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A. Rama Rao v. The Post Master General, Andhra Circle, Hyderabad And Others
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Post Master General, Andhra Circle, invited applications for appointment to posts of T.S. Clerks. The petitioner applied, was selected for appointment and deputed to undergo training at the Telecommunications Training Centre, Kakinada. He executed the prescribed bond (guaranteed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India). While undergoing training he received a communication from the Assistant Engineer purporting to discharge him from the Training Centre; no reasons were given in that communication. After protest through his advocate, the Divisional Engineer informed the petitioner that he had been discharged because the police verification report was unfavourable.
The relevant communication relied upon by the respondents was a report from the Superintendent of Police, Guntur (conveyed via the District Revenue Officer and Collector) stating that the petitioner, Sri A. Rama Rao, was a member and active worker of the Student Federation of India (SFI) and had attended a Yuva-Jana Sangh meeting organised by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) at Sattenapalli on 2-1-72; the report concluded that "it is not desirable to entertain him in the Department."
The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking quashing of the discharge order and a direction to continue him in training/the service. The respondents produced records; the court examined them and identified the police communication above as the entire basis for the discharge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a candidate for public employment can be denied appointment or discharged from training or service solely on the basis of a police report about his political association, membership of a political or student organization, or attendance at a political meeting when there is no allegation of criminal or subversive activity.
- Whether seeking and acting upon police reports about a candidate's political faith, beliefs or past political activity infringes fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, in particular equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and the freedoms of expression and association (as reflected in the preamble and Articles 14 and 16).
- Whether the discharge of the petitioner on the stated grounds should be quashed and the petitioner reinstated or re-entertained in service and training.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M. Narasimha Rao v. Senior Director Pilot Production & Training Centre: Survey of India (W.P. No. 4159/1968) | Termination of services of an employee on the ground of his past political persuasions is a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16(1) (as applied by the court in that earlier case). | The court relied on its prior reasoning in that case to support the proposition that termination or discharge on account of past political persuasion is impermissible. The opinion quotes the earlier observation that such termination is "a clear violation" of Article 16(1). |
| V.S. Menon v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1160) | Taking an interest in political activities of the Communist Party does not amount to engaging in subversive activities so long as the party is a recognised political organisation and not banned. | The court cited this Supreme Court observation to reinforce that association or conversation with members of a recognised political party cannot be equated with subversive conduct warranting denial of employment. |
| T. Kodandaramayya v. State of A.P. (ILR 1974 A.P. 237) | The denial of employment based on vague, unconfirmed, confidential police reports of past political activity is offensive to Articles 14 and 16 and introduces an unacceptable form of political discrimination (compared to "McCarthyism"). | The court reiterated and relied upon the reasoning in this case to show that young persons should not be denied public employment merely because of past political agitation or affiliations unless such past activity indicates a propensity to commit criminal or subversive acts that would affect service integrity or efficiency. |
| Wieman v. Updegraff (344 U.S. 183; 97 L. Ed. 236) | Test oaths and statutes that penalize past lawful associations or utterances are dangerous tools of tyranny; governments should not have power to punish thought and speech as distinguished from acts (observations of Black, J.). | The court quoted Black, J.'s condemnation of test oaths and laws penalising past lawful associations to illustrate the broader constitutional and democratic principle that penalising belief or association is odious and incompatible with a free society. |
| Speiser v. Randall (357 U.S. 573) | Penalising or imposing disabilities on persons because of their views and expressions concerning government is repugnant to principles of freedom; loyalty oaths and security measures tend to stifle unorthodox or unpopular thinking (observations of Black, J.). | The court invoked this case to demonstrate the pernicious consequences of penalising citizens for views or associations and to support its conclusion that public employment should not be denied for such reasons. |
| Gitlow v. New York (268 U.S. 652) | Quoted for the principle that advocacy unconnected with action should be protected—free speech may include ideas that are unpopular or despised (Justice Holmes quoted in dissent). | The court used this quotation, via Black and Douglas's remarks in U.S. cases, to underline the constitutional protection that should extend to advocacy not brigaded with action and to support the conclusion that mere political advocacy or association cannot justify denial of employment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by placing the case in the constitutional context: India is a democratic republic committed by its Preamble to securing liberty of thought, expression, belief, equality of opportunity and the dignity of the individual. The court identified that the petitioner was denied employment and training on the ground that he was a member and active worker of the Student Federation of India and had attended a political meeting organised by the CPI(M). The court emphasised that the impugned police communication made no allegation of the petitioner participating in any illegal, violent or subversive activity, nor did it allege that the organisations named were themselves engaged in unlawful activity.
