Obul Reddi, J.:— Mr. Chowdary, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that, on account of the Government's involvement by granting financial aid to the Andhra Girls' College, Khammam, it has become an instrumentality of the State within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution and that, therefore there is no bar to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate wit or order or direction regarding the relief prayed for by the appellant.

2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this writ appeal are these; The appellant, Subhadra Devi, was appointed as an Assistant Lecturer (Economics) in the Andhra Girls' College, Khammam, on a temporary basis subject to confirmation and approval by the Osmania University. The appointment was initially made for one year 1967-68, as she was not qualified to hold the post of an Assistant Lecturer, unless she passed in second division the M.A Degree Examination. Since she had obtained only a pass in third division, she was asked to qualify herself appearing once again for the M.A Degree Examination, so that she may Obtain a second or first division. This communication from the University was in supersession of its earlier proceedings dated 23rd November, 1968 exempting her from possessing the required minimum post graduate qualification i.e, second class with 50 per cent, marks. Since the exemption granted to her earlier by the University was cancelled by the University by its later proceedings dated 2nd January, 1969 without affording an opportunity to her before cancelling the exemption given to her she filed W.P No. 3793 of 1969, which was later allowed by this Court. Meanwhile, the President of Andhra Girls College issued the impugned proceedings dated 23rd November, 1969 terminating her services for the reasons recorded therein. The reasons given in the impugned proceedings are that she was appointed purely on a temporary basis subject to the approval of the University that she had failed to appear and qualify herself for appointment as required by the University rules or regulations; that her work was not satisfactory; that she was habituated to go on leave piecemeal even without getting the leave sanctioned; and that, therefore, the governing body of the College, at its meeting held on 14th October, 1969, resolved to terminate her services with immediate effect and appoint a duly-qualified candidate in her place. It is her case that the action taken is mala fide and that the grounds mentioned in the impugned proceedings are wholly extraneous and none of them is true. She, therefore, moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the reliefs referred to in the writ petition. The Secretary of the College, in his counter-affidavit, contended inter alia that the petitioner was originally appointed as a Tutor and later promoted temporarily as an Assistant Lecturer subject to the approval of the University. The University informed the management that the appointment was approved for the year 1967-68 subject to the condition that she should appear for the M.A Degree Examination and secure a higher division and that she was specifically told that there could be no relaxation of the rules and that her appointment was made purely on a temporary bans and terminable at any time without notice. The University approved her appointment only temporarily subject to her being qualified to hold the post. She was not a Government servant when she joined the Andhra Girls' College at Khammam, as she had Resigned her post in the Government Women's College at Chirala on 14th October, 1966. She was a new entrant into service and she was appointed on a temporary basis and, therefore, she has no right to question the order terminating her services. In short, it is the case of the management that the College being a private educational institution, it is entitled to appoint its own staff and the conditions of service are governed by the terms of the contract and that the management was justified in terminating her services for the reasons recorded in the impugned proceedings.

3. Chinnappa Reddy, J., while accepting the submission of Mr. Choudary that there is nothing in Articles 32 and 226, which prohibits the issue of an appropriate writ or direction to persons or authorities other than the Government, governmental agencies, statutory authorities and statutory corporations, held that.

“But that does not really conclude the question. The real question is not to whom a writ or direction may be addressed but when may it be issued.”

4. The learned Judge ultimately held:

“The mere fact that a person discharged a public duty which he has…… taken upon himself and is the recipient of the bounty of the State in connection with the discharge of that duty does not expose that person to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 unless the wrong complained of is connected with statutory or constitutional obligation”.

and in that view, dismissed the writ petition.

5. The learned Counsel for the appellant Urged that granting financial aid to the Andhra Girls' College, Khammam, is sufficient to establish that there is Government's ‘involvement’ in the functioning and management of the institution and as such, it is either an instrumentality of the State or “other authority under the control of the Government” thus attracting the definition of the expression ‘State’ is Article 12 of the Constitution.

