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Mullapudi Venkatarayudu And Others v. Chintnapu Varada Raju And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant is a Trust for whose benefit Ac. 5-49 cents of land on the outskirts of Tanuku (West Godavari district) was acquired by the Land Acquisition Officer (the 2nd respondent). The Trust sought to be impleaded as a party to A.S. No. 352 of 1970 (preferred by the Land Acquisition Officer) and A.S. Nos. 411 & 412 of 1970 (filed by claimants Chitrapu Varadaraju and Kakarla Ravanamma) on the ground that it was a necessary or proper party. Applications for impleadment were dismissed by the learned single Judge A.D.V. Reddy, J., and the Trust appealed against those orders. The central procedural posture is thus an appeal from the dismissal of applications to implead the Trust as a party to the referenced appeals under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and under provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure invoked by the Trust.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant-Trust is entitled to be brought on record as a party-respondent to the appeals preferred to this Court by the Land Acquisition Officer and by the claimants for the purpose of enforcing the rights guaranteed to it under section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
- Whether provisions of Order I, Rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (invoked by the appellant) are applicable to implead the Trust in the appeals arising under the Land Acquisition Act?
- Whether the Trust may be permitted at the appellate stage to appear and adduce evidence under section 50(2) of the Act, treating the appeal as a continuation of the original proceeding?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented)
- The Trust argued that it was a necessary or, at least, a proper party to be brought on record in the appeals under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 because it had a direct interest in the result.
- It invoked section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and relied on Order I, Rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to support impleadment.
- Separately, the Trust contended that the appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding, and therefore the present application could be treated as an application under section 50(2) permitting it to appear and adduce evidence at the appellate stage; it relied on decisions such as Garikapati Veerayya v. N. Subbaiah Choudhry and State of Kerala v. K.M.C. Abdulla & Co. to support the proposition that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and that appellate authorities have power to review evidence.
Opposing Arguments (as presented)
- The claimants (through Sri N. Bapiraju) contended that the Trust was neither a "person interested" within the meaning of the Act nor a necessary or proper party, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to implead the Trust as a party to the appeals arising under the Act.
- The respondent side opposed treating the present applications as falling under section 50(2), and resisted allowing the Trust to adduce evidence at the appellate stage, noting that the Trust had not availed itself of its limited rights under section 50(2) before the Collector or the Court of original jurisdiction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Municpal Corporation of Patna v. Jogendra Narain Rajkut (Calcutta High Court) | Held that a municipal corporation for whose benefit land was acquired was not a necessary party and could only appear to watch or assist; it could not request a reference under section 18 nor had a right to appeal against the decree on reference. | The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that a local authority or company is not a necessary party and has limited rights under the Act. |
| Mandalay Municipal Committee v. Maungit (Rangoon High Court) | Followed the view that the municipal/local authority is not a necessary party and only has limited participatory rights. | The Court cited it as consistent authority supporting restricted status of local authorities/companies under the Act. |
| In re Jerbai Framji Matha (Bombay High Court) | A Bombay High Court decision following the same line that the company or local authority was not a necessary party. | Adduced as supporting precedent in the line of High Court decisions denying party-status to beneficiary authorities. |
| Nagpur Corporation v. Narendrakumar (Bombay High Court) | Held similarly that a municipal/corporate beneficiary is not a necessary party to acquisition proceedings. | Used to corroborate the view that beneficiary entities cannot be joined as necessary parties. |
| Gautamlal v. Land Acquisition Officer (Gujarat High Court) | Held that a local authority or company cannot be joined as a necessary or proper party merely because it was directed to appear and adduce evidence under section 50(2); the right to appear is distinct and does not make it a party under Order I, Rule 10. | The Court relied on this decision to conclude that section 50(2) provides a specific, limited right and excludes joining the authority as a party-defendant. |
| Himalayan Tile & Marble v. Francis (Bombay High Court) | Held that a company for whose benefit acquisition was made could not challenge the award under Article 226 as it was neither a necessary nor proper party to the proceedings resulting in the award. | The decision was cited to support the principle that beneficiary companies lack standing to be effective parties in acquisition proceedings and related challenges. |
| State v. Amarandra Pratap (Orissa High Court) | Held that a company for whose benefit acquisition is made is not a "person interested" under section 3(b) and is not a necessary party, though it may appear and adduce evidence to determine compensation. | The Court used this as supporting authority for the limited participatory status of beneficiary companies. |