The court analysed the legal significance of reliance on police reports about political faith and past political activity of candidates for public employment. It drew a firm distinction between seeking police reports about any criminal or subversive conduct (which could bear on suitability for public employment) and seeking or acting upon police reports solely concerning political faith, association or attendance at political meetings. The latter, the court held, strikes at the root of fundamental rights—equality of opportunity in public employment and the freedoms of expression and association.
To support its analysis the court invoked its prior decision in M. Narasimha Rao, which held that termination on grounds of past political persuasion violated Article 16(1). It relied on the Supreme Court's observation in V.S. Menon that mere interest or association with a recognised political party does not amount to subversive activity. The court also relied on T. Kodandaramayya to show that vague, unconfirmed or confidential police reports of past political agitation should not be used to bar public employment, and described such practices as akin to "McCarthyism."
The court further relied on quotations from decisions of the United States Supreme Court (Wieman v. Updegraff, Speiser v. Randall, and commentary invoking Gitlow) to illustrate the constitutional danger and social cost of penalising thought and speech by denying employment or imposing loyalty tests. These authorities were used persuasively to underline the principle that governments may punish reasonable acts but must not be permitted to punish mere beliefs, associations or expressions not joined to unlawful conduct.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the sole basis for discharge—an adverse police report about political association and attendance at a political meeting—was insufficient to justify denial of training or employment. Because there was no allegation of involvement in illegal or subversive acts, acting upon the police report violated the petitioner's fundamental rights and equality of opportunity.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was allowed. The court QUASHED the proceedings of the 3rd respondent dated 25-5-1972 and the proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated 26-5-1972, and directed the respondents to re-entertain the petitioner in service, depute him for training if necessary, and take all other necessary and incidental steps. The court awarded costs and assessed advocate's fee at Rs. 100/-.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the petitioner must be reinstated/re-entertained and given opportunity for training or continuation in service as directed. More broadly, the judgment emphasises that the practice of seeking and acting upon police reports about a candidate's political faith, associations or past political activity—absent allegations of criminal or subversive conduct—is repugnant to the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution (including equality of opportunity in public employment and freedoms of expression and association) and is contrary to democratic principles. The opinion draws on prior judicial authority and comparative pronouncements to warn against adopting measures that would penalise thought and speech; it thereby signals the court's stance against permitting political discrimination in public employment decisions.
1. India is a democratic republic. It was so resolved by its people twenty five years ago, on 26-1-1950. It is not a police State. The people of India who resolved to constitute India into a democratic republic determined to secure to all its citizens “Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, Equality of opportunity and Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual. This determination of the people, so boldly and wisely proclaimed in the preamble of the Constitution of India, is, let us hope, not a forgotten chapter of history. This determination which has been written into the Articles of the Constitution in the shape of rights declared as fundamental and inviolable is what makes India a democratic republic and what marks India from authoritarian or police states. The right to freedom of speech and expression is declared fundamental; so is the right to form associations or unions; so is the right to assemble peaceably and without arms: so is the right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws; so is the right to equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Yet a young man has been denied employment under the Government on the ground that he was a member and an active worker of the Student Federation of India and that he had attended the Yuvajana Sangh meeting organised by the Marxis Communist Party at Sattenapalli. Patently the young man has been denied the right to equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment, he has been denied the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of association. This is the third case of its kind which has come before me. That should be enough for any judge to be troubled by his conscience and to take up the constitutional issues involved, lest the virus spread. I proceed to do so.
