(1) The facts giving rise to these appeals, which arise out of certain execution proceedings, may briefly be stated: one maturi sambasi varao obtained a final decree for recovery of over rs. 15,000 against krishnamurty, the appellant herein, in o. S. No. 17 of 1942 on the file of the district munsif, rajahmundry.

(2) This decree was ultimately confirmed by the high court with slight vaiiation in s. A. No. 2207 of 1952. During the pendency of this appeal, sambasivarao was adjudged insolvent in i. P. No. 1 of 1950 on the file of the district court, east godavari at rajahmundry with the result that the official receiver in whom his propertit. S vested, was impleaded as a party to s. A. No. 2207 of 1952. In the courss of the administration of the estate of the insolvent, the official receiver sold his only 1/4th share in the decree in o. S. No. 17 of 1942, ashis sons lajapathi raju, lakshminarayana and colonal raju seem to have served him with a notice declaring their intention to become divided with their father, sambasivarao. Lajapathiraju and lakshminarayana thereafter filed e. A. No. 926 of 1961 under order 21, rule 15, civil procedure code, for permission to execute the decree on behalf of their younger brother colonal raju also. On the same day they filed two more petitions, e. As. Nos. 925 and 927 of 1961 for transmission of the decree to the agency munsif, bhad - rachlam and for executing the decree to the extent of their 3 /4th share therein. The appellant (judgment - debtor) resisted all these applications contending inter alia that the petitioners are not entitled to any one of the reliefs claimed by them as they are neither decree - holders nor transferees of the decree. The executing court accepted this and accordingly dismissed all the three applications. The learned additional district judge, east godavari, to whom the matters were taken in appeal and who dealt with all the petitions together, reversed the decision of the executing court and allowed the appeals holding that the petitioners should be deemed to be transferees of the decree by operation of law as their father was adji'dged insolvent and his 1/4th share in the decree was already sold away ; and that even otherwise, the petitioners' right to execute the decree cannot be questioned having regard to the provisions of sections 146 and 151 of the code of civil procedure. Aggrieved by this decision, the judgment - debtor has preferred these appeals.

(3) The only question that arises for consideration is as to whether the respondents are entitled, in law, to execute the decree in o. S. No. 17 of 1942 to the extent of their 3/4th share therein. It is contended for the appellant that the respondents, not being decree - holders within the meaning of section 2 (3) or any other provision of the code, are not entitled to execute the decree even to the extent of their 3/4th share therein. It is only the decree - holder that can ordinarily apply for execution of a decree under the provisions of the code. Where, however, there is a transfer of the decree by assignment in writing or operation of law, the transferee is allowed to execute the decree under order 21, rule 16, civil procedure code. Order 21, rule 15 (1) likewise provides that where a decree has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, any one or more of such persons may, unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary, apply for the execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all, or where any of them has died, for the benefit of the survivors and the legal representatives of the deceased. The respondents are admittedly not decree - holders within the meaning of section 2 (3) of the code as they are not persons in whose favour the decree has been passed. Let us see if they are at least transferees under order 21, rule 16. This rule, in so far as it is relevant for our purpose, reads : -

"where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree - holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree - holder."

The respondents do not claim to be assignees in writing of the decree sought to be executed or any part thereof. Relying on narain sarup v. Daya shanker, a. I. R. 1938 all. 258. The lower appellate court held that the respondents should be deemed to be transferees of the decree, to the extent of their 3/4th share therein, by operation of law as their father, sambasivarao, who obtained the decree, has since been adjudged insolvent. The correctness of this finding is vehemently questioned on behalf of the appellant. The decision cited seems to be inapplicable to this case. In any view, it does not help the respondents to say that the adjudication of their father as insolvent had the effect of transferring to them a 3/4th share in the decree by operation of law. In that case, one har sarup obtained a decree for money in his capacity as manager of the joint family consisting of himself and his three sons on 27th october, 1930. After recovering one half of the amount covered by the decree, he disappeared and his whereabouts could not be known. His eldest son, narain sarup thereupon applied for execution of the decree on 19th april, 1934, i. E. , even before the period necessary to raise a presumption of har sarup's death had expired. The question then arose as to whether he was entitled to apply for execution of the decree standing in the name of his father. This was answered in the affirmative as can be seen from the following :

