Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Pyndah Venkatanarayana v. G.V Sudhakar Rao And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Feb 24, 1965
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the Election Tribunal, Hyderabad's dismissal of Election Petition No. 357/1962 filed by the appellant, who challenged the election of the 2nd respondent (S. Malkonda Reddy) and sought declaration that he (the appellant) be declared duly elected to one of the ten seats of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council. The election (held 25-6-1962) was for ten seats and conducted under proportional representation by single transferable vote. The Returning Officer performed scrutiny, parceling and counting in accordance with the Conduct of Election Rules, and calculated a Droop-type quota. A sequence of counts and transfers of surplus votes left only two candidates (the appellant and respondent No.2) competing for the final seat; respondent No.2 had more votes and was declared elected.

The appellant petitioned alleging multiple irregularities in scrutiny, counting and distribution of surplus votes, asserted that many ballot papers incorrectly accepted as valid should have been invalid, complained of inadequate opportunity for candidates/agents to see ballot papers, and alleged corrupt practice by the 2nd respondent (active canvassing within the prohibited area in contravention of s.130 of the Representation of the People Act). The Tribunal formulated eight issues, conducted evidence (three witnesses per side on corrupt practice), and after an initial finding that the appellant had made a prima facie case for recount/scrutiny, undertook scrutiny and recount. The Tribunal resolved which disputed ballots were valid/invalid, corrected a counting error involving transfer of a surplus and completed recounting; ultimately the Tribunal dismissed the election petition. The appellant appealed to the court which delivered the present opinion dismissing the appeal and awarding costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Returning Officer accepted any ballot paper which did not contain the figure (1) as prescribed by Rule 73(2)(a) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and, if so, whether the result was materially affected.
  2. Whether Rule 73(2)(a) is mandatory and, if so, whether instructions/clarifications issued by the Election Commission have binding force.
  3. Whether the averments contained in paragraph 9 of the petition are true and, if so, their effect on the result.
  4. Whether the Returning Officer committed the errors and irregularities alleged in paragraphs 3 to 8 of the petition and whether the result was materially affected by them.
  5. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a recount and scrutiny.
  6. Whether the election of the 1st and 2nd or any other respondent is void.
  7. Whether the Returning Officer is a necessary or proper party to these proceedings.
  8. Whether the petitioner is entitled to be declared duly elected and, generally, to what relief he is entitled.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Returning Officer committed several irregularities and mistakes in scrutiny, counting and distribution of surplus votes.
  • No adequate opportunity was given to candidates or their agents to inspect ballot papers.
  • Classification of valid and invalid votes was incorrect: many ballot papers that ought to have been declared invalid were accepted as valid, in contravention of mandatory rule provisions (the petition refers to Rule 78(2) and Rule 73(2)(a)).
  • Specific objections to the recount procedure: (a) a fresh lot was drawn at recount for transfer of surplus votes of three elected candidates although a lot was already drawn at original counting (this changed the order of dealing with surpluses and, it was alleged, materially affected the result); (b) Bendi Kurmanna's surplus was dealt with prematurely (before some earlier surpluses had been transferred), in contravention of the rules; (c) because several mistakes were found during recount and rectified, there was a likelihood of further mistakes and therefore another recount was needed.
  • Allegation of corrupt practice against S. Malkonda Reddy for active canvassing within the prohibited area (s.130 RPA).
  • In respect of particular disputed ballots, argued that certain numerals used (Roman, Urdu, Telugu or Devanagari forms) rendered ballots invalid under the relevant rules.

Respondent(s)' Arguments

  • The respondents contested the appellant's claims and argued that several of the disputed ballot papers did not contravene Rule 78(2) (or the equivalent sub-rules) and thus should be valid.
  • Respondents relied on the evidence before the Tribunal to show there was insufficient proof of corrupt practice; the identity of the voter allegedly whispered to was not satisfactorily established.
  • Respondents (and the Tribunal's approach, as adopted by the court) maintained that recount and recount-related procedures lie in the discretion of the Returning Officer or Tribunal and are governed by the rules (specifically Rule 82 and related counting rules); a recount is not a matter of right.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narsimhareddy v. Bhoomaj, 17 ELR 207 : AIR 1959 Andh Pra 111 Need for clear, precise and cogent evidence to establish corrupt practice in election petitions (quasi-criminal standard). Cited to support the conclusion that the allegation of corrupt practice against respondent No.2 was not proved and could not be accepted without clear evidence.
Kandaswami v. S.B. Adityan, 21 ELR 435 : AIR 1960 Mad 170 Same principle—requirement of strong evidence in election offences. Used to corroborate the Tribunal's finding that corrupt practice was not satisfactorily established.
Harischandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 ELR 461 : AIR 1957 SC 444 Supreme Court authority on evidentiary standard for election offences/charges of corrupt practice. Relied on to emphasize that the appellant's charge of corrupt practice could not be sustained on the evidence before the Tribunal.
Ackers v. Howard, (1886) 2 ILR 484 at p.485 Distinction: statutory provisions are directory when done by officers but mandatory when the action is to be performed by the voter. Invoked in considering whether the rule on ballot validity should be treated as mandatory where it prescribes the voter's act.
Criencester Division case, (1893) 4 OM and H 194 Ballot papers should be interpreted liberally; not every departure from form invalidates; effect should be given where voter's intention is clear. Cited to support a liberal construction of the ballot-paper validity rules and to uphold ballots where the voter's intention was manifest despite imperfect form.
K. Sadanandan v. Madhava Menon, AIR 1962 Kerala 68 Principle that a mark will invalidate only if it identifies the elector or is proved to be by prior arrangement. Used to support the conclusion that isolated marks (e.g., inverted commas) without evidence of pre-arrangement do not render a ballot invalid.
Mohan Reddy v. Narayan Reddy, 1963-2 Andh WR 101 : AIR 1964 Andh Pra 190 Recount is not granted as of right; applicant must show good grounds and evidence of mistake by the Returning Officer. Cited for the proposition that recount is discretionary and requires prima facie evidence of inaccuracy; applied to reject appellant's general requests for further recounts.
Stepheney's Case, 40 Malley and Hardcastle 34 Historical authority that recount/scrutiny requires good grounds evidenced for believing a mistake occurred. Referred to in explaining the established principle that recounts require evidential foundation; supports Tribunal's and court's exercise of discretion.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaq, 10 ELR p.216 : AIR 1955 SC 233 Tribunal's jurisdiction is coextensive with that of the Returning Officer (i.e., Tribunal can direct recounts and recount from a stage where a mistake occurred). Invoked to justify the Tribunal's power to order recount and to direct recount from the stage where a mistake had crept in (and to correct counting errors).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two parallel veins: (A) the allegation of corrupt practice, and (B) the challenges to scrutiny, validity of disputed ballot papers, recount procedure and the application of counting rules.