2. The Post Master General, Andhra Circle, invited applications for appointment to posts of T.S Clerks. The petitioner submitted his application. He was selected for appointment and deputed to undergo training at the circle, Telecommunications Training Centre, at Kakinada. As required he executed a bond in the prescribed form, which was guaranteed by the Life insurance Corporation of India. While he was undergoing training he received a communication from the Assistant Engineer purporting to discharge him from the Training Centre. No reasons were mentioned. The Petitioner protested through his advocate, whereupon he was informed by the Divisional Engineer that he had been discharged from the Training Centre as the Police verification report was unfavourable to him. The petitioner has filed the present application for the issue of a writ to quash the order of discharge and for a direction to the respondents to continue the petitioner in the training Centre. The respondents have produced the relevant records and on a perusal I find than the basis of the order of discharge is the following communication received by the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Guntur from the District Revenue, Officer and Collector (in full additional charge).
“The Superintendent of Police, Guntur reported that Sri A. Rama Rao resident of Perilkapadu of Sattenapalli taluk is the member of Student Federation and active worker of the SFI. It is also, reported that the individual has attended the Yuva-Jana Sangh Meeting organised by CPM at Sattenapalli on 2-1-72 and it is not desirable to entertain him in the Department.
3. That is the entire allegation against the petitioner. It is seen that it is not alleged that he ever participated in any illegal or subversive activity. Be it noted that neither the Student Federation of India nor the Marxist Communist party is alleged to be engaged in any subversive activity. Distinguished members of the Marxist Communist Party have been and are members of Parliament and State Legislatures. They are listened to with respect inside and outside Parliament. What then was the sin that the petitioner committed in attending a meeting organised by the Marxist Communist party. What was wrong in his being an active member of the Student Federation of India, presumably an association of students, which is not even allege to be devoted to subversive or illegal activities. The whole idea of seeking a police reports on the political faith and the past political activity of a Candidate for public employment appears to my mind to cut at the very root of the Fundamental Rights of equality of opportunity in the matter of employment, freedom of expression and freedom of association. It is a different matter altogether if a police report is sought on the question of any criminal or subversive activity of a candidate in order to find our whether he is suitable for employment in public service. But why seek a police report on the political faith of a candidate and act upon it? Does it mean that only True Belivers in the political faith of the party in power for the time being are entitled to public employment? What pernicious results would not follow if each of the Governments of the constituent States of India pursued such a policy? Does not the pursit of such a policy mean that thought and speech as distinguished from acts are also punished quite apart from a denial of equality of opportunity? Is public employment, therefore, reserved for “the cringing and the craven” in the words of Mr. justice Black of the United States Supreme Court? Is it not destructive of the dignity of the individual mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution? Does it mean that students should stifle thought and expression and think only at their peril? is thought and belief to confirm to the political thinking of the party in power? Is not the domain of conscience and belief, in the words of Douglas, J. to be protected from active intrusion? I have not the slightest doubt that the whole business of seeking police report about the political faith belief and associations and the past political activity of a candidate for public employment is repugnant to the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution and entirely misplaced in a democratic republic dedicated to the ideals set forth in the preamble and extracted by me at the outset of this judgment.
4. In M. Narasimha Rao v. Senior Director Pilot Production & Training Centre: Survey of India (1) W.P No. 4159/1968. I had to deal with a similar case where a ‘Topo trainee Type, B’ was discharged from service on the basis of a police report that he was previously a member of the Communist Party. In that case I observed.
“It is true that the Government has the undoubted right to terminate the services of a temporary employee if it finds that it is no longer suitable to continue him in service either because his work is unsatisfactory or even because information has since been received regarding his antecedents which makes his continuance in service unsuitable or unsafe. But that is a far cry from saying that services of a temporary employee may be terminated arbitrarily on the ground that he once professed a political philosophy different from the political persuasions of the party in power…….. I am of the emphatic view that termination of services of an employee, temporary though he may be, on the ground of his past political persuasions is a clear violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16(1) of the Constitution.”