6. Article 12 has been construed by the Supreme Court and High Courts in a number of cases and some of the leading cases may be profitably noticed. One of the early cases where the expression “local or other authorities” came to be construed in University of Madras v. Shanta Bai . I.L.R 1954 Mad. 426; 1953 2 M.L.J 287; A.I.R 1954 Mad. 67.. The construction placed by the learned Judges is

“These words must be construed as ejusdem generis, with Government or Legislature and so construed can only mean authorities exercising governmental functions. They would not include persons, natural or jurisdic who cannot be regarded as instrumentalities of the Government”.

7. The Supreme Court, in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mokanlal, which is relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, held that the expression “other authorities” is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India, Or under the control of the Government of India, and that there is no reason to narrow down this meaning in the contest in which the words “other authorities” are used in Article 12 of the Constitution. The learned Judge thus over-ruled the limited meaning given in Shanta Bat's case . I.L.R 1954 Mad. 426; 1953 2 M.L.J 287; A.I.R 1954 Mad. 67. to the words “other authorities” on the ground that: the rule of ejusdem generis is not applicable. It is on the strength of this decision that the learned Counsel sought to contend that the expression ‘State’ should be construed in its widest extent and, if so construed, a private educational institution receiving financial aid from the State would come within the definition of ‘State’.

8. It may be straightaway stated that that decision renders no assistance to the stand taken by the learned Counsel if the facts of that case are examined. The Electricity Board, Rajasthan Was an authority created by statute with certain sovereign power of the State. It has the power of promoting coordinate development, generation supply and distribution of electricity and for that purpose to make, alter, amend and carry out schemes Under Chapter V of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, to engage in certain incidental undertaking. The Board is also invested by statutes with extensive powers of control overelectricity undertakings. The power to make rules and regulations and to administer the Act is in substance the sovereign power of the. State delegated to the Board. It is in that view that their Lordships held that the Board is thus an “other authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Their Lordships, however cautioned that

“Every constitutional or statutory authority on whom powers are conferred by law is however not ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12. The expression ‘authority’ in its etymological sense means a body invested with power to command or give an ultimate decision, or enforce obedience, or having a legal right to command and be obeyed.”

9. In one of the earliest cases, Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, the expression ‘State’ was construed as to include inter alia a department of the Government. In that case, a question arose whether the Income-tax Department could be brought within the scope of Article 12 and the learned Judges held that the Incom-tax Department was a department of the Government answering the definition of ‘State’.

10. We may now notice the case, Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where two of the questions raised were; (1) whether an order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute, which is intra vires is open to challenge as repugnant to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution on the sole ground that it is based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder; and (2) whether the validity of such an order can be questioned in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. S.K Das, J., per majority answered the two questions in the negative. To quote the learned Judge;

“An order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is intra vires and in: the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the sole ground that it it is passed on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder. Nor can the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The proper remedy for correcting an error in such an order is to proceed by way of appeal or if the error is an error apparent on the face of the record, then by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is necessary to observe here that Article 32 of the Constitution does not give this Court an appellate jurisdiction such as is given by Articles 132 to 136.

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There can be no question of the enforcement of a fundamental right if the order challenged is a valid and legal order, in spite of the allegation that it is erroneous.”

11. Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) in a separate but concurring judgment, held; at page 1666):

“The taxing departments are instrumentalities of the State. They are not apart of the Legislature; nor are they a part of the Judiciary.

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They still remain the instrumentalities of the State and are within the definition of ‘State’ in Article 12. In this view of the matter, their actions must be regarded, in the ultimate analysis, as executive in nature, since their determinations result in the demand of tax which neither the Legislature nor the judiciary can collect. Thus, the actions of these quasi-judicial bodies may be open to challenge on the ground of breach of fundamental rights”.

12. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) in his dissenting judgment, brought the authorities constituted under Sales Tax Act for assessing the tax within the meaning of the expression “other authorities”, as such authorities exercise government functions and are the instrumentalities of the Government. We may also notice the construction placed by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in his dissenting judgment. The dissenting judgments are noticed only to illustrate the scope of Article 12. We are not here concerned with the ultimate decision as rendered by the majority. The scope of Article 12 is stated by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.; (page 1678);

“In the first place, it has to be pointed out that the definition is only inclusive which itself is apt to indicate that besides the Government and the Legislature there might be other instrumentalities of State action which ght be comprehended within the expression ‘State’ That this expression ‘includes’ is used in this sense and not in that in which it is very occasionally used as meaning ‘means and includes’ could be gathered not merely from other provisions of Part III but also from Article 12 itself.

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No doubt, the definition in Article 12 starts with the words ‘unless the context otherwise requires’, that expression however could serve to cut down even further the reach of the definition and cannot serve to expand it beyond the executive and legislative fields of State action if the word ‘includes’ were understood as ‘means and includes’ which is the contention urged by the learned Counsel.

Article 12 on any reasonable construction cannot permit the dissection of ‘Government’ for the purpose of discovering the nature or the quality of the powers exercised by it, into the three fields of executive pure and simple, judicial and legislative for the purpose of a fresh reclassification into certain categories. When Government exercise any power, be it exclusive, pure and simple, or quasi-judicial under a statute or quasi-legislative in any framing subordinate legislation, it does so as ‘Government’ and no further sub-division of it is possible except for the purposes merely of academic study or for determining the nature of the relief which might be had by persons affected by its activities in any particular field. * * * If so, it is manifest that such rules might violate the fundamental rights, i.e, their validity would depend inter alia, on their passing the test of permissible legislation under Part III. This would directly contradict any argument that Courts and quasi-judiclal authorities are outside the definition of State in Article 12

13. The Supreme Court again construed the words “under the control of the Government of India” in K.S Ramamurthy v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, in these terms:

“The control envisaged under Article 12 is control of the functions of the authorities and it is only when the Government of India can control the function of an authority that it can be said that the authority is under the control of the Government of India. Such control is possible in the case of a purely executive or administrative authority, it is impossible in the case of a quasi-judicial or judicial authority for in the very nature of things, where rule of law prevails, it is not open to the Government, be it the Government of India or the Government of a State, to direct a quasi-judicial or judicial authority to decide a particular matter before it in a particular manner. The appellate authority being quasijudicial could not therefore be directed by the Government of India to decide a particular matter before it in a particular manner and therefore it cannot be said that, it is an authority under the control of the Government of India”.

14. These decisions clearly bring out that the concept of State action does not extend to the action of a private individual or institution, unless that individual or institution acts under some law clothing the private action with the character or impress of a State action. The college in question cannot be deemed to be an instrumentality of the State, unless it exercises governmental functions. The fact that the Government gives financial assistance does not bring a private college under its control, as it exercises no control either in the management of the affairs of the college or in the matter of appointments or removal of the members of its staff. The mere fact that it receives bounty from the Government will not make it an instrumentality of the State. By no process of reasoning can this private educational institution be said to be under the control of the Government. There is nothing to show that the institution is discharging any statutory functions. Article 29 of the Constitution cannot be invoked in this case, as sought to be done by the learned Counsel, as it is not a case where the jurisdiction of this Court is sought for enforcement of any cultural or educational rights. Clause (2) of Article 29 relied upon by the learned Counsel only injuncts that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. It is not a case of any denial of admission on any of the grounds specified in that Article. The right of a private educational institution receiving aid out of State: funds to terminate the services of its staff is not covered by Article 29. Involvement of the Government must mean State participation in the management of the affairs of the college, its funds Or property. There is no such involvement in this case. If the removal of the appellant could be construed as an action of the State, then certainly she would be entitled to equal protection of laws and the benefit of Article 311(2). The following passage relied upon by the learned Counsel in ‘Comparative Constitutional Process’ by Thomas M. Frank at page 587, dealing with the topic “The right to equal protection” renders no help to his contentions.

“State action might also be found in situations which do not directly involve State officials or institutions. Thus under certain circumstances ‘State participation through any arrangement, management, funds or property’ Would establish the requisite State action (Cooper v. Aaron)”.