A. Corrupt Practice

The court agreed with the Tribunal that evidence of corrupt practice (active canvassing within the prohibited area) was not established to the requisite quasi‑criminal standard. Citing authorities (including Narsimhareddy, Kandaswami and Harischandra Bajpai), the court emphasized that trial in an election petition is quasi-criminal and requires clear, precise and cogent evidence to sustain a charge. The Tribunal's finding of absence of substantial or conclusive proof was accepted.

B. Scrutiny, Ballot Validity and Interpretation of the Rules

1) Governing rule(s) and their character: The court considered the relevant invalidity provision (quoted in the opinion as Rule 78(2), and the opinion also discusses Rule 73(2) in relation to causes of invalidity). The court held the provision to be mandatory insofar as it prescribes an act to be performed by the voter (citing Ackers v. Howard and noting the use of the word "shall"). However, the court stressed the textual limits of the sub-rule: only the enumerated mischiefs in the sub-rule render a ballot invalid.

2) Form vs. substance of marks: The court drew a clear distinction between imperfect form and failure to satisfy the specific mischiefs in the rule. It held that the requirement that figure (1) be marked does not prescribe a single typographic form of the numeral; intention and the recognisable numeral are decisive. The court referred to Article 343 and the fact that numerals in different scripts (International Indian and Devanagari) are contemplated, and observed that the presence of other Indian numerals in a ballot supports an inference that the voter intended the ordinary marking of preferences.

3) Application to disputed ballots: The Tribunal identified ten disputed ballots (marked C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M). The court accepted the Tribunal's detailed factual findings and legal reasoning that:

  • Ballots C, D and E — although the figure (1) might resemble a Roman "I" in form, the other numerals on those ballots were in the International Indian form and the voter's intention was clear; thus these ballots were valid.
  • Ballots F, G and H — these contained Roman numerals as the other figures and the Tribunal concluded the elector intended to use Roman figures exclusively; these were rejected by the Tribunal as not complying with the rule.
  • Ballot J — contained Urdu numeral (2) for an additional preference; as additional figures (2,3,4...) are discretionary under Rule 37-A, the mere use of non-International numerals for additional preferences does not, without more, invalidate the ballot unless it attracts a mischief in sub-clauses (b), (c) or (d); the Tribunal rejected J on the basis explained in its factual findings.
  • Ballot K — the voter initially mistakenly wrote a "1" against the wrong candidate, immediately struck it out and legibly placed a "2" beside the intended candidate; the court held this was an accidental correction that did not come within the mischief of clauses (b), (c) or (d), and therefore the ballot was valid.
  • Ballot L — inverted commas placed around figures were not shown by evidence to be a mark identifying the elector or the result of prior arrangement; the court accepted the Tribunal's conclusion that L was rightly accepted.
  • Ballot M — contained additional figures in the wrong column and used a Telugu form for figure 4; the Tribunal considered M invalid for reasons explained in its factual findings.

4) Principle of liberal construction: Relying on older authorities (Criencester Division case) and the statutory language, the court reiterated that ballot papers should be interpreted to give effect to the voter's intention unless the defect falls squarely within the mischief of the invalidity provisions. Mere departure from the precise graphical form of a numeral does not automatically render a ballot invalid.

C. Recount and Counting Procedure

1) Discretion and statutory limits: The court reviewed Rule 82 (as quoted) and emphasized that recount is discretionary with the Returning Officer (and, by parity, the Tribunal). A request for recount made must generally be during counting and is limited to papers not set aside at a previous transfer as finally dealt with. Sub-rule (2) permits recounting more than once only in the Returning Officer's discretion and does not oblige repeated recounts. Authorities (Stepheney's Case, Mohan Reddy v. Narayan Reddy) were invoked to underline that recounts are not to be granted as a matter of course but only upon prima facie evidence of a counting mistake.

2) Lot-drawing and transfers: The proportional representation rules require that when surpluses are equal, the order in which surpluses are dealt with is determined by lot. Because the quota changed after scrutiny and some parceling during recount, the court accepted that fresh lot(s) in the recount process were unavoidable for the proper application of counting rules. Where a counting mistake had been identified (Bendi Kurmanna's surplus transferred prematurely), the Tribunal was empowered and justified in directing counting to be resumed from the stage where the defect occurred and to correct the error.

3) Specific complaints rejected: The court found the Tribunal correctly rejected the appellant's objections that a fresh lot should have been drawn in relation to Govindarajulu and Ramachandrayya during the continuation of the recount. The court held the lot drawn at the appropriate stage sufficed, and no rule required casting a new lot when the recount was a continuation rather than a fresh recount. Further, the appellant failed to demonstrate specific mistakes remaining after the recount; general suspicion or the possibility of undetected mistakes does not suffice to command further recounts.