5. I recalled the observations of the Supreme Court in V.S Menon v. Union of India (2) A.I.R 1960 S.C 1160 where it had been said.
“Taking interest in political activities of the Communist Party would not amount to taking part in subversive activities so long as the Communist Party continued to be a recognised political organization, which has not been banned. It cannot be asserted that simply talking with members of the Communist Party or association with such member would amount to engaging in subversive activities.”
6. My decision in Narasimha Rao v. Senior Director, Pilot Production and Training Centre, Survey of India (1) was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Vaidya and Sharfuddin, JJ.
7. In T. Kodandaramayya v. State of A.P (3), (ILR 1974 A.P 237) a similar question arose. A temporary Junior Engineer in the service of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board was discharged from service on the basis of an adverse police report that when freshly out of college he had participated in the Telangana agitation and had addressed a public meeting along with certain extremists advocating the adoption of revolutionary methods to fight the Congress Government. I had then observed:
“Eveyone is entitled his beliefs… New ideas everywhere are labelled revolutionary. The reports of the police officers do not Indicate the particular revolutionary methods which were advocated by the petitioner. The words used by the petitioner are not mentioned. But this much is clear. The police reports do not show that the petitioner was or is a perpetrator of violent deeds. The police report, do not show that the petitioner had exhorted any one to commit violent deeds. There is no hint in the police reports that the petitioner is addicted or wedded to violence or that there have been any incidents other than the two mentioned. The police reports do not show that either shortly before he entered service or after he entered service in November, 1969 he was in any manner associated with any political group. It was on this slender material that one of the police officers passed judgment that the petitioner was unsuitable for public service, a judgment which would effect the entire career of the petitioner. Unfortunately the judgment of the police officer was acted upon unquestioningly by the Electricity Board. Is it to be put against an young man of warm blood, that before the cold climate of age or office could freez him into immobility, he expressed his then political views and took part in some political agitation in a mild manner? Most students and most young men, now-a-days, get involved in some form of political agitation or the other. It is not to their discredit that they do so. Sometimes they get involved because they feel strongly and badly about injustice, because they are possessed of integrity and because they are fired by idealism, Often they get involved because they are pushed into the forefront by elderly leaders. Should these young men be debarred from employment in Government and public-sector undertakings?………
8. Government service is no heaven that only angels should seek entry into it. Persons convicted of crime are given fresh chances to redeem themselves and make themselves useful citizens. Laws have been made which prevent any stigma being attached to certain convictions, vide the Probation of offenders Act. Why, then should young men who in the past got emotionally involved and participated in tome agitation be denied the opportunity of public service which they seek? I have dealt at such length on this matter because if employment is to be denied on such grounds and on the basis of such flimsy police reports, a whole generation of active young men may have to be overlooked in the matter of public employment. This is a serous matter………I think it is offensive to the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to deny employment to an individual because of his political beliefs or because of his past political affinities unless such beliefs and affinities are considered likely to affect the integrity and the efficiency of the individual's service. To hold otherwise would be to introduce obnoxious McCarthysm into India. We do not want it, we will not have it. Of course, once an individual becomes a Government servant he becomes subject to the various public servants' Conduct Rules, etc. and he may participate in agitations and continue his political affinities at his own risk. But he cannot be turned back at the very threshold on the ground of his past political affinities. In the present case, the petitioner after going through a Competitive process of selection, is turned out of his employment on the ground that certain vague unconfirmed, confidential police reports showed that in the past when he was unemployed and freshly out of college he took part in a political agitation in which a whole section of the people were involved and that he addressed a meeting in which a certain political ideology was advocated. I am of the view that he cannot be so turned away. There is a violation of the principle of equality”.
