- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Dr. (Miss) J.V Raj v. Dr. P. Siva Reddy And Others .
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner has occupied premises No. 3-5-386 at Narayanaguda in Hyderabad since 1959 and runs a maternity and nursing home there. The first respondent, who later purchased the premises and is also a doctor, filed an eviction petition before the Rent Controller claiming he owned no other house and required the purchased premises for his bona fide residence. The petitioner resisted eviction on the basis that the premises was non-residential within the meaning of section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (“the Act”), and that bona fide residential requirement is not a ground of eviction for non-residential premises under section 10.
The Rent Controller found that the first respondent required the premises for bona fide residence and ordered eviction. On appeal the Appellate Court, relying on Dr. Gopal Das Verma v. Dr. Bharadwaj (1961 2 S.C.J 616), held that a premises used as a nursing or maternity home is non-residential, allowed the appeal and set aside the eviction order on that ground alone. The first respondent then applied to the Government under section 26 of the Andhra Act for exemption of the premises from the operation of section 10. After giving notice to the petitioner and considering her representations, the Government issued a notification (G.O. Ms. No. 24 G.A.D dated 9-1-1964) exempting the premises from section 10. The petitioner challenged that notification by way of this writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the State Government can, under section 26 of the Andhra Pradesh Act, exempt a premises from the operation of section 10 even though the premises is being used for non-residential purposes (a nursing/maternity home).
- Whether a notification of exemption that does not recite detailed reasons (or state satisfaction on its face) is vitiated for want of reasons.
- Whether the Government can grant an exemption under section 26 after an appellate court has allowed an appeal setting aside an eviction order (i.e., whether the exercise of the executive power in such a situation improperly attempts to overrule the court).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Relying on P.J. Irani v. State of Madras (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731) and Abdul Subhan Sahib & Sons v. State of Madras (1959 2 M.L.J. 387), the petitioner argued that once premises are used for non-residential purposes they cannot be exempted under the corresponding power in the statute, because such an exemption would contravene the statute which does not permit eviction of non-residential premises on the ground of bona fide residential requirement.
- The petitioner contended the notification went beyond the object and purpose of the Act.
- She also argued that the notification did not give any reasons for exempting the first respondent's house from the provisions of the Act and that that omission rendered it invalid.
- It was further contended that the Government had no power to grant exemption after the appellate court had allowed the petitioner's appeal (i.e., the contention that the executive improperly sought to override the judicial decision).
Government / First Respondent's Arguments
- The Government (as set out in its counter affidavit) maintained that under section 26 of the Andhra Act the Government has the statutory power to exempt any of the provisions of the Act and that such a power is not unconstitutional and can be exercised in individual cases of hardship, so long as there is no discrimination or mala fides.
- The Government stated that it had examined the petitions and found that the first respondent had no other house of his own and that his need for the house was bona fide.
- In response to the challenge concerning absence of reasons in the notification, the Government relied on the counter affidavit and the record to show that the bona fide ground was considered and that the statement in the counter was a sufficient explanation of the basis on which the exemption was granted.
