherein it was held that the
"rent courts constituted for deciding on purely civil questions between persons seeking thsir civil rights"observed :
"the true import of such a distinction is that while special courts have jurisdiction over a limited class of suits specified in the statute the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not limited to any class of suits. To this extent there is a distinction between the two classes of courts but. In respect of the class of suits entrusted to the jurisdiction of special courts they perform in relation to them functions which but for the special act would have been performed by civil courts and to that extent the special courts can be said to be civil courts in a different attire".
Relying upon the decision in sri rama rao's case the learned government pleader contended that the deputy registrar who acts as an arbitrator under sec. 61 of the act is a civil court.
(9) Tae registrar functions as a special court for deciding disputesunder sec. 61 of the act and that court is a civil court but from this, i think no conclusion follows that the procedural aspects must in their entirety be governed by the provisions of c. P. C. What is the procedure the registrar should follow is indicated in the rules to which i have adverted to supra. In many respects no doubt the procedure is akin to the one incorporated in the civil procedure code. , only in respect of matters specifically covered by the provisions of the co - operative societies act and the rules made thereunder a registrar can be said to be a civil court but not for all purposes in respect of which the provisions of c. P. C are applicable. The code of civil procedure applies to courts governed by it and to designated forums under any special law, to the extent its application is enjoined by such law.
(10) Dealing with the question whether for purposes of sec. 39 of thec. P. C. , the registrar under the co - operative societies act is a civil court, a division bench of the madras high court in amin sahib vs. Tiruvannamalai co - optrative society expressed the view that ;
"it rcay be that the registrar acting under sec. 57 - a could be deemed to be civil court for some purposes; sec. 57 - b expressly says that the registrar will be a civil court for purposes of article 182 of the limitation act. For purposes of court - fee a learned judge of this court has held that the registrar may be deemed to be a civil court. (vide subramania vs. The official liquidator (4) but there is no authority for the proposition that the registrar can be treated as a court within the meaning of sec. 39 of the civil procedure code".
Venkatarama ayyar, j in sri rama rao's case after noticing the above view of the division bench observed :
"what was laid in this decision is that the provisions of the code of civil procedure apply only to courts governed by it which is what had been held by the privy council in ramabhadra raju bahadur vs. Maharaja of jeypore". 5
(11) Dealing with the scope of interlocutory orders the registrar canpass under sec. 62 (4) , jaganmohan reddy, j (as he then was) in lakshmunaidu vs. Sitaramaswamy held :
"the fact that the legislature conferred certain powers on the registrar under sec, 62 (4) must be construed independently and not read in conjunction with the civil procedure code. The provisions of she c. P. C. , themselves are applicable to civil courts and certainly enquiries by the registrar under sec. 62 (4) cannot be said to be enquiries by a civil court ; nor is it contended by mr. Jagannadha rao that it is so. In the circumstances, i must hold that the registrar or the deputy registiar, as the case may be i. E. , 11th respondent has power to issue orders of injunction against respondents 1 to 9."
(12) Rule 49 (2) of the rules obligates that the period of limitationin respect of disputes under sec. 61, as already noticed,
"shall be regulated by the provisions of the limitation act as if the dispute were a suit and the registrar, a civil court."for the purpose of ascertaining the period of limitation the registrar, by rule 49 (2) , acts as a civil court. There is no provision either in the act or in the rules that the registrar shall try all the issues arising in any dispute before him and that he shall not try the issue relating to limitation as a preliminary issue. The provisions of order xiv rule 2 of the c. P. C. Which enjoin the court to pronounce judgment on all issues subject to the exceptions contained therein have no application in so far as resolution of disputes under sec. 61 of the act are concerned. The contention advanced in this regard by shri saradhy, learned counsel for the fourth respondent that the registrar is bound to decide all the issues based on order xiv rule 2 c. P. C. Is untenable. The obligation cast on the registrar or the arbitrator by sub - rule (4) of rule 49 to decide the dispute by recording a brief note of the evidence of the panics and witnesses, consider the evidence adduced before him and pass a decision in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience comes into play only after the registrar is satisfied that the petition filed before him is not barred by limitation. If he is satisfied that the dispute referred to him is not barred by limitation, his duty to decide the matter in the manner laid down by sub - rule (4) will arise. If at the threshold stage itself a dispute is not entertainable by virtue of its being barred by time, the registrar is not obliged to render a decision in the manner obligated by sub - rule (4). The decision of the allahabad high court in anand prakash vs. Asst. Registrar co. Op. Societies relied upon by shri saradhy lays down the proposition that the arbitrator under the u. P. Co - operative societies act has no power to grant injunction or interm stay during the pendency of arbitration proceedings. It has no application to the case on hand. The u. P. Co - operative societies act does not contain any provision empowering the arbitrator to pass interlocutory orders and, therefore, the allahabad high court held that the arbitrator being a creature of the statute has no inherent power to pass interim orders.
(13) The registrar although acting under sec. 61 as a civil court, isnot governed by all the provisions of the c. P. C. To the extent the act and the rules permit, the provisions of c. P. C. Come into play and this is clear from sec. 62 (4) which mandates that the registrar or arbitrator
"shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this act and the rules and bye - laws."any power conferred on the registrar - arbitrator by the act or the rules cannot be read in conjunction with the provisions of the c. P. C. That power has to be excercised by him independently. The view taken by the tribunal that the :
"registrar under rule 49 (2) is a competent civil court and he can resort to the provisions of civil procedure code and has to give a finding on all aspects after examining the witnesses and marking documents".
Is clearly contrary to principle and precedent.
(14) Article 54 of the limitation act, it is common ground, appliesto the present dispute. The period of three years under article 54 runs from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused. The fourth respondent herein received ex. X - i letter (it is marked as x - i by the arbitrator) on 8 - 8 - 83 from the third respondent - society informing her about the mistake that occured and the decision of the managing committee to allot alternative plot no. 468 in block iii area to her. Her reply was on 1 - 9 - 83 by ex. X - 2 (marked as x - 2 by the arbitrator) requesting the society to cancel the letter dated 8 - 8 - 83. She had notice about the refusal of the performance by the society through their letter dated 8 - 8 - 83 which she acknowledged by ex. X - 2. The view taken by the arbitrator that the three years period of limitation should be computed from 1 - 9 - 83 and, therefore, the limitation expired on 30 - 8 - 86 is correct. The subsequent correspondence by the fourth respondent with the third respondent - society will not enlarge the period of limitation. The only documents marked before the arbitrator are exhibits x - 1 and x - 2. Shri saradhi, learned counsel for the fourth respondent says that his client did not have a fair opportunity before the arbitrator to adduce all available evidence on the question of limitation and, therefore, the matter may be remitted. I cannot agree. The question of limitation was tried as a preliminary issue and both parties went to trial on that issue. I do not, therefore, feel any nece ssity to remit the case to the arbitrator for fresh disposal.
(15) No arguments are advanced on the second question decided bythe arbitrator viz. , the petirion filed by the fourth respondent is not enter - tainable because it did not contain her signature. After the arguments are closed shri tulasi reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner requested that 1 should decide this question also. I am not inclined to do so as neither side has argued this point. Even otherwise on the view i have taken on the first question concerning limitation, it is unnecessary to decide this aspect.
(16) In the result the writ petition is allowed. The order of the vassistant judge, city civil court in c. T. A. 3/88 dated 17 - 1 - 89 is set aside and the order of the arbitrator/deputy registrar of co - operative societies (housing) in arc. No. 41/87 - g dated 30 - 3 - 1988 is restored.
(17) There shall be no order as to coats. Advocate's fee rs, 250/ -.
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