9. I reiterate all that has been said by me earlier. In my earlier judgment I referred to McCarthyism. In the fifties, the practice of baiting and crucifying teachers, public servants and a host of others in the United States, as Communists came to be known as McCarthyism. Its baleful effects were described by President Eisenhower himself an anticommunist as follows:—
“McCarthyism took its toll on many individuals and on the Nation. No one was safe from charges recklessly made from inside the walls of congressional immunity. Teachers, Government employees, and even ministers, became vulnerable. Innocent people accused of Communist associations or party membership have not to this day been able to clear their names fully. For a few, of course the cost was little where the accused was a figure who stood high in public trust and respect, personal damage, if any could be ignored or laughed away. But where, without proof of guilt, or because of some accidental or early-in-life association with suspected persons, a man or woman had lost a job or the confidence and trust of superiors and associates, the cost was often tragic, both emotionally and occupationally.”
10. The late President also said,
“They…fear other people's ideas every new idea. They…….talk about censoring the sources and the communication of ideas…without exhaustive debate—even heated debate—of ideas and programs, free government would weaken and wither. But if we allow ourselves to be persuaded that every individual, or party, that takes issue with our own convictions is necessarily wicked or treasonous then we are approaching the end of freedom's road…”
11. I would also recall the observations of Black, J., made in connection with the notorious oaths of loyality insisted upon in some of the States in the United States of America (Wiemen v. Updegraff) (4); (344 U.S 183 : 97 L. Ed. 236)
“Suppressive laws and practices are the fashion. The Oklahoma oath statute is but one manifestation of a national network of laws aimed at coercing and controlling the minds of men. Test of this are notorious tools of tyranny. When used to shackle the mind they are, or at least they should be, unspeakably odious to a free people. Test oaths are made still more dangerous when combined with bills of attainder which like this Oklahoma statute impose pains, and penalties for past lawful associations and utterances. Governments need and have ample power to punish reasonable acts. But it does not follow that they must have a further power to punish thought and speech as distinguished from acts. Our own free society should never forget that laws which stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the unorthodox have a way of reaching, ensnaring and silencing many more people than at first intended. We must have freedom of speech for all or we will in the long run have it for none but the cringing and the craven.”
12. Later, in Speiser v. Randall (5) 357 U.S 573 Black, J., again said—
“This case offers just another example of a wide-scale effort by government in this country to impose penalties and disabilities on everyone who is or is suspected of being a ‘Communist’ or who is not ready at all times and all places to swear his loyality to State and Nation,… I am convinced that this whole business of penalizing people because of their views and expressions concerning government is hopelessly repugnant to the principles of freedom upon which this Nation was founded………….Loyality oaths, as well as other contemporary “security measures,” tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or unpopular thinking or expression the kind of thought and expression which has played such a vital and beneficial role is the History of this Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which in the end may well turnout to be more destructive to our free society than foreign agents could ever hope to be. The course which we have been following the last decade is not the course of a strong, free, secure people, but that of the frightened, the insecure, the Intolerant”.
13. In the same case, Douglass said:—
“Advocacy which is in no way brigaded with action should always be protected by the First Amendment. That protection should extend even to the ideas we despise. As Mr. Justice Holmes wrote in dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S 652, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 1148, 45 S.Ct 625, “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.” It is time for government—state or federal—to become concerned with the citizen's advocacy when his ideas and beliefs move into the realm of action.”
14. Without free thought and expression orthodox and unorthodox, particularly unorthodox, there can be no critical enquiry and there can be no progress. To stifle free thought and expression is to strangle the mind of the Nation. To stifle free thought and expression amongst the youth of the country by the threat of denial of employment for the wrong beliefs is to deny a future to the nation. And here, let me quote Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore;
“Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high: Where knowledge is free;… … … … … … … … … …
Where the clear stream of reason has not lose its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit;
Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever widening thought and action… … … … let my country awake.”
15. For these reasons, I hold, that the petitioner ought not to have been discharged from training. The writ petition is allowed with costs. The proceedings of the 3rd respondent dated 25-5-1972 and the proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated 26-5-1972 are quashed and the respondents are directed to re-entertain the petitioner in service, depute him for training if necessary and do all other things necessary and incidental.
16. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.
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