| Orissa Cement Limited v. State of Orissa (Orissa High Court) | Reiterated the position that beneficiary companies are not necessary parties but have limited rights to appear and give evidence on compensation questions. | Cited as further confirmation of the view taken by other High Courts. |
| C.R.P. No. 1235 of 1954 (reported Madras Weekly Notes 1954, 128; decision of Rajamannar C.J.) | Held that a local authority or company could not be permitted to take part in argument on a petition under section 18 because section 50(2) only provides for appearance and adducing of evidence for determination of compensation. | Relied on to support the submission that the right under section 50(2) does not include the right to argue the petition or participate in appellate argument. |
| Garikapati Veerayya v. N. Subbaiah Choudhry (Supreme Court) | Recognized the view that the pursuit of remedies (suit, appeal, second appeal) can be stages of a single series of proceedings (appeal as continuation). | The Court acknowledged this authority but distinguished it on the ground that section 50(2) confers a limited right specifically tied to proceedings before the Collector or the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. |
| State of Kerala v. K.M.C. Abdulla & Co. (Supreme Court) | Held that an appeal is a continuation of proceedings and the appellate authority has the power to review evidence subject to statutory limits. | This authority was considered and explicitly distinguished because section 50(2) was interpreted to apply only to the Collector or the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, not broadly to appellate courts. |
| D. Pullaiah v. A. Nagabushanam (this High Court) | Held that a person adversely affected by an appellate decision, though not a party under Order I, Rule 8, might be granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. | The Court found that this decision was not relevant to the present facts and was distinguishable. |
| C. Subbarayudu v. E. Brahmanandan (this High Court) | Held an alienee who acquired interest during pendency of suit could be a necessary and proper party under Order I, Rule 10 read with section 151 and other provisions of CPC. | The Court held this case distinguishable and inapplicable because the facts (a transfer of interest in a particular item) differed materially from the present situation under the Land Acquisition Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a textual and contextual construction of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act), with special emphasis on section 50(2) and related provisions (sections 3 definitions, 18, 20, 21, 53, and sections governing procedure on reference and compensation). The analytical steps were as follows:
- Interpretation of section 50(2): The Court read section 50(2) to confer a specific and limited entitlement on the local authority or company "for whose purpose and benefit" land is acquired — namely, the right to appear and adduce evidence in proceedings before the Collector or the Court of original jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The phrase "may appear and adduce evidence" was read as permissive (may or may not), not as mandatory or transformative into full party status.
- Scope of the proviso and section 18: The proviso to section 50(2) expressly precludes any right in the local authority/company to demand a reference under section 18; only a "person interested" (as defined in section 3(b)) may request a reference. Thus the Act itself restricts the role of beneficiary entities and does not confer upon them the procedural rights of parties who are "persons interested."
- Rights arising from appearance: The Court concluded that the limited right to appear and adduce evidence includes the right to lead independent evidence (oral and documentary) and to cross-examine witnesses produced by claimants or the Land Acquisition Officer for quantum determinations. However, it does not extend to the right to address arguments (i.e., to participate in legal argument as a party) nor to the right to appeal against the award or decree in the reference proceeding.
- Relationship with CPC provisions (Order I, Rule 10 and Section 151): By operation of section 53 of the Act (making the CPC applicable except where inconsistent) and the special provision of section 50(2), the Court held that the general rules for adding parties under Order I, Rule 10 (read with section 151) are excluded in the present context. Thus those CPC provisions could not be used to convert the Trust into a necessary or proper party in proceedings under the Act.
- Essential tests for necessary/proper party: Even if CPC provisions were applicable, the Court applied the settled tests: a necessary party is one against whom some relief must be granted or whose presence is necessary for complete and effective adjudication; a proper party is one whose presence is desirable for final adjudication though no relief is claimed against them. The Court found that neither test was satisfied because no relief was sought against the Trust and its presence was not necessary to enable a complete adjudication of the issues.
- Statutory scheme and practical consequences: The Court noted that compensation, interest and costs, if awarded, are payable by the State represented by the Collector to persons interested. The Act assigns the responsibility for taking possession and handing over land to beneficiary authorities to the Collector/State. Thus the State adequately represents the interests of both claimants and beneficiary authorities; the Act does not grant an independent status to the beneficiary to be treated as a party with rights of enforcement against claimants.