- The Government contended that its exercise of the exemption power did not amount to arbitrarily circumventing the appellate court's decision but was an appropriate exercise of a distinct statutory power, invoked because eviction could not otherwise be ordered under the Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dr. Gopal Das Verma v. Dr. Bharadwaj (1961 2 S.C.J 616) | Held that premises used as a nursing home or maternity home is non-residential. | The Appellate Court followed this decision to hold the premises non-residential and set aside the eviction order; that decision created the factual need for the Government's exemption under section 26. |
| P.J. Irani v. State of Madras (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731) | Explained the purpose of the Act and the power of exemption: the State's power of exemption can be used to further the policy of the Act (to prevent unreasonable eviction) and not to discriminate, and it is not unconstitutional. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court reasoning to hold that the Government's power of exemption under section 26 is valid and may be applied in individual hardship cases subject to absence of discrimination or mala fides. |
| Abdul Subhan Sahib & Sons v. State of Madras (1959 2 M.L.J. 387) | Expressed the view that procuring premises for a landlord for a purpose for which eviction is not permissible under the Act would not be in furtherance of the Act's object; therefore exemption for that end would be unreasonable. | The Court treated this earlier view as not laying down a general proposition that exemption could never be granted for such cases; later decisions and Supreme Court approval modified its application. |
| Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State of Madras (1954 2 M.L.J. 110) | Recognised the need for a power of exemption to be exercised in proper cases but warned against unfettered executive discretion; accepted that exemptions may be required to avoid hardship and to further the policy of the Act. | The Bench decision is binding on the Court; it formed a foundational basis for upholding the Government's power to exempt and was relied upon repeatedly in subsequent cases. |
| Chinnaiah Seervai v. State of Madras | Held that if premises are capable of being used for residential purposes, notwithstanding current non-residential use, Government could exempt them from the provisions corresponding to section 10. | The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that exemption may be granted where premises are suitable for residential occupation and the need is bona fide. |
| Pannalal Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. The State of Madras (1963 1 M.L.J. 415) | Held the State Government could exercise the corresponding exemption power to exempt premises from operation of the relevant section on grounds of exceptional hardship or abuse of position; such exercise is subject to judicial review for justification and bona fides. | Applied by the Court to confirm that the Government's exercise of exemption is reviewable but permissible where bona fide hardship exists; used to reject the contention that Government lacked power post-judicial decision. |
| M.M. Abbas Bros. v. The State of Madras (1964 1 M.L.J. 219) | Reviewed preceding case law and held that special facts of hardship or abuse of rights could justify Government exemption even where premises are non-residential. | Used by the Court as part of the chain of authority supporting the exercise of exemption in cases of bona fide need or hardship. |
| Perumal Chetty & Co. v. State of Madras | Expressed that the grant of exemption is not vitiated merely because it may result in eviction on grounds other than those specified in the Act. | The Court treated this as settled law and relied on it to reject the petitioner's contention that exemption is impermissible merely because eviction would occur on grounds outside the Act. |
| F. Andrews v. Abhorani Ammal (W.A. No. 166 of 1963) | Mentioned in the context of upholding the power to grant exemptions and particular exemptions. | Referred to by the Court as part of the supporting authorities confirming the validity of Government exemption power. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, relying strictly on the materials and precedents referenced in the opinion:
- Addressing the petitioner's primary contention that a premises used for non-residential purposes cannot be exempted: the Court observed that while section 10 does not permit eviction of tenants of non-residential premises on the ground of bona fide residential requirement, section 26 expressly confers on the Government a power to exempt any of the provisions of the Act. The Court treated this statutory exemption power as intended to address contingencies not specifically provided for in the Act.
- The Court relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in P.J. Irani v. State of Madras to explain the proper scope of the exemption power: the power is to be used to further the policy of the Act (to prevent unreasonable evictions) and not for discriminatory purposes. On that basis, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that exemption in all cases of non-residential use is impermissible.
- The Court reviewed the Madras High Court line of authority (including Globe Theatres, Chinnaiah Seervai, Pannalal, M.M. Abbas Bros. and Perumal Chetty), noting that this body of case law supports governmental exemption in individual cases of hardship or bona fide requirement, even where the premises are non-residential. The Court observed that these decisions had received the approval of the Supreme Court in P.J. Irani.
- Concerning the petitioner's contention that the Government could not grant exemption after the appellate court allowed the petitioner's appeal: the Court characterized this contention as untenable. It explained that the Government's power is not an attempt to set aside judicial findings but a statutory power to relieve cases where eviction could not be ordered under the Act; the appellate decision had in fact made the need for exemption manifest.
- On the complaint that the notification lacked stated reasons, the Court examined the record and the Government's counter affidavit. The Government's counter expressly stated that it found the first respondent had no other house and that his need was bona fide. The Court treated the Government's counter and the record as showing that the question was considered on bona fide grounds and found that such material sufficed (citing Pannalal and other precedents where counter-affidavit reasons were treated as adequate).