15. As already pointed out, unless there is State participation in the governance of the college, mere financial assistance to the college will not bring it within the definition of ‘State’, nor would it amount to involvement of the Government in the governance of the college. Such State participation, stated by the learned author, Thomas, M. Frank, is totally lacking in this case.

16. We may next consider the question whether the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked by the appellant.

17. Article 226(I) reads:

“Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs including Writs, in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose”.

18. Under the first part of the Article, a writ will issue only if it is found that the fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen are infringed by an act of ‘State’. No fundamental rights of the appellant are involved in this case. If she is able to establish that she has a ‘legal right’ and that right has been infringed, then only she will be entitled to relief under the second part of the Article. The amplitude of the power under Article 226 came to be considered by Kania, C.J in The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, That was a case where the High Court of Orissa, on the ground that the petitioner had no alternative legal remedy, equally convenient, beneficial and effect-tual because he could not file a suit till after the expiry of the period of sixty days required for the purpose under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, thought that, unless he was protected by the Court in the meanwhile, he would undergo irreparable and irremediable loss and, therefore, directed the State of Orissa, restraining it from disturbing the petitioner's possession over the mining areas in question till after the expiry of the period of sixty days required for the purpose under section 80, Civil Procedure Code. On appeal, their Lordships reversed the decision of the High Court, Kania, C.J, construing the concluding words “and for any other purpose”, said:

“The language of the Article shows that the issuing of Writs or directions by the Court is founded only on its decision that a right of the aggrieved party under Part III of the C institution (Fundamental Rights) has been infringed. It can also issue writs or give similar directions for any other purposes. The concluding words of Article 226 have to be read in the context of what precedes the same. Therefore, the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under this Article. The judgment of the Orissa High Court under appeal however, shows that the Judges have decided nothing at all in respect of the rights of the parties”.

19. In P.D Shandasani v. Central Bank of India, where the shares of the petitioner before the Supreme Court, in the share-capital of a Bank were sold by the Bank to a third party in purported exercise of its right of lien for recovery of a debt due to it from the petitioner. Patanjali Sastry, C.J, observed that the petitioner misconceived his remedy and that

“the language and structure of Article 19 and its setting in Part III of the Constitution cleanly show that the Article was intended to protect those freedom against State action other than in the legitimate exercise of it power to regulate private rights in the public interest. Violation of rightss of property by individuals is not within the purview of the Article”.

20. Though it was a decision rendered under Article 32 of the Constitution, it applies equally to an application made under Article 226 too, as Article 226 is not intended to prevent Wrongful individual acts or to provide protection against merely private conduct.

21. In Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General, Mahajan, J., (as he then was) considered the conditions required for the issue of a writ, of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution and observed:

“A writ of certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior Court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong It must be shown before such a Writ is issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Once it is held that the Court has jurisdiction but while exercising it, it made a mistake the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right inasmuch as a Court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as Wrongly”.

22. It is not a case where an inferior tribunal or Court wrongly exercised its jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice, but a case where a private educational institution governed by a committee of individuals terminated the service of the appellant. Article 226 is not intended to be used to provide protection against private rights arising out of contracts.

23. In Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. while dealing with the scope of Article 226 in the matter of granting permits under the Motor Vehicles Act, Chandrasekhar Ayyar J., observed:

“Such Writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However, extensive the jurisdiction may be, it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into, a Court of Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made”.

24. In T.C Basappa v. T. Nagappa B.K Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) considered the essential features of a writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it may be issued. As stated by his Lordship:

“One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of a writ of certiorari, is that the writ can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. The expression ‘Judicial Acts’ includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions and is used in contract with what are purely ministerial acts, The second essential feature of a Writ of certiorari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity…….

The supervision of the superior Court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be demanded”.

25. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque, after referring to the earlier decisions of the Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J., summarised the conditions under which a writ of certiorari could be issued, (at p. 243):

“(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) certiorari Will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction”.

26. Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) in C.K Achutan v. State of Kerala, dealing with a case where the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked under Article 32 of the Constitution by a person holding contracts for supply of milk to a Government Hospital, observed:

“When one person is chosen rather than another, the aggrieved party cannot claim the protection of Article 14, because the choice of the person to fulfill a particular contract must be left to the Government Similarly, a contract which is held from Government stands on no different footing from a contract held from a private party. The breach of the contract, if any, may entitle the person aggrieved to sue for damages or in appropriate cases, even specific performance, but he cannot complain that there has been a deprivation of the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, such as is contemplated by Article 19(1)(g). Nor was it shown how Article 31 might be invoked to prevent cancellation of a contract in exercise of powers conferred by one of the terms of the contract itself.

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Article 16(1) of the Constitution both in its terms and in the collocation of the words, indicates, that it is confined to ‘employment’ by the State, and has reference to employment in service rather than as contractors”.

27. That case is an authority for the proposition that, in case of breach of contract held by a private individual, whether from the Government or from a private party, it makes no difference and it is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of a civil Court.

28. In K.K Kochunni v. State of Madras, their Lordships drew distinction between a dispute arising between two sets of private individuals unconnected with any State action and a dispute between a private individual and the ‘State’ as defined in Article 12. S.R Das, C.J after referring to Shamdasani's case, observed:

“The present position is, however, entirely different, for the gravamen of the complaint of the ‘sthanee’ petitioner and the other petitioners who claim title from him, is directly against the impugned Act passed by the Madras Legislature, which is within the expression ‘State’ as defined in Article 12. Therefore, in the cases now before us the petitions are primarily against the action of the State and respondents 2 to 17 have been impleaded because they are interested in denying the petitioners' rights created in their favour by the impugned Act. Indeed by means of suits and public notices, those respondents have in fact been asserting the rights conferred upon them by the impugned Act. In these circumstances, the petitioners grievance is certainly against the action of the State, which, by virtue of the definition of that term given in Article 12 of the Constitution, includes the Madras Legislature and it cannot certainly be said that the subject matters of the present petitions comprise disputes between two sets of private individuals unconnected With any State action”.

29. The case on hand is one where there is a dispute between two sets of private individuals unconnected with any State action.

30. In Akshaibar Lal v. Vice-Chancellor, Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) considered the validity of the to minations of certain Readers, Professors and Lecturers employed in several faculties of the Banaras Hindu University. Before the new statute No. 30 (introduced by the Banaras Hindu University (Amendment) Act (XXXIV of 1958), the power of the University to terminate the services of the incumbents was derived from (a) agreements; (b) Ordinances; and. (c) (old) Statute No. 30. The agreements merely represented the general right of a master to terminate the services of the incumbents, where they were subject to agreements, after reasonable notice, without giving any reason. The Ordinances, in addition to preserving that right, gave power to terminate service for proved misconduct, inefficiency or physical unfitness. By new statute No. 30, a special ground Was required to be proved. It Was that the continuance of an incumbent Was detrimental to the interests of the University. The University invoked special powers under statute No. 30 and issued notices to the appellants before their Lordships to show’ cause why their servicer should not be terminated. But the appellants had obtained a stay order from the High Court. Thereafter, the executive counsel of the University had abandoned their action under statute No. 30 and proceeded to act under powers which flowed from the agreements and he Ordinances and terminated the services of the incumbents giving four or six months' salary in lieu of notice. Hidayatullah, J., therefore, held that statute No. 30, which was enacted by the Parliament to meet a special situation had an over-riding effect on the agreements. Ordinances and old statute No. 30 and that the University could not having started enquiries under statute No. 30, abandon the enquiries in midcourse and pass on to something else. This decision clearly brings out the position that, unless the service conditions of an employee are governed by some statute or rules made by the Government, the employee, who is governed solely by agricement, cannot have recourse to Article 226, as the relationship between the parties would only be that of a master and servant, the master having the general right to terminate the services of a servant.

31. The Supreme Court, in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V Imanual, again considered the powers of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Shelat, J., observed:

“It is, however, not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body. The company being a non-statutory body and one incorporated under the Companies Act there is neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus nor is there in its workmen any corresponding legal right for enforcement of any statutory or public duty”.