- Reliance on precedent and distinguishing attempts to expand rights at appellate stage: The Court surveyed and relied on a line of High Court authorities (Calcutta, Bombay, Gujarat, Orissa, Rangoon) and Madras authority concluding the same. The Trust's attempt to rely on Supreme Court authority (that an appeal is a continuation of proceedings) was considered but distinguished on the ground that section 50(2) uses the word "Court" in the limited sense of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction and that the special procedural regime under the Act does not permit expansion of the limited right to appear to appellate proceedings. The Court also observed that the Trust had not exercised any right to appear and adduce evidence before the Collector or the Court of original jurisdiction; having failed to do so, it could not now be allowed to do so on appeal or by conversion of previously dismissed CPC-based applications into section 50(2) applications.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEALS DISMISSED. The Court answered the principal question in the negative: the appellant-Trust is not entitled to be brought on record as a party-respondent to the appeals for the purpose of enforcing rights under section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
Immediate implications and consequences:
- The Trust is not a necessary or proper party to the proceedings before the Collector or the principal civil court of original jurisdiction; its entitlement under section 50(2) is limited to appearing and adducing evidence (and cross-examining) in proceedings before the Collector or the original civil court for determination of compensation.
- The Trust does not possess, under the Act, the right to demand a reference under section 18, the right to argue as a party in those proceedings, or the right to file an appeal in its own name against the award or decree arising from such reference.
- The Trust cannot, at the appellate stage, convert or re-cast previously dismissed applications under Order I, Rule 10 and Section 151 CPC into applications under section 50(2) to gain the limited evidentiary rights it failed to exercise earlier before the Collector or original Court.
- The Court observed that the Trust remains free to assist the Government Pleader and to furnish materials so that its grievance, if any, may be pursued through the appropriate representative (the State/Collector) under the procedures permissible by law.
- The appeals are dismissed without costs, producing the direct effect that the Trust is not impleaded and the prior dismissal of the impleadment applications is upheld.
The Court's decision applies established statutory construction of the Land Acquisition Act and relies on existing High Court authorities; it applies the Act's special procedural scheme rather than creating a novel rule expanding party rights at the appellate stage.
Kondaiah, J.:— The appellant-Trust, for whose purpose and benefit Ac. 5-49 cents of land situate on the outskirts of Tanuku in the district of West Godavari, was aquired by the Land Acquisition Officer, the 2nd respondent herein, seeks to impleaded itself as a party to A.S No. 352 of 1970 preferred by the Land Acquisition Officer and A.S No. 411 & 412 of 1970 filed by the two claimants, Chitrapu Varadaraju and Kakarla Ravanamma, on the ground that it is a necessary or proper party. The applications have been dismissed by our learned brother, A.D.V Reddy, J, holding that it is not a necessary party to the appeals. Hence these appeals.
2. Sri B.V Subbaiah, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that his client is a necessary or in any event, a proper party to be brought on record in the aforesaid appeals preferred by the respective parties under section 54 of the Land Aquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) as it is very much interested in the result of the appeals, and sought the aid of the provisions of section 50(2) of the Act and Order 1, Rule 10 and section 151 of the Code of Civil procedure in support of his plea. Sri N. Bapiraju, the learned counsel for the claimants, opposed the claim of the appellant contending inter alia that the the appellant is neither a person interested nor a necessary and proper party and this Court has no jurisdiction to implead it as a party to the appeals arising out of the proceedings under the Act.
3. The short question that falls for decision is:
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, the appellant-Trust for whose purpose the land in question has been acquired, is or is not entitled to be brought on record as a party respondent to the appeals preferred to this Court by the Land Acquisition Officer as well as the claimants, for the purpose of enforcing the rights guaranteed to it under section 50(2) of the Act?
4. In order to appreciate the scope of the question and the respective contentions of the contesting parties, it is necessary to refer to the intendment and scheme of the Act and the relevant and material provisions thereof. The intendment of the Act, which came into force on March 1, 1894, is to amend the law empowering the Government to acquire land only for a public purpose or for a company and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. The expressions “person interested” “Court” and “company”, which are material for our purpose, have been defined by clauses (b), (d) and (e) of sec 3. Section 3???(b) defines “person interested” as inclusive of “all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of acquisition of land under this Act,” and it further says that a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. The expression “Court” wherever used, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, is defined under section 3(d) as “a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction” unless a special judicial Officer to perform the functions of the Court under the Act has been appointed by the appropriate Government. “Company” is defined under clause (e) of section 3 as “a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882, or under the (English) Companies Act, 1862 & 1890, or incorporated by an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by any Indian Law or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent and includes a society registered under the Society Registration Act, 1860, and a registered society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies, Act, 1912.”