- The Court also noted that the petitioner did not concretely contest the factual finding of bona fide requirement before the Rent Controller or before the Government; the petitioner confined her challenges to legal questions. The Rent Controller had given an evidential finding in favour of the first respondent's bona fide requirement, which the Court took into account.
- In light of the statutory text (section 26), the Supreme Court authority, and the consistent line of High Court decisions, the Court concluded that the Government's exercise of the exemption power in this case was within its statutory authority, not arbitrary or mala fide, and was supported by the record.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The Court ordered the petitioner to vacate the premises within one month from the date of the order and awarded costs against the petitioner.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the Government's notification exempting the premises from the operation of section 10 stands; the eviction may proceed consistent with that exemption and the first respondent was granted one month to have the petitioner vacate.
- The Court treated the Government's exercise of power under section 26 as lawful in principle and in the present facts, subject to the usual safeguards against discrimination or mala fides; it did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle but followed and applied an established chain of authority (including Supreme Court approval).
- The opinion does not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying the existing line of cases; the decision is a resolution of the petition on the facts and law as recited in the opinion.
This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond that text have been added.
1. By this writ petition, the order of the Government exempting from the operation of the provisions of section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter called “the Act”), the premises No. 3-5-386 at Narayanaguda in Hyderabad, is challenged. The facts are not in controversy. The petitioner has been occupying the said premises from 1959 and has a maternity and nursing home there. After the 1st respondent, who is also a doctor, purchased the premises, he filed a petition before the Rent Controller for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he owned no other house and that he requires it for his bona fide residence. The petitioner opposed the eviction proceedings on the ground that since the premises was a non-residential building, within the meaning of Sec. 10 of the Act, she could not be evicted on any grounds other than those specified in Sec. 10 and that requirement for bona fide residence is not one of such grounds. It may be stated that before the Rent Controller, the question of the 1st Respondent requiring the house for his bona fide residence was not challenged. The Rent Controller found that the 1st respondent required it for his bona fide residence, he not having any other building, and ordered eviction. The petitioner filed an appeal. The Appellate Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma v. Dr. Bharadwaj . 1961 2 S.C.J 616 holding that a premises used for nursing home or maternity home is a non-residential premises, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of eviction merely on that ground. The 1st respondent thereafter applied to the Government under Sec 26 for exemption of his house from the provisions of Sec. 10. The Government gave notice to the petitioner and after taking into consideration the representations made by her notified the exemption in G.O Ms. No. 24 G.A.D dated 9-1-1964.
2. The learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Raghava Rao, relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court in P.J Irani v. State of Maddras . A.I.R 1961 S.C 1731 as also a judgment of the Madras High Court in Abdul Subhan Sahib & Sons v. Stdte of Madras . 1959 2 M.L.J 387 contends that once a premises has been used for non-residental purposes, it cannot be exempted under sec. 26 because to do so would be to contravene the provisions of the statute inasmuch as the provisions of that statute de not permit eviction on the ground that the house is required for bona fide residential purposes. He also contends that the notification travels beyond the object and purpose of the statute. Lastly he contends that the notification do not give any reasons for exempting the 1st respondent's house from the provisions of the Act. I may at once state that the first two grounds are not tenable either on a reading of the provisions of the Act or on authority, It is true that section 10 does not contemplate eviction of a tenant occupying a non-residential building on the ground chat it is required bona fide for residential, purposes; but it is for this purpose that Sec. 26 enacted a power to exempt any of the provisions of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the very case on which the petitioner relies, namely, P.J Irani v. State Of Madras & Another which is incidentally an appeal from the judgment of the Madras High Court in Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State Of Madras . 1954 2 M.L.J 110 stated the purpose of the Act at page 1737 as follows:—
“Though the enactment thus conferred these rights on tenants, it was possible that the statutory protection could either have caused great hardship to a landlord or was the subject of abuse by the tenant him self. It was not possible for the statute itself to contemplate every such? contingency and make specific provision therefor; in the enactments. It was for this reason that a power of exemption in general terms, was conferred on the State Government which however could be used not for the purpose of discriminating between tenant and tenant, but in order to further the policy and purpose of the Act which was, in the context of the present case, to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants.”