32. This decision mates it clear that a person or authority on whom no statutory duty is imposed is not exposed to the jurisdiction of this Court Article 226 of the Constitution.

33. In Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. Chandra Kian Tyagi, an appeal preferred by Special Leave under Article 136, their Lordships observed:

“Normally a contract of personal service will not be enforced by an order for specific performance nor will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept the repudiation of a contract of service by his master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. But when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute while terminating the services of such An employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order, is null and void and that he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a master terminating the services of a servant. The exceptions to the normal rule that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be granted are: (1) a public servant who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311; (2) reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law or by Labour or Industrial Tribunals; (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute”.

34. In Civil Appeal (reported in (1972) 4 SCC 188 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1920) No. 500 of 1966 dated 16th March, 1-971, the Supreme Court, once again, stated that the relationship between a teacher of an elementary school, which receives aid from the Government, and the management of that school is that of a master and servant. The fact that the Government gives financial assistance does not change the character of relationship between the management and its teachers. Shelat, J., observed:

“Ordinarily, the relations between the management of an elementary school and the teachers employed in it would be governed by the terms of the contract of employment and the law of master and servant in the absence of any statute controlling or abrogating such a contract of employment and providing to the contrary. The mere fact that such a school has obtained recognition and aid from the education department would not mean that the relationship between its management and its employees has ceased to be governed by the contracts of employment under which the employees are recruited.”

35. We may, in this connection, refer to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Gopal Rao Ekbote, J., and one of us (Ramachandra Raju, J.) in W.P No. 2136 of 1969 dated 31st December, 1970 where an idential question as to the maintainability of a writ petition by a college principal against a private educational institution came up for consideration on a reference made by a single Judge (Ramachandra Rao, J.) After referring to some of the English and Indian cases, the learned Judges ultimately held:

“Our concluded opinion therefore is that the Writ petition is maintainable, and if a proper case is made out, a writ of certiorari can issue against an affiliated and aided college.”

36. On the question whether any relief can be granted to the petitioner, the principal of the college, whose services were terminated, the learned Judges however held that “the impugned order of termination of service does not suffer from any in fumity on the basis of which this Court can quash it by the issue of a Writ of certiorari”

37. The case of Praca Tools Corporation v. C.V Imanual, was distinguished by the learned Judges as one relating to a corporation incorporated under the Indian Companies Act although the Government held considerable shares in the Corporation and held that it was neither a government body nor was it receiving any Government aid. The only other decision of the Supreme Court cited and referred to by the learned Judges is Shiyendra Bahadur v. Nalanda College. That case was distinguished by the learned Judges on the ground that

“it was not specifically decided but was assumed that the Nalanda College affiliated to the Bihar University was a public body and has to perform a public duty in the appointment of a principal, but as it was not shown that the principal had any right which could be enforced by a mandamus, the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court was, affirmed in appeal. This decision therefore cannot be said to have laid down any law in that behalf.”

38. We may, therefore, examine the facts of Shivendra Bahadur's case, to see the law laid down by their-Lordships. Nalanda College was founded by a private citizen in 1920 and Was affiliated to the Bihar University in 1951. In March, 1952, one Mr. D.P Srivastava, a Government servant, was appointed as its principal, but the Government withdrew him in February, 1958. Then, at an extraordinary meeting of the governing body of the college held on 23rd February, 1958, the petitioner was appointed as the principal of the college and the University was informed of the appointment as required by the University statues. That appointment Was confirmed in July, 1958. In November, 1959 there was a change of the chairman of the governing body. The new governing body resolved to appoint a new principal and, after appointing an outsider, the petitioner was asked to hand over charge. Then the petitioner, filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the appointment of a new principal. The High Court held that the petitioner could not challenge the new appointment because his own appointment was not valid under the rules and the appointment of the new principal Was valid as it Was approved by the University. Before their Lordships a great deal of controversy was raised as, to whether the statutes framed by the University under section 20 of the University of Bihar Act have or have not the force of law and whether a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can issue against the governing body of the college i.e, whether the appellant has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the respondents. Their Lordships held:

