- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Bansilal Ratwa (Deft. No. 1) v. Laxminarayan
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit was filed by the plaintiff seeking recovery of possession of a building and mesne profits. The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of the property, asserting it was jointly purchased by himself and his brother Jainarayan with consideration entirely from the plaintiff, making him the sole owner. The first defendant, the plaintiff's brother's son, contended that he was the adopted son of Jainarayan and that the property was joint family property of the plaintiff and Jainarayan, entitling him to a half share. The lower court framed three issues regarding possession, ownership, and whether the property constituted joint family property requiring partition. The court found that Jainarayan had been adopted into another family, excluding him from the plaintiff’s family, and ruled no general partition suit was necessary. It concluded the property was jointly acquired by the plaintiff and Jainarayan, with the plaintiff entitled to three-fourths and the defendant to one-fourth share. The suit was dismissed with costs on the basis that one co-owner cannot recover possession of the entire property by evicting the other co-owner. The defendant sought to appeal the findings related to the joint ownership shares and the status of other properties as joint family property.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendant can file an appeal against a decree dismissing the suit with costs when crucial findings in the judgment are adverse to the defendant.
- Whether the findings of joint ownership and share distribution in the property operate as res judicata against the defendant in other proceedings.
- Whether incidental findings relating to other properties, not subject matter of the suit, can be grounds for appeal or operate as res judicata.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Krishna Chandra Golder v. Mohesh Chandra Saha, 9 Cal. W.N 584 | Right to appeal lies only with parties adversely affected by the decree; a decree may appear favorable but be injurious when read with the judgment. | Used to establish that a defendant can appeal against a decree dismissing the suit if findings in the judgment are adverse to him. |
| Secretary of State v. Saminath Kownden, I.L.R 37 Mad. 25 | Appeal lies only if the appellant is adversely affected by the decree. | Clarified the essential condition of adverse effect for maintaining an appeal. |
| Venkateswarlu v. Lingayya, A.I.R 1924 Mad. 589 | Even if a suit is decided in favor of a defendant, adverse findings on certain points allow the defendant to appeal. | Supported the exception to the general rule of appeal rights, permitting appeal when findings adversely affect the party despite favorable decree. |
| Raghava Aiyengar v. Irula Thevan, A.I.R 1926 Mad. 974 | Findings against a party in a judgment that dismisses the suit in their favor allow that party to appeal. | Applied to confirm the right of appeal for parties adversely affected by findings despite favorable decree. |
| United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum, 1941 1 M.L.J Suppl. 65 at 104 | Extension of right of appeal to parties bound by adverse findings in the judgment even without a decree against them. | Recognized hardship exceptions to the general rule limiting appeals only against decrees. |
| Vethal Yeshwant v. Shikandar Khan, A.I.R 1963 S.C 385 | Each final decision on points sufficient for ultimate decision operates as res judicata between parties. | Used to explain the principle of res judicata applicable to findings in the judgment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined whether the defendant could appeal a decree dismissing the suit with costs, despite some findings being adverse to the defendant. It analyzed the statutory provision under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, which permits appeal only from decrees. However, the court acknowledged that the judgment’s reasons and findings must be considered to understand the decree's effect. It reviewed precedents establishing that a party may appeal if the decree, read with the judgment, is injurious to them, even if the decree formally favors them.
The court identified two categories of findings: incidental observations about other properties not subject to the suit, and crucial findings about the suit property’s ownership and share distribution. It held that incidental findings do not operate as res judicata or justify appeal, as they did not influence the decree. Conversely, the findings on the suit property’s joint ownership and share entitlement directly affected the suit’s outcome and would operate as res judicata in related proceedings, including a partition suit filed by the plaintiff.
Applying the principle of res judicata under Section 11 CPC and the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the court concluded that the adverse findings against the defendant on the suit property’s ownership bind the defendant in other proceedings. Therefore, the defendant is adversely affected by the decree and entitled to appeal the judgment.
Holding and Implications
The appeal by the first defendant is held to be competent.
The court’s decision permits the defendant to challenge adverse findings embedded in a decree dismissing the suit, recognizing that such findings may bind the defendant in other proceedings as res judicata. This ruling clarifies that an appeal can lie against a decree even when the suit is dismissed in favor of the defendant, if the judgment contains findings detrimental to that defendant. The direct effect is that the first defendant may maintain an appeal on the disputed findings concerning ownership shares. No broader precedent beyond the application of established principles was set.