5. The Act is divided into 8 parts. Part II of the Act comprising sections 4 to 17 deals with acquisition and preliminary investigation. Section 4 requires the appropriate Government to publish a notification in the official Gazette to the effect that the land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. The persons who are interested in any land sought to be acquired, may make their objections under section 5-A to the acquisition of Land or any portion of it and such objections shall be heard by the Collector and a report containing his recommendations on the objections submitted to the appropriate Government.
6. “Company” is defined under clause (e) of Section 3 as “a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882, or under the (English) Companies Act, 1862 & 1890, or incorporated by an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by any Indian Law or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent and includes a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and a registered society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912.”
7. The Act is divided into 8 parts. Part II of the Act comprising sections 4 to 17 deals with acquisition and preliminary investigation. Section 4 requires the appropriate Government to publish a notification in the official Gazette to the effect that the land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. The persons who are interested in any land sought to be acquired, may make their objections under section 5-A to the acquisition of land or any portion of it and such objections shall be heard by the Collector and a report containing his recommendations on the objections submitted to the appropriate Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. A declaration under section 6 that land is required for a public purpose shall be made to that effect by any officer authorised by the Government and such declaration has to be published in the official Gazette. Such declaration shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company the Collector, under section 9, has to issue notices to persons interested in the land acquired, stating that the Government intends to take possession of such land and requiring them to make claims to compensation for their interests in such land. The Collector may enquire into the claims of the persons interested in the land and after due enquiry in the course of which the parties are entitled to adduce evidence, oral and documentary, make an award. Part III consisting of sections 18 to 28 deals with the reference to court and procedure for the purpose of determining compensation. Under section 18, any person interested in the land may request the Collector to refer the matter for the determination of the Court with regard to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Thereupon, the Collector has to make a statement in writing to the principal court of original jurisdiction furnishing the particulars specified under clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) to section 19. Section 20 requires the Court thereafter to issue notices to the applicant, the persons interested in the objection and the Collector. Section 21 restricts the scope of the enquiry to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. Section 23 provides for matters to be considered in determining compensation whereas section 24 specifies the matters to be neglected in determining compensation. The next section which is material for our purpose is section 50 which reads thus:
“50 Acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or company.
(1) Where the provisions of this Act are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any company, the charges of and incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by such fund or company.
(2) In any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or the company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.
Provided that no such local authority or company shall be entitled to demand a reference unner Section 11.
8. Section 53 makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure except those which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, applicable to all proceedings before the Court under the Act. Subject to the provisions of the Code of civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees, section 54 provides for appeals from the original Court to the High Court and from the High Court to the Supreme Court, to the parties aggrieved by the decision of the Court in any proceedings under the Act.
9. We shall now advert to the claim of the appellant based on the provisions of sub-section (2) to section 50 of the Act. A combined reading of the provisions of section 50(2) and sections 18, 20, 21, 53 and the other material provisions referred to earlier manifests that the local authority or company for whose purpose and benefit the land has been acquired under the Act, is entitled only to appear and adduce evidence in any proceeding held before the Collector or the Court of original jurisdiction, for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The proviso to sub-section (2) to section 50 makes it abundantly clear that no such local authority or company is empowered to demand a referenc under section 18. Section 18 empowers only the “person interested “as defined in section 3(b) to request the Collector to make a reference to the Court. The Collector, either suo moto or at the request of the local authority or company, is not competent to request the Collector to make a reference to the Court. The collector, either suo motu or at the request of the local authority or company, is not competent to make a reference under section 18(1). The award passed by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer is binding on the local authority or the company as well as the State represented by the Collector.