“In order that mandamus may issue to compel the respondents to do something it must be shown that the statutes impose a legal duty and the appellant has a legal right under the statutes to enforce its performance. It is, however, wholly unnecessary to go into or decide this question or to decide whether the statutes impose on the governing body of the college a duty which can be enforced by a writ of mandamus because assuming that the contention of the appellant is right that the college is a public body and it has to perform a public duty in the appointment of a principal, it has not been shown that there is any right in the appellant which can be enforced by mandamus. According to the statutes all appointments of teachers and staff have to be made by the governing body and no person can be appointed, removed or demoted except in accordance with rules but the appellant has not shown that he has any right entitling him to get an order for appointment or reinstatement. Our attention has not been drawn to any article in the statutes by Which the appellant has a right to be appointed or reinstated and if he has not that right he cannot come to Court and ask for a writ to issue.”

39. It, therefore, follows that, not withstanding that the statutes provided appointments of teachers and staff by the governing body of the college and no person could be removed except in accordance with the rules, the appellant was unable to show any right entitling him to get an order of appointment or reinstatement.

40. In the case before us, the appointment of the appellant by the governing body of the college is not made under any statute. The appointment was only on a contractual basis unconnected with any statutory provisions. That being the case, it cannot be said that the appellant has a legal right under any law, regulations or rules in force to enforce her non-fundamental rights.

41. The decisions of the Supreme Court in The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta and P.D Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, it does not appear from the judgment in W.P No. 2136 of 1969 dated 31st December, 1970, were placed before the learned Judges, nor Was the attention of the learned Judges invited to the other decisions in T.C Basappa v. T. Nagappa . 1954 S.C.J 695; 1955 1 S.C.R 250; A.I.R 1954 S.C 440.; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque . 1955 S.C.J 267; A.I.R 1955 S.C 233. and Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. . 1952 S.C.J 261; A.I.R 1952 S.C 192.. The scope of the expression “for any other purpose” was clearly explained by Kania, C.J, in The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, by stating that

“the concluding words of Article 226 have to be read in the context of what precedes the same. Therefore, the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under this Article.”

42. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not subsequently expressed any view different from what has been expressed by Kania, J. All the decisions to which we have referred lay down that the existence of a legal right said to have been infringed is a condition precedent for the maintenance of an application under Article 226, where the application has been brought for the enforcement of a non-fundamental right. That opinion was consistently expressed in the other cases of the Supreme Court cited by us. Violation of a right to hold a particular office by an individual in private institution is not within the purview of Article 226. The law on the question involved has been declared by the Supreme Court in The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, and it is binding under Article 141 on all Courts within the territory of India. This decision was referred to and followed by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra . A.I.R 1964 S.C 685.. Gajendragadkar, J., (as he then was) stated the scope of Article 226 on these terms;

“Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate Writs can be issued by the High Court under the said Article even for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined to cases of illegal invasion of his fundamental rights alone.

Though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of the Article clearly indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226”.

43. In view of what has been expressed by their Lordships not only in Madan Gopal Rungta's case but also in other cases which we have noticed supra, we do not feel called upon to refer the question involved to a Full Bench, as the decision rendered by the other Division Bench in W.P No. 2136 of 1969 dated 31st December, 1970 must be deemed to be not in conformity with the declared law of the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal Rungta's case.

44. Gopal Rao Ekbote, J., who spoke for the Bench in W.P No. 2136 of 1969 date 31st December, 1970, relied upon a decision in Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, where it was held that public body required to make determinations affecting individual interests in a judicial manner was subject to review by certiorari despite the fact that it was neither constituted by the statute nor endowed with jurisdiction by a statute.

45. In this connection, it would be appropriate to recall what Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) said in T.C Basappa v. T. Nagappa:

“In view of the express provisions in our Constitution, the Court need not now look back to the early history of the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by the difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges.”

46. The complaint made regarding termination of services arises out of breach of contract held by the appellant from a private body and it is obviously a dispute cognizable by a competent civil Court. For the reasons recorded by us the writ appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.

47. Writ Appeal dismissed.