4) Overall exercise of discretion: The court concluded the Tribunal acted within its discretion (and in accordance with the rules and authorities) in ordering scrutiny and a contingent recount, correcting an identified counting error, and ultimately dismissing the petition after recount did not materially change the result in favour of the appellant.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The Tribunal's findings were upheld: the allegation of corrupt practice against S. Malkonda Reddy was not proved; the appellant's challenge to the validity of certain ballot papers and to the recount process did not demonstrate that the election result was materially affected.
  • The court endorsed the Tribunal's approach to ballot-paper validity — that a ballot should be invalidated only where it falls within the explicit mischiefs described by the invalidity provision, and that imperfect form of numerals alone does not void a ballot where the voter's intention is clear.
  • The court reaffirmed that recounts are discretionary (Rule 82) and not a matter of right; a party seeking recount must make out prima facie grounds showing likely error in counting.
  • Practical outcome: the appellant was not declared elected; the election petition was dismissed and the appeal failed. Costs were awarded: advocate's fee of Rs. 300.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal precedent beyond applying established principles on ballot interpretation, recount discretion and evidentiary standards in election petitions; the decision enforces and applies existing authorities to the facts of the case.

End of summary. This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Kumarayya, J.:— This appeal is from the order of the Election Tribunal, Hyderabad dismissing the Election Petition No. 357/1962 filed by the appellant questioning the election of the 2nd respondent herein (S. Malkonda Reddy) and praying that the election of respondents 1, 2 or any other respondent be declared void and the appellant be declared duly elected to one of the ten seats of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council.

2. The appellant was one of the 13 candidates duly nominated to contest for one of the ten seats in the biennial election to the Andhra Pradesh Council by the members of the legislative Assemblv which was held on 25-6-1962. The election to these seals was based on the principle of proportional representation by a single transferable vote. The process involved is elaborate and the task of the Returning Officer particularly is rather arduous, the principle underlying the system being that it is not sufficient that every citizen should have the vote but he should also be assured of the greatest possible freedom and effectiveness in its use. This system gives ample scope to the electors to take part as freely and fully as possible in the selection of their own representatives by choosing between candidates on personal as well as party grounds with the assurance that all or nearly all the votes cast in them are made effective by being passed on as may be necessary from the candidate they have marked “1” to the candidate they have marked “2” and so on. It is therefore legitimate to expect that the total result will reflect the opinion of all or nearly all the voters. One characteristic feature of this system is that in this form of representation the successful candidate is elected not by a majority of votes but by a quota that quota being one vote more than the number obtained by dividing the total number of valid votes by one more than the number of seats to be filled. This is popularly known at Droop quota. The detailed procedure to be followed in this behalf has been laid down in Rs. 76 to 88 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.

3. Accordingly, the Returning Officer after scrutiny and arrangement of valid ballot papers in parcels as per rules 73 and 74 counted and recorded the valid votes which totalled to 290 their paper value according to lie rules being 2900. He then determined the requisite quota for election as 2637. He found that seven of the candidates in the very first count had secured the requisite quota and more. They were declared elected. As the votes in excess of their quota could not be wasted but had to be transferred to the continuing candidates according to the next available preference as recorded on the ballot papers, he then considered the question of transfer of surplus votes. Largest surplus secured by a candidate had to be dealt with first. As three successful candidates had to their credit the largest equal surplus, the order in which this was to be dealt with was determined by lot. Accordingly he first dealt with Brahmavya's (Respondent No. 3) surplus votes, then Pallam Raju's (since dend) and then Abu Yusuf's (respondent No. 4). Thereafter, he dealt with the other surplus in the order of magnitude. Of course lots had to be cast in relation to Goulam Venkalasctty also who had obtained equal points i.e 2700 As a result of the iransfer of surplus votes. Bendi Kurmanna gol elected in the second count itself as he shot past the required quota His surplus votes were distributed on the 9th count amongst the continuing candidates. At this stage, it appeared from the position of the value of votes to the credit of each continuing candidate that Kaloji Narayanarao (respondent No. 9 and Page Pulla Reddy (respondent No. 10) had no chance of election as they were lowest on the poll. Therefore they were excluded as per the rules and their voles were distributed among the continuing candidates, as a result of which Sudhakararao was declared elected.

4. The only candidates then left in the field were Malkonda Reddy and the appellant there was only one seat to be filled in the appellant had 2434 points whereas the 2nd respondent had secured 2,555 points of course none of them had requisite quota so the remaining one seat had to go to the candidate who had obtained majority of votes Respondent No. 2 as between the remaining contestants was such a candidate. He was therefore, declared elected and the appellant was declared not elected Dissatisfied with the way in which election was declared, the appellant filed his election petition praying that the election of respondents 1 and 2 or other respondents be declared void and he be declared duly elected he also prayed for a fresh scrutiny and recount of the ballot papers.

5. The main grounds on which these requests were made were that the Returning Officer had committed several irregularities and mistakes in scrutiny counting and in the distribution of surplus votes his complaint was that no adequate opportunity-was given to the candidates or their agents to see the ballot papers, that the classification of valid and invalid votes was not rightly done. Most of the ballot papers which ought to have been declared invalid were wrongly received as valid. There were other irregularities besides it was averred that consequently the result of the election was materially a fleeted lie complained also of corrupt practice committed at the election by the candidate S. Malkonda Reddy in that the latter had actively canvassed within the prohibited area of the polling booth contravening the provisions of section 130 of the Representation of the People Act.

