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A. Venkatramana v. Mudiam Sanjeeva Ragudu And Others S (Accused Nos. 1 And 2 And State).
Judgment Summary — Muktadar, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The factual matrix begins with the murder of the petitioner's brother, Chinna Dasthagiri, on 16-4-1974 at 9 p.m. The petitioner lodged a complaint at Mydkur Police Station which was registered as Crime No. 41/74 and, after investigation, a charge-sheet was filed on 6-5-74 taken on file as P.R.C. No. 1/74 before the J.S.C.M., Proddatur. Separately, the C.B.C.I.D. filed a second charge-sheet on 25-4-1974 against two other accused taken on file as P.R.C. No. 5/74. The petitioner filed Crl. M.P. No. 1692/74 to quash P.R.C. No. 5/74: by order dated 23-8-1974 that charge-sheet was quashed and the names were ordered to be added as accused Nos. 3 and 4 in P.R.C. No. 1/74.
Subsequently, by G.O.Rt. No. 81 dated 31-1-1975 the Government decided to withdraw prosecution against A-1 and A-2 and requested the Collector to instruct the Public Prosecutor to file for withdrawal under section 321 Cr. P.C., 1973. The Assistant Public Prosecutor filed a petition under section 321 before the J.S.C.M., Proddatur. The Magistrate held he had no jurisdiction to permit or refuse withdrawal under S.321. The State preferred a revision to the Court of Session, Cuddapah, and the Sessions Judge allowed the revision holding the Magistrate did have jurisdiction and went into the merits, stating he was satisfied with the reasons for withdrawal. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred the present revision before this Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the committal (Magistrate) court has jurisdiction to entertain an application/memo by the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor under section 321 Cr. P.C. 1973 seeking permission to withdraw from prosecution.
- Whether section 321 Cr. P.C. 1973 is controlled or qualified by section 209 (and the scheme of the new Code), particularly where withdrawal would result in discharge or acquittal that only a Court with power to discharge/acquit may effect.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)
- Under section 209 Cr. P.C. 1973 there is no inquiry in committal proceedings; the Magistrate's functions are limited to determining whether the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session and to furnishing certain materials to the accused.
- The Magistrate in committal proceedings has no power to discharge the accused or to frame charges; those functions were assigned to the Court of Session by section 227 of the new Code.
- Because section 321 presupposes the power to discharge or acquit the accused, it has no application to committal proceedings before the Magistrate.
Respondents' / State's Arguments (as presented)
- Section 321 Cr. P.C. 1973 is wide and not controlled by other provisions of the new Code; section 209 was said to be for a limited purpose and should not impede S.321.
- The committal court has jurisdiction to dispose of memos under section 321 and to grant or refuse withdrawal.
- Reliance was placed on precedents decided under the old Code, notably State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh (AIR 1957 S.C. 389), Kapa Kasi Viswanadham v. Bondili Madan Singh (AIR 1948 Mad. 422) and M.N.S. Nair v. P.V. Balakrishna ((1972) 1 SCC 318 : AIR 1972 S.C. 496) to support the proposition that the Public Prosecutor's power to seek withdrawal is not confined by other provisions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh, AIR 1957 S.C. 389 | The opinion cites this decision as authority relied on by respondents to show that (under the old Code) the provision corresponding to section 321 (i.e., S.494 old Code) was wide and not controlled by other provisions. The judgment is quoted as supporting that S.494 is "wide enough to cover every kind of inquiry and trial." | The Court observed that this ruling related to the old Code and the jurisdictional scheme under the old Code; it held that the reasoning in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh is not relevant to the jurisdictional question under the new Code of 1973. |
| Kapa Kasi Viswanadham v. Bondili Madan Singh, AIR 1948 Mad. 422 | The provided opinion lists this case among authorities relied upon by respondents; the opinion does not state the specific rule or principle from this case. | The Court noted it was cited by respondents but stated that rulings cited under the old Code have no relevancy in light of the provisions of the new Code. |
| M.N.S. Nair v. P.V. Balakrishna, (1972) 1 SCC 318 : AIR 1972 S.C. 496 | The opinion quotes the principle: "This permission can be sought by him at any stage during enquiry or after the committal or even before the judgment is pronounced." It was relied upon to show the breadth of the corresponding old-Code provision. | The Court treated this as a ruling about the old Code and observed that the Sessions Judge ought to have examined the grounds of the memo in the light of M.N.S. Nair; however, the Bench concluded the committal court lacked jurisdiction under the new Code and therefore refrained from making observations on the merits of the application. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds by careful comparison between the procedure under the old Code (section 207-A and section 494 old Code) and the scheme of the new Code (several provisions in Chapters XVI, XVIII and XXIV).
