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Raja Ram v. State Of Rajasthan .
Factual and Procedural Background
Rameshwari Devi was initially married, during childhood, to Ram Chander. After Ram Chander’s death before attaining majority, she was married to his younger brother, the present appellant. On 27-2-1992 she sustained burn injuries after kerosene was poured on her and she died on 10-3-1992. Based on two dying declarations recorded the same day—Exhibit P-17 by the Assistant Sub-Inspector (PW 12) and Exhibit P-13 by a Judicial Magistrate (PW 9)—the appellant and his parents were prosecuted for murder. The trial court acquitted the parents but convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Rajasthan High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The present judgment resolves the appellant’s further appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the two dying declarations of Rameshwari Devi could, standing alone, sustain the appellant’s conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC.
- Whether attendant circumstances—particularly alleged coaching of the deceased by neighbour PW 5 and supporting testimony from PW 8—undermined the reliability of those dying declarations.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court acknowledged that the prosecution’s case rested exclusively on the deceased’s two dying declarations. It stated the uncontested legal principle that a reliable dying declaration can, by itself, ground a conviction. The Court, however, found the declarations unreliable for several interconnected reasons:
- Testimony of PW 6 and PW 4: Both neighbours testified that PW 5 had instructed the deceased to blame her husband and in-laws instead of admitting self-immolation. Though declared hostile, their statements introduced doubt.
- Un-rebutted testimony of PW 8 (Dr. Sukhdev Singh): A neighbour and prosecution witness, PW 8 confirmed seeing PW 5 persuading the deceased to implicate the appellant. The prosecution did not seek to treat PW 8 as hostile, making his evidence binding on it.
- Corroboration by Investigating Officer (PW 12): PW 12 admitted witnessing a conversation between PW 5 and the deceased immediately before recording Exhibit P-17, though he could not hear its content. This supported PW 8’s account.
- Absence of additional incriminating evidence: The prosecution conceded that, apart from the contested dying declarations, it had no evidence against the appellant.
Given these factors, the Court held that the dying declarations failed the requisite scrutiny and could not form the sole basis for conviction.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SET ASIDE. The appellant was acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith unless wanted in any other case. The decision affects only the parties; it establishes no new precedent beyond reinforcing the caution that dying declarations, though admissible, must be free from suspicion before being treated as solitary evidence for conviction.
Order
1. The appellant was the husband of Rameshwari Devi, who was first given in marriage to the appellant's elder brother Ram Chander during their childhood. When Ram Chander died before attaining majority, Rameshwari Devi was married to his younger brother who is the appellant before us. Regarding the death of Rameshwari Devi by burns, the appellant as well as his parents were prosecuted on the strength of the dying declaration made by her. The trial court acquitted the parents of the appellant, but convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. Though he filed an appeal before the High Court of Rajasthan, a Division Bench confirmed the conviction and sentence and dismissed his appeal.
2. There is no dispute that Rameshwari Devi died of burn injuries. Kerosene was doused on her by about noontime on 27-2-1992 and she was set ablaze, but she died only on 10-3-1992.
3. On 27-2-1992 itself her statement was recorded by the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (PW 12) at 1.30 p.m It is marked as Exhibit P-17. The FIR was prepared on its basis for the offence under Section 307 IPC. After her death the said statement was treated as evidence falling under the purview of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
4. About one hour after Exhibit P-17 was recorded, PW 9, the Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of Rameshwari Devi, which is marked as Exhibit P-13.
5. The above two dying declarations had definitely implicated the appellant and his parents for dousing her with kerosene and setting her ablaze. The motive alleged by her in the dying declaration was that her parents-in-law were constantly abusing her with the allegation that the last child born to her was conceived by her not out of the wedlock. Rameshwari Devi had two children after her marriage with the appellant and the youngest was only 9 months old when she died.
6. In order to involve the appellant in the alleged offence the solitary evidence is the dying declaration made by the deceased. Though the dying declaration was made by her repeatedly at an interval of one hour in between, the basic factum remains that the only material of the prosecution is her dying declaration. If the dying declaration would pass the test of scrutiny it can be relied on as the sole basis of conviction. There is no dispute on the aforesaid legal proposition.
7. But the difficulty in this case is that the dying declaration cannot survive scrutiny due to certain broad circumstances. The first circumstance is the testimony of the father of Rameshwari Devi who was examined as PW 6. He said that one Khajan Chand (PW 5) who was a neighbour was impressing upon the deceased while she was in burnt condition that she should not tell the authorities that she herself poured kerosene and set herself ablaze as that would land her in prosecution proceedings against her. Instead she was advised to put the blame on the husband and his parents as a way out to rescue herself. As the Public Prosecutor treated PW 6 hostile the trial court and the High Court rightly declined to place reliance on his testimony.
8. But PW 4 Subhash Chander, another neighbour, who too was present when Rameshwari Devi was removed to the hospital had also testified to the same position as PW 6 said. Of course, he was also treated as hostile by the prosecution and, therefore, he was also placed on the same position of reliability as PW 6.
9. But the testimony of PW 8 Dr. Sukhdev Singh, who is another neighbour, cannot easily be surmounted by the prosecution. He has testified in very clear terms that he saw PW 5 making the deceased believe that unless she puts the blame on the appellant and his parents she would have to face the consequences like prosecution proceedings. It did not occur to the Public Prosecutor in the trial court to seek permission of the court to heard (sic declare) PW 8 as a hostile witness for reasons only known to him. Now, as it is, the evidence of PW 8 is binding on the prosecution. Absolutely no reason, much less any good reason, has been stated by the Division Bench of the High Court as to how PW 8's testimony can be sidelined.
10. In the above context, it is important to notice that even PW 12, the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police has admitted in the cross-examination that he saw PW 5 conversing with the deceased before he started recording the dying declaration. Of course, PW 12 was not in a position to overhear what exactly transpired between the deceased and PW 5. But when PW 8 Dr. Sukhdev Singh, whose testimony is completely owned by the prosecution, has stated in clear terms that PW 5 was telling the deceased as noted above, there is no escape for the prosecution from the conclusion that the dying declaration cannot be made the sole basis for the conviction of the appellant. It is admitted that apart from the dying declaration there is nothing in evidence against the appellant.
11. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant. We acquit him and direct that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case.
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