1. This reference by the High Court office raises an interesting, but by no means an easy problem. The decree of the lower court shows that the plaintiff's suit was dismissed with costs. However, some of its crucial findings were against the defendant. The question is whether the defendant can file an appeal against that decree and judgment, cavassing the correctness of those findings.
2. The first defendant is the brother's son of the plaintiff. The suit relates to a building and was filed for recovery of its possession, with mesne profits. The case of the plaintiff was that it was originally purchased in the joint names of himself and his brother Jainarayan, though the consideration proceeded entirely from himself. Therefore, he was the sole owner of the house. Under the pretext of living in a portion of the house with the permission of the plaintiff, the first defendant got into exclusive possession of the property and subsequently leased it our to the second defendant. The suit thus came to be filed for possession and mesne profits. On the other hand, the first defendant contended that he was the adopted son of Jainarayan, though he was the natural son of Ramanarayan, another brother of the plaintiff, who was mainly responsible for earning a large fortune and purchasing the suit property. Since the property was purchased by Jainarayan, who was living with the plaintiff, it was the joint family property of the two brothers and the first defendant was entitled to a half share in the property as the adopted son of Jainarayan, while the plaintiff was entitled to the other half share.
3. On those contentions the lower court interalia framed the three following issues—
“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of suit property?
2. Whether the plaintiff is the exclusive and absolute owner of the suit property and whether the first defendant took possession of the same from the plaintiff on false representation?
3. Whether the suit property constitutes the joint family property of the first defendant and whether the remedy is to file a suit for general partition of the family properties?
4. On the third issue, the Court found that Jainarayan himself had gone in adoption into another family, with the result that he could not be a member of the family of the plaintiff or of the first defendant. It, therefore, took the view that no question of filing a suit for general partition would arise and found is used No. 3 for the plaintiff. However, on issue No. 2, the court came to the conclusion that the purchase of the suit house “was a mere case of joint acquisition by the two brothers, Laxminarayan end Jainarayan”. The consequence was that it was found that the plaintiff was not the exclusive owner of the property and that it was owned jointly by him and his deceased brother, Jainarayan. While disbelieving the case that the property was handed over to the first defendant under false representation, the lower court found on issue No. 1.
“The suit property belonged to Jainarayan and Laxminarayan (plaintiff). It was jointly acquired by them. The result being that the plaintiff is entitled to half of it and Jainarayan was entitled to its other half. Jainarayan is not have now. His half share in the suit property devolved on the plaintiff his brother, and the defendant his brother's son. Hence plaintiff is entitled ¾th share in it. In other words the plaintiff and defendant are co-owners of the suit property and one co-owner is not entitled to recover the possession of the entire property by evicting the other co-owner. Hence plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession of the suit property. I find issue No. 1 against the plaintiff”.
5. While recording these findings, the lower court also incidentally referred to the claim of the first defendant that certain other properties besides the house, which is the subject matter of the suit, are joint family properties in which the first defendant is entitled to a share. It not only observed that “there is no evidence to prove that there was any joint family property” but also found that “thus the defendant's allegation that the suit property as well as other properties are joint family properties and that he has a Share in them is absolutely baseless”. Despite these findings, the lower court dismissed the suit holding that “the plaintiff and the defendant are co-owners of the suit property and one co-owner is not entitled to recover possession of the entire property by evicting the other. In that view, it dismissed the suit with costs. In the proposed appeal, the first defendant seeks to canvass the observations of finding of the lower court that the other properties are not joint; and that the plaintiff is entitled to ¾th share in the suit property, while the first defendant is entitled only to ¼th. The question is whether the first defendant can maintain this appeal, though the decree is one of dismissal of the suit with costs.
6. This purports to be on an appeal under Sec. 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that section provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such court. It is therefore, against a decree that an appeal is filed. But, the fact remains that the reasons and grounds for the decree are given in the judgment and in order to fully understand the scope and content of the decree, it is always necessary to refer to the judgment. That is why, courts have occasions, whenever such questions arose, referred to the reasons and findings recorded in the judgment, in order to examine whether a particular decree is against any party to the proceedings. There appears to be on apparent divergence of view in regard to the question whether such reference to the findings given in the judgment could be made to find out whether an appeal lies from any decree or not. There are more than one precedent, wherein an appeal presented by a defendant, against whom a suit had been totally dismissed, was held to be maintainable. I may briefly refer to some of those decisions. In Krishna Chandra Golder v. Mohesh Chandra Saha . 9 Cal. W.N 584. Woodroffee J., while recognising that principle observed:
“It is for this reason that apart from cases of estoppel, only a party to the suit at the time of the decree is made or his representatives or assignee when brought on record, or an auction purchaser in appeal from an order passed in execution, may appeal as they alone can be affected by the decree or order. Again of such parties only those can appeal who are adversely affected by the decree. Usually, only the party against whom a decree is passed i.e the person ordinarily injuriously affected by the decree can appeal. For the same reason, the person against whom a suit has been dismissed, cannot usually appeal against the decree as he is not ordinarily affected, otherwise than beneficiary by it. But in some cases, a suit may be dismissed as against the defendants and yet the latter may have a right of appeal.