1. Under the old Code (section 207-A), the committal Magistrate conducted an inquiry in which evidence was recorded; the Magistrate could examine witnesses, permit cross-examination, consider documents, examine the accused and, after hearing, either discharge the accused or frame a charge and commit for trial. Thus the committal court under the old Code had a substantive adjudicatory role, including power to discharge.
2. Under the new Code, the Court examined relevant provisions: sections 204, 205, 207, 208 and especially section 209 (committal when offence is triable exclusively by Court of Session). Section 209 confines the Magistrate's role to (a) committing the case to the Court of Session, (b) remanding as appropriate, (c) sending records/documents and (d) notifying the Public Prosecutor. The Bench described the committal court's function under section 209 as akin to "a post office."
3. The Court contrasted the role under the new Code: once a case is committed to the Court of Session, sections 225–228 apply. Section 227 vests in the Court of Session the power to discharge the accused after considering the record and submissions; section 228 to frame a charge. Consequently, the power to discharge (previously vested in the Magistrate under the old Code) now belongs to the Court of Session.
4. Turning to section 321 of the new Code (which corresponds to section 494 of the old Code), the Court observed that the statutory result of consent to withdrawal under section 321 is either discharge (if before charge) or acquittal (if after charge). Therefore, entertaining an application under section 321 presupposes that the court before which the application is filed has the jurisdiction to discharge or acquit according to the stage reached.
5. Because the committal court under section 209 has no power to discharge or to acquit (its role is limited to commitment and transmission of records), the Court reasoned it lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 321. The Court also noted that section 321 is placed in Chapter XXIV (general provisions as to inquiries and trials), supporting the conclusion that it is to operate within the trial / inquiry jurisdictional scheme of the Code.
6. The Bench considered the authorities relied upon by the respondents (decisions decided under the old Code, including State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh and M.N.S. Nair). It found those precedents dealt with the provisions of the old Code (where the committal court had a broader inquiry role and power to discharge), and thus they do not govern the jurisdictional framework of the new Code. Accordingly, the Court rejected the submission that section 321 under the new Code is uncontrolled by section 209.
7. The Court further observed that although the Sessions Judge (on revision) had entertained the section 321 memo and stated he was "satisfied with the reason" for withdrawal, that approach was incorrect: when a competent court considers a section 321 application, it must be satisfied on the material placed before it that withdrawal sub-serves the administration of justice and is not sought for an ulterior motive. The Sessions Judge had failed to discuss the grounds in the light of M.N.S. Nair; however, because the Bench holds that the committal court lacked jurisdiction, it refrained from making observations on the merits of the withdrawal application itself.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court allowed the revision, quashed the order of the Court of Session and held that the committal (Magistrate) court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 321 Cr. P.C., 1973.
Direct implications and directions contained in the opinion:
- The order of the Court of Session (which held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction and granted consent to withdraw) is quashed.
- The Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case in accordance with section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (i.e., commit the case to the Court of Session where appropriate and transmit records, etc.).
- The Public Prosecutor, if he so chooses, may file an application under section 321 of the new Code before the Court of Session (which has jurisdiction to discharge or acquit as appropriate).
- The Bench refrained from expressing any view on the merits of the section 321 application itself and therefore did not decide whether, on the material, withdrawal should have been permitted—only the jurisdictional point was decided.
The opinion therefore resolves the procedural question of jurisdiction: section 321 applications in cases triable exclusively by the Court of Session must be addressed to the Court of Session (post-commitment) and not to the committal Magistrate under section 209.
