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Khimji Vidhu v. Premier High School .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant–landlord instituted two eviction suits against the respondent–tenant regarding premises in “Popatlal New Chawl.” The tenancy agreement (specifically Condition 11) prohibited the tenant from using any passages or spaces outside the demised rooms except for ingress and egress. The trial court found that the respondent had indeed used such common areas for purposes other than ingress and egress, constituting a serious breach of tenancy. Nonetheless, the suits were dismissed because notice of forfeiture had allegedly not been properly served.
The landlord appealed to the Appellate Court of Small Causes, while the tenant filed cross-objections. The appellate court concurred with the trial court’s factual findings on breach of tenancy. The tenant then invoked Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court, which overturned the concurrent findings of fact and set aside the eviction orders. The landlord obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, acting under Article 227 of the Constitution, erred in overturning concurrent findings of fact made by the trial court and the first appellate court regarding breach of the tenancy conditions.
- Whether the respondent’s use of passages and spaces not included in the lease deprived the tenant of protection under the Bombay Rent Control Act and justified eviction.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasized that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors and cannot be used to re-appreciate evidence or disturb pure findings of fact, a function reserved for appellate courts. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court of Small Causes had meticulously documented how the tenant used common passages and spaces in violation of Condition 11 of the lease, amounting to a “vital” breach of tenancy. These concurrent factual determinations, the Supreme Court held, were immune from interference by the High Court in Article 227 proceedings. Accordingly, the High Court’s order was characterized as suffering from a “jurisdictional defect.”
Holding and Implications
APPEALS ALLOWED; HIGH COURT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE; EVICTION ORDER RESTORED.
Implications: The respondent–tenant must vacate the premises by 31 May 2002 after filing the usual undertaking within four weeks. During the interim period (1 February 1999–31 May 2002) the tenant shall pay rent of Rs 1,250 per month plus all applicable taxes. The decision chiefly affects the parties to the litigation and reiterates the limited scope of High Court interference under Article 227 without establishing new substantive precedent.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant is the landlord while the respondent is the tenant. The appellant filed two eviction suits in respect of premises let out to the respondent in the building known as Popatlal New Chawl. The ground on which eviction was sought was that the tenant had, by using passages and spaces not let out to it, committed breach of the terms of the tenancy and in particular of clause 11 and was, therefore, not entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rent Control Act. Both the suits were heard by the trial court together. The trial court, on facts, found that the passages and spaces had not been let out to the respondent and that by using the passages and spaces in the manner in which the respondent was using, there had been a clear breach of the terms of the tenancy. The suits were, however, dismissed on the ground that there was no proper service of the notice of forfeiture of the tenancy of the tenant.
3. While the appellant filed appeals before the Appellate Court of Small Causes, the respondent filed cross-objections. The appellate court, on facts, found that the trial court was right in concluding that the passages and spaces had not been let out to the respondent and that the manner in which the same had been used, was in breach of the terms of the tenancy. Against the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts, the respondent filed two petitions in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The writ petitions were allowed and the findings of fact, as recorded by the two courts below, were upset and the eviction set aside. Hence these appeals by the landlord on special leave.
4. We have perused the record and heard learned counsel for the parties.
5. Under Condition (11) of the lease deed, the respondent was not to use any space which did not form part of the demised premises. So far as the passage and space, as also the staircase passage are concerned, they could be used by the respondent only for ingress and egress to and from the demised rooms and for no other purpose. Both the trial court as well as the first appellate court, on the basis of the material on record, came to the conclusion that the respondent had used the spaces and passages, which had not been let out to them, in a manner other than for use of ingress and egress and had committed breach of the terms of the tenancy of vital nature. Both the courts detailed the manner in which the tenant had put to use the spaces and passages. These findings of fact could not have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution must be sparingly exercised and may be exercised to correct errors of jurisdiction and the like but not to upset pure findings of fact, which falls in the domain of an appellate court only. The High Court, thus, exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it by upsetting the findings of fact and the impugned order suffers from a jurisdictional defect. On this short ground, the appeals must succeed and are allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The eviction ordered against the respondent is maintained.
6. In the demised premises, it is not disputed that a Junior College and High School are being run. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that there are almost 600 students studying in the School and the College. Mr H.N Salve, learned counsel for the appellant, keeping in view that the demised premises are being used for an educational institution very fairly did not oppose the grant of time to the tenant till 31-5-2002 to vacate and hand over the vacant possession to the landlord subject to the respondent filing the usual undertaking within four weeks.
7. Mr A.M Khanwilkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent also fairly submitted that during this period, commencing 1-2-1999 till 31-5-2002, the respondent shall pay rent for the demised premises (subject-matter of these appeals) @ Rs 1250 per mensem plus all taxes to the landlord. The parties shall act as per the statements, made by their learned counsel, as recorded above.
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