According to the learned Judge, the real test is whether there is anything to complain about by reason of the decree, notwithstanding its form. If the decree, though apparently in favour of the defendant, is really unfavorable to him, when read in the light of the record and may prove injurious to him, he can be prefer an appeal, he being aggrieved by it.
The Madras High Court had an occasion to construe this decision of the Calcutta High Court in Secretary of State v. Saminath Kownden . I.L.R 37 Mad. 25.: The learned Judges constituting the division bench of the Madras High Court understood the judgment of Woodrefee, J. that “that learned Judge has considered it as an essential condition of the right of appeal that the appellant should be adversely affected in some way or other by the decree itself”.
7. In Venkateswarlu v. Lingayya . A.I.R 1924 Mad. 589. a similar question arose. It was a case where the suit was decided in favour of the defendant. But certain points were adversely decided against the defendant, which were correctly and substantially in issue. They were held be resjudicata in other matters. Kumaraswami Sastri, J. dealing with such a situation, held following Krishna Chandra Golder v. Mohesh Chandra Saha (1) and distinguishing Secretary of State v. Saminatha Kownden (2) that—
“It would be contrary to all principles of justice and equity to hold that he (the defendant) is precluded from agitating the matter in appeal, merely because the suit was decided in his favour on some other ground.”
8. The ratio of the decision is that, if the findings operate as resjudicata in other proceedings, an appeal is maintainable at the instance of the party, who is adversely affected by those findings, though the suit is decided in his favour on some other ground.
9. This decision was followed by Krishna, J. in Raghava Aiyengar v. Irula Thevan . A.I.R 1926 Mad. 974.. The matter before the learned Judge arose out of a suit by a mortgagee against ‘A’ for possession. The mortgagor also was joined as a party to the suit, for the express purpose of determining rights of all parties concerned. ‘A’ denied title and possession of both the mortgagors and mortgagee. The trial court held that neither the mortgagors nor the mortgagee had any title and dismissed the suit. The mortgagors preferred an appeal to the appellate court disputing the finding that they had no title. Explaining Secretary of State v. Saminath Kownden (2) and following Venkateswarlu v. Lingayya (3) Krishna J. held that
“though the decree was passed formally in favour of the mortgagors, there were findings against their contentions on which the court acted dismissing the plaintiff's suit and therefore, they had a right of appeal.”
10. Varadachari, J. upheld this exception to the general rule and observed in United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum . 1941 1 M.L.J Suppl. 65 at 104. in the following manner.
“Sec. 96 C.P.C does not in terms say who is entitled to prefer an appeal. But according to the code it is the decree that has to be appealed against. The decisions have therefore laid it down as a matter of inference that a party adversely affected by the decree is the only person entitled to appeal. It was however realized that a rule so limited might cause hardship in some cases. An extension was therefore made by conceding a right of appeal to a party who might be bound by a finding in the judgment, though there was no decree against him”.
11. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh considered this problem in S.K No. 34171 of 1967 (appeal) dated 15th of July 1968. Parthasarathi, J. referring to the aforesaid view of Varadachari, J. and some of the decisions above referred to, observed as follows:—
“Varadachari, J. therefore, limits the exception to only a single category where a finding might bind the defendant adversely. Even this extension involves a departure from the literal application of the provisions of Sec. 96 Civil Procedure Code. The right of appeal that is given by the Code of Civil Procedure is a right to appeal against the decree. It therefore, follows that the right cannot be unduly enlarged by following the right of appeal to be used in cases where the decree by its own force or terms does not indicate any injury or grievance. The principle that is deducible from some precedents is that some cases of exceptions are recognised. These exceptions, if allowed on the principle of stare decises, must be limited to cases where a decree itself implies an adverse result though it is dot expressly contained in the formal adjudication”.