Muktadar, J.:— The facts which give rise to this petition are these:—
The petitioner's brother named Chinna Dasthagiri was murdered on 16-4-1974 at 9 p.m The petitioner lodged a complaint with Mydkur Police Station and it was registered as Crime No. 41/74. In that complaint, the petitioner had implicated A-1 and A-2. After registration of the crime and completion of the investigation, the local police filed a charge sheet on 6-5-74. It was taken on file as P.R.C No. 1/74 on the file of the J.S.C.M, Proddatur. In the meantime, the C.B.C.I.D also took up investigation and later filed a second charge-sheet on 25-4-1974 against two other accused. This charge sheet was taken on file as P.R.C No. 5/74 on the file of the same Court. The petitioner then filed Crl. M.P No. 1692/74 in this Court to quash P.R.C No. 5/74. Our learned brother, Ramachandra Raju, J., by his order dated 23-8-1974 quashed P.R.C No. 5/74 and observed that the names mentioned in the second charge-sheet be added as accused Nos. 3 and 4 in P.R.C No. 1/74. Thereafter through G.O.Rt No. 81 dated 31-1-1975 Government had decided to withdraw the prosecution launched against A-1 and A-2 and requested the Collector to instruct the concerned Public Prosecutor to file a petition for withdrawal from prosecution under S. 321, Cr. P.C 1973 in so far as A-1 and A-2 were concerned. The Additional Public Prosecutor, Grade if filed a petition under S. 321 before the J.S.C.M, Proddatur to permit him to withdraw from prosecution against A-1 and A-2. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to permit or refuse the withdrawal from prosecution under S. 321 Cr. P.C 1973).
2. The State preferred a revision before the Court of Session, Cuddapah and the learned Sessions Judge allowed the revision holding that the Magistrate did have jurisdiction to permit or refuse the withdrawal from prosecution under S. 321, Cr. P.C 1973. The teamed Sessions judge also went into the merits of the application and observed as follows:—
“I am satisfied with the reason given for seeking withdrawal of prosecution against R-1 and R-2.
3. Aggrieved by this order of the court of Session; the petitioner has preferred this revision. One of us sitting single (i.e Muktadar, J.,) noting that the point of law involved is important, had referred the matter for consideration of the Bench, and that is how this revision is before us. Mr. Harisesha Reddy, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner contends that under S. 209, Cr. P.C 1973 there is no inquiry in committal proceedings. The Magistrate before whom the Committal proceedings are pending has only to see whether the offence is triable exclusively by the court of Session and if it is so, then the Magistrate would furnish to the accused (1) the Statements recorded under S. 200 or 202, Cr. P.C 1973 of all the persons examined by the Magistrate, (2) the confessions, if any, recorded under S. 161 or S. 164 Cr. P.C, 1973 and (3) any documents produced before the Magistrate on which the prosecution proposes to rely, and thereafter commit the case to the Court of Session. He contends that there is no enquiry in committal proceedings as was conducted under section 207A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. He further submits that the Magistrate in committal proceedings has no power to discharge the accused person of any of the charges against him or frame any charge or charges against him. That function has now been assigned to the Court of session under S. 227, Cr. P.C, 1973. He, therefore, submits that when such is the position S. 321 has no application to committal proceedings because that section presupposes the power to discharge of acquit the accused.
4. Mr. Obulapathi Chowdary, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and Mr. Narasimha Reddi who appears for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 contend that S. 321, Cr. P.C 1973 is wide enough and uncontrolled by any other provisions of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, that S. 209 is meant only for a limited purpose and cannot in any way hamper the operation of S. 321, and that the Committal Court has jurisdiction to dispose of petitions or memos under S. 321 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of their contention, they rely upon State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh, AIR 1957 S.C 389.
5. We had also called upon Mr. Padmanabha Reddy to assist the Court as the question is one of importance. Mr. Padmanabha Reddy has also reiterated the stand taken by the learned Advocates appearing for the respondents. He submits that S. 321, Cr. P.C 1973 is a self-contained and special provision uncontrolled by S. 209, and gives general executive directions to Public Prosecutors and that under section 321 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate only considers the application and not the case, and it gives power to the Magistrate to discharge the accused in support of his contention. Mr. Padmanabha Reddy relied upon State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh, AIR 1957 S.C 389 Kapa Kasi Viswanadham v. Bondili Madan Singh, AIR 1948 Mad 422 and M.N.S Nair v. P.V Balakrishnan, (1972) 1 SCC 318 : AIR 1972 S.C 496.