6. The Election Tribunal in view of the allegations of the parties raised eight issues which are to the following effect:—’

1.(a) Whether the Returning Officer accepted any ballot paper which did not contain the figure (1) as prescribed by Rule 73(2)(a) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961? If so whether the result of the election has been materially affected?

(b) Whether Rule 73(2)(a) is a mandatory provision and if so whether the instructions or clarifications issued by the Election Commission have any binding force?

2. Whether the averments contained in paragraph 9 of the petition are true? If so, what is its effect on the result of the election?

3. Whether the Returning Officer committed errors and irregularities as stated in paragraphs 3 to 8 of the petition and has the result of the election been materially affected by reason of such errors and irregularities?

4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a recount and scrutiny?

5. Whether the election of the 1st and 2nd or any other respondent is void?

6. Whether the Returning Officer is a ne-cessarv or proper partv to these proceedings.

7. Is the petitioner entitled to be declared to be duly cleted?

8. To what relief is the petitioner entitled?

7. Three witnesses were examined on each side on the question of corrupt practice viz., that Sri Malkonda Reddy had actively canvassed in contravention of Section 130 within the prohibited area of the polling booth by whispering into the ear of one of the voters, the Tribunal held that there was absence of substantial or conclusive proof in this behalf and that at any rate the evidence adduced fell for short of the proof necessary to hold that the said respondent had committed an election offence. On the other main question whether recount should be ordered having regard to the irregularities or mistakes alleged to have been committed, the Tribunal observed that both on principle and authority no candidate can claim as of right recount and scrutiny unless he makes out a prima facie case of good grounds for believing that either there was in fact a mistake committed by the Returning Officer or that there is cause to suspect the calculation of votes and the distribution of ballot papers

8. On the evidence brought on record the Tribunal believed the case of the petitioner that the Returning Officer had declared that all papers not containing the international Indian numerals would be invalidated and proceeded with the scrutiny on that assumption but later on made a second declaration to the effect that those which contained mark ‘x’ alone would be invalidated and all others would be declared valid. As a result it entertained the view that certain ballot papers which might contain marks or figures in contravention of Rule 73(2) which is mandatory in nature, might have been included in the valid papers. On this basis and also because there was a close fight between the appellant and Sri Malkonda Reddy, there being a difference of only 1-21 votes, it was inclined to believe that the appellant had made out a prima facie case to justify the order of recount. It did not however accept the contention that there has been any mistake in following the procedure relating to the distribution of surplus votes. Nor did it come to the definite conclusion that there was a contravention of Rule 73(2) All that it had held was that scrutiny and then recount was expedient to ensure due compliance of Rule 73(2) which is imperative and unless that is done issue No. 1 cannot be fully and satisfactorily decided. Then the Tribunal proceeded with the work of scrutiny having decided other issues in the case. This work was undertaken in the presence of the parties and in the light of the objection raised as to the validity of the papers. The Returning Officer was also present.

9. The disputed ballot papers were found to be only ten in number. Out of these, three ballot papers marked C.C and E contained the figure (1) mark in this manner: 1. Three ballot papers marked F, G and H contained Roman figures I, II and III instead of International Indian figures. The ballot paper marked J. contained Urdu numeral (2). The ballot paper marked K contained the figure I which was scored out and the Arbic figure (2) was put by the side instead. In one ballot paper maked L, figure 2 had inverted commas added on both sides. The ballot paper marked M contained marking of figures 1, 2, 3, 4 etc. in the column where the names of the candidates are found and not in the space bearing the heading “mark order of preference”, and figure 4 was in the form of Telugu numeral.

10. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that but for the ballot papers F, G and H wherein Roman figures were employed and ballot paper marked J. where figure (2) is marked in Urdu and ballot paper M where figure 4 is marked probably in Telugu all other ballot papers are valid.

11. After holding so by its order dated 25-6-1963, a fresh count was made of the votes polled by the candidates, keeping in view the Rules 76 to 83. A chart was prepared and certified to be correct by the Returning Officer. Just before the declaration of the result of the election the appellant again prayed for recount for the reason that some mistake had occurred in the process of recounting. He was asked by the Tribunal to put forward his objections in the form of an affidavit. The appellant in the affidavit took exception to the fresh lot drawn at the time of recount for transfer of surplus votes of Sri Abu Yusuf, Sri G. Brahmayya and Sri Pallam Raju on the ground that this step was unwarranted having regard to the fact that such lot was already drawn by the Returning Officer at the time of previous counting and the recount did not affect the strength of their valid votes. His contention was that the fresh lot varied the order in which the surplus of the said three elected candidates was to be dealt with and in fact has materially affected the result of the election so far as he was concerned. It may be noted at this stage that whereas according to previous lot Brahmayya's surplus votes were dealt with first, as a result of the fresh lot precedence was given to Pallamaraju's surplus votes.

12. The second objection which found favour with the Tribunal was that Bendi Kurmanna's surplus was dealt with even before the surplus votes of some of the candidates declared in the first count were transferred to the continuing candidates and this was a clear contravention of the rules. The third ground raised was that since several mistakes were detected at the time of recount which of course were rectified then and there, it is likely that there may be found still some more mistakes of the same nature and hence recount is necessary. The Tribunal by its order dated 6-8-1963 rejected this and the first mentioned objection for the reasons shown. However, on account of the mistake committed while dealing with Sri Bendi Kuramanna's surplus votes it directed that this error in recounting should be rectified from the stage where it had crept in Accordingly the process of counting and transfer of surplus votes was taken up as from the fifth count and was completed in accordance with the rules in the presence of the parties and their advocates and a chart was prepared showing the position of the votes secured by the candidates before and after the transfer of surplus votes and this statement was certified to be correct by the Returning Officer. As a result of this recount also, the appellant could not be declared to be elected. Then again an objection was raised by the appellant that during the process the lot had to be cast afresh as between Govindarajulu and Ramachandrayya who had polled equal votes and that since that was not done recount must be ordered. The Tribunal rejected this objection by its order dated 10-8-1963 on the ground that it was not a fresh recount. As a result, the Election Petition was dismissed by the order dated 13-8-1968. The appellant therefore, has come up to this Court challenging the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal.