3. In the judgment from which this appeal arose, Viz., Globe Theatres, Ltd. State of Madras, a Bench of the Madras High Court had observed thus:—
“On the one hand, it is obvious that there should exist a power of exemption to be exercised in proper cases. On the other hand, it would be dangerous to vest in the executive unfettered discretion in granting exemptions, a discretion which cannot, be challenged in a Court. On the one hand, it is not easy or feasible to enumerate the grounds on which exemption should be made. On the other hand, it would be wrong to allow the Government to exercise the power of exemption on irrelevant or mala fide considerations.”
It is also observed:
“There are bound to be cases in which an inflexible application of the provisions of the Act may result in unnecessary hardship not contemplated by the Legislature, I would even go further and say that the enforcement of the provisions of the Act may amount to an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the right conferd by Article 19 of the Constitution It is eminently desirable that there should be some authority vested with the power to make exceptions to the general application of the Act and its provisions in proper cases. If so, there could be no better body than the State Government on whom such power could be conferred.”
4. This Bench decision was pronounced on 23-10-1953 and is also binding on this Court. Apart from this, the reasoning of the Bench was also approved by theft Lordships of the Supreme Court in P.J Irani's Case.
5. Prior to this decision, however, in Abdul Subhan Sahib & Sons v. State of Madras Ganapati Pillai, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench consisting of himself & Rajamannar, C.J observed:
“We fail to see how procuring the premises for the landlord for a purpose for which he is not entitled to evict a tenant under the provisions of the Act, would be in furtherance of the object of the Act, Of course, regulation of letting of a premises includes not only prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants but also permitting reasonable eviction. The Act itself provides for such reasonable eviction. If a particular case does not fall within the provisions of the Act permitting such eviction, we are unable to hold that exercise of power of exemption by the Government under Sec. 13 for achieving such eviction would be a reasonable exercise of power.”
6. This judgment seems to have given rise to several decisions, in all of which the Madras High Court consistently took the view that exemption could be granted by the Government on the ground that it is required for bonafide residential purposes. In Chinnaiah Seervai v. State of Madras the same Bench as decided Abdul Subhan's case held that if the premises is capable of being used for residential purposes, notwithstanding the fact that it is being used for non-residential purposes Government could exempt it from the provisions of Sec. 10. Subsequently, in Globe Theatre Private Ltd. v. State Of Madras, C.J, and Veeraswami J., confirmed that decision and explained the decision in Abdul Subhan's case. At page 86, the learned Chief Justice said:—
“We confess that there are here and there certain observations in this case which might appear to support this argument. But when examined carefully it will be evident that it was not the intention of the Division Bench to lay down a general proposition that the exemption could be granted only on grounds contained in the Act as valid grounds for eviction”
7. These above observations would show that not only the learned Chief Justice who was a member of the Bench in Abdul Suban's case but also that vary bench in a subsequent case Chinnaiah Seervai v. State of Madras did not understand Abdul Suban's case in the light in which the learned advocate for the petitioner seeks to contend. In spite of this judgment this point seemed to have been urged from time to time in Madras. In Pannalal Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. The State of Madras Ramachandra Iyer, C.J, and Anantanarayanan J. referred to these cases and held that the State Government could exercise their powers under section 13 of the Madras Buildings, (Lease and Rent Control) Act corresponding to section 26 of the Andhra Act to exempt certain premises from the operation of section 7 corresponding to section 10 of the Andhra Act, upon grounds of exceptional hardship or of abuse of position by one of the parties, though it might be taken by implication, eviction of such premises could not be obtained within the terms of the Act itself. It is not merely in a situation where the Act had omitted to provide for eviction, that Government could properly exercise their power under section 13. But, of course, every such exercise of power is subject to judicial review by the High Court both upon grounds of justification and upon the grounds of the presence or absence of bona fides, or the degree to which the exercise of exemption was in implementation of the policy underlying the Act.