"if, however, the analogy of rules of procedure of order 21, civil procedure code, be necessary, then the rule which will apply is rule 16. That rule deals with the transfer of a decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law and presumably the rule is intended to cover all the cases of transfer by these two expressions. The present case of the succession of one manager to another, would come under the words "operation of law" and the present applicant is therefore entitled under that rule to apply for execution of the decree. There does not appear to be any special rule dealing with the cases of succession of managers of joint hindu families. Such cases of succession would not always be covered by the case of the death of the manager, because, there might be a case where the manager was incapacitated by illness or old age from acting as manager. Exactly the same point arises in the case of any group of persons where one person is entitled to act as manager or director and he is succeeded by another member of the group. We consider, therefore that the applicant was entitled to apply for execution of the decree. "

The reason which appears to have weighed with their lordships in coming to the conclusion that there was a transfer of the decree by operation of law in favour of narain sarup is that he succeeded his father as manager of the joint hindu family on behalf of which har sarup obtained the decree. But the instant case is not one in which the eldest of the sons of sambasivarao is seeking to execute the decree on the ground that after the adjudication of his father as insolvent, he has become the manager of the joint hindu family on behalf of which the decree was obtained. On the contrary, all the three sons of sambasivarao are seeking to execute the decree and that too, to the extent of only 3/4 on the ground that there was a disruption of the joint family status as a result of their having issued a notice for the purpose to the official receiver, soon after the adjudication of sambasivarao as insolvent. Narain sarup v. Daya shanker,a. I. R. 1938 all. 258 does not therefore help the respondents to say that there was a transfer of the decree to the extent of 3/4 in their favour by operation of law. It is true that transfers by operation of law are not intended to be confined to cases of death, devolution or succession and that in order to constitute a transfer of property " by operation of law ", all that is necessary is that there must be passing of one's rights in the property to another by force of some law, statutory or otherwise as indicated in jugalkishore v. Raw cotton co. (1955) s. C. J. 371 : (1955) 1 s. C. R. 1369: (1955) 1 m. L. J. (s. C.) 220 : a. I. R. 1955 s. C. But this decision does not in any way support the respondents' contention that the adjudication of their father had the effect of transferring 3/4th of the decree to them by operation of law. I have not been referred to any authority to say that when a hindu father, in whose name a decree stands, is adjudged insolvent, the adjudication would have the effect of transferring to his sons their shares of the decree by operation of law.

(4) The preponderance of authority appears to be that even in the case of a partition, the coparcener to whose share a decree may be allotted has no right to execute the decree under order 21, rule 16, civil procedure code, in the absence of an instrument in writing, as such allotment does not amount to transfer by operation of law. It was held in ramanathan chettiyar v. Raghavendra row, (1912) 16 indian cases 807. That whre a decree obtained by one of the members of a hindu family is allocated, at a family partition, to another coparcener, the person to whom it is allocated cannot be treated as an assignee of the decree by operation of law and that he cannot, by reason of such allocation alone, execute the decree unless he was so empowered by an instrument in writing. To the same effect is the decision in sankara pattar v. Ramanath ayyar,. (1954) 2 m. L. J. 155. It is not the respondents' case that there was any partition of the family properties between them or that any portion of the decree has been specifically allotted to their share not to speak of any instrument in writing, empowering them to execute it. When it is thus seen that there is neither an assignment of the decree in writing nor its transfer by operation of law in favour of the respondents, it cannot be said that they are entitled to execute it to the extent of their 3/4th share therein under order 21, rule 16 of the code of civil procedure.

(5) The contention that the respondents are entitled to invoke to their aid provisions of section 146 of the code for the purpose of executing the decree appears to have found favour with the learned additional district judge. This section lays down that save as otherwise provided by this code or by any law for the time being in force where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him. If the respondents are claiming under sambasivarao they can certainly invoke to their aid section 146 but this is not the case. Their claim to a 3/4th share in the decree is based on their own right by birth in a hindu undivided family and independent of their father, sambasivarao. Section 146 has therefore no application to this case.