13. Though the grounds raised covered all the objections referred to above, the arguments were confined to only some of them. The finding on corrupt practice was not canvassed Evidently, there is no scope for challenging the finding having regard to the state of evidence. Even the identity of the voter in whose ear Sri Malkonda Reddy is said to have whispered is not satisfactorily established we agree with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the corrupt practice alleged is not satisfactorily established as such. Needless to say that the trial in election petition is a quasi criminal trial and unless there is clear, precise and cogent evidence to bring home the charge, it cannot be accepted. That is what is held by this Court in Narsimhareddy v. Bhoomaj, 17 ELR 207 : (AIR 1959 Andh Pra 111). That is also the view of the Madras High Court in Kandaswami v. S.B Adityan, 21 ELR 435 : AIR 1960 Mad 170. To the same effect is the compelling authority of the Supreme Court in Harischandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 ELR 461 : AIR 1957 SC 444.

14. The main grounds urged in this appeal relate to the mistake and the irregularities in recounting and also scrutiny. It is contended as was done before the Tribunal that when the lots were drawn at the time of the original counting itself in relation to surplus votes of the three candidates declared elected in the first count, no fresh lot should have been cast at the stage of the recount when the position of those candidates was exactly the same as at the time of original counting. It is alternatively contended that if drawing of fresh lots was necessary at the time of recount, the same method ought to have been resorted to in relation to Sri Govindarajulu and Sri Ramchandrayya when a further check up was ordered. It was further contended that the so-called check-up was indeed in the nature of recount which could not be continued only from a particular stage. At any rate failure to cast lot in relation to the aforementioned two candidates has materially affected the result of the election. As regards scrutiny, it is alleged that the Ave ballot papers out of the disputed ten were improperly received even though they contravened the mandatory provisions of Rule 78(2) and this is sufficient to declare the election to be void.

15. We first take up the objection relating to scrutiny. The question is whether the Tribunal has erred in holding that five out of the ten disputed ballot papers were not invalid. It is no doubt pointed out on behalf of the respondent that even the five other papers which have been invalidated ought to have been declared valid. But we do not think it necessary to discuss elaborately that question though a casual reference even to these papers may be found necessary while dealing with the question raised by the appellant. We deem it meet to confine our attention as far as possible only to the Ave ballot papers which were held ralld. The relevant provision which must be noticed in this behalf is contained in Rule 78(2) of the Conduct of Election Rules which reads thus:

(2) A ballot paper shall be invalid on which—

(a) the figure 1 is not marked; or

(b) the figure 1 is set opposite the name of more than one candidate or so placed as to render it doubtful to which candidate it is intended to apply; or

(c) the figure 1 and some other figures are set opposite the name of the same candidate: or

(d) there is any mark or writing by which the elector can be identified”

This provision both in form and essence is mandatory, concerned as it is with the ballot paper and particularly with the act to be clone by the voter himself. As observed in Ackers v. Howard, (1886) 2 ILR 484 at p. 485 the statutory provisions in general are directory where the thing is to begone by an officer but are mandatory where it is to be done by the voter. Besides the word used in the rule is “shall” showing that it is imperative. So then if it is not obeyed in full it would necessarily follow that the thing is not done as required by the Act, with the result that the ballot paper shall be held invalid as that in terms is enjoined by the rule. The rule, it may be noticed, contemplates four types of cases which render the ballot paper invalid. Firstly, it may be a case where the figure (1) is not marked at all. Such a ballot paper would be of no value at all. Secondly, though figure (1) is marked it may be found opposite the names of more than one person or in such a manner as to render it doubtful to which candidate it is intended to apply. The ballot paper will then be void for uncertainty Thirdly, in addition to figure (1) some other figures may be set opposite the name of the same candidate leading to confusion. That again would show uncertainty and indecision of the elector. Lastly some further mark or writing may be made which may give an indication about the identity of the elector. That would obviously constitute candid breach of the secrecy of voting which is the essence of voting by ballot. These are the several cases which render the ballot papers invalid. The rules regulating proportional representation by a singly transferable vote as embodied in Chapters VI and VII do not contemplate any other type of case which per se renders the ballot paper invalid. Of course Rule 37 which finds place in Chapter VI provides for additional figures to be placed in the ballot paper but it leaves the matter to the discretion of the voter. Failure to make figures 2, 3, 4 etc., will not therefore, invalidate the ballot paper. Rule 78 being the express rule in Chapters VI and VII dealing with invalidity, the ballot paper shall be ignored only if it is within the mischief of sub-rule (2) of Rule 78. Further Rule 73(2) is in terms exhaustive of all the causes which invalidate the ballot papers. So then, while pronouncing on the invalidity of a ballot paper, we ought to adhere to the clear language of that sub-rule (2) and its necessary implications. Its scope cannot extend beyond what its language permits. In the instant case, as already noticed, out of the ten disputed ballot papers marked, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L and M the criticism against the ballot papers C, D and E is that the figure (1) marked in paper C opposite the name of Shri Sudhakararao and in D opposite the name of Sri Bendi Kurmanna and in E opposite the name of Sri Abu Yusuf appears to be a Roman figure I rather than an international Indian numeral as enjoined to be used by Art. 343 of the Constitution of India. To our mind, this is a distinction without much difference. The objection is to the form rather than to the figure itself and it is raised by invoking Art. 343 of the Constitution of India which it is urged qualifies or supplements the provision in question.