10. The use of the words “the local authority or Company concerned may appear and adduce evidence” in sub-section (2) to section 50 connotes that they may or may not appear and adduce evidence. There is no compulsion on the part of the claimant to make the local authority or the company concerned, a party-respondent to the proceeding before the Collector or the Court. The Collector also is not compelled to make the local authority or the company appear and adduce evidence in any proceeding. The choice is entirely left to the local authority or the company concerned either to appear and adduce evidence in determining the amount of compensation or not. Where the local authority or company decides to appear and adduce evidence, the Collector or the Court before whom such request is made, must permit it to do so. The Collector or Court has no jurisdiction to deny the local authority or company from exercising the limited right to appear and adduce evidence for determining the amount of compensation, if it seeks to do so. Such right can be availed of only in respect of any proceeding before the Collector or the Court of orignal jurisdiction. The right of the local authority or company concerned to be brought on record for the limited purpose of adducing evidence independently must be construed so as to include its right to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the claimants and the Land Acquisition officer. If the intention of the Central Legislature were to make the local authority or the company a necessary or proper party, sub-section (2) to section 50 of the Act would have been worded differently. It is not open for the Court to read something into the section which is not there, except to construe the meaning of the words used therein fairly and reasonably and in the light of the intendment and scheme of the Act.
11. In our judgment, the local authority or company will only be a watching party in a proceeding before the Collector or the Court of original jurisdiction. It can only appsar and adduce evidence to determine the quantum of compensation. In other Words, it can independently lead evidence, oral and documentary, and also cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the claimants as Well as the Land Acquisition Officer in determining the quantum of compensation. However, it has no right to argue either by itself or through a counsel in such proceedings as the right, to argue would accrue only to a party entitled to be on record as a necessary or proper party. Further, the right to appeal against a decision of the Collector or the Court of Original jurisdiction would accrue only to a party, be it necessary or proper, to such proceeding but not to others.
12. This view of ours gains support from the material provisions of the Act relating to the payment of compensation, interest thereon and the costs of the proceedings. The payment of compensation, interest thereon and the costs of any proceeding before the Court, if awarded, shall be made only by the State represented by the Collector to the “persons interested” within the meaning of clause (b) of section 3. The claimants are not entitled to proceed against the local authority or company for whose purpose and benefit the land is acquired, either for compensation and interest thereon or for costs awarded in the proceedings. Their right is only to sue the State represented by the Collector and recover the amounts due and payable in respect of the land acquired. It is the Collector or Land Acquisition Officer, as the case may be, that is entitled to take possession of the acquired lands from the owners or claimants or persons in possession and occupation of the same and thereafter hand over them to the local authority or company for whose benefit they are acquired. The local authority or company is not competent under the Act to proceed against the claimants otherwise known as the “persons interested” in the land acquired, under any circumstances though under subsection (1) to section 50, it is the local authority or company that is ultimately liable and responsible to pay the charges of and incidental to the acqusition of land. However, nowhere under the Act a right is given to such company or local authority to be an effective party, be it necessary or proper, to any proceeding before the Collector or the Court. The scheme of the Act appears to be that the State represented by the Collector would sufficiently safeguard the interests of the local authority or company for whose purpose the land is acquired and such company or local authority may seek redress of their grievances, if any, through the Collector. They are not given any independent status of a party empowered to proceed against or liable to be proceeded by the “persons interested” in respect of any matter or for any purpose under the Act. The very acquistion being made by the State for and on behalf of the local authority or company concerned, the framers of the Act must have deemed it just and proper to empower the State represented by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer to protect the interests of the local authority or company as well as the “persons interested” and see that just and proper compensation is fixed The interests of the local authority or the company must be deemed to have been merged with the State represented by the Collector.
13. We may now proceed to examine whether or not the porvisions of order. 1, Rule 10 and section 151 of the Code of Civil procedure are applicable to the case on hand.
14. As pointed out earlier, the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure except those which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act are applicable under section 53 to all proceedings before the court under the Act. By enacting the special provision, i.e, sub-section (2) to section 53 of the Act which governs the present case, the general application of Order 1, Rule 10 and section 151 of the Code of Civil procedure must be held to have been positively excluded. Hence the provisions of Order I, Rule 10 read with section 151 of the Civil procedure Code are not attracted in this case.