(6) Learned counsel for the respondents however argued that being a beneficiant provision, section 146 should be construed liberally as so to advance justice and not in a restricted manner and that in this view, the respondents, though they are not claiming under sambasivarao, should be permitted to execute the decree. Saila bala v. Nirmala sundari, (1958) s. C. J. 743 : (1958) s. C. R. 1287:, (1958) 2 an. W. R. (s. C.) 99 : (1958) 2 m. L. T. (s. C.) 99 : a. I. R. 1958 s. C. 394 is cited in support of this contention. There is no gainsaying that section 146 of the code, being a beneficient provision, has to be construed liberally but no question of liberal or other construction would arise in this case when the section itself is inapplicable to it. The question that arose for determination in the decision cited was whether section 146 could be called in aid only for initiating proceedings or even for continuance of proceedings which are already pending and not whether the provisions of the section could be applied even in case to which, it is altogether inapplicable.

(7) While conceding that section 146 does not, in terms, apply here, learned counsel for the respondents argued that the principle adumbrated in it should be extended to this case having regard to the hardship which would otherwise ensue. Reliance is placed, in this context, on a full bench decision of the madras high court in muthiah chettiar v. Krishna doss varu, (1921) i. L. R. 44 mad. 919: 41 m. L. J. 316' a. I. R. 1921 mad. 599 at 605 wherein kumaraswami sastry, j. , as he then was, observed:

"where rights are conferred by the sections of the code and no provision is made for a particular set of facts, i think courts ought to apply the provisions of the rules which are nearest in point with such modifications as may be necessary and not refuse on the ground that the legislature has not made provision for a particular case though within the generality of a section of the code. The object of section 151 is to give such power to courts and to prevent a failure of justice."

I am afraid that the respondents are not entitled to press into service the aforesaid observations as there is not a case where any rights as such are conferred on them by any section of the code. The question that fell to be considered in the decision cited was as to whether a person who obtained transfer of a part of a decree pending execution (prior to the amendment of order 21, rule 16, civil procedure code) could be allowed to come on record in the execution proceedings and whether the further proceedings could be treated as if it was a joint petition by the transferor and the transferee. These questions were answered in the affirmative having regard to the fact that the transferee of a part of a decree is a person claiming under the decree - holder and that section 146 and the special provisions of order 22, rule 10 as to devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit appear to be ample authority for permitting the assignee decree - holder to continue the pending execution proceedings. But there is no transfer at all of any portion of the decree in favour of the respondents in this case either by assignment in writing or by operation of law and so no question of extending the principle of section 146 for the purpose of enabling them to execute the decree would arise.

(8) Another provision of the code under which the respondents were found entitled to execute the decree, by the lower appellate court, is section 151. But it is settled law that a court is not entitled to invoke its inherent powers for the purpose of granting relief when alternative remedies are available for securing the relief in question. It is not open to a court to exercise its inherent power for doing a thing which is prohibited or excluded by the code. The code empowers decree - holders transferees of decree by assignment in writing or operation of law, joint decree - holders and persons claiming under the decree - holders alone and none else to execute decrees. If in spite of this, permission to execute the decree, in exercise of the inherent powers under section 151 should be accorded to the respondents notwithstanding that they do not come within any one of the several categories of persons entitled to execute a decree, it would amount to doing a thing which is prohibited by the code. Nothing prevented the respondents from filing a suit for partition soon after their father was adjudged insolvent or from getting an assignment of the decree to the extent of their 3/4th from the; official receiver representing the insolvent but they did not care to do so. Mere hardship cannot be a relevant consideration for the purpose of granting relief under section 151, civil procedure code, if the effect of granting such relief should be to violate the specific provisions contained in the other parts of the code. I must, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the decision rendered by the lower appellate court is liable to be set aside, being contrary to law.

(9) In the result, the judgment and decrees of the lower appellate court are set aside and the decision of the executing court, dismissing e. A. Nos. 925, 926 and 927 of 1961, is restored. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The parties will however bear their respective costs of these appeals in the circumstances of the case. Leave granted. Appeals allowed.