6. Having regard to the respective contentions advanced by the learned Advocates, it is to be seen as to whether under the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the Committal Court has jurisdiction to entertain a memo filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor under section 321 Cr. P.C 1973 and permit withdrawal from prosecution. In order to appreciate this question, it is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the new Code of Criminal Procedure but before doing so, it would, in our opinion be appropriate to examine section 207-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for the procedure to be adopted in proceedings instituted on police report. A plain reading of the relevant provisions of section 207-A of the Old Code would show that when a charge sheet is filed before the Magistrate, he has to hold an inquiry and fix a date not later than 14 days from the date of the filing of the charge-sheet unless for reasons to be recorded the Magistrate fixes a date latter than 14 days. If before the date fixed for holding the enquiry, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, as the case might be, applies to the Magistrate for issuing a process and compel the attendance of any witnesses or production of any document etc. the Magistrate would issue such process unless for reasons to be recorded he deems it unnecessary to do so. At the commencement of the inquiry, when the accused appears or is brought before him, the Magistrate would satisfy himself that the documents referred to in the charge-sheet have been furnished to the accused, and if he finds that such documents have not been furnished to the accused, he would cause the same to be so furnished. He would then proceed to take the evidence of such of the witnessess, if any, as may be produced by the prosecution as direct witnessess to the occurrence, and if the Magistrate considers that it is necessary in the interests of justice to take the evidence of any one or more of the other witnesses for the prosecution, he is empowered to take such evidence also. Liberty is given to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses examined under sub-sec. (4) of S. 207-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. After the completion of the evidence referred to in S. 207-A(4), the Magistrate would consider all the documents referred to in the charge-sheet; examine, if necessary, the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and after hearing the prosecution and the accused, the Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that no grounds for committing the accused person for trial have been made out in such evidence and documents, would discharge the accused by giving reasons for the same. If, on the other hand, it appears to the Magistrate that a prima facie case has been made out by the prosecution, he would try the case himself or if the case has to be tried by some other Magistrate, he would issue the necessary directions in that respect if after considering the evidence taken under Sub-sec. (4) of S. 207-A and the documents referred to in the charge-sheet and the examination of the accused and after hearing the prosecution and the accused the Magistrate is of the opinion that the accused should be committed for trial, he should frame a charge declaring the offences the accused is charged with and commit the accused to take his trial in the Court of Session.
7. It would thus be seen that whether a case is triable by a Magistrate or whether the case is triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate has to hold an inquiry when a charge-sheet is filed by the police. If, on the basis of the evidence recorded by the Magistrate in the inquiry and after considering the documents and hearing the parties, the Magistrate is of the opinion that no prima facie case is made out against the accused, he has the power to discharge the accused. If, however, the prosecution makes out a prima facie case against the accused, the Magistrate, if the case is triable by him would proceed with the trial of the accused by framing a charge, and if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the offences are such as are triable exclusively by the court of the session, then the Magistrate would commit the accused to take his trial in the court of Session by framing a charge against the accused. Thus under section 207-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, an inquiry had to be held in which evidence had to be recorded and the Magistrate had the power to discharge the accused person or commit him to take his trial either before himself or some other Magistrate as the case might be, or if the case was triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate had to commit the accused to that Court. But under the new Code of Criminal Procedure. Chapter XVI provides for the commencement of proceedings before Magistrates. S. 204 provides that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking congnizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be a summons case, he will issue summons for the attendance of the accused, or when it is a warrant case, he may issue a warrant or if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before him or, if he has no jurisdiction himself, before some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. The Magistrate will not issue summons or warrant under sub-sec. (1) of S. 204 until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. In case of private complaint, a copy of the complaint would accompany every summons or warrant issued under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 204 of the new code of Criminal Procedure.
8. Under S. 205 of the New code of Criminal Procedure in case the Magistrate issues a summons in the first instance, and if he sees reasons so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader. But the Magistrate is empowered at any stage of the proceeding to direct the personal attendance of the accused, and if necessary, enforce such attendance in the manner provided.