8. Again in M.M Abbas Bros. v. The State of Madras, in another Bench, Anantanarayanan and Ramakrishnan JJ, reviewed the entire case law exhaustively and it was held:
“The intendment of the Legislature in enacting section 7(3)(a)(iii) was that it would be unreasonable to evict a tenant from non-residential premises where the landlord was already in occupation of non-residential premises for his own business. But it by no means follows that there cannot be special facts and circumstances, constituting either great hardship or of abuse of rights, which would justify the Government in exempting such premises under section 13 of the Act,”
9. In that case the landlord was in occupation of a non-residential house. He found that it was not sufficient and required the eviction of the tenant who was occupying another building belonging to the landlord in which the tenant was doing the same kind of business as the landlord. In previous proceedings for eviction of tenant before the Rent Controller the application was rejected on the grounds up on which this exemption was sought by the landlord in 1956. The landlord had earlier applied to the Government for exemption which exemption was rejected and subsequently on the same ground he again applied and this time the Government had exempted in 1957. In that application he averred that the business was expanding, and that the ground-floor was totally inadequate for his business end very congested. He was paying a rent of nearly Rs. 550/- per month for his office buildings and stock godowns, while he was getting only a rent of Rs. 425/- per month for the two premises If he improved those buildings, he could obtain nearly a rent of Rs. 1,000/- per month and also have decent accommodation for his office. Actually the two tenants of the buildings (appellants) had other available accommodation of their own. By getting control of the premises, he could accommodate the godowns and office in one place and improve his business. Further, the buildings were old and dilapidated, and urgently required alterations and improvements. It is not in dispute that after the appellants filed objections to this memorandum of the landlord, a report was submitted to Government by the Accomrnodation Controller, Madras, after making a local inspection. That officer was of the opinion that the landlord genuinely required additional accommodation for his expanding business, that it was but fair that he should occupy buildings owned by him in the locality where the particular trade was being carried on, that the buildings were dilapidated and urgently required repairs and hence that the request of the landlord was reasonable.
10. In this case also the Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State Of Madras formed the basis of the judgment. Anantanarayanan J., referred to the Supreme Court case in P.J Irani v. Stale of Madras, viz., Perumal Chetti & Co. v. State of Madras W.P No. 290/1957, Chinnaiah Servai v. State of Madras Pannalal Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. State Of Madras . 1963 1 M.L.J 415 F. Andrews v. Abhorani Ammal . W.A No. 166 of 1963 in upholding the power to grant exemption and the exemption itself.
11. Rajamannar, C.J in Globe Theatre Ltd. v. State of Madras as well as anantanarayanan J., in M.M Abbas Bros v. State of Madras . 1964 1 M.L.J 219 approved and adopted the observations in Perumal Chetty & Co. v. State of Madras Rajagopalan J., observed in that case as follows:—
(a) The grant of exemption is not vitiated merely because it may result in eviction of a tenant on grounds other than those specified in section 7. of the Act”
It should, therefore, be taken as well settled now that the grant of exemption is not vitiated merely because it may result in eviction on grounds other than those specified in section 7 of the Act. It should be obvious that, if the desired eviction could be secured under the terms of the Act itself, there should be no occasion at all to grant any exemption from the operation of the Act, The exemption is not a substitute for a relief permissible under the Act itself.”