16. It must be remembered that all that Rule 73(2)(a) contemplates is that figure (1) must be marked. It does not specify further that this figure should be in the form of particular type of numerals nor does it state that the size and shape of the figure must exactly be the same as it is marked in the rule itself. While construing a penal provision we cannot read into it certain other words or provisions unless the language in terms or by necessary implication so warrants. The provision does not in tortes refer to Art. 343 nor does it contain specific direction as to the form of the numeral to be used. It may nevertheless be, legitimate to think that the recognised or approved forms of numerals at all events must be used. The recognised form of numerals is not of only International Indian numerals. In fact the form of figure (1) as may be seen in the Hindi version of the rules is not that of International Indian numeral but it is of Devanagari numeral. It is obvious therefore, that the stress is not so much on the shape of the figure as on the figure itself self which should be a recognised numeral and should be so marked as not to be mistaken for any figure other than (1). Article 343 which is concerned with the official language of the Union while providing in sub-cl. (1) for the International form of Indian numerals to be used, under proviso to sub-cl. (2) states that the President may authorise the use of Devanagari form of numerals as well for and official purposes. Thus the Articles con templates the use of both forms of numerals for certain official purposes. If the election process is to be regarded as the official purpose, evidently the recognised numerals to be used for that purpose would be International form of Indian numerals and also Devanagari form of numerals if that is per milled

17. It is not the case of the respondent that in C, D and E and several numerals used are other than the International Indian numerals. It is however contended on behalf of the appellant that figure (1) marked looks more a Roman figure in that the line at the head extends to the right side as well. But a perusal of figure (1) used at various places in the published edition of the Conduct of Elections Rules itself would show that though that figure is intended to be marked in the form of International Indian numeral and is accompanied by figures which are evidently of the form of International Indian numeral, has the line at the top extended to the right which, if the contention of the appellant has to prevail, must be a Roman Figure I. Instances of this nature may be found at pages 360, 361, 362, 366 and 367 etc., where the line at the head is extended to the right side in the same way as is seen in the line at the bottom. Merely because the line at the head on the left of figure (1) is extended to the right to any extent in the figure (1) cannot be necessarily held as Roman figure. That is so even if the said lines do not fully touch the head or bottom and it is possible to presume that might have been done to render it impossible for any addition thereto or alterations therein without being detected. Judged thus, the figure (1) so used in ballot papers C.D and E cannot he said to be essentially a Roman numeral nor it is liable to be mistaken for any other figure. C.D and E ballot papers therefore, are not within the hims chef of Rule 73(2) of the rules Perhans of the lines above and below forming the top and bottom of figure (1) had been so designed as to come within the mischief of Cls. (b), (c) and (d) of Rule 73(2) the ballot papers would have been invalid.

18. But that is not the complaint here. The only complaint is that the figure (1) appears to be more a Roman numeral rather than the International Indian numeral. But as already observed, the question cannot be decided on mere imperfections in or tendencies of the form of the figure but actually by what it was intended to be and this intention may as well be inferred from the intrinsic evidence contained in the ballot paper itself. When we look to the other figure used in the paper it would he obvious that the author intended to use only International Indian numerals in the ballot paper. The figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 bear ample testimony to the same. It is on this basis that the Tribunal held that the objection raised is without merits

19. In the absence of specific directions in Rule 73(2) we are clearly of the view that when the figure (1) is in fact marked in the ballot paper about which there can be no dis pule, the ballot paper cannot be invalidated on the ground that the figure marked is not in full accord with the form and shape of the International Indian numeral. The ballot paper as held in Criencester Division case. (1893) 4 OM and H 194 must be interpreted liberally and it is not every departure from the rules that would render the voting invalid. Effect must needs be given to any mark on the face of the paper which clearly indicates the intention of the voter.

20. Evidently imperfection of form is of little consequence when the intention of the voter is obvious Penal clauses should be strictly construed and unless the defect complained of clearly falls within the mischief of the rule, that will not be hit thereby. The Tribunal was right in holding that there was no informant of Rule 73(2) and the ballot papers C, D and E are valid. It may be further noted here that in none of these three ballot papers neither the appellant nor the respondent Sir Malkonda Reddy plot any vote.

21. The two other ballot papers in relation to which the objection was taken as having been improperly received are ballot papers K and M. the objection with regard to K is that the figure (1) originally marked was struck off and figure (2) was put in the column concerned. The voter in this paper his first reference to P. Pullareddy and entered mark 1) as against his name. Then he wanted to give his next preference to Sudhakararao. Instead of putting figure (2) against his name he put figure (1) forgetfully and then he scored this figure (1) effectively and put the correct figure (2) by the side legibly. Thus the scoring be came inevitable on account of his carelessness or absent-mindness. It cannot be said that this figure (1) as scored makes the ballot paper void for uncertainty, nor does it violate the principle of secrecy of voting which is of the essence of voting by ballot. It does not in any manner offend the salutary principle underlying the provisions of Rule 73(2). It is an accidental mistake which was immediately corrected by effectively scoring it. That is indeed permissible so long as it is not within the mischief of sub-cls. (b), (c) and (d) of Rule 73(2).