9. Under S. 207, if the proceedings have been instituted on the basis of a police report, the Magistrate would without delay furnish the accused, free of cost (1) a copy of the police report, (2) the first information recorded under S. 154(3) the statements recorded under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 161 of all persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses, excluding therefrom any part in regard to which a request for such exclusion has been made by the police officer under Sub-Section (6) of Section 173(4) the confessions and statements if any, recorded under Section 164, and (5) any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to the Magistrate which the police report under sub-section (5) of Sec. 173 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure.
10. Section 208 provides for supply of copies of statements or documents to the accused in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report and triable by a Court of Session.
11. Section 209 provides for the commitment of a case to Court of Session when the offences is triable exclusively by it. Since this section is relevant for purposes of this revision, it may be quoted as follows:—
“When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall—
(a) commit the case to the Court of Session:
(b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of the trial:
(c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence:
(d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session”
12. From a reading of this section, it is clear that where in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the facts mentioned in charge-sheet or the private complaint as the case might be, make out an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he would commit the case to the Court of Session, and subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial, and send to the Court of session the record of the case, the documents and articles, if any, which are produced in evidence and notify the public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of session. We are not concerned with the other sections in chapter XVI.
13. In chapter XVIII, section 225 provides that in every trial before a Court of session, the prosecution should be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. Section 226 provides that when the accused appears or is brought before the Court in pursuance of a commitment of the case under section 209, the prosecutor should open his case by describing the charge brought against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Section 227 provides that upon a consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, if the Court of session considers that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, it shall discharge the accused and record its reasons for so doing.
14. Section 228 provides for the framing of a charge, if after such consideration and hearing as provided in section 227, the Court of session is of the opinion that there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. From a reading of these sections it becomes obvious that once the case is committed to the Court of session, it is that Court which should either discharge the accused or frame a charge after considering the documents relied upon by the prosecution. Therefore, to our mind, the functions assigned to the Committal Court under section 209 are that of a post office. Under section 209, the Committal Court has no power whatsoever to discharge the accused, and under Sections 227 and 228 it is only the court of session, when a case is committed to it, that has the power to discharge the accused or frame a charge against him which power under the old Code of Criminal Procedure vested with he Magistrate.
15. In view of the above mentioned provisions of the new code, it is to be seen whether section 321 of the new Code still gives jurisdiction to the committing court to entertain a memo or an application by the Assistant Public Prosecutor seeking permission to withdraw from the prosecution of any person. The relevant portions of section 321 of the new Code provides as follows:—
“The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally, or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried and, upon such withdrawal—
(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences:
(b) If it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences.
16. The present section corresponds to Sec. 494 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. The changes brought about in the new section are that the words “The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case” are substituted in the new section for the words “Any Public Prosecutor” occurring in Section 494 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. The other change is that the words “in cases tried by jury before the return of the verdict” occurring in Section 494 of the old Code have been deleted as the jury system of trial has been abolished. Apart from the above changes, the main provisions of section 321 of the new Code are practically similar to that of Section 494 of the old Code.
17. A plain reading of section 321 of the new Code would show that it is the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, who files a memo or an application seeking consent of the court to withdraw from the prosecution, and the only duty cast upon the Court is to grant or withhold consent which is to be determined on various possible grounds. It is now well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court that in granting or refusing consent, the Court, in order to satisfy itself has to see “that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised or it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of Justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes.” It is also well settled that in granting or withholding consent, the Court should not determine any matter judicially. In other words, the function of the Court in granting or withholding consent is not the same as a Prima facie judicial determination of a triable issue on judicial evidence, but what the Court has to satisfy itself before granting consent is that “the executive functions of the Public prosecutor have been properly exercised that it is in the interests of administration of justice”, and that “the permission is not sought on grounds extraneous to the interests of justice or that offences which are offences against the State do not go unpunished merely because Government as a matter of general policy or expediency unconnected with its duty to prosecute offenders under the law directs the public prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, and the public prosecutor merely does so at its be hest.” Having regard to the two alternatives mentioned in Cls. (a) and (b) of section 321 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the result of giving consent by the Court for withdrawal is either a discharge or an acquittal according to the stage to which that case has reached. The apparently wide language used in the section would give one the impression that the legislature intended that Section 321 should not be controlled by any other provision of the new Code. But a careful reading of that section would show that the resultant effect of granting consent to withdraw from the prosecution as envisaged in Cls. (a) and (b) to that section assumes great importance in coming to the conclusion that Section 321 is controlled by Section 209 of the new Code. It is implicit in Cls. (a) and (b) to S. 321 that the court in order to entertain an application under S. 321 should have the jurisdiction to discharge or acquit the accused according to the stage to which a case has reached. When the court does not have the jurisdiction to discharge or acquit the accused, then it has no jurisdiction to entertain a memo by the Public Prosecutor under section 321 of the new Code. Since under S. 209 of the new Code, the committal court has only one function to perform viz., to commit the case to the court of Session where the offence is triable exclusively by the court of Session, and has no jurisdiction to discharge the accused it becomes clear that it has no Jurisdiction to entertain an application under S. 321 of the new Code. We are fortified in our view by the fact that S. 321 finds place in Chapter XXIV which deals with the general provisions as to inquiries and trials.