15. That apart, we may notice that even on the application of the provisions of order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C it cannot be said that the local authority or company can be called a necessary or proper party. It is well-settled that a party may be considered a necessary party only when there is a right to some relief against him in respect of the matter involved in the proceeding and when his presence is necessary to enable the court to adjudicate effectively and completely upon and settle all the questions involved in the proceeding. Where the presence of a party to a proceeding is necessary for a complete and final adjudication of all the questions involved therein, although no relief may be claimed against such party, he is a proper party. The dividing line between a necessary party and a proper party, though thin, is still distinct. On a consideration of the several provisions of the Act referred to earlier, we are unable to accede to the submission of Mr. Subbaiah that his client outght to have been joined as a party-respondent in the proceeding before the Court of original jurisdiction to enable the court to make an effective and complete adjudication of all the questions involved therein, or that his presence was necessary for a complete and final decision of the questions involved in such proceeding. Admittedly no relief is sought by the claimants otherwise known as “persons interested” in the O.P before the Court of original jurisdiction as a result of the reference made at the instance of the claimants by the Collector under sec. 18 of the Act. The proceeding to determine the compensation before the Court of original jurisdiction can be finally decided without the presence of the appellant herein. The presence of the appellant was not necessary for the final decision of all the questions effectively and completely in the reference proceeding. Hence, the appellant, in our considered opinion, is not a necessary or proper party to the proceeding before the Court of original jurisdication or the Collector and it is only entitled by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (2) to section 50 of the Act to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation.
16. We find supoort for our view from the decided cases of several High Courts which we shall presently refer to although there is no case of our High Court. The earliest decision is that of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in The Municpal Corporation of Patna v. Jogendra Narain Rajkut]1. Therein it was held that the Municipal Corporation, for whose benefit the land in that case was acquired by the Collector, was not a necessary party in a land acquisition proceeding except to appear simply for the purpose of watching the proceedings or assisting the Secretary of State. It was further held that the Corporation or company had no power to request the Collector to make a reference under section 18 of the Act, nor had it the right to appeal against a decree made upon a reference.
17. The above view of the Calcutta High Court has been followed by the Rangoon High Court in Mandalay Municpal Committee v. Maungit] and the Bombay High Court in In re Jerbai Framji Matha]2 and Nagpur Corporation v. Narendrakumar]3 and also the Gujerat High Court in Gautamlal v. Land Acquisition Officer]4 it was held by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court that the local authority or company, for whose purpose and benefit land has been acquired under the Act, cannot take advantage of the provisions of order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and the fact that it was directed to appear and adduce evidence under section 52 of the Act does not make it competent to be called a necessary or proper party in any proceeding under the Act. It was held that the right to a local authority or company to “appear and adduce evidence” has been specifically, provided under sub-section (2) to section 50 and in no case, it can be jointed or added as a party defendant on the ground that it is a necessary or proper party.
18. In Himalayan Tile & Marble v. Francis]5 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, reiterating its earlier view stated in the case of Nagpur Corporation]6 held that the company, for whose purpose and benefit the acquisition under the Act has been made, is not competent to challenge the award under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India as it was neither a necessary nor proper party to the proceedings resulting in the award which was sought to be quashed. Therein the learned Judge, Kotval, C.J, who spoke for the Court, has reviewed the entire case law on the subject, and agreeing with the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Gautamalal v. land Acquisition Officer]7 proceeded to observe as follows;
“We think that we would be doing violence to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act if we were to permit the selfsame party to challenge an award, in the proceedings under art. 226 of the Constitution, which would virtually amount to challenging the acquisition proceedings and the award, for, though no doubt these proceedings taken under our constitutional powers are independent proceedings, nonetheless it is an accepted principle that such proceedings must be determined in accordance with the law and especially so, is the case where there is a special Act making special provisions upon a special subject such as land acquisition.”
19. The view taken consistently by the High Courts of Calcutta, Gujarat and Bombay is also followed by Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in state v. Amarandra Pratap]8 wherein it was held that the company, for whose benefit the acquisition is made, was not included in any “person interested” defined under section 3(b) and it was not a necessary party to the proceedings under the Act except that it has a right to appear and adduce evidence for determining the amount of compensation. The contention of the company that without a notice of reference being given to it, the right to appear and adduce evidence would become illusory, was rejected. It was observed that the interests of the company have amply been safeguarded by the presence of the State which is competent to acquire the land for its benefit and give it the necessary intimation regarding the pendency of the proceedings under section 18 for adducing evidence, if any, and where the court's judgment inadvertently mentions the company's name in cause title, it must be ignored. The same view has been reiterated by another Divsion Bench of the Orissa High Court in Orissa Cement Limited v. State of Orissa].
20. In C.R.P No. 1235 of 1954 dated September 24, 1954, 1954 Madras Weekly Notes (journal) 128, the learned Judge, Rajamannar C.J held that the local authority or company cannot be permitted to take part in the arguments on the petition under section 18 of the Act as section 50(2). provides only for the appearance and adducing of evidence by such authority or company for the purpose of determination of the amount of compensation.