12. This long catena of cases, mostly of the Bench of the Madras High Court beginning from first. The Globe Theatres case has been confirmed by their lordships of the Supreme Court. In Irani's Case they have held that the power of exemption conferred on the Government under Sec. 13 of the Madras Act (corresponding to Sec, 26 of the Andhra Act) is not unconstitutional and can be applied to individual cases of hardship, subject, of course, to there being no discrimination, malafides etc. In this case as in some of the Madras cases, the fact, that the premises is required for bona fide residential purposes of the 1st respondent has never been in doubt and the petitioner never challenged this ground either before the Rent Controller or before the Government.
13. The Rent Controller on evidence gave a finding that the first respondent required it for bona fide purposes. The petitioner stated before the Government in reply to the show cause notice as follows:—
“The respondent submits that the house in which the petitioner is at present residing is suitable for his accommodation as is evident from the fact that he is staying in that house for the past several years.”
14. This is only to say that the house in which the first respondent was living was suitable, but the petitioner did not in fact controvert the allegation that the house which the respondent purchased was required for his bona fide occupation. The petitioner merely confined herself to the legal question throughout, before the Rent Controller as well as before the Government denying the power of the Government to grant exemption in individual cases. It is also contended before me by Mr. K. Raghava Rao that the Government has no power to giant exemption after the appellate court had allowed the appeal and decided the question. This contention, to my mind, is untenable for the reason that it is only where eviction cannot be ordered under the provisions of the Act that the special power vested in the Government can be exercised in special cases. It is not that the power of the Government is being exercised to overrule the decision of the court. On the other hand it is correct to say that the Government exercised the power with due deference to the decision of the court because it is only due to that decision of the court that the need to exemption arose. Where a similar question was raised in Chinnaiah Servai v. State of Madras Rajamannar, C.J observed at page 194:—
“The Government in our opinion did not purport to set aside the finding of this court that the building was non-residential in character. What they were impressed by was the bona fide requirement of the building by the respondent for her residential purposes. As to this both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Tribunal and this Court have been concurrently of opinion that the respondent's case was bona fide.”
15. I have already stated with respect to the bona fides of the first respondent in this Writ petition, so that in my view the aforesaid contention urged by the learned advocate cannot be sustained.
16. Lastly, it is submitted that the order on the face of it did not mention the grounds for granting the exemption. No doubt, the notification merely grants the exemption and does not say anything about the Government being satisfied of the bona fide requirements of the first respondent for occupation of the premises for his residence. But both in the counter as well as in the proceedings on record the question was considered only on the ground of its requirement for bona fide purposes. In the counter of the Government it was stated as follows:—
“The Government after examining carefully the petitions of Dr. Siva Reddy and Dr. J.V Rai the petitioner herein found that Dr. Siva Reddy had no other house of his own and that his need for the house was bona fide.”
17. In this said counter Mr. M. Bhoota Raja Rao, Deputy Secretary to Govern ment, of Hyderabad, stated:
“I submit the Government in the exercise of powers conferred under section 26 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 exempted the building from the operation of the provisions of section 10 of the said Act and the order of exemption is within their power and the same is neither arbitrary nor malafide nor does it amount to circumventing an order of the court of the appellate, authority.”
18. The Statement in the counter as also the examination of the record would show that the Government did consider this question and it was only on the ground, that the first respondent required it for his own personal residence that the exemption was granted.
19. In Pannalal Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. The State of Madras a similar point was urged before a, Bench which was answered by Anantanarayanan J., at page 416 as follows:—
“As the learned Judge has pointed out, the actual order of the Government does not deal in detail with the considerations which led the Government to exempt these premises, but the counter affidavit does hot furnish those details. In their counteraffidavit, the Government point out that the restoration of the premises was really effected by virtue of advances made by the landlord and not through the funds of the appellant as claimed.”
20. The reasons given in the counter affidavit in that case were considered to be a sufficient ground to sustain the order of eviction.
21. Having regard to what has been said above, this Writ petition merits dismissal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.
22. Mr. Raghava Rao requests me to grant some time for his client to vacate I think one month's time is reasonable.
23. I accordingly grant him one month time from the date of this order.
25. Writ petition dismissed.
Alert