18. The Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr. Narasimha Reddy and Mr. Padmanabha Reddy in support of their contentions have cited State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh, AIR 1957 S.C 389, Kapa Kasi Viswanadham v. Bondili Madan Singh, AIR 1948 Mad. 422, and M.N.S Nair v. P.V Balakrishna, (1972) 1 SCC 318 : AIR 1972 S.C 496 to show that S. 494 of the old Code is uncontrolled by any other provision in that code but the rulings cited, to our mind, have no relevancy in the light of the provisions of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. Under S. 207-A of the old Code, as we have already pointed out, the Committal Court had to hold a regular inquiry before it committed the accused to take his trial in the court of Session. It has also the power to discharge the accused if it came to the conclusion that no prima facie case was made out against the accused. But under the new code, neither any inquiry by the Committal court is permitted nor has the committal Court got the power to discharge the accused. That function is assigned under S. 227 of the new Code to the Court of Session after the case is committed to it. In State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh, AIR 1957 S.C 389, the Supreme Court after discussing the provisions of S. 494 of the old Code and the other relevant sections, has categorically held:
“These various legislative changes from time to time with reference to S. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the definition of the word ‘inquiry’ confirm the view above taken that S. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide enough to cover every kind of inquriy and trial and that the word ‘trial’ in the section has not been used in any limited sense.”
19. Similarly in M.N.S Nair v. P.V Balakrishnan, (1972) 1 SCC 318 : AIR 1972 S.C 496, the Supreme Court has held:
“This permission can be sought by him at any stage during enquiry or after the committal or even before the judgment is pronounced.”
20. Obviously, the Supreme Court was considering S. 494 of the old Code in the light of the jurisdiction of Committal Court under the old Code. Therefore, to our mind, the rulings cited by the learned Advocates have no relevancy to the case on hand. Hence we conclude that the Committal Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under S. 321 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure.
21. The learned Sessions Judge having held that the Committal court had the jurisdiction to entertain an application under S. 321 of the new Code, also went into the merits of the case and allowed the memo filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor and gave consent to withdraw from the prosecution by observing:
“I am satisfied with the reason given for seeking withdrawal of prosecution against A-1 and A-2.”
22. Now this is not the way, to dispose of an application under S. 321 of the New Code. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in M.N.S Nairs v. P.V Balakrishnan, (1972) 1 SCC 318 : AIR 1972 S.C 496, a duty is cast upon the Court to give permission to withdraw, not as a mere formality simply for the asking of it, but only if it is satisfied on the material placed before it that giving of permission for withdrawal would sub-serve administration of justice, and that permission is not sought for with ulterior motive. The learned Sessions Judge ought to have discussed the grounds mentioned in the memo filed under S. 321 of the new Code in the light of the observations in M.N.S Nair v. P.V Balakrishnan, (1972) 1 SCC 318 : AIR 1972 S.C 496 which he had not done. Since we are holding that the Committal Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor under S. 321 of the new Code, we refrain from making any observations on the merits of the application. Before closing the judgment, we would like to record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. Padmanabha Reddy.
23. We, therefore, allow this revision, quash the order the Court of Session, and direct the Magistrate to proceed with the case according to the provisions of S. 209 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. The Public Prosecutor, if he so chooses, may file an application under section 321 of the new Code before the Court of Session.
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