21. We must therefore reject the principal plea of the appellant as devoid of any merit.
22. It was next contended by Mr. B.V Subbaiah that the appeal is only a continuation of the original proceeding and the present application may be treated as an application under section 50(2) of the Act and his client be permitted to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation. In support of this submission, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veerayya v. N. Subbaiah Choudhry] and the State of Kerala v. K.M.C Abdulla & Co] and those of this Court in D. Pullaiah v. A. Nagabushanam] and C. Subbarayudu v. E. Brahmanandan] are cited. This contention of the appellant must be rejected for reasons more than one. Firstly, the appellant did not avail of its right to appear and adduce evidence either before the Collector or the Court of original jurisdiction. Having failed to do so, it cannot be permitted now in the appeals to adduce evidence in that regard. Secondly, the present applications are not filed under section 50(2) of the Act but only under Order 1, Rule 10 and section 151 of the Code of Civil procedure. Those applications have been dismissed by the learned single Judge against whose orders the present appeals have been preferred. We cannot at this stage permit the appellant to convert those applications already disposed of by the learned single judge, into applications under section 50(2) of the Act. In any event we are unable to agree with the appellant's plea even on merits which we shall presently discuss.
23. In Garikapati Veerayya v. N. Subbaiah Choudhry] it was held that “the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceedings”. The learned Judge Subba Rao, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the majority of the Court, in the State of Kerala v. K.M.C Abdulla & Co.] has ruled that “an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings; in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has power to review the evidence subject to the statutory limitations prescribed”. However, in the instant case, the afore said general principles are, in our judgment, not applicable as section 50(2) of the Act specifically provides for the limited right of appearance and adducing evidence in any proceeding before the Collector or the Court. The expression “court” as defined under clause (d) of section 3 means “a” principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction”. The word “court” used in section 50(2) must be construed to be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context in which it has been used. Section 50(2) refers to any proceeding held before a Collector or Court. The Act is a special enactment which provides for special procedure. The very intendment of section 50(2) is to permit the local authority or company to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Normally it is the original Court of jurisdiction that receives evidence for determining this. In the context in which the word “court” is used in sub-section (2) to section 50, it cannot be said that the same has been used in a generic sense so as to take in “the court of appeal”. Normally the court of appeal will decide the appeals on the record already available by hearing the arguments of the respective counsel. Judged from any angle, we are of the considered view that the expression “court” in sub-section (2) to section 50 has been used only in a limited sense so as to take in only the pricipal civil court of original jurisdiction but not in a generic sense so as to include the appellate court. There remain the two decisions of our High Court on which strong reliance has been placed by the appellant. In the case of D. Pullayya v. A. Nagabushnam] it was held that a person who would be adversely affected by the decision of the appellate court, although he was not a party to the proceedings under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was entitled for the grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. That case has no relevancy to the case on hand and it is, therefore, distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In C. Subbarayudu v. E. Brahmanandan] the alienee of one of the suit properties from a party during the pendency of the suit, was held to be a necessary and proper party under order 1, Rule 10 read with section 151 and section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therein, the alienee was undoubtely interested in the result of the appeal in so far as the item purchased by him was concerned. The omission on the part of such alienee who sought to be impleaded as a respondent to take steps for being impleaded in the suit was held to be not a bar for his being impleaded in the appeal. He could not have preferred an appeal as his settlor had succeeded in the original suit for partition filed by the appellant against his brother, his mother and two alienees. Hence that case also does not advance the plea of the appellant, as the principle decided therein, has no application to the present case.
24. Judged from any angle, we are satisfied that the appeals merit dismissal as the appellant-trust herein is not a necessary party to the main appeals as no relief is sought by any of the appellants therein against the trust. Nor the appellants-trust is a proper party either, as it cannot be said that without it there can be no effective and complete adjudication of the rights of the parties in the main appeals.
25. However, it is always open to the appellant herein to assist the Government Pleader and furnish all the material available to it as a representative and see that its grievance, if any, is redressed by following such procedure as is permissible under law. For all the reasons stated our answer to the question is in the negative and against the appellant herein.
26. In the circumstances, the appeals fail and are dismissed but without costs.
27. Appeals dismissed.
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