12. The learned judge also referred the view expressed by Kumaraswamy Sastry, J. in Venkateswarlu v. Lingayya and states:—
“It is unnecessary for me to consider whether this decision is consistent with the principle formulated by the Division Bench in Secretary of State v. Saminath Kownden The present case does not involve considerations of the nature that were deemed pertinent or weighed with Kumaraswamy Sastry J. It is not free from doubt, whether considerations of hardship can be regarded as relevant, because the basic principle is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and no extension of that right can be allowed unless it is warranted by the clear or express terms of the statute. It is not permissible to allow an appeal to be preferred against findings on considerations of hardship or inconvenience, when the right is limited by the terms of the statute to an appeal against decree itself I am relieved in the present case of examining the question whether the present case can or need be brought within the extended application of Sec. 96, because the decree with which I am concerned is a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit, which is not executable by its own force………… Quit apart from the question whether the omission to give the direction in paragraph 15, the shape and content of a final adjudication, was inadvertent or not, the fact remains that the terms of the decree do not imply any result adverse to the sixth defendant and therefore, on the principle of the decision of the Division Bench in Secretary of State v. Saminath Kownden it must be held that the appeal of the 6th defendant is not competent”
13. It is obvious from the above quoted passages that, though Parihasarthi, J. was doubting the correctness of the view taken by Kumarswamy Sastry, J. in Venkateswarlu v. Lingayya, the learned judge did not lay down any rule which was contrary to the view taken by Kumaraswamy Sastry, J. and other learned Judges in the cases considered by me above. It was not necessary for the learned judge to go into that question, as he himself stated I do not, therefore, think that this court has laid down any rule which is different from the view expressed by the Calcutta and Madras High Courts.
14. The principle that is deducible from the above precedents is that a party to a suit can maintain an appeal against a decision of the trial court, when certain findings, which would be resjudicata in other proceedings are against him, though the suit is decided in his favour for other reasons. Therefore applying this principle to the decree and findings of this case, what is to be considered is, whether the findings of the Court below, which are against the appealing defendant would be resjudicata in other proceedings.
15. Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Cods lays down the principle of resjudicata in the following terms:—
‘No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such court………………………
Explanation III. The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other…………” It is significant to note that Sec. 11 bars not only the trial of any suit but also any issue which was directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties.
16. It is explained under Explanation III that the matter must have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted by the other in the former suit. Explaining the scope of sec. 11 the Supreme. Court held in Vethal Yeshwant v. Shikandar Khan . A.I.R 1963 S.C 385..
“Where the final decision in any matter at issue between the parties is hassed by a Court on its decisions on more than one point, each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision, the decision on each of these points operate as resjudicate between this parties.”
17. It is in the light of this principle of resjudicate, that I would proceed to consider whether the finding of the lower court would operate as resjudicate against the defendant in other proceedings.
18. As I have Doted earlier, the findings of the lower court are is two parts. The first is in regard to properties other than the suit house. Those properties did not form the subject matter of the suit. No issue was framed in regard to them. Indeed the lower court itself observed that they did not really arise for consideration in the suit. Any observation in regard to them is only a passing reference. That observation has not in any way led to the result of the suit and passing of the decree. Such observations cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as operating as rejudicate in other proceedings. As far as this part of the finding is concerned, it can be undoubtedly concluded that it does not operate as resjudicate. But, in my view the other finding relating to the suit house would operate as res judicate against the defendant. The finding relates to the subject matter of the suit. The plaintiff claimed it as his exclusive and separate property. On the other band, the defence of the defendant was that it was joint property, in which the plaintiff and the fist defendant are entitled to half a share each. The first three issues framed by the lower court directly arose on the basis of these claims and counter claims of the Parties. There is, therefore, no doubt that the question. Whether it is joint property or not, and if so, of what nature and how the parties to the suit are interested in it, was a matter directly and substantially in issue in the suit, which has been decided by ??? lower court. The parties went to trial on these crucial issue. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, the Court below has found that the suit house was a joint acquisition of the plaintiff and his brother Jainarayan, and that the plaintiff was entitled to ¾th share and the first defendant was entitled to ¼th. It, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff and the defendant are co-owners of the suit property. From this finding, the result of dismissal of the suit, in the form it was framed directly followed. Since one co-owner was not entitled to recover possession of the entire properly by evicting the other co-owner the lower court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover possession of the entire suit property. In deed, the plaintiff filed another suit O.S No. 76 of 1967 on the file of the Second Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking partition of his ¾ths share of the suit property, evidently basing his claim on the finding of the lower court in this suit. I have, therefore, do doubt in coming to the conclusion that this finding of the lower court would certainly operate as res judicate against the first defendant in O.S No. 76 of 1967 and other proceedings between the parties which relate to the suit property.
19. If that is so, the result is that the appeal by the first defendant is competent. The question referred to me is answered accordingly.
Alert