22. When the scoring is effective, sub-cls. (b) and (c) cannot be attracted at all. Besides, it is not every additional mark or writing made on the ballot paper that can bring the case within the mischief of Cl. (d). The terms of the said sub-clause are categorical that in order to attract that, provision the mark must be a mark by which the voter can be identified. Either it should by itself afford an indication of the voter or should appear from the evidence that the mark was placed in pursuance of a prior arrangement it is neither alleged nor is there any material on record to show that this mark was made a result of prior arrangement. It cannot even be said that this mark standing alone can lead to the identification of the voter. On the other hand, it shows that the figure (1) struck off was mistakenly entered. The effective striking thereof further shows the clear intention of the elector to give second preference to that person against whom the mark was made. Mistakes of this nature, in filling up the ballot papers, are not uncommon. When they are innocent and not a device for the elector's identification no invalidity can possibly be attached to the ballot paper. Needless to stress here that in determining the invalidity of the ballot paper we ought to adhere to the language of the provision which says that the mark must be mark by which the voter can be identified.

23. There remains the ballot paper L. The objection in regard to this was that inverted comma was added on both sides of the figures 1 and 2 and that would serve as an indication for the identification of the voter. This contention is not supported by any evidence intrinsic. There is no evidence of pre-agreement either it is well settled that unless the mark itself affords an indication of the voter or there is positive evidence from which it can be inferred that it was placed in pursuance of prior arrangement no invalidity can be attached to the ballot paper. It is unnecessary to cite authorities on this point. It may be sufficient to refer to the case K. Sadanandan v. Madhava Menon, AIR 1962 Kerala 68 decided by the Kerala High Court which refers to some such authorities. We are of the view that ballot paper L was rightly accepted. We may further observe that out of these five ballot papers only in ballot paper L.S Malkon-Dareddygota vote. In others neither the appellant nor Malkonda Reddy got any.

24. The respondent make grievance of the fact that the Tribunal did not receive the other five disputed ballot papers also which did not contravene Rule 78(2) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. As already noticed, the ballot papers in question could be held invalid only if they were within the mischief of Rule 73(2). Rule 73(2)(a) renders the ballot paper invalid if the figure (1) is not) marked. All the ballot papers marked F, G, H, J and M bear the mark of figure 1, though of course with regard to F, G and H it is said that figure (1) marked therein is the Roman figure and not the International Indian numeral.

Obviously enough, in the ballot paper F figure (1) by its appearance is not at all Roman to any extent, but since in that paper as also in papers G and H the other figures marked are Roman numerals, the Tribunal considered that the elector intended to use only the Roman figures. These papers were rejected on that score. As to the other two papers which are rejected there was no dispute at all with regard to the marking of figure (1). They were rejected because in the ballot paper J the figure 2 was Urdu figure and in ballot paper M, the figure 4 was Telugu figure. Rule 37-A which relates to the method of voting says that every elector may in addition to figure (1) may place on his ballot paper the figures (2) and (3) or figures 2, 3 and 4 and so on in the) space provided for the other candidates in the order of preference.

25. Thus this rule providing for marking of additional figure is not mandatory. It is not imperative thus on the part of the voters to make additional figure it is left wholly to I hear discretion. So then, even if any of these additional figures were not entered, the ballot papers would not have been rendered invalid the same consequence must follow if the figures marked are not in the form of International Indian numerals, unless of course the way in which they are marked brings them within the mischief of (b). (c) and (d) of Rule 73(2) The matter does not appear to have been considered in that light. However we think it unnecessary to enter into discussion in that behalf as that will not in any event swing the balance in favour of the appellant.

26. Now we lake up the other objection of the appellant which is concerned with the question of recounting as noticed already this request is based on three grounds. Firstly the Tribunal committed a mistake in casting fresh lots with regard to the surplus votes of the three candidates declared elected on the first count, at the time of recounting. Secondly, assuming that was the correct procedure surplus votes of Govindarajulu and Ramchandrayya should have been similarly dealt with where the counting for the third time was being done and thirdly since at any rate there is likelihood of more mistakes having been committed than what were discovered and rectified at the time of recounting, a further recount was necessary. It is not easy to see how these pleas constitute valid grounds for getting the relief of recounting. A scrutiny of recount cannot be granted for the mere askance. It can be allowed neither as a matter of right nor as a matter of course. It is left to the discretion of the Returning Officer or the Tribunal, as the case may be; albeit it is a discretion to be exercised not arbitrarily but on principles of justice, equity and good conscience. By a long chain of authorities it is firmly established that this discretion can be exercised only on good grounds made out by evidence for believing that there has been a mistake on the part of the Returning Officer. The party praying has to make out a prima facie case and satisfy the Tribunal that the return was not accurate and that a scrutiny and recount are necessary in the interests of justice. That is what has been laid down in Stepheney's Case, 40 Malley and Hard castle 34. To the same effect was the view of this Court in Mohan Reddy v. Narayan Reddy, 1963-2 Andh WR 101 : (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 190) when it observed that a recount is not granted as of right, but only on evidence of good grounds for believing that there has been a mistake on the part of the Returning Officer. A party therefore cannot ask for recount on the off chance of his being able to detect mistakes. As observed in 1963-2 Andh WR 101 at p. 106 : (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 190 at p. 194)

“the proceedings before the Tribunal cannot be converted into a forum fishing out any possible defects regarding which no objection was raised before the Tribunal, or in the election petition and the same principle should apply in the case of scrutiny”

27. In fact the statutory rule providing for recounting imposes limitations on the right of the party to apply for recounting and makes it abundantly clear that the question of recount is discretionary with the returning officer. The relevant rule i.e Rule 82 reads thus

“(1) Any candidate or in his absence his election agent or counting agent may at am time during the counting of the votes, either before the commencement or after the completion of any transfer of votes (whether surplus or otherwise), request the returning officer to re examine and re-count the papers of all or any candidates (not being papers set aside at any previous transfer as finally dealt with), and the returning officer shall forthwith reexamine and re-count the same accordingly.

(2) The returning officer pay in the discretion re-count the votes on there once or more than once in any case in which he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any previous count:

Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall make it obligatory on the returning officer to re-count the same votes more than once.”

According to this rule a candidate or his agent can make a request for recount during the counting of votes, but such request is limited to papers which are not set aside at any previous transfer as finally dealt with: in other words, if the papers have been transferred to the respective parcels they will not be re opened. Further, if the request is not made during the counting of votes as specifically provided in the rule, the returning officer is no bound to re-examine and re-count the votes so then, if the returning officer has declared the result, any mistake can only be rectified by the Tribunal on an election petition. Sub rule (2) further lays down that recount is discretionary with the returning officer. If he thinks that there has been error in counting he can recount the votes before he declares the result. It is open to the returning officer to recount the votes even more than once if he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of the previous count but however, it is not obligatory on him to recount more than once. It follows therefore, that a candidate, or his election of counting agent may remain present during the counting of the votes and require the returning officer to have the votes re-examined or recounted but the returning officer may refuse to do so if in his opinion the request is unreasonable. What holds true in the case of the returning officer may be equally applicable, to the Tribunal as well when an election petition is filed.

28. As observed by the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaq, 10 ELR p. 216 : (AIR 1955 SC 233) the jurisdiction of a Tribunal is coextensive with that of the re turning officer. The Tribunal can therefore. If satisfied, direct re-count and if still dis satis fled with the accuracy of the recount on find Ing that some mistake has been committed, if can as well direct recount from the stage where the mistake had been committed.

29. That is what the Tribunal had done as is clear from the facts already narrated. On the first occasion when the Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant had made out a case and raised reasonable grounds it directed scrutiny and recount. In fact it undertook the task of scrutiny and recount in the presence of the parties and the returning officer. It resolved the dispute in relation to the ten ballot papers during the scrutiny. Then after arrangement of valid ballot papers in parcels, it started fresh counting, which was inevitable as in consequence of scrutiny. The number of total valid votes polled was affected and the requisite quota for election of a candidate likewise underwent a change. No doubt the total votes polled by Shri Abu Yusuf, fihri G. Brahmayya and Shri Pallamraju romained constant even after recount; fresh lot under the rules was nevertheless unavoidable specially because the quota itself had varied. The appellant having requested for scrutiny and recount cannot make a grievance if the result went against him unless the rules regulating recount were not adhered to. The course adopted by the Tribunal was indeed was warranted by rule 79. It may be remembered that under R. 71(2) conunting means—

“(a) all the operations involved in the counting of the first preferences recorded for candidates; or

(b) all the operations involved in the trans for of the surplus of an elected candidate; or

(c) all the operations involved in the transfer of the total value of votes of an excluded candidate;

30. When it is clear that the surplus of the elected candidates which was to be taken in order of magnitude and in case of equality has to be decided by lot for determining which surplus should be dealt with first, the Tribunal had no other alternative but to resort to lot for purposes of counting within the meaning of R. 71(2)(b). The plea of the appellant as against this cannot be tenable. Before the result of the recount was declared, it seems the appellant who kept quiet till the end had informed the Tribunal that he would request the Tribunal for re-count. At the instance of the Tribunal he even filed an affidavit referring to the mistake committed in the case of counting. That mistake related to the transfer of surplus votes secured by Bendi Kurmanna (who got the requisite quota in second count) which was effected before the surplus of the other candidates elected in first count was dealt with. This was indeed a clear contravention of the rules. The Tribunal therefore, directed counting from the stage the defect had crept in Ramachandravya and Govindarajulu were the candidates who had to their credit the next best quota in order of magnitude. They had polled 2800 votes each. Their surplus had to be dealt with Immediately after the transfer of first three candidates was effected. No other person could step in between. The lot was in fact cast at the time of count. Therefore, the same lot was taken as a guide for the transfer of surplus votes secured by them.

31. The appellant took exception to this course His contention is that a fresh lot ought to have been cast. The Tribunal rejected this contention on the ground that the appellant could not show any rules which would declare that a fresh lot was necessary. We think that the Tribunal is right in holding that the lot drawn at the time of recount was sufficient for the purpose and no fresh lot was necessary, specially when at the time of previous count the only mistake committed was that the surplus of these two persons was not transferred first. This transfer could have been effected only by lots which were already drawn So, there was no necessity of fresh lot to be cast. Further that was only a continuation of recount and not a fresh recount as the Tribunal has observed. It cannot therefore, be said that there has been any contravention of any rule in doing so.

32. The third objection relates to the fact that since various mistakes were discovered at the time of recount which the parties were vigilant enough to find them out, there might still be some more mistakes and for that purpose recount was necessary. It cannot be disputed that there were indeed some mistakes pointed out at the time of recounting in relation to the placing of ballot papers and all these were rectified at the very moment.

33. The recount was done in the presence of the parties and the parties as may be seen, were vigilant enough. The appellant cannot point out any specific mistakes that might have been committed in recount, in order to satisfy that there were grounds for directing recount. We do not think that the Tribunal was wrong in rejecting their request. After all as we have already pointed out, the recount is not a matter of right and the returning officer is not bound to recount more than once unless he is satis-fled that there has been inaccuracy in counter. The Tribunal too, unless satisfied, that there was inaccuracy, could not direct recount. In these circumstances all the three objections raised by the appellant fail. That being ??? case, the appeal also must fail.

34. It may be noticed that the appellant in his election petition had prayed not only for recount and scrutiny of the ballot papers but also for the declaration that the election of respondents 1 or 2 or any other respondent is void and that the appellant himself has been duly elected to one of the ten seats of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council. No doubt, he had established before the Tribunal that a scrutiny and recount was necessary in the interests of justice and got that relief but the recount did not materially affect the result of the election. The election Tribunal therefore had decided the petition against him. We see, no merits in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee is Rs. 300.

EJ/HGP/D.V.C

35